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During internal conflicts, states view some civilians as threats, suspects, or 
internal enemies based on ideological identification criteria. Institutional security 
provisions may be unequally delivered based on these views. Often countries in the post-
peace agreement phase are characterized by legacies of violence, where states struggle 
to provide security to all groups, re-establish their legitimacy and fill the power vacuum 
left by the non-state actors. The existing literature focuses on studying strategies in the 
aftermath of internal conflict that aim to build state capacity, usually in capacity building, 
by transforming their institutions and strengthening their security forces. However, some 
those studies often assume the state and its institutions are benign and neutral in their 
relationship with civilians during and following conflict. How does ideology influence 
the attitudes of state armed actors towards civilians after peace agreements? To what 
extent do state armed actors contribute to the persistence of violence – after peace accords 
– because their ideological bias influences their willingness to protect and behave 
aggressively toward civilians, depending on their group identity? My thesis project, “War 
mentality and post-peace accord violence: A field experiment of political-ideological 
bias among Colombian soldiers,” answer those question and argue that members of state 
armed forces – particularly the army – continue to sustain, as a legacy of the conflict, the 
wartime cleavages that define enemies and threats. I show that aggressive disposition and 
willingness to protect civilians – the main dependent variables of this study – vary across 
(1) civilian wartime cleavages and (2) civilians’ political attitudes regarding the political 
reintegration of the former rebels. To gather the data, I conducted fieldwork in Colombia 
for four months, during which time I delivered a survey with embedded experiments 
(N=920) and interviewed 28 Colombian soldiers in 2019, following the peace agreement 
signed between the government and the FARC-EP in 2016. The study shows how the 
state’s soldiers may contribute to post-peace agreement violence in Colombia by failing 
to protect civilians because of their ideological identity. The findings suggest that 
civilians’ ideological identity influences soldiers’ threat perceptions and emotions, 
exposing their ideological bias toward civilians. These results indicate that ideology 
remains an essential driver of soldiers’ attitudes, with the potential to affect their behavior 
toward civilians. One implication of the study is that without addressing and challenging 
the history of identity-based grievances that creates enemy images held by soldiers during 






transitional period if the state wants to consolidate its presence throughout its territory 
by healing relations with civilians with different views and backgrounds, and 









This thesis is based on original research, and parts of the theory, methodology design and 
results have been presented in international conferences and seminars at earlier dates. 
Some of the feedback from those academic encounters have been integrated within the 
text. Definitions and operationalization of the main variables, as well as the experimental 
design of this research have been showed at Conflict Research Society Conference 
(CRS), at the University of Sussex, September 2019; Peace in Aotearoa-New Zealand: 
Past, Present and Future. 10th Anniversary Conference to Commemorate the National 
Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. November 2019; New Zealand Political Studies 
Association Annual Conference (NZPSA), November 2019; International Studies 
Association (ISA) Annual Convention. Poster Presentation, Military, Defense and 
Security Matters1; Latin American Studies Association (LASA) Annual Convention,  
May 2020; Politics After War (PAW) Network Virtual Research Workshop: 
Reexamining Dilemmas of Peacebuilding in the Era of Trump and COVID-19, 
September 2020;  What is a Battlefield, who is a Fighter? Virtual Conference, University 
of Southern Denmark, October 2020; From Armed to Non-Armed Politics: A series of 
Virtual Seminars Initiating a Research-Policy Dialogue on the Political Dynamics of 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) organized by Politics After War 
(PAW) Network and Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), December 2020. Results and 
theoretical implications of my research have been included in a chapter book, From 
Liberal Peace to Positive Peace: Security Sector Reform in Deeply Divided Societies 
accepted by the editors of the Palgrave Handbook of Positive Peace and some reflections 
of my research implications where mentioned in the article, The Military and the Peace-
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1 Introduction  
 “We did not know the world without war, the world of war was the 
only one nearby, and the people of war were the only people we 
knew. So far I don't know another world, nor other people. Did they 
ever exist? 
― Svetlana Alexievich, War's Unwomanly Face 
Mamerto, izquierdoso, mochilero or guerrilla in civilians' clothes (guerrillero 
vestido de civil), were the first political terms that I learned. According to the Oxford 
Dictionary, mamerto in Colombia is a slang term that has a negative connotation to refer 
to a member of a communist political party. During the 1960s, the word mamerto became 
very popular, along with izquierdoso (being left-wing), to refer to people identifying with 
left-wing political ideals. In everyday discussions about politics in Colombia, mamerto 
is used as an adjective by right-wing supporters to invalidate the arguments of their 
opponents (Arbeláez Pareja, 2011). In 2017, the word became popular again during the 
presidential campaign, used by the current president, who was supported by the most 
radical factions of his right-wing party, and a former rebel, who was the first leftist 
candidate in generations to pass to the second round. The term Mochilero in Colombia 
was used with a political meaning to identify young people, mainly from public 
universities in the main cities. Mochila is the Spanish word for a bag made originally by 
an indigenous tribe called the Wayuu located in the north of the country. My mother used 
to tell me that when she was a university student, the people that wore mochilas 
(mochileros), were usually identified as members of left-wing organizations and 
commonly accused of being guerrillas in civilians' clothes, or fellows of the rebels. I 
learned at a very young age that in Colombia, it is dangerous to be labelled as leftist. For 
that reason, my mother needed to deal with my inevitable question when I was seven 
years old: What we are? Leftists or rightists? 
Coming from and living in a country affected by a long history of political 
violence, and a civil war cleavage along ideological lines (left-right), but also co-existing 
within democratic institutions, a common culture and an experience of unity, I found 
myself interested in studying individual political attitudes, opinions and behaviors along 
the left-right cleavage in Colombia, and in Latin America generally. By 2008, Ecuador, 





taken a critical left turn. By contrast, Colombia had one of the most radical right-wing 
leaders the country had ever had as president. In the same year, I started at the university 
as an undergraduate. When I finished my Masters, by 2013, many of these leftist 
governments were in a period of decline. In the same period, I published, with one of my 
mentors, my first academic article about the impact of the presidential style of 
government among Latin American leaders from different ideologies, on civilians’ 
presidential approval (see Ortiz-Ayala & García-Sánchez, 2014).  
My research interest in individuals’ political identities and behaviors became 
more prominent when I began my career as a researcher during the peace negotiations 
between the Colombian government and the oldest and largest armed group of the 
country, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). I found myself involved 
in different projects that allowed me to travel to the periphery of the country where the 
war was located, and listen to ex-rebels, ex-paramilitaries, members of the army, and 
civilian victims of the conflict. My experience working with the army became an 
important turning point in my academic career.  
The peace process in Colombia is an unusual case because, in comparison with 
others, the process was very much driven by the Colombian government. There were not 
incentives in terms of institutional transformation when it came to the central state, 
particularly regarding the security sector. For that reason, despite the initial demands of 
the FARC for a security sector transformation, they renounced this request and agreed to 
lay down their arms (Cortés & Millán, 2019; Rafael Grasa, 2019; Liévano Bermúdez, 
2018; Ortiz-Ayala, 2019). 
The armed forces leaders (the military and police), along with the government’s 
refusal to discuss any reforms of the security sector, was accompanied by narratives 
framing ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. For instance, when the former President Juan Manuel 
Santos visited the military units, he disseminated the notion that the peace agreement was 
a consequence of the victory of the armed forces and that their efforts in the battlefield 
had placed the FARC in Havana. On one of his visits to the most important military 
training unit in the country in 2014, the former president told its members: “In the future 
they will be able to say: We were the soldiers who brought peace to Colombia after 50 








between transformation and doctrine to build peace”, General Mejía, a former army 
commander and government delegate in Havana, affirmed that the military forces had 
contributed to the achievement of the peace process because they had been “the peace 
architects during five and more decades”. Those narratives make it difficult to discuss 
the historical impact of the civil war cleavage along ideological lines on the way that 
state forces have defined internal enemies and threats. The conversation about wartime 
legacies on the security sector thus appears to be an outstanding debt of the peace talks. 
This personal concern became stronger since, in Colombia, the state armed actors 
remain active and in theory, after the peace agreement, bound by a duty to embrace their 
long-standing enemies as equals and to protect them as though they are no longer 
enemies. In that sense, the state security institutions are responsible for building a safe 
atmosphere for all actors and for addressing the security foundations of long-term peace. 
This presupposes a change in the image of the social groups and individuals that used to 
be considered threats because of the association of their political identity and demands 
with those of the rebel groups. The lack of systematic empirical evidence and research 
among soldiers on the consequences that a civil war has on their political identities and 
behavior toward civilians during and after the conflict inspired the core of this thesis.  
In the Colombian case, the assumption of having an apolitical military ethos or 
neutrality in the middle of a civil war with a longstanding history of political violence 
among ideological cleavages makes this conversation particularly difficult among the 
army. In my experience, it was possible to recognize soldiers’ historical and political 
aversion to the identity represented by the rebels (see  Wills, Ortiz-Ayala, & Machado, 
2017). However, despite some qualitative studies (e.g. Dufort, 2017; Forero Angel, 
2017a, 2017b; Forero Angel, González, Ramirez, & Guerrero, 2018; Leal Buitrago, 
2003; Leal Buitrago, 2006; Pizarro, 1995), the fact that there are no quantitative studies 
among the members of the armed forces and their political identities3 and behaviors, this 
study aimed to fill this vacuum for the Colombia case, and also to contribute to empirical 
studies on the conflict. However, this would not have been possible as a local researcher 
if it were not for years of building trust with the army, which allowed me to open this 
Pandora’s box.  
For that reason, I started to question how the wartime cleavages would affect the 
behavior of state armed actors toward civilians after the conflict ends. Furthermore, 
 





considering the ongoing violence in the country against social leaders, activists, human 
rights defenders, supporters of the peace agreement, and former rebels, I asked myself to 
what extent is the security sector making efforts, if any, to protect those that are 
vulnerable in those regions in which power vacuums generated by the demobilization of 
the insurgents are being disputed by dissidents of the FARC, criminal organizations and 
other armed groups. Some of these questions inspired a hypothesis concerning whether 
the individuals that are members of the state armed forces continue considering as 
enemies or threats those that are living in those regions where the state’s presence was 
historically unreliable or absent. They could be contributing to the perpetuation of 
violence because of their lack of willingness to protect those communities.  
While many case studies within the of peace and conflict studies literature 
recognize that peace agreements do not guarantee the end of violence, intergroup 
relations usually remain damaged (Čehajić-Clancy, Goldenberg, Gross, & Halperin, 
2016; J. P. Lederach, 1997; MacGinty, 2010, 2016). This suggests that more refined 
approaches are needed to explain the perpetuation of violence and the conditions for a 
durable peace after achieving an agreement in contexts of longstanding internal conflict.  
Studies in peace and conflict have to date remained at a state-centric, privileged 
organizational level of analysis to explain the legacies of conflict, usually by focusing on 
non-state actors, and institution-building projects which diminish the notion of security 
to a technocratic issue with an apolitical orientation. They thereby fail to consider how 
the state may contribute to ongoing violence after peace agreements take place. 
Moreover, while much attention has been paid to the study of ideology in analyzing the 
behavior of non-state armed actors within civil wars, little thought has been given to 
analyzing state armed actors. Approaches favoring the state assume the state and its 
institutions are neutral and benign, and are often incapable of considering how the 
wartime cleavages also impact on the individuals that are part of the state during and after 
the conflict. 
The state, and especially the state armed actors involved in internal conflicts, 
develop worldviews, values and beliefs that enables them to justify the use of violence, 
in some cases even against civilians because of their identity group. The foregoing 
significantly impacts the way in which state armed actors define enemies and threats. 
Therefore, it is worth rethinking relations between the state, especially between the army, 





For that reason, this study shares the thesis introduced by Brewer (2010, p. 35) 
that suggested that peace brings psychological and ontological costs for some 
individuals. On the one hand, peace agreements are just the beginning of a social 
transformation process that requires that each actor involved in the conflict accept and 
internalize the idea of allowing themselves to coexist with those who they used to 
consider as their enemies, or even perpetrators of violence (Aiken, 2008; Halpern & 
Weinstein, 2004; Prieto, 2012; Angelika Rettberg & Ugarriza, 2016; J. E. Ugarriza & 
Nussio, 2016). 
On the other hand, the society in general needs to engage in a self-reflection about 
the reasons behind the collective violence, and start a new social contract (Rettberg, 
2019). These require accepting that being a victim or a perpetrator in a conflict is not 
random: there are social dynamics of group membership or the group identity of 
individuals that explain why some people become victims, perpetrators, or targets 
(Brewer, 2010; Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2017; Ugarriza & Weintraub, 2015). As a 
consequence, the definitions about who deserves to be protected, who deserves to be a 
victim of violence, or against whom violence is justified, must be questioned and 
reconsidered. As a result, peace becomes more than a political agreement; it is a social 
process of healing relationships that were damaged by violent conflict, and it requires 
addressing the past history of identity divisions. If the state wants to prevent cycles of 
violence and provide an atmosphere for peace, it is necessary that the members of the 
state security institutions are able to reconsider their identities, and change their 
mentalities about who deserves to be protected or against whom violence is justified 
(O'Rawe, 2010). In other words, healing the relationships between the state armed actors 
and the civilians after the conflict implies readdressing the identities of the members of 
the state armed institutions to guarantee behavioral changes. The present study aims to 
fill part of the lacuna in previous research on legacies of war by addressing how wartime 
cleavages – in the case of Colombia, the left-right cleavage – have consequences on state 
armed actors’ behaviors toward civilians after the conflict ends that can contribute to the 
perpetuation of violence. 
1.1 The Research Problem 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the legacies of the civil war in Colombia by 
studying the role of ideological grievances concerning the conflict among state 





the literature on the legacies of conflict, ideology in armed groups, and security sector 
reform by demonstrating theoretically and empirically that state security forces may 
contribute to internal violence after peace agreements. This study shares the thesis 
proposed by other scholars that argues that the dynamics of targeting in ideological 
conflicts are similar to those in ethnic civil wars (Balcells, 2012, 2017; Balcells & Steele, 
2016). Therefore, even in non-ethnic civil wars, armed groups’ identities around which 
the conflict is articulated are important in understanding the armed group dynamics of 
violence (Balcells, 2017, p. 28). For that reason, in this study, I argue that the ideological 
identity that defines the enemy image held by soldiers remains even after the conflict 
ends, and may explain soldiers’ bias toward individuals associated with the identity of 
their former enemies, and that ideological biases are a reflection of their rejection of the 
identity of the enemy during the conflict.  
In order to examine the legacies of the conflict in military actors, I study the impact 
of ideology on soldiers’ behavior toward civilians, analyzing how soldiers may continue 
to uphold the legacies of the conflict and contribute to ongoing violence after formal 
agreements, because identity-based cleavages during the conflict – in the case of 
Colombia, the left-right cleavage – continue shaping the definition of who enemies and 
threats are. Therefore, I test if soldiers’ aggressive disposition and willingness to protect 
civilians – the main dependent variables of this study – vary across civilian wartime 
cleavages and civilians’ political attitudes regarding the political reintegration of the 
former rebels.  
Furthermore, this study enhances the analysis by considering particularities of the 
Colombian context associated with the war on drugs, and introducing other layers into 
the study such as intergroup emotions and out-group threat perception – following studies 
of the social-psychological infrastructure of intractable conflicts. I agree with other 
scholars that rejection of the identity of former enemies may involve negative emotions, 
threat perception, and exclusionist political attitudes, that in this case can act as a sign of 
soldiers’ preferences regarding the treatment of the former rebels (Balcells, 2012, 2017; 
Daphna, Eran, Keren, & Stevan, 2009). 
Previous studies have commonly left the role of the state armed actors aside to 
study the legacies of the conflict for explaining the ongoing violence after peace 
agreements. Further, the role of ideology in explaining state armed groups’ behavior 





knowledge, the first effort to study ideology as a legacy of civil war on soldiers’ behavior 
toward civilians after a peace agreement is signed. 
In order to carry out the empirical evaluation, I built an original dataset based on  
an experimental design, and collected data from Colombian soldiers by means of mobile 
phone surveys. I also conducted semi-structured interviews to enrich the quantitative 
approach of the study and unpack the soldiers’ understanding of ideological lines (left-
right). This study is the first attempt to compile a dataset on soldiers’ political identities 
and behavior toward civilians in a context of post-peace agreement.  
1.2 Overview of the Study  
This study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews previous research on the legacies 
of war after peace agreements, focusing on studies that consider the role of the state and 
its security forces in the perpetuation of violence. This entails a review of the studies that 
address state violence and transformation of the security sector during the post-agreement 
period. In addition, this chapter addresses the role of ideologies to analyze armed group 
behavior focused on the social identification process of combatants. This chapter also 
identifies what research is lacking. I show the limitations of the institutional level of 
analysis in studying the security sector in post-conflict scenarios, and the lack of studies 
that consider the role of ideology in analyzing state armed groups involved in internal 
conflicts. This chapter thus reveals the major research gaps in the literature.  
Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical framework. The reasons for studying this 
research problem on an individual level of analysis, and the rationale for engaging with 
the literature from social psychology, intergroup relations, ideology and armed groups 
behavior to study combatants are presented. Furthermore, the research questions are 
introduced, along with the main theoretical argument, which considers the impact of 
ideology on the configuration of the enemy image held by combatants during internal 
conflicts, taking into account the extent to which ideologies as identities influence the 
mentalities and behaviors of combatants. This chapter introduces the theoretical and 
empirical background of ideology, and how ideology is defined and operationalized in 
this study. Additionally, this chapter outlines the main variables considered from the 
sociopsychological literature and intergroup conflicts to analyze soldiers’ mentalities and 
behaviors.   
Chapter 4 sets out the contextualization with the case selection and research 





the main points of the peace agenda, stressing the more important aspects to understand 
the main research questions of this study. Next, this chapter introduces the role of the 
military forces during the conflict and the peace negotiations with the FARC. This 
chapter also presents the main factors behind the ongoing violence in Colombia during 
the post-agreement period. 
In chapter 5, the research design and method are presented. The chapter begins by 
justifying mixed methods as the methodological design selected to empirically evaluate 
the research questions. Particular attention is given to outlining how the quantitative and 
qualitative dataset have been established. Information about the field work preparation, 
sample selection considerations, and contextual challenges are addressed. This chapter 
also include positionality reflections.  
Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the quantitative aspects of the study. Chapter 6 
introduces the hypotheses concerning the main dependent variables of this study. Chapter 
7 introduces another layer to the thesis considering the Colombian situation associated 
with the war on drugs. Both chapters tackle aspects associated with the legacies of 
wartimes cleavages, and how they influence soldiers’ behavior toward civilians. 
Consequently, hypotheses are explored and the results are presented. For instance, the 
results show that the main way soldiers contribute to ongoing violence is by failing to 
protect, rather than being themselves actively supportive of violence. Additionally, the 
findings suggest that soldiers can stop justifying violence against those that can be 
associated with the identity of their former enemies, and may support the political 
reintegration of the rebels, but that doesn’t mean that they will be willing to protect them. 
At the same time, the results indicate that emotions and threat perception play an 
important role in soldiers’ ideological biases toward civilians regarding justification of 
violence and willingness to protect. The results also suggest that soldiers will decrease 
their willingness to make costly sacrifices for those civilians with policy preferences 
associated with the grievances of the former rebels.  In addition, these chapters present 
the quantitative variables and how they are measured.  
 In chapters 8 and 9, the quantitative analyses are complemented and extended by 
the qualitative approach. First, the chapters take a closer look at the soldiers’ narratives 
regarding the role of ideology in terms of the definition of enemies and threats. The data 
refines and discuses in depth the soldiers’ narratives by unpacking their understanding of 
the ideological labels of left and right. The tenth and final chapter contains the 





theoretical and practical implications of the findings. Further, the main contributions are 
summarized, some of the limitations of the study discussed, and opportunities for future 






2 No peace, no War: legacies of war and persistence of 
political violence after peace agreements 
In chapter 1, I outlined my study of the persistence of violence in post-peace 
accord societies and the role of the state, particularly the role of state armed actors. I 
focus on the soldier’s attitudes and behaviors after direct conflict to explain their 
contribution to the perpetuation of violence. The purpose of this chapter is to relate this 
study to previous research that analyzes the persistence of violence after peace 
agreements. One purpose here is to establish and evaluate the lack in literature of 
explaining the persistence of violence in post-accord societies, particularly concerning 
the role of the state and state security institutions. 
The literature on the persistence of violence in post-accord societies is very large, 
but mainly focuses on non-state armed actors, and institutional fragility. Violence inertia 
is explained by factors related to the unsuccessful reintegration programs of rebels 
(Kaplan & Nussio, 2018; Themnér, 2011), the legacies of war economies (Kurtenbach & 
Rettberg, 2018; Nitzschke & Studdard, 2005), difficulties in re-establishing security and 
development coherent agendas (M. Nilsson, 2018), and state weakness, institutional 
distrust, and low law enforcement capacity (Deglow, 2018; Kreutz & Nussio, 2019; 
Rotberg, 2004). Finally, there is a body of literature about the normalization of violence 
or the culture of violence4 where society’s norms and values have a social tolerance of 
individuals’ violent behavior (Steenkamp, 2005). 
However, few studies recognize the role that the state, particularly state armed 
actors, play in the perpetuation or generation of violence after peace accords. During 
transitions from war to peace or from authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes, some 
evidence suggests that state armed actors present bias in favour of or against certain 
groups of civilians, creating a permissive environment of violence (Della Porta & Reiter, 
1998; Esparza, Huttenbach, & Feierstein, 2010; Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2014; Jaime 
& Reinares, 1998; Kurtenbach, 2013; Scharpf, 2018; Schirmer, 1998a; Steenkamp, 
2005). Most recent studies suggested that in democratic or quasi-democratic countries 
with relatively strong capacity, the state security providers are complicit in enforcing the 
 
4Culture of violence is the system of norms, values or attitudes which allow, make possible or even 






conditions to privilege violence as a way to maintain the power of political and economic 
elites (Kleinfeld, 2019; Kleinfeld & Barham, 2018). 
For my purposes, I concentrate on studies that relate the role of the state to the 
perpetuation of political violence5 after peace agreements are signed. First, I introduce 
some studies concerning the role of the state in the persistence of violence in post-peace 
agreement societies. The intention in this section is to address some limitations about 
studying the state and its security institutions only from an organizational point of view. 
Second, I introduce how the liberal peace agenda comprehends the State after the end of 
peace agreements. Part of this section traces the weakness of the liberal peace agenda, 
and opens a debate about the constraints affecting explaining violent conflict as an issue 
of governance, and peace as the mere absence of violence. Then, I introduce some 
previous studies of state violence. One purpose here is to establish that the state, as an 
active member of conflict, is not politically neutral or benevolent towards all civilians 
during and after conflict. In consequence, to complement the traditional institutional 
approach of studying the state and its security institutions, I incorporate a body of recent 
research that combines theories from sociopsychology, political science, and peace 
studies. This multidisciplinary approach attempts to investigate the micro-level dynamics 
of conflicts to explain the perpetuation of violence after peace agreements are signed. 
This section is divided into four subsections. First, I introduce the role of 
ideologies, as a group identification between members of armed groups, to explain why 
violence as a deliberative process uses ideologies to define targets, motivate or constrain 
violence towards civilians. Second, I explain the social identification process of 
combatants, and why they can resist peace intentions as a consequence of their identity, 
and hence contribute to the perpetuation of violence. Then, I introduce a review of the 
literature on military culture to explain how it can reinforce the warrior mentality that 
creates the moral justification of violence, and the perpetuation of the friend-
 
5 I understand political violence as the confrontation between the state and civilians motived by changing 
the state or affecting the distribution of political power. In consequence, violence is political when it has 
the goal of impacting the distribution of political power and aims to change the macro-level political 
relationship. The violence is against the state by non-state adversaries, or used by the state against their 
opponents (Steenkamp, 2011). For that reason, by political violence, I understand any form of “political of 
organized violence carried out by political actors, including governments, rebel groups, insurgents, or 





enemy distinction in the minds of soldiers making it more difficult for them to adapt to 
the new context of the absence of war. 
Finally, I address the gaps in the current literature on the political reintegration of 
combatants to justify why addressing the political identities of members of the security 
sector can prevent future violence. This provides the foundation of the theoretical and 
practical justification of my research question in peace and conflict studies and reasons 
why my study can contribute to fill the current literature gaps. 
2.1 The role of the state and state armed actors on post-peace accord  
political violence 
According to Steenkamp (2005), the culture of violence manifests on four levels: 
the international, the state, the collective and the individual level (see Figure 2.1). 
Contextual factors create the conditions that allow the use of violence at the individual 
level. As a consequence, they cannot explain the causes of violence, but indicate the 
elements that make possible a context of violence “where the use of violence is allowed 
and even encouraged” (p. 255). I concentrate on analyzing the arguments concerning the 
state level factors to explain the state’s contribution to the perpetuation of violence in 
post-accord societies.  
Figure 2.1 State Level Factors that create and sustain a culture of violence in post-
accord societies (Steenkamp, 2005, p. 256).  






The behavior of the state and its institutions incentivize the development of 
violent values and norms in society. As one of the main characteristics of war, the state 
can use violence to confront its enemies and intimidate its opponents, for instance, in 
intra-state conflicts, where the identity of the enemy combatants is uncertain, and can be 
camouflaged within civilians. States implement extrajudicial actions, such as torture and 
secret killings, to obtain information about their enemies. These strategies create an 
environment of violence, fear and intimidation that can persist even after peace accords 
are signed. States might continue to justify the use of excessive force to solve social 
problems and maintain order in society (Steenkamp, 2005, p. 258). This creates a feeling 
that it is acceptable to use violence for self-protection or by following the state’s example. 
In fact, militarization in societies can through “the omnipresence of the symbols of 
violence: guns, armored, vehicles, soldiers, barbed wire weapons” contribute to a 
permissive environment of violence (ibid.: 258). Moreover, some scholars use the state 
weakness approach to understand political violence. In that sense, the official use of 
violence can continue after the conflict because of state’s lack of capacity to penetrate all 
the territory and its institutional weakness. Some states sacrifice public investment in 
services like education, health or infrastructure to increase military budgets. This policy 
approach represents an inertia of the logics of war in the state’s behavior (Kurtenbach & 
Rettberg, 2018; Steenkamp, 2011).  
Instead, the lack of state capacity provides an incentive to decentralize the use of 
violence. It helps to justify using civilians as a support for the state, creating militias and 
paramilitary groups (Gutiérrez Sanín & Baron, 2005). For instance, a recent study by 
Carey and González (2020) suggests that in the context of intra-state armed conflict, the 
legacies of war impact state-sponsored repression. After analyzing data from 1981 to 
2014, the authors show that pro-government militias (PGMs) inherited from the previous 
conflict are consistently associated with the aggravation of human rights violations after 
the war, compared with cases without such irregular forces. 
In post-conflict scenarios, states need to reevaluate these strategies. As a result, 
institutional reforms of the security sector take place, such as police and military reforms, 
staff reductions, budget cuts, and human rights sensitization. Nevertheless, despite these 
efforts, the state and its security institutions can continue contributing to an environment 
of violence though the way the state implements justice and manages its political power 
and the economic system. First, when criminal justice is ineffective, the cost of using 





Kurtenbach (2019) suggests “the judiciary should be responsible for sanctioning the 
illegal use of violence and monitor state institutions in the security sector and beyond” 
(p. 60). However, in some cases the reproduction of violence or its persistence is 
explained by the lack of accountability processes, especially for the military and the 
police or perpetrators in position of power. In this sense, it creates the sensation that the 
state and its armed institutions are untouchable by the judicial system, constructing a 
corrupt image of the judicial sphere (Kurtenbach, 2019; Ríos-Figueroa, 2016; 
Steenkamp, 2005; Trejo, Albarracín, & Tiscornia, 2018). Further, in the eyes of civilians, 
justice is unable to be impartial or autonomous. As a consequence, this engenders 
institutional distrust and reasons to use violence to resolve social problems, thus 
perpetuating cycles of violence.  
Second, the policy-making function or public policy governance is another means 
whereby the state might contribute to the perpetuation of violence. The public policies 
that a government adopts in post-accord contexts show the political will of a state with 
peace intentions. In this sense, the prioritization of policies reflects the intention of the 
state to reduce structural violence suffered by the most vulnerable after the peace 
agreements. Alternatively, if the state ignores or refuses to prioritize attention to these 
marginalized communities, it can create a permissive environment of violence expressed 
in the intrapersonal and interpersonal spheres of societies’ experiences (Casas-Casas, 
Mendez, & Pino, 2020). For instance, war economies and grievances are an important 
factor in violence motivation in some intra-state conflicts (Collier, 2003; Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner, 2009). Thus, in post-conflict scenarios some 
states focus on restructuring society to make it economically sustainable. As a 
consequence, states need to create policies that address this issue to prevent cycles of 
violence. Nevertheless, war economies can corrupt the democratic system, can coexist 
with it, and even involve the state itself, making the end of violence more complex 
(Duncan, 2014; Goodhand, 2008; Kurtenbach & Rettberg, 2018; Zaum & Cheng, 2011). 
Finally, another way in which the state promotes violence could be related to the 
“glorification of violence”. Elite groups can generate a dispute of heroic narratives that 
glorify past uses of violence. This dispute provides the incentive for the perpetuation of 
violence through moral justification, revenge and denial. For example, the effectiveness 
of transitional justice and engaging with the violent past can play an important role in the 
prevention or even justification of future violence (Aiken, 2008, 2013; Arai, 2015; Bar-





According to Steenkamp (2005), when violence becomes “trivialized” or part of 
the “everyday,” its political meaning is lost, because violence becomes a socially 
accepted mechanism to achieve power and status in society (p. 154). Nevertheless, I 
suggest that the political dimension of violence against civilians after peace accords is 
still relevant. However, the institutional approach is too narrow to explain the political 
dimension of this violence because it denies that political violence is a deliberative 
strategy (Balcells, 2010; Hoover Green, 2018; Ron, 2003; Scharpf, 2018; Steele, 2011; 
Valentino, 2004; E. Wood, 2010). As a result, this approach is unable to 
explain why even after institutional reforms, or human rights sensitization of the police 
or the army takes place, violence persists. At the individual level, soldiers and police 
continue using violence against civilians. In other words, institutional change cannot 
guarantee behavior change. To that extent, this approach is also limited in explaining 
against whom the official violence is justified after the peace agreements are signed.  
It is possible to argue that it requires time to achieve change in institutions and 
behavioral changes in their members. Nevertheless, it is still uncertain what the length of 
time is required to guarantee effective behavioral change within the police and military 
that were involved in conflict. Further, some empirical evidence demonstrates that even 
after more than two decades of efforts to make institutional change, individuals within 
the police or the army resist institutional change (Celermajer & Grewal, 2013; García 
Pinzón & Rojas Ospina, 2020; Juncos, 2018; Wahl, 2016). For that reason, it is essential 
to understand what variables and conditions can positively and effectively affect 
individual behavioral change after institutional reforms. Recent studies suggested that 
rather than focusing on economic and military capabilities states should invest in “local 
governance infrastructures that promote prosocial behavior” to reduce the risk future 
violence or intergroup violence after peace agreement (see more in Casas-Casas et al., 
2020) These kind of studies reinforce the idea that it is worth analyzing psychological 
and cognitive barriers that underline the effectiveness of top-down transformations.  
2.2 Liberal peace: the limits of institutional change, path dependence on 
military transformation 
One of the biggest challenges of post-conflict peacebuilding in the field is the 
dominant orientation to privilege top-down structural interventions over bottom-up 
socio-psychosocial methods (Ansorg, 2017; Newman, Paris, & Richmond, 2009; 





strategies end up reinforcing rather than challenge intergroup divisions. Further, the 
technocratic approaches reflects a linear logic of state building that is based on the 
strategy of building, rebuilding or creating institutions based on the ideal view of the 
Weberian state of the monopoly over the use of force (P. Jackson & Bakrania, 2018).This 
strategy prioritizes institutionalization before liberalization (IBL) (Paris, 2004), 
assuming that the first step is creating effective institutions that can enforce market 
sovereignty, and the principles of liberal democracy (democracy oversight, transparency, 
and good governance) (Andersen, 2011; Goodhand & Sedra, 2013; P. Jackson & 
Bakrania, 2018; Juncos, 2018).  
Many scholars have recognized the limitations of focusing on technocratic 
interventions in liberal peacebuilding (Cooper, 2007; Donais, 2018; MacGinty, 2016; 
Newman et al., 2009; Paris, 1997). The realities on the ground show us the failure of this 
model, mainly because of the lack of dialogue and understanding of the contextual 
realities, local needs, domestic logic, and the underestimation of local capacities (Ansorg, 
2017; J. P. Lederach & Lederach, 2014; MacGinty, 2008, 2014; Tellidis, 2012). The main 
critique argues that top-down neoliberal state-building strategies reduce a political 
process to a mere technical exercise of capacity building (Cawthra & Luckham, 2003; P. 
Jackson, 2011). 
Nevertheless,  recent scholars recognize that post-war institutional reforms do not 
occur in a historical or political vacuum (Ansorg & Kurtenbach, 2017; Kurtenbach, 
2019). For this reason, institutional reform plans need to recognize the impact of pre-
existing structures that might influence the history and culture of societies during war, 
because they can persist and even influence the reforms. As a consequence, even after 
institutional transformation has taken place there is coexistence with legacies of previous 
structures, behaviors and customs that may contribute to the persistence of violence 
(Ansorg & Gordon, 2019; Ansorg & Kurtenbach, 2017; Arjona, 2014; Kagoro, 2019; 
Kurtenbach, 2019; E. J. Wood, 2008). 
In the next subsection, I provide a review of how historical institutionalism helps 
to explain why past legacies persist at the institutional level, and how this impacts the 
individual level of analysis. This provides some arguments for the importance of the 





2.2.1 Historical institutionalism: path dependence and institutional change  
Path dependence derives from the assumption that “history matters”. As a result, 
current options around the decision-making process are based on and demarked by 
previous decisions. In other words,  the decisions that are made today depend on the past 
knowledge trajectory or past decisions that took place (Greener, 2005).   
The literature in political science uses the term “path dependence” to refer to the 
historical institutionalism approach. It explains that choices made when an institution is 
being formed, or when a policy is being formulated, have a constraining effect on the 
future (Peters, 2005). This process occurs because institutions, policies, and rules have a 
tendency towards inertia. Once specific paths have been forged, it requires a significant 
effort or a breaking point to readdress and divert these paths to another course. For that 
reason, “history matters” because the bases or pillars put in place in the early stages of 
institutional or policy life effectively come to constrain activity after that point (Almeida, 
2019; Peters, 2005; Skocpol, 1992). This phenomenon explains why, despite training or 
formal regulations to respect human rights, the majority of state security actors continue 
reproducing repressive practices (García Pinzón & Rojas Ospina, 2020; Kurtenbach, 
2019, p. 68). Traditionally, the focus of reforms in institutions like the police or the army 
is on the organizational level, which assumes that institutional transformation will 
“change mentalities” automatically (Karim, 2015). But we know little about the way 
members of security institutions adapt their mindsets after the conflicts (Blair, Karim, & 
Gilligan, 2016; Samii, 2013; Schirmer, 2019; Wilén, 2015). Also, the emphasis on 
knowledge transmission of legal norms assumes that the members of these institutions 
are a tabula rasa without agency in the learning process. This ignores the impact of the 
system of values, cultural institutions and potential biases that security institutions have 
on their members (Ansorg & Gordon, 2019; Ansorg & Kurtenbach, 2017; Kagoro, 2019; 
Kurtenbach, 2019; Wahl, 2013).  
Human rights scholars provide significant evidence about how members of 
security institutions can resist, adapt or appropriate institutional changes. In the case of 
police reforms and sensitization of human rights, the evidence shows the limits of 
attitudinal and behavioral changes. Indeed, a number of scholars note that many police 
officers view human rights as an obstacle to their work (Bullock & Johnson, 2012; 
Hornberger, 2011). Nepal, Sri Lanka and India are cases that illustrate the lack of 





practices. For instance, in India human rights education in the police was one strategy to 
mitigate police brutality such as the use of torture. However, according to Wahl (2016), 
police negotiate the meaning of human rights “scripts” using their own preconceptions 
and values about what security means for them, and also their notion of their role as 
policeman in enforcing security in the Indian community. In fact, they use human rights 
discourse to auto-justify continuing the use of torture as a legitimate use of force (Wahl, 
2013, 2016). This case corroborates the fact that the mere transfer of legal mechanisms 
is insufficient to promote attitudinal and behavioral change to prevent human rights 
violations.  
Indeed, some reports on international humanitarian law (IHL) by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) found that members of security institutions could 
have knowledge and may even express acceptance of norms, but they are not necessarily 
able to apply them in practice and in daily duties (Castano, Muñoz-Rojas, & Čehajić-
Clancy, 2019; Celermajer & Grewal, 2013). Moreover, evidence from the transition from 
dictatorships to democracies shows how police have responded to social protests and how 
security forces have adapted to new sociopolitical realities. The evidence demonstrates 
that police institutions and their members need to confront their past behavior during the 
transition (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998). For example, in Spain, the Franco dictatorship 
regime was characterized by an evident hostility towards any kind of political dissident. 
This disposition was manifested in the way the security forces prioritized combating 
threats to the regime. This was the scenario despite the constitutional reforms in 1978 
which constituted a turning point, for the main concern of these reforms was to 
disestablish the focus on regime protection. For instance, in practice, during the early 
years of the transition, “there was still a confusion between the concepts of public order 
and public safety” (Jaime & Reinares, 1998, p. 171).  
As a result, institutional inertia and cognitive bias held by members of the police 
were expressed in the continuing labeling of young people and social protest as a threat. 
In fact, “a certain passivity could be perceived on the part of the security forces in the 
investigation of crimes perpetrated by extreme right-wing groups. While actions of the 
extreme left wing were answered immediately and forcefully” (Jaime & Reinares, 1998, 
p. 174). This demonstrates how the political ideology biases that justified violence in the 
past can persist and be expressed in the behavior of the members of the security 






At this point, the reader may recognize the importance of considering the micro-
level of analysis of the state’s behavior in post-conflict scenarios to explain the 
persistence of violence. In the following section, I introduce a body of literature on state 
violence, and justify the study of the role of the states in the perpetuation of violence 
through a micro-level lens. Finally, I summarize this section with some reflections on 
why a technocratic approach are limited in healing social relationships, or rethinking the 
role of the state, and it relationship with its citizens after peace agreements.  
2.3 State violence: why a sociopsychological approach to security 
transformation matters 
After the Cold War, state criminalization and systematic discrimination against 
marginalized populations increased through state administrations and methodologies that 
divided populations into insiders and outsiders, using ideological identification criteria 
based on nationalism, religion, ethnicity, social class, tribe, and kinship (Cederman, 
Wimmer, & Min, 2010; Ron, 2003). Some scholars argue that governmental leaders play 
an important role in the generation of violence (Chiozza, 2011; Horowitz, Stam, & Ellis, 
2015; Valentino, 2004). There are also scholars who note the importance of the study of 
the relationship between governments and their military forces to understand how 
modern states conduct intra-state violence against civilians (Demeritt, 2015; Greitens, 
2016; Hassan, 2017; R. Jackson, 2017; Scharpf, 2018). 
The evidence suggests that states can strategically refuse to provide protection to 
certain groups of civilians because they consider them threats or enemies of the state or 
its interests (O'Rawe, 2010; Ron, 2003; Stanton, 2016). They can also justify abuse of 
the use of force by their security forces against civilians (Davenport, 2007a, 2007b; 
Denyer Willis, 2015). Some authors suggest when states and their leaders sense “that 
parts of society are opposing, resisting, or conspiring against them and their ideological 
agendas” (Scharpf, 2018, p. 208), they have more incentives to justify violence against 
their own citizens (Valentino, 2004, 2014). Under these circumstances, the political 
ideology of the state helps in the understanding of why they demand the restriction, 
persecution, or elimination of entire social groups (Cederman et al., 2010; Harff, 2003; 
Scharpf, 2018). 
In the intra-state conflicts during the Cold War, the military doctrine of the states 
“permitted the large-scale ‘mistaken’ killing of innocent civilians suspected of being 





present in Colombia where security forces shaped their doctrine and training with US 
guidelines, introducing the notion of an “internal enemy”, “irregular warfare”, 
“psychological operations” and “civic actions”. This concept helped to frame 
counterinsurgency plans that included eradicating communism through social programs 
in order to “win the heart and mind of the population” (Cruz-Rodríguez, 2017; Dufort, 
2017; Leal Buitrago, 2003; Wolf, 2007). Moreover, in Colombia the anticommunist 
doctrine and the cold war mentality inheritance persisted as a political ideological identity 
that explains the patterns of violence and the identity of targets by state armed actors in 
the last half of the decade (Dufort, 2017). As Gutierrez and Wood (2017) said, in 
Colombia, police organization may combine selective and identity-based violence 
against the same person, as when its initial use of force is to detain someone alleged to 
have committed a crime (selective on behavior), but its subsequent violence against that 
person while in detention is extreme because of whom he is (selective on identity) (p. 
36). 
However, there have not been enough systematic studies that show us how police 
officers or soldiers internalize and make sense of this kind of political-ideological identity 
bias in their definitions of enemies and threats6. Furthermore, there is a lack of empirical 
studies at the individual level about people directly involved in a conflict, like soldiers, 
that might allow us to understand how ideas can be translated into violent behaviors 
(Leader Maynard, 2019). 
Recently, some results illustrate the unintended consequences of institutional 
transformation on the security sector, such as abuses of the use of force by security 
members, their involvement in criminality and their contribution to increasing violence 
after the reforms (Acemoglu, Ferguson, Robinson, Romero, & Vargas, 2016; Dell, 2015; 
Duran-Martinez, 2015; Tiscornia, 2017). This evidence provides strong arguments for 
the limitations of the institutional approach to change violent behavior in the security 
sector. 
For this reason, moving beyond the institutional or organizational dimensions, 
psychological theories suggest that the legacies of the past, such as militarized logic in 
the police, the justification of the use of violence by the security forces, or patterns of 
violent behaviors, can persist even after the reforms (Kahneman, 2011). The evidence 
demonstrates that the process of learning new information passes through the filter of our 
 





previous knowledge. Thus, when further information arises and has cognitive dissonance 
with our current knowledge, values or beliefs, the tendency is to reject this information 
and restore the previous shortcuts that lead to “belief perseverance” or “confirmation 
bias” (Levy, 1994; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Therefore, it is possible to argue that to 
change past behaviors in order to prevent future violence, it is vital to understand the 
biases or factors that help members of the security institutions resist the institutional 
changes.  
As Tiscornia (2017) argues, to be effective, institutional changes demand changes 
in the perceptions of the individuals who are part of those institutions. This requires 
addressing identities, and resocialization strategies that encourage the incorporation of a 
new system of values and beliefs (Ocantos, 2014; Tyler, Callahan, & Frost, 2007). Thus, 
an effective and comprehensive transformation of the security sector to prevent violence 
needs to go beyond institutional transformation, and consider the sociopsychological 
impact of the conflict in the minds of the individuals that are part of those institutions.  
This study thus suggests opening the black box of the institutions and recognizing 
the agency, emotions and cognitive considerations of the actors inside them. In this 
particular case, security transformation requires the study of their members as a 
complement to institutional change. 
2.3.1 Peace as an identity dilemma  
Making peace implies redefining identity and changing mentalities. In this way, 
as Brewer (2010) states, peace has psychological and ontological costs, and for some 
people, a high price. On the one hand, peace agreements are just the beginning of a social 
transformation process that requires that each actor involved in the conflict accept and 
internalize the idea of allowing themselves to coexist with those who they used to 
consider their enemies, or even their perpetrators of violent crimes (Prieto, 2012). On the 
other hand, society in general needs to engage in self-reflection on the reasons behind the 
collective violence.  
This requires accepting that being a victim or a perpetrator in a conflict is not 
random; social dynamics exist that make it possible that the group membership or the 
group identity of individuals explains why some people become victims, perpetrators, or 
targets (Brewer, 2010; Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2017; J. E. Ugarriza & Weintraub, 





of healing relationships that were damaged by violent conflict, and it requires addressing 
the past history of identity divisions (Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2016; J. P. Lederach, 2005). 
For that reason, security sector reform is a way to heal the relationship between the state 
and its citizens, but only if it goes beyond mere institutional reform.  
 Nevertheless, after peace agreements people can remain divided, explaining why 
these agreements are so fragile: social divisions can persist and violence can continue, as 
a signal of the impossibility for some actors to reconsider their position in society after 
the agreement. For instance, some perpetrators under certain conditions genuinely feel 
themselves to be morally justified (Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Brewer, 2010). This can 
explain why some actors keep using violence rather than expressing remorse, shame or a 
sense of guilt. Transition periods open spaces for actors’ self-questioning, and this can 
cause many of them to feel overwhelmed by a strong sense of guilt or the cognitive 
dissonance that results in them seeing themselves as the bad ones or like those who were 
wrong (Brewer, 2010; Chirot & McCauley, 2010; Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011).  
Peace requires social compromise, but it can cause as much insecurity and fear as 
the violence itself. It is emotionally challenging to confront one’s own identity, familiar 
ideas, beliefs, routines and behaviors. For instance, radical or devoted actors can act as 
spoilers in the materialization of peace in everyday life. Because they “have defined their 
group identity traditions and loyalties for so long in terms of, the enemy, suddenly find 
they have to reshape their sense of who they are and what groups they see loyalty 
towards” (Brewer, 2010, p. 121) Under these circumstances, reflection about the identity 
dilemma is not only for the victims and the perpetrators that are associated with the rebel 
or para-state groups or the groups that are “outside the law”.  
The peace compromise also requires that members of the state and its institutions 
are able to question themselves. In other words, the fear of peace can also come from the 
public servants, like state combatants. However, few studies recognize that reality in 
intra-state conflicts, ignoring empirical evidence that suggest that resistance to peace will 
be particularly intense in combatants (Castano, Leidner, & Slawuta, 2008; Castano et al., 
2019). The study led by Castano et al. (2019) indicates the importance of  intervention 
designed at modifying the image of the enemy held by combatants in the post-conflict, 
transitional period, as a way to reduce the willingness of combatants to engage in violent 
behavior in the future, and thus reduce intergroup conflict. However, this process requires 
recognizing that, first, combatants are trained to kill the enemy in battle. Second, to be 





reasons to kill (Göbel, 2014). Third, military culture provides the infrastructure that is 
necessary to disseminate the ideologies that help to define the identity of the enemies. 
Moreover, military training and the cultural structure of the military setting and the 
environment of combat may intensify the process that is needed to facilitate killing.  
Combat can be frightening, stressful, dangerous and tiring. For that reason, moral 
drift and dehumanization of the enemy are likely to be even more pronounced under 
battle conditions (O’Sullivan, 2016). As a result, military training creates a mental 
disposition in soldiers of readiness for battle. In that sense, supporting war can be a way 
to validate their source of identity (Rohall, Ender, & Matthews, 2006) and peace through 
political negotiation, and instead of a military defeat, can be seen as a defeat in the eyes 
of the combatants.  
In sum, peace implies a redefinition of the enemy image, and a confrontation of 
the motivation behind the use of violence during the conflict. For soldiers’ identity, peace 
may create “ontological insecurities”, and emotional destabilization, because all familiar 
ideas, routines, behaviors and beliefs are questioned. The compromise that is required to 
follow peace intentions implies reshaping their sense of who they and their enemies are. 
This may open a possibility to feel shame or remorse in a way that is overwhelming, and 
that may resist peace intentions or simply because there is a genuine sense of moral 
justification of violence.  
While the literature indicates the reasons behind the potential resistance of 
combatants to peace, further work on this topic is necessary, especially studies that 
consider the members of state armed institutions. Currently, there is a general assumption 
in the Security Sector Reform (SSR) provisions that the state is neutral and benign toward 
civilians during and after the conflict (See more in Ortiz-Ayala, 2021).  However, states 
involved in internal conflicts develop worldviews, values and beliefs that justify their use 
of internal violence, in some cases even against civilians or group of civilians because of 
their group identity (O'Rawe, 2010). For this reason, it is important to recognize that 
identity dilemmas can also occur within state institutions, especially among the state 
armed actors because they are the ones who are directly involved with the violence. 
Therefore, it is worth rethinking relations between the state, especially between the army, 
the police and civil society in transitional contexts. So, if states want to prevent cycles of 
violence and provide an environment for peace, it is necessary that members of the state 
security institutions reconsider their identities and change their mentalities about who 





the relationships between the state armed actors and the civilians after the conflict implies 
readdressing the identities of the members of the state armed institutions to guarantee 
behavioral changes and prevent future violence.  
To summarize, in this section I propose a new approach to studying and analyzing 
the role of the state through the security sector institution on the perpetuation of violence 
after peace accords are signed in intrastate conflicts. The privilege view on the top-down 
dynamics and the institutional-building project diminishes the notion of security to a 
technocratic issue with an apolitical orientation (Ansorg & Gordon, 2019; Nicole  Ball, 
2014; Sedra, 2018). Discussion about security is presented as a mere modification of 
institutions and equipment provision rather than a deep dialogue on the fundaments of 
the normative view about what security is in the social contract of societies, and how it 
will respond to their needs and help them to prevent violence, and promote democratic 
values and development (Donais, 2017, 2018; Gordon, 2014a, 2014b; Knight, 2010; 
Angelika Rettberg, 2019).  
In the next section, I provide a review of literature to explain why the 
effectiveness of institutional reforms will depend on their capacity to impact the 
mentality of the members of state security institutions. In particular, reforms must 
challenge the way that the members of state armed institutions address their past history 
of identity divisions that justified violent conflict.  If not, many possibilities for future 
cycles of violence remain. 
2.3.2 Ideology as a group identity: micro-level perspective of analysis of state security 
institutions 
Many of the arguments that acknowledge the role of ideology are derived from 
recent studies of religious terrorism that view the violent behavior of terrorist groups as 
simplistic, reductionist, and speculative  (Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2017), particularly 
when they use statements and terms such as “indiscriminate” or “brutal” to describe the 
violence of these groups. This approach automatically denies any kind of logical analysis 
to understand the incentives and causes behind the violent behavior of these groups 
(Balcells, 2010; Hoover Green, 2018; Ron, 2003; Scharpf, 2018; Steele, 2011, 2017a; 
Valentino, 2014; E. Wood, 2010). Nevertheless, “violence against civilians, once 
assumed to be a tragic, if virtually inevitable, side effect of wars, is now understood to 





91). In other words, political violence is usually a means to an end and ideology helps to 
explain the reasons behind armed group civilian targeting.  
For my purposes, I concentrate on the studies that employ micro-level analysis to 
address ideology as an identity to explain why members of the army resist 
transformations after the peace accords, and why they can obstruct the peace intentions 
and act as spoilers after the signing of peace agreements (Ansorg & Gordon, 2019; Gerras 
& Wong, 2013; Schirmer, 2019). This section is divided into four subsections. First, I 
introduce the role of ideologies, as a group identification between members of armed 
groups, to explain why violence as a deliberative process uses ideologies to define 
targets, and motivate or constrain violence toward civilians. Second, I explain the social 
identification process of combatants, and why they can resist peace intentions as a 
consequence of their identity, hence contributing to the perpetuation of violence. Then I 
introduce a review of literature on military culture to explain how it can reinforce the 
warrior mentality that creates the moral justification of violence, and the perpetuation of 
friend-enemy distinctions in the mind of the soldiers, making it more difficult for them 
to adapt to the new context. 
Finally, I close the chapter addressing the gaps in the current literature of political 
reintegration of combatants to justify why addressing political identities of members of 
the security sector can prevent future violence. This provides the foundation of the 
theoretical and practical justification of my research question in peace and conflict 
studies and reasons why my study can contribute to filling the current literature gaps.  
A comprehensive view of ideology as a concept recognizes the mutually 
constitutive relationship between ideology and identity (Leader Maynard, 2019). This 
means that identity and ideology in this study are interrelated and mutually dependent. 
This is especially the case for armed groups where ideology is the essential element that 
explains in-group cohesion, discipline and collective mobilization around a group 
identity (Castano et al., 2008; Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2014, p. 218; Oppenheim, 
Vargas, & Weintraub, 2011). Hence, the affiliation to an armed group implies the 
incorporation of a system of values and beliefs which is passed on in social learning 
processes. This may explain the political socialization and transmission of ideologies 
leading to thinking of oneself as a member of a group with group-based beliefs (Castano 
et al., 2008; Homer-Dixon et al., 2013a; Hoover Green, 2016; G. Rico & Jennings, 2016). 
Some authors argue that ideologies in armed groups can promote violence (Bar-Tal & 





(Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2014; J. E. Ugarriza & Weintraub, 2015; R. M. Wood & 
Thomas, 2017) and stimulate or restrain violence against civilians (Gutiérrez-Sanín & 
Wood, 2017; Oppenheim et al., 2011; Steele, 2011; Scott Straus, 2012; Thaler, 2012). 
Some established empirical studies show that political ideologies have an impact in 
molding the mindsets of the members of armed groups focusing on identity-based 
targeting, which is explained as: “the targeting by an armed organization of certain 
individuals specifically based on their identity as members of a social group” (Gutiérrez-
Sanín & Wood, 2017, p. 24). In other words, targeting based on identity means that 
individual behavior is not the cause of the targeting. Rather, the cause is the group 
identity that the person embraces, like the association between peasants and perceptions 
of them as communist.  
Recent studies from different disciplines emphasize the instrumental value of 
ideology in the formal and informal socialization experiences of combatants. Some argue 
that ideology helps the armed group to align the “heterogeneous motivations into a 
coherent group, dampening principal-agent problems, prioritizing competing goals, and 
coordinating external actors, including civilians” (Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2014, p. 
222) Therefore, ideology as a set of beliefs, norms and values, acts as a glue that connects 
individuals to an organization as a whole (Hewstone & Cairns, 2001; Hewstone et al., 
2014; Siebold, 2007; J. E. Ugarriza, 2009; J. E. Ugarriza & Craig, 2013; E. J. Wood, 
2003).  
Additionally, ideological indoctrination is a perfect tool to coordinate the 
cooperation of militias and create social support through establishing an ally-enemy 
mentality (Hewstone & Cairns, 2001; Hoover Green, 2016; Kalyvas, 2008; E. J. Wood, 
2008). For that reason, ideology not only provides a long-term vision of the group as an 
organization, it also improves military performance because promoting internal cohesion 
and discipline makes the military operational capacity of armed groups more effective. 
(Cham, 1999; Hoover Green, 2016; Siebold, 2007; J. E. Ugarriza & Craig, 2013). As a 
result, it makes sense that different insurgent groups invest social capital efforts in 
ideological indoctrination processes within themselves.  
For instance, the rigid indoctrination implemented in Taliban combatants in the 
religious schools had an important effect in creating a cohesive military unit.  
Additionally, the training used political-religious content that facilitated the 
internalization of the military component, such as discipline and codes of conduct. A 





a blueprint for their institutions and strategies, but also to regulate the routines and daily 
lives of their members (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2008; Moro, 2017; Nojumi, 2002; Thaler, 2012; 
J. E. Ugarriza, 2009).  
In Colombia, ideological differences explain the variation in the pattern and 
repertories of violence in the guerrillas and the paramilitaries. Both groups are deeply 
engaged in narcotrafficing7 and other illegal businesses, and assault civilians. However, 
each group uses different military tactics and different ways to interact with civilians 
(Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2008; Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2017; Oppenheim & Weintraub, 
2017). These differences can be explained by the effects of ideological indoctrination.  In 
fact, as Weinstein (2007) argues, when non-state armed groups have access to resources 
independently of the support of the population, they become more indiscriminately 
violent in comparison with armed groups that invest in the ideological indoctrination that 
regulates the relationship with civilians. In other words, the repertories of violence and 
the intensity of violence are correlated with the level of ideological indoctrination of the 
members of armed groups.  
This argument could be developed by taking into account the variation in the 
levels of indoctrination, its intensity distributed across all ranks and roles of the group, 
and the socialization processes and internal organizational differences between armed 
groups (Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2014; Hoover Green, 2016, 2018; Moro, 2017; 
Schubiger & Zelina, 2017; Weinstein, 2007; E. J. Wood, 2003; R. M. Wood & Thomas, 
2017). The evidence suggests different outcomes and goals in the indoctrination of 
commanders and front line soldiers (Hoover Green, 2016; Scharpf, 2018).  
Although most of these studies have focused on non-state armed actors. I suggest 
that ideology probably has the same role in state armed institutions involved in intra-state 
conflicts, in the sense that ideology provides a worldview and influences the perception 
of threat within soldiers and police that influences their relationship with civilians, even 
after the end of direct conflict (Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2017). Despite this, there are 
few studies that focus on the political-ideological education of state armies (See some 
exceptions in Esparza et al., 2010; Hoover Green, 2018; Ryan, 2008; Scharpf, 2018; Stohl 
& Lopez, 1984; Wolf, 2007). Some evidence suggests that it will work in a similar way 
to those of non-state armies.  
 
7 Gutiérrez D and Thomson (2020) argue that the involvement of the FARC in the illicit drug economy is 





In the next section, I discuss another body of literature that uses a micro-level 
approach to studying state armed actors in post-accord societies and the social 
identification process of combatants: political ideology as group identification. As 
previously mentioned, at the individual level, political ideology8 works as a worldview 
of individuals based on group referent beliefs that provide group membership 
identification. For this reason, combatants of armed groups develop their identity as 
group members. These help them to categorize insiders and outsiders, influence threat 
perception and shape behaviors. In a violent conflict, continuous exposure to negative 
and threatening information reinforces the biases to the out-group, and helps to justify 
the violence against the antagonist group (Sharvit & Halperin, 2016, p. 27). Under these 
circumstances, the social identification process is particularly salient, especially in 
combatants. Therefore, the influence of social identity in shaping attitudes and behaviors 
of combatants is more extreme than in non-combatant actors (Castano et al., 2008).  
According to Tajfel, the membership of a social group helps the individual to 
know and have a coherent image of himself (H. Tajfel, 1969). But for those who 
experience combat situations, psychological experiments and surveys suggest that the 
level of social identification is higher because the sense of belonging reduces anxiety and 
stress, the most common feeling that a combatant confronts during war, because their 
lives are constantly at risk (S. A. Haslam, O' Brien, Jetten, Vormedal, & Penna, 2005). 
Further, individuals who perpetrate violence toward others also suffer high levels of 
distress. In-group identification helps relieve the feelings of uncertainty that causes 
harming others by increasing their identification with the group that validates their 
violent behavior (Hogg & Adelman, 2013; Littman, 2018). Exposure to battle conditions 
makes the in-group identification process stronger which lower the stress experienced 
(Castano et al., 2008). 
Consequently, social identities related to the conflict are likely to become very 
prominent within combatants. They also reveal a deeper polarization of beliefs. Equally 
important, when groups of people participate actively in a conflict, there is a need to act 
under a shared framework that allows the enemy or antagonist group to be seen as a 
 
8Leader Maynard (2019) argues that there are different political worldviews and the common tendency is 
to focus on the “big isms” such as liberalism, Islamic fundamentalism or other over aggregated ideologies 
like nationalism or left and right. He argues that it is important to consider the impact of the context in the 





projection of unwanted traits, as the antithesis of their values and beliefs (Volkan, 1999, 
2009). This process helps to build an enemy image or an idea of the “other” which is 
associated with negative stereotypes and negative societal belief that helps to deny the 
adversary group its humanity (Aiken, 2008; Bar-On, 2000; Moses, 1990). 
Negative stereotyping between adversaries implies the creation of labels that 
allow a dichotomous reading of the context of violence, approving actions under a friend-
enemy logic and setting up filters on valid and invalid information. This psychological 
process of construction of the “other” allows cognitive shortcuts to be generated that 
quickly produce negative adjectives, for example: “communists are bad people”, “their 
beliefs deny individual values and freedom”, “they want to seize the world”, etc. 
(Northrup, 1989, p. 74). For instance, if we focus on state actors, soldiers tend to see 
themselves as those whose duty it is to defend the morally superior in-group against the 
dehumanized out-group (Castano et al., 2008). As a consequence, the moral exclusion or 
delegitimization of the out-group is higher and the accountability of their own actions 
much lower (Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Bar‐Tal, 1990). In other words, is possible to 
say that for armed groups the glorification of the in-group is deeper, making the 
annihilation of the “other” a moral duty easier and making it easy to justify the use of 
violence against them without any sense of accountability. Nevertheless, more empirical 
evidence is necessary to corroborate this notion. 
Finally, the evidence also shows that during violent conflict people process only 
selective information, mainly that which is congruent with their preconceptions.  For this 
reason, conflict increases in-group favoritism, exacerbating the bias against the out-
group. This explains why some actors resist peace intentions or act as spoilers during and 
after peace accords (Bar-Tal, 2011; Halperin & Sharvit, 2015). Despite the theoretical 
advances, more empirical studies are needed to identify the mechanisms that explain the 
resistance to peace in the state armed actors that were involved in intrastate conflicts, 
especially concerning the role of ideologies, the definition of enemies and threats and the 
justification of violence after peace negotiations. 
2.3.3 Political ideological identification and enemy construction: why combatants 
may resist peace  
The enemy construction process “offers insight into how a decline in bridging 





ultimately, as a legitimate target for violence” (Aiken, 2008, p. 5). The negative labeling 
process of the members of out-groups as uncivilized, savage, primitive or animal help to 
reaffirm in-group values and beliefs as good or inherently correct. This also helps in 
conducting delegitimization of the opponent through the creation of a deep differentiation 
between groups and the justification of violence against them (Bar-On, 2006; Bar-Tal & 
Salomon, 2006). This delegitimization contributes to justify any kind of actions against 
the out-group, centralizing their own suffering and exculpating the in-group of any kind 
of shame or guilt (Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Sharvit & Halperin, 2016). For 
combatants,9 who live in constant insecurity because of the cognitive response of fear, 
this constant threat perception can be instrumentalized and helps the armed group to build 
internal unity through group-based emotional orientation10 (Bar-Tal, 2001, 2013; 
Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2016). This unity is developed in an atmosphere of anxiety and a 
constant feeling of threat that creates a permanent self-defensive attitude towards the out-
group, and commonality between the members of the in-group (Bar-Tal & Salomon, 
2006). 
As a result, the reinforcement of the antagonist identity is part of the essence of 
the group’s identity, because the recognition of their own identity depends on the mirror 
vision of the out-group (Sharvit, 2016). Without them it is impossible to define the self-
identity of the group. In other words, when a group’s moral identity is threatened, it 
accelerates the social categorization and the emergence of positive in-group and negative 
out-group biases. Those who identify strongly with the in-group will especially attempt 
to defend the in-group’s positive image by denying the injustices or crimes committed 
by the in-group (Sullivan, Landau, Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012; Täuber & 
Zomeren, 2013; Wohl, Matheson, Branscombe, & Anisman, 2013). Here, morality is 
understood as the definition of justice and care that the group creates, which has the main 
 
9 According to Sundberg (2015), usually soldiers differ from civilians for five main reasons. First, usually soldiers are 
self-selected and have been designated and trained to participate in violence.  Second, they have been exposed to 
combat. Third, there is evidence about the psychological change from the exposure to combat and war experience 
(Barrett, 2011; Kilner, 2000; Sherman, 2014). Fourth, scholars demonstrated that political and social changes are 
stronger among soldiers than civilians who were exposed to conflicts. Fifth, “the identity, roles and self-images of 
soldiers are important for understanding how they interpret their deployment experience” and life experience after 
their life as soldiers (Sundberg, 2016, pp. 36,37). 
10 Group-based emotions are defined as all emotions that are dependent upon an individual’s self-categorization as a 





purpose of regulation of interpersonal conflicts and relationships, hence the emphasis on 
duties, rights, responsibilities, and welfare (Carter, 2013; Stets & Carter, 2006; Walker 
& Hennig, 2004). In general, the groups believe that their own moral standards are 
superior to those of other groups (Cehajic-Clancy, 2020). 
However, most of the literature presented above focuses on inter-state conflicts, 
soldiers who participate in peacekeeper operations where developing a positive in-group 
and negative out-group bias or an enemy image is easier because the enemy is already an 
outsider. There is also evidence from civil wars, but they are primarily developed to study 
the rebels’ side. For that reason, there is still a lack of empirical evidence of the process 
and effects of the internal enemy image and the role of ideologies in the mind of the 
combatants from the state that participates in intrastate conflicts. We know little about 
how ideology within state armed actors affects their decision to protect certain groups or 
deny protection to others; or how ideology affects the definition of enemies and threats 
in the transitional context that comes from intra-state conflicts. In general, we know that 
in contexts of conflict, adversary groups build a sense of moral superiority that helps 
them justify their violent actions. Authors like Bar-Tal and Hammack (2012) and 
Bandura (1999) argue that “adversaries sanctify their own militant actions but condemn 
those of their antagonists as barbarity masquerading and as outrageous moral reasoning. 
Each side feels morally superior to the other” (Bandura, 1999, p. 195). 
Moreover, at the individual level, people develop cognitive strategies that help 
them to distort the reality turning violent or transgressive behavior into an acceptable 
conduct (Villegas Posada, Flórez, & Espinel, 2018). Bandura (2002, 2016) called these 
cognitive strategies as moral disengagement mechanisms that may focus on: (a) 
reconstructing the behavior so that it is not viewed as immoral; (b) minimizing the agent’s 
responsibility in causing harm; (c) trivializing the consequences that follow from the 
action; and (d) devaluing the victims or holding them responsible  for  their  misfortune. 
However, in irregular warfare, the status of  “legal” and “illegal” grants a label of 
apparent legitimacy to those who defend the institutionality (Cruz-Rodríguez, 2016; 
Denyer Willis, 2015; Leal Buitrago, 2002; Schirmer, 1998a). 
As a result, rebels are automatically classified as illegitimate and the state security 
forces as legitimate. The Weberian concept of the modern state assumes that states are 
the only bodies with a monopoly on the use of force and the legitimate use of physical 
force against the residents of the state’s territory (Sedra, 2018). Under those 





agents are viewed as obedient functionaries who have the duty to protect the stability of 
the state (Schirmer, 1998a; Wills et al., 2017). This reinforces and exacerbates the sense 
of rightness, moral superiority and self-group favoritism in soldiers and police involved 
in intrastate conflicts. As Leach, Bilali, and Pagliaro (2015) state, “morality is at the heart 
of in-group identity, positive group esteem, and social action” (p.124). For the state 
armed actors law made a separation, at least theoretically, between the legal coercion of 
the State-as-sovereign and the space outside the law occupied by the enemy, “this we-
versus-them attitude reinforces the idea that unjustifiable violence only occurs outside 
State structures; violence by the State to defend itself is mandated, and thus justifiable” 
(Schirmer, 1998a, p. 137). 
Denyer Willis (2015), shows how the notion of sovereignty provides the police 
with the “right to kill” and legitimizes violent practices against civilians. Moreover, the 
argument to act within a legal boundary works in practice as a larger moral understanding 
of who can live and who can die; it is “like a regulatory system in which police are the 
only body that may kill and arbitrate killing” (Denyer Willis, 2015, p. 30). 
For instance, state security actors involved in irregular warfare draw a moral line 
where acts of violence perpetuated by the in-group are justifiable and less cruel than those 
committed by the out-group. Some authors name this phenomena a “moral license”, as it 
allows the cognitive dissonance that is generated when seeing ourselves doing something 
that contradicts our positive self-image to be confronted (Chirot & McCauley, 2006; 
Monin, Sawyer, & Marquez, 2008). The less outside pressure is imposed on us, the less 
we can excuse our acts, and the greater the dissonance; but even when we can say “It was 
an order,” killing usually involves some feeling of responsibility. Therefore, to get rid of 
dissonance, we change our beliefs about what is right and wrong to bring our beliefs into 
line with our acts (Chirot & McCauley, 2006, p. 54). 
At this point, the reader may recognize that law and institutionality offer the 
illusion of impartiality, amorality, and immunity to ideological contamination in the 
mindsets of soldiers and police. This creates the impression of having a green card to act 
without restrictions because they place themselves above issues of morality in order to 
maintain national security. As students in Chile said in the nationwide strike in 2019, in 
which almost 18 people died in police gunfire: “it is seen that killing is not a sin, when 
the killer is the state”. This might explain why there is a big lacuna in the literature about 





important academic research and the broader society all operate in a generalized context 
in which state violence is viewed as normal and legitimate. 
In the following section, I concentrate on studies of military training to explain 
how the institutional framework of military institutions reinforces the social 
categorization under the logic of enemies and friends in soldiers’ mentalities. The 
purpose here is to explain why soldiers can act as a spoiler after peace agreements are 
signed.  
2.3.4 Military training and warrior mentality  
Military training is the heart of the transition to turn ordinary individuals into 
soldiers, shape combatants’ behavior and prepare them to conduct war (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 
2008; Oppenheim & Weintraub, 2017). Military theorists traditionally argue that military 
training is a fundamental element of the formal and informal socialization process of the 
armed group to prepare soldiers in technical and organizational skills that help them to 
acclimatize their minds and bodies to confront the battle atmosphere and mitigate 
potential confusion in combat (Brooks & Stanley, 2007; Eisenhart, 1975; Karsten, 1998). 
Military training is typically routinized and intense to achieve discipline, group identity, 
cohesion, peer bonding and coordination (Göbel, 2014; Oppenheim & Weintraub, 2017; 
Siebold, 2007; E. J. Wood, 2003). According to Siebold (2007), military cohesion 
operates at two levels: primary group cohesion (peer and leader bonding) and secondary 
group cohesion (organizational and institutional bonding). Each type of bonding implies 
two aspects: affective (an emotional or reactive side) and instrumental (an action or 
proactive side). 
For this reason, the construct of cohesion developed during training emerges 
through bonding. For Siebold (2007), bonding is the essence of military cohesion. He 
argues that bonding is a social relationship, both affective and instrumental, between 
soldiers, their group and the service institution. This relationship can be weak or strong, 
and it explains how individual actions and the interaction between members and the 
organization are influenced by and feed back into the relationship: “Social relationships 
are supported by internal and external factors of social control (e.g., law, regulation, 
doctrine, norms, habits, and socialization) that stabilize relationship patterns and provide 
a sense outside and above a person that there is something more than just a collection of 





Also, training incentives build loyalties and prosocial psychological 
transformations, such as altruistic solidarity with nonrelatives (Siebold, 2007; E. J. 
Wood, 2003). The group cohesion under the logic of war creates the perfect environment 
to make it easier to be a member of the organization by disengagement of morality and 
personal responsibility of violent actions (Bandura, 1999, 2002; Chirot & McCauley, 
2010). Then a combatant tend to displace, diffuse and exonerate one´s responsibility 
because as Bandura (2002) notes because “when everyone is responsible, no one  really 
feels responsible”(p. 107). Consequently, the socialization process during military 
training contributes to the cognitive structures that are necessary for soldiers to be able 
to kill and be effective in battle without any remorse or doubts. 
Particularly, training in weapons management and combat operations introduces 
strategies of routinization to shape soldiers’ behaviors. This means that routine is 
essential for soldiers to memorize their reactions and the steps to follow in combat 
situations. These strategies reinforce trust in authorities and the internalization of the role 
of the individual within the institution, whereby soldiers recognize that they are just 
another link in a chain of command. For these reasons, following instructions in a 
disciplined manner is highly valued in military and police education environments in the 
name of creating an effective military force (Osiel, 1999; Wolfendale, 2007). However, 
there are unintended consequences of this routinization: it can cause the brain to focus 
on the task, to complete the task and be effective, instead of thinking about the 
consequences of, or the reasons behind, the task.  
This explains why in armed groups, training in obedience, routinization, 
hierarchical organization and teamwork helps to desensitize their members and guarantes 
a successful performance in battle. Some of the consequences of military socialization 
for combatants are still not well documented (see some exceptions in Hoover Green, 
2018; Oppenheim & Weintraub, 2017; E. J. Wood, 2003, 2008). Nevertheless, some 
evidence suggests that training helps to internalize witnessing and wielding violence 
(Sofsky 2003). In fact, “shooting another human being is not an easy thing to learn and 
do. But, shooting at someone one does not recognize as a human being is much easier” 
(Göbel, 2014, p. 106). For that reason, military training is intended to have effects of 
“dehumanization, diffusion of responsibility, habituation, and deindividuation, all of 
which are likely to undermine constraints on violence" (E. J. Wood, 2008, p. 102).11 Or, 
 





in the words of Baggaley, Marques, and Shon (2019), “killing is facilitated when the 
enemy is assigned a label that deprives them of their individuality, of their humanity” (p. 
30). This requires a learning and socialization process that influences soldiers’ ability to 
kill through emotional and cognitive withdrawal that enables them to create a distance 
from the enemy image with a sense of “othering”. I call this process “the warrior 
mentalities development”. However, to date, the liberal peace agenda in intrastate 
conflicts ignores these socialization processes and how they are embodied in the 
mentality of members of security institutions. For this reason, I argue that current 
institutional strategies are limited in the process of deconstructing the enemy images held 
by the minds of soldiers and police officers involved in internal conflicts.  
War mentality as a concept shares some similarities with the concept “Ethos of 
Conflict” developed by Bar-Tal (2000), and also relates to “atrocity justifying 
ideologies” (AJIs) (Leader Maynard, 2014, 2015). Both concepts are frequently used to 
explain perceptions and behaviors during the conflict among civilians and combatants. 
However, they have been principally developed for deeply divided societies, societies 
that have experienced wars or where violent experiences are common collective 
experiences. War mentality as a concept aims to navigate a greater variety of case studies, 
including those that fall outside the “usual suspects,” such as the so-called developed 
countries or well-established democracies. Some countries with colonial and settler-
colonial histories are no stranger to building models of identity and otherness. 
Institutional racism persists in the security sector among these countries, affecting their 
behaviour toward civilians (Ansorg & Gordon, 2019). For instance, a variety of studies 
have shown the racial bias of US police (Mears, Craig, Stewart, & Warren, 2017; Ross, 
2015). Similar patterns among the security forces in the UK and EU countries have been 
found where police officers tend to patrol communities of colour with force (Guerber, 
2020; Shiner, Carre, Delsol, & Eastwood, 2018). For that reason, I argue that war 
mentality in the security sector is not exclusive to post conflict societies. Social divisions 
and ideologies in developed countries also create internal enemies or suspicious 
communities, which then impacts the behaviour of security sector members toward 
civilians. Thus, state forces in these contexts also develop bias by perceiving certain 
groups of individuals within their communities as less worthy of state protection, which 







2.3.5 Moral justification, and moral disengagement: spoilers of peace and changing 
mentalities  
The military psychology literature explains that displacement of responsibility, 
diffusion of responsibility and moral disengagement are mechanisms that makes it 
possible to dehumanize the enemy (Bandura, 1999, 2002, 2016; Castano et al., 2019; 
Chirot & McCauley, 2010; Milgram, 2005). As a result, the military environment creates 
the necessary conditions to develop these mechanisms, increasing feelings of moral 
justification and moral superiority status necessary for the process of dehumanization, 
aiding effectiveness in combat through the willingness to kill (Göbel, 2014). In other 
words, military training creates an environment that helps to develop the psychological 
mechanism that makes it possible to practice violence against other human beings.  The 
adaptation of group membership and the wielding of violence are founded on 
compliance, role adoption, internalization of group norms, cognitive dissonance 
reduction, habituation to violence, diffusion of responsibility onto the group, 
deindividuation, and dehumanization of the victimized group (S. Straus, 2007; E. J. 
Wood, 2008).  
Thinking in the context of the soldiers undergoing military training incorporates 
rituals that generate affective ties to the institution to instill feelings of honor and pride 
for the causes that are defended (Göbel, 2014). This process helps to creates a sense of 
belonging, feelings of morale and pride12 (Mihaela Macovei, 2018), elements that 
contribute to the control of soldiers though an internalization of values, beliefs and 
operating rules that connect them with the organization (Mihaela Macovei, 2018, p. 322). 
Such attachment and morale also creates bonds of trust and reinforces the impression of 
being on the side of the good, generating a notion of institutional infallibility. Scholars 
of soldier`s identity creation have shown that it is intrinsically connected “to the ability 
to wield and the legitimacy of wielding force in their service of state institutions” 
(Sundberg, 2015, p. 55). Therefore, among combatants conflict is about “hurting an 
 
12 Following Mihaela Macovei (2018) feeling of morale is defined as: "Individuals’ high degree of loyalty to fellow 
group members and their willingness to endure frustration for the group”, and feeling of belonging or belonginess is 
defined as “the degree to which members of a group are attracted to each other”. Finally, the author link the belonginess 
with group pride, which is defined as “the extent to which group members exhibit liking for the status or the ideologies 





enemy who has no morals and about obeying the in-group authorities, which thus ensures 
the welfare of the in-group (Castano et al., 2019, p. 7). 
Finally, the institutional and cultural framework of military settings makes 
changing their mentalities a great challenge. In fact, it is much more challenging to think 
about changing how enemies and threats have traditionally been defined, since this would 
imply questioning the actions of the past, or questioning the mentalities that existed 
behind the justification of the use of force against certain military objectives in the past. 
Authors such as Gerras and Wong (2013)13 quote in their text: “the only thing harder than 
getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out” by B.H. Liddell Hart. 
These authors define changing minds as “a reversal of a previous judgment or position 
on an issue” (Gerras & Wong, 2013, p. 4).  In their text, they talk about the importance 
of considering the frame of references. The political ideologies of armed groups can 
permeate or frame the doctrines of military bodies in internal conflicts. To that extent, 
changing mentalities involves questioning their own worldviews, beliefs and values: 
Changing one´s mind requires a reevaluation of one´s frames of reference when 
confronted with new information. Unfortunately, shattering or unlearning our frames of 
reference is an action that is easy to espouse, yet incredibly difficult to execute (Gerras 
& Wong, 2013, p. 6). 
This procedure is especially hard within military institutions, which are deeply 
hierarchical, and where discipline, obedience and respect for the authorities play 
important roles when making decisions: “In large hierarchical organizations such as the 
army, consistency of thought is the norm and not the exception” (Gerras & Wong, 2013, 
p. 28). Hence, the organizational environment is unfavorable for self-questioning or self-
reflection, prioritizing stability, and maintenance of the structure or the status quo, 
instead of considering change as a potential option. In fact, the empirical evidence that 
these authors include in their work among U.S. Army senior leaders suggests that “people 
with lower openness (to change) would probably be more inclined to join the Army in 
the first place. Additionally, since those who are more closed tend to be more productive, 
it is logical that officers view them as successful and the institution would be even less 
 
13 Stephen Gerras, served in the U.S Army for over 25 years. He holds a B.Sc. from the U.S. Military Academy and 
an M.Sc. and Ph.D. in industrial and organizational psychology from Penn State University. He is a Professor of 
Behavioural Sciences in the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the U.S. Army War College. 
Leonard Wong is an expert on human and organizational dimensions of the military. He is a professor in the Strategic 





open” (Gerras & Wong, 2013, p. 9). However, this could be counterproductive at a 
strategic level under conditions of uncertainty and complexity, such as transitions from 
war to peace, since they fail to see the new conditions under which they must operate. 
Therefore, in the military institutions two disadvantages of the change of 
mentalities converge: organizational structure, and the common human characteristic of 
confirmation bias, which is exacerbated within military institutions. In general, 
individuals tend to pay more attention to, and consider more valuable information that 
confirms their previous knowledge. The authors suggest introducing mechanisms within 
the institutional culture of military organizations that allow more “deliberative” 
“horizontal”, and “democratizing” conversations between superiors and subordinates, 
where criticism and exposure to multiple ideas are encouraged. In turn, “while high 
power distance cultures provide a stable distribution of power that brings order in 
uncertain and chaotic environments, they also tend to suppress subordinates from 
questioning, disagreeing, or raising alternative points of view to combat effectiveness in 
adverse and complex situation” (Gerras & Wong, 2013, pp. 21-22). For instance, the 
Colombian Armed Forces had unprecedented active involvement during the negotiation 
and implementation of the Colombian peace agreement. However, some members of the 
army claim that “when military personnel are designated to take part in peace 
negotiations, they generally receive little support from their commanding officers” 
(Cortés & Millán, 2019). This shows that it is difficult to coordinate and motivate all 
members of the army to support peace intentions, especially if the initiatives derive from 
lower ranks.  
According to Stedman (1997), spoilers are defined as groups or individuals that 
genuinely believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, 
worldview, and interests. In that sense, it is possible to argue that for soldiers 
confrontation with their worldview is significant and peace can represent an important 
cost, because they can feel morally justified and a peace accord can question their 
morality, creating anxieties and suspicion about peace intentions. 
Considering the concept of spoilers and the literature presented above, it is 
possible to argue that soldiers of the state armed organizations can resist the intentions 





literature on spoilers mainly focuses on the former combatants from non-state armed 
actors14. Further research on the military in post-conflict scenarios is necessary. 
2.3.6 State armed actors as spoilers of peace: political identities of combatants in 
post-conflict scenarios. 
After the return of soldiers from the two world wars, there were general fears of former 
combatants’ political mobilization. Some politicians from the United States and the UK 
argued that veterans may have a deviant perception of societies after being exposed to 
war (Söderström, 2015). They proposed the notion that war experiences have an impact 
on individual identities and former combatants’ political behavior, making it difficult for 
them to adapt to the new social and political order (Bøås & Hatløy, 2008; R. A. Nilsson, 
2008). They were thus perceived as a threat to the security and stability of their states. 
In fact, European military scholars show how transnationalization and the 
permeation of fascism in veterans’ politics in interwar Europe demonstrated the potential 
threat of former combatants in politics (Alcalde, 2018; Garau, 2014). For instance, 
current debate in European military history explores the hypothesis of the potential 
influence of the Italian fascist movement in the early stages of the Nazi party, particularly 
the rise of fascism and its relationship with veterans (Alcalde, 2017). This lesson from 
the past established the important necessity for the political reintegration of former 
combatants. 
Some scholars argue that, to some extent, military service changes the values and 
behaviors of those who serve, especially in the political sphere (C. L. Johnson, 2010; 
Rohall et al., 2006; Sondheimer, Toner, & Wilson, 2012). For that reason, it is important 
to understand the political voice of former combatants as a way to guarantee a successful 
democratization and peacebuilding process, especially in post-conflict scenarios 
(Söderström, 2015). The political reintegration of an ex-combatant is understood to be 
the process through which this person becomes a citizen once again within a political 
system (Söderström, 2013), accepting and recognizing the values and behaviors 
promulgated within a democracy. 
 
14 See an exception in Nasi (2006) study shows how the armed forces of Colombia, the Colombian Congress, drug-
traffickers, entrepreneurs, rightwing paramilitary groups and the USA government, were spoilers in Colombia peace 
intentions since 1986, they used violence and nonviolence sabotage and influence to undermine attempts to achieve 





In the political reintegration model presented by Söderström (2015) there are 
three types of former combatants that lead to different outcomes of political reintegration. 
Each of these types represent the body of current work that addresses political 
reintegration after war. First, the transformation of military elites to political elites: for 
example, in transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes, as in Argentina or Chile 
where the security forces need to be subordinate to a civil authority and the political elites 
are elected representatives. Second, the rebel to party transformation, this kind of 
political reintegration is associated with transitions from war to peace, as in Colombia 
and Northern Ireland, where the non-state armed actors become political parties and  
third, when individual rank and file combatants becoming citizens (veterans): when the 
combatants leave the armed institutions and become citizens.  
Most of the literature in peace and conflict studies concentrates attention on the 
second category. In this category, the former combatants usually come from non-state 
armed groups. After a political agreement, such as a peace accord, the ex-combatants can 
belong to a political party with the possibility of being popularly elected. Thus, the 
political reintegration of ex-combatants is understood as a process that provides a bridge 
between the conflict termination process and democratization (Söderström, 2015). At the 
micro-level of analysis, this recognizes that can ex-combatants have war experiences, 
capacities, knowledge, and access to networks that help them remobilize and return to 
the conflict, but which can be a challenge in the postwar context. For this reason, they 
are politically important because they can return to arms (R. A. Nilsson, 2008). 
Political reintegration on the individual level means that ex-combatants 
understand that political channels are viable and accessible for them to manage their 
social problems. This requires a socialization process that helps ex-combatants to 
develop and practice democratic norms and values. According to Söderström (2013), 
democratic citizenship can be assessed, based on ex-combatants’ political participation 
and their  degree of affinity to democratic values. In other words, embracing democratic 
values indicates positive political reintegration in terms of the degree of political 
involvement of the combatants – their feeling that their voices contribute to collective 
decisions, and the values and norms that inform that involvement:  “the extent to which 
democratic norms and values are embraced by ex-combatants” (Söderström, 2015, pp. 
14-16). 
Furthermore, J. E. Ugarriza and Nussio (2017) analyze political reintegration, 





behavior of ex-combatants in political discussions, to understand the quality of their 
attitudes in terms of key components of the deliberative model: participation, respect, 
reasoning, relationship to the common good and the ability to compromise. 
For the scholars mentioned above, political reintegration is a process that can 
address the political-ideological identification that ex-combatants have developed within 
armed groups and that can be seen in their attitudes and behaviors in post-demobilization 
scenarios. This conflict of ideas, values and beliefs that an individual has, in this case a 
demobilized individual, will have to be adjusted to conform to the values and behaviors 
of the political system into which this person is being reintegrated. I suggest that 
members of the military forces will experience the same identity dilemma in post-conflict 
scenarios.  
While much attention has been given to the reintegration of combatants from non-
state armed groups, members of the security sector or state armed actors have been 
underestimated. Yet, as for ex-rebels, military members also hold the potential of spoiling 
the peace implementation process because their political identities developed during the 
conflict, frustrating their adaption and reintegration into a post-conflict society.  
However, this typology of combatants is not included in the model presented by 
Söderström (2015). The other two typologies in the model indicate former combatants 
from the state armed groups. However, combatants that remain active and become the 
only ones with the right to exercise legitimate use of physical force after the end of the 
direct conflict have not been considered. This kind of combatant in post-conflict 
scenarios will have the duty to protect former opponents whom they previously fought 
against, and accept them as members of the parliament and active political leaders. This 
is a blind spot in the literature of political reintegration of combatants in post-conflict 
scenarios. It is thus important to address the political-ideological identity of active 
combatants of state armed actors to prevent spoilers of peace and the perpetuation of 
future political violence in post-accord societies.  
In armed groups, at the collective level, political ideologies work as an identity 
and as a device for creating enemy image, threat perceptions, and willingness to use 
violence (Leader Maynard, 2019). For that reason, in intra-state conflicts, states and non-
state armed actors define enemies, threats and violent strategies using the lens of those 
ideologies. Hence, the state as an active member of the conflict, is not politically neutral 





think that the members of state security institutions would automatically change their 
worldviews and preferences after the conflict. 
A recent cross-national study of the effectiveness of peacekeeper operations in 
civilian protection shows that peacekeepers are effective in protecting civilians from non-
state armed actors, but notably unsuccessful in protecting civilians from the state (Fjelde, 
Hultman, & Nilsson, 2018). That ineffectiveness of civilians protection by the 
peacekeepers reflects their limits because of their dependence on the state elite’s 
permission to operate which may end up reinforcing state violence. This evidence shows 
that states involved in inter-state conflicts also develop political ideologies that enable 
them to define targets and develop preferences regarding public security provisions.  But, 
to date, this approach of the state and their security institutions in post-peace agreements 
has been left unexplored in the literature. In the following sections, I summarize what is 
missing in previous research and provide an illustration of how the present study aims to 
contribute toward filling the gaps identified. 
2.4 What is missing?  
In the first part of this chapter, it was shown that the role of the State in the 
perpetuation of violence is commonly explored by focusing on institutional reforms. 
However, some studies highlight that this technocratic approach is unable to read the 
interests and dynamics of power of different groups in society, including the state 
(Ansorg, 2017; Detzner, 2017; Gordon, 2014b; P. Jackson & Bakrania, 2018; Juncos, 
2018; MacGinty, 2016). Furthermore, these studies recognize that the view of the state 
and its institutions is narrow because it reduces the phenomenon of violence to a problem 
of institutional fragility and lack of governability. Also, this reflects an overestimation of 
the state’s capability of change. Nevertheless, some case studies indicated that 
institutional reforms or human rights sensitization might not guarantee behavioural 
changes in the members of institutions (Castano et al., 2019; Celermajer & Grewal, 2013; 
Wahl, 2013, 2016).  
These studies reveal that individuals can resist institutional changes because they 
can generate cognitive dissonance with their values and beliefs. For that reason, it is 
possible to say that institutional reforms are not sufficient to prevent violent behaviour 
in the members of the security sector. In that sense, I suggest exploring micro-level 
dimensions. First, literature from political science and peace studies recognizes the 





that the members of armed groups develop ideologies as worldviews and group identities, 
which help members of armed groups to define enemies and threats, and motivate and 
constrain violence. 
Second, literature from sociopsychology studies the effects of conflict on 
combatants’ identity and social categorization processes from the perspective of the 
enemy image. Similarly, literature from military studies and military psychology 
addresses the effects of conflict on combatants’ identity, and military training on 
developing warrior mentalities. Each of these fields introduces factors such as 
psychological barriers (emotions and threat perception), dehumanization and moral 
disengagement to explain violent behavior and why combatants may resist peace 
intentions. Finally, I underline that most of the literature that talks about combatants as 
spoilers of peace concentrates on non-state armed actors, former combatants and inter-
state conflicts. However, how the members that remain active in intra-state conflicts 
adapt to the new context and may potentially be spoilers of peace is unknown. Moreover, 
with the existing literature, it is not possible to explain who are the most vulnerable after 
the signing of the peace agreements, or against whom is it more likely that state violence 
will be justified. For that reason, it is important to evaluate how the state and state armed 
institutions address the past history of identity divisions after the peace accords.  
Overall, this thesis challenges the assumption within the liberal peace approach 
that institutional reforms or peace agreement provisions flow down to individual-level 
behaviour among members of institutions like state forces. This assumption might be 
violated if state combatants continue to hold ideological bias connected with the wartime 
cleavages with the potential to shape their behaviour toward civilians through aggressive 
behaviour or affecting their willingness to protect civilians after peace agreement are 
signed. Thus, this thesis tests whether ideological bias continues to shape the enemy 
image and threat perceptions after peace agreement are signed and whether they are likely 
to affect state combatant behaviour; it does so experimentally. The thesis will also 
explore the cognitive mechanisms, such as emotions and threat perceptions, behind the 
residual bias attitudes of state combatants’ link with the ideological-identity of civilians. 
Existing studies are mainly based on observational data, not experimental, which makes 
it unclear whether such ideological biases have behavioural implications. 
 The methodology suggested for this study will overcome this limitation by 
contributing to our understanding of the individual-level drivers of post-peace agreement 





identifying how ideologies shapes the enemy image and threat perception of the state 
combatants after peace agreements are signed. I argue that this is a way to detect and 
understand the legacies of past violence and its perpetuation in post-peace accord 
societies. As a result, I suggest unpacking the state, focusing on state armed institutions, 
and going beyond institutions to study their members’ ideological bias and behaviour 
toward civilians post-peace agreement.  
2.5 Filling the gap  
Hence, although in different fields of research there have been significant 
advances in recent years to explain violence at the individual level, there is a need to 
explore from a multidisciplinary approach the behavior of the members of state armed 
actors in post-accord societies. In that sense, my study articulates different groups of 
literature from different fields at the micro-level to study how states may contribute to 
the perpetuation of violence. To achieve this, I develop the following research questions: 
Does ideology influence state armed forces’ protection of civilians after the conflict 
ends? Specifically, to what extent do state armed actors contribute to the persistence of 
violence because their ideological bias influences their willingness to: 
1. withhold their protection of civilians because of their group identity? and  
2.  support aggressive behavior against civilians because of their group identity? 
This study attempts to contribute to the current research gaps concerning the role 
of the security sector in post-peace accord societies and its contribution in the 
perpetuation of political violence. I use Colombia as my case study.  After a half-century 
of conflict, the Colombian government signed a peace agreement with The Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a Marxist guerrilla group, in September 2016. 
During and after the signing, Colombia has experienced a decline in generalized violence 
but an increase in targeted violence. In particular, anti-activist violence has intensified, 
with a disturbing increase in the systematic assassinations of social leaders and human 
rights defenders (P. Ball, Rodríguez, & Rozo, 2018; CrisisGroup, 2020).  
The peace agreement signed with the FARC deliberately avoids reforms related to 
the security sector (Gobierno Nacional de Colombia & FARC, 2016; Rafael Grasa, 2019; 
Liévano Bermúdez, 2018). For the Colombian government, the transformation of the 
army or the police were red lines. In fact, General Mejía, a former army commander and 
government delegate in Havana, stated: “The transformation of the Army is carried out 





know these issues, here, no civilians will come, nor will any organization come to make 
us do those changes” (G. Mejia, 2015). This statement stands in contrast to international 
research asserting that reforms to the security sector are essential to maintain peace and 
avoid cycles of violence (Nicole Ball, 2010; DCAF, 2006; Hänggi & Hagmann, 2006; 
Sedra, 2010). Hence, in the next chapter, which outlines my theoretical and conceptual 
framework, the ideological component of the conflict is in focus, and it will be specified 
how ideology as a group identification for members of the security sector is expected to 









3 Ideological identity, soldiers’ mentalities, and post-peace 
agreement violence  
Following the previous chapter, this study proposes that active members of state 
armed institutions can contribute to the persistence of political violence after peace 
agreements are signed. Specifically, this study asks: to what extent do state armed actors 
contribute to the persistence of political violence because their ideological bias influences 
their willingness to: 
1. withhold their protection from certain groups of civilians because of their 
group-identity? 
2. have the disposition to support aggressive behavior against civilians 
because of their group-identity. 
The intent of this study is to explain how these biases have potential behavioral 
consequences that raise the risk of violence directed toward out-groups in the post-peace 
agreement environment. Willingness to protect and aggressive disposition are the 
behavioral variables studied. Willingness to Protect civilians is defined here as the state 
combatants’ willingness to provide protection, including defending and supporting 
civilians. Aggressive disposition is defined as state combatants’ aggressive behavioral 
intentions toward civilians through misconduct in the use of force and justification of 
violence.  
Following previous studies, it is suggested that the effects of the civil war can be 
the rejection of the identity represented by the armed group (Balcells, 2012, 2017) which 
can be manifested by negative feeling, attitudes and behaviors toward individuals, social 
or groups associated with the perpetrators (Daphna, Gal, & Eran, 2008; Halperin, Canetti‐
Nisim, & Hirsch‐Hoefler, 2009). In this study, I assume that soldiers, based on their past 
trajectories, will continue to exhibit in their attitudes the legacies arising from ideological 
identity-based grievances internalized during the conflict and socialization into the 
military that enabled them to define enemies and threats. To answer these research 
questions, it is necessary to understand and explain the impact of ideological identity on 
soldiers’ tendency to behave aggressively toward civilians, or their willingness to protect 
them after peace agreements are signed. In addition, it is important to identify other 
factors that can influence soldiers’ prejudices and attitudes towards civilians. For this 
reason, in this study I corroborate, with empirical data, the existence of prejudices and 





soldiers’ attitudes and behaviors. Then, I test other variables that appear in the literature 
at the individual level explaining intergroup conflict to complement the role of ideology. 
Some of these variables can enrich the explanation of soldiers’ predisposition to 
aggression and willingness to protect civilians after peace agreements are signed.  
Finally, I aim to understand soldiers’ mentalities as much as possible in their own 
words, in order to remain close to their beliefs and practices, and to be able to interpret 
how they understand ideology, if ideology helped them to frame their enemies and 
threats, and if so, how they do it. I am also interested in understanding the mechanisms 
that makes possible the internalization of ideologies, and how they can influence decision 
and behaviors. For this reason, I conduct semistructured interviews. This approach can 
enrich the quantitative findings and increase our knowledge of the role of ideology in 
soldiers’ preferences towards civilians and how they are justified in their minds after 
peace agreements are signed.  
In this chapter, the theoretical and conceptual framework to answer the research 
questions of this study is presented, and particular attention is given to the 
conceptualization and operationalization of ideology as the main independent variable. 
This study aims, on the individual level of analysis, to explain the legacies and 
consequence of war in a particular context. In this case, the individual level refers to 
soldiers who are active members of the Colombian Army, and who signed a peace 
agreement in 2016 after more than five decades of civil war with a Marxist-Leninist 
inspired guerrilla group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(Revolutionary Armed forces of Colombia, FARC). This individual approach can 
complement research conducted at the group and institutional level to understand the role 
of ideology on the behavior of armed groups.  
This chapter begins with the current debate about ideology as an essential variable 
to study armed group behaviour. Second, I introduce current challenges around the 
conceptualization of ideology. Third, I describe the different approaches from a 
quantitative perspective to measure ideology, underlining their strengths and limitations. 
Then, I justify the concepts and methods that I have selected to conduct the quantitative 
approach of this study. Afterwards, in line with previous research about ideology in 
members of armed groups, I indicate the gaps to explain the influence of ideology on 
violent behaviours. I introduce the conceptual model that I will use to analyze the 





intergroup conflict that explains at the individual level, violent behaviour, and why it can 
complement the role of ideology and answer the research questions. 
3.1 Ideology and armed group behavior 
According to the literature on ideology in armed groups, ideology is an essential 
variable in understanding the functioning and variations in contemporary armed group 
behavior, providing empirical evidence showing multiples effects of ideology on diverse 
forms of organized violence (Leader Maynard, 2019). In civil wars, for example,15 
political ideologies work as an instrumental value that explains the variation in behavior 
between armed groups (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2004; Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2014; 
Oppenheim et al., 2011; Oppenheim & Weintraub, 2017). 
However, Leader Maynard (2019) draws attention to an important limitation of 
the current conceptualization of ideology in armed conflict. First, he argues that there is 
still a gap in explanations of the mechanisms that connect the first level of analysis, 
individuals, with the second, organizations. In other words, the core of the relationship 
between ideology and armed conflict is needed to explain the causal relation between 
ideas, values, beliefs, and actions. We are still lacking the mechanism that makes this 
possible inside the armed organizations, so we need to unpack how ideology is 
manifested in behaviors. 
Second, Leader Maynard (2019) also mentioned that the focus on the 
instrumental level of ideology is unable to tell us “the scale of aggregation at which 
specific ideologies are conceptualized”. We know about devoted actors in armed groups 
(S. Atran & Ginger, 2015; Sheikh, Gómez, & Atran, 2016), but what about the other 
members (Leader Maynard, 2019, p. 3)? Some studies suggest that there is a socialization 
process that leads to shared behavior among the members of armed groups (Oppenheim 
et al., 2011; Oppenheim & Weintraub, 2017; Steele, 2011). These studies focus on the 
strategic level of the armed group and assume a homogenous effect of the training process 
on individual members. For that reason, the cognitive mechanisms that make 
internalization possible, and that determine the level of internalization of the ideologies 
and their influence in an actor’s decision-making have not been explained. They also 
 
15 There is also evidence about the role of ideology to explain state repression (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998; 






ignore the constraints of social structure that induce individuals to follow certain 
ideologies. Despite these limitations, it is possible to say that ideology influences an 
actor’s threat perception, and can also shape their strategic propensities (Gutiérrez-Sanín 
& Wood, 2017; Leader Maynard, 2019; Oppenheim et al., 2011; Oppenheim & 
Weintraub, 2017; J. E. Ugarriza & Craig, 2013). In that sense, political ideology works 
as an identity because it helps to establish a self-image and a sense of an in-group and an 
out-group identity that contributes to the categorization of “us” and “them”. Therefore, 
“identities are perceived and mobilized in different ways within different ideological 
worldviews, and all ideologies depend on certain interpretation of identities” (Leader 
Maynard, 2022, p. 4).  
Following social identity theory (SIT), membership of a social group helps the 
individual to understand and create a coherent image of themselves (H. Tajfel, 1969; H 
Tajfel & Turner, 1986).  SIT argues that individuals commonly identify themselves with 
a social group. The in-group is the group to which an individual feels they belong. Social 
psychological research shows that individuals have a view of the in-group as “superior, 
better, diverse, and more moral” than the out-group, which is usually perceived as 
“inferior, bad, more homogenous, and less moral” (Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2016, p. 77). 
 In the context of armed conflict where groups of individuals jointly and actively 
participate in a conflict, armed groups need to act under a shared framework that allows 
them to see the enemy or the antagonist group as an entity which embodies undesired 
characteristics, the antithesis of their values and beliefs (Volkan, 2009). This makes 
participation in violence dynamics easier, with actions taken based on differences against 
“others” being justified. In other words, acting against individuals “that are not like me” 
is accepted (Aiken, 2008, 2013). Oppenheimer (2006) suggests that the emerge of the 
enemy image is a prerequisite for justification, motivation and maintenance of hostility 
and antagonism between groups. Oppenheimer (2006) defines an enemy image as a 
specific form of negative stereotype (p. 269). His model based on how children within 
internal conflict develop enemy images, indicated that its emerge is a dynamic process 
embedded within an immediate social context through socialization and social 
categorization. The empirical evidence suggests that negative stereotyping is the process 
of individuals’ adoption and meaning of categorization prescribed by the social context 
(Oppenheimer, 2006, pp. 284-285), which explain why stereotypes are caught rather than 
taught (Allport, 1954). For that reason, in children growing up in internal conflicts, the 





However, I argue that the development of enemy image in soldiers participating 
in an internal conflict could be caught from the social environment, and implicitly or 
formally taught by the ideologies connected with the wartime cleavages (in the case of 
Colombia, the war cleavage was ideological-left-wing vs right-wing) that make possible 
the identity-division between the in-group and out-group.  
According to Scharpf (2018), repression is an instrument for governments to 
achieve their political goals. For that reason, government ideology could explain how 
state actors define enemies and threats and how much violence and repression needs to 
be applied (Harff, 2003; Valentino, 2004, 2014). Under these conditions, state armed 
actors – following the ideology of the government – justify state violence. As a 
consequence, political ideology works as an identity that defines political threats, 
identifies targets, and explains how violence and repression should be utilized depending 
on the identity of the target. For instance, in the case of Colombia, the anti-communist 
bias established within the doctrine of the military forces can persist and may have an 
impact on the development of a new political order after the peace agreement was 
signed16. Therefore, any kind of modification in the army needs to aim to deconstruct the 
enemy image held by the combatants, which implies reconsidering the role of political-
ideological identification among soldiers on the emergence of the enemy image during 
the conflict.  
3.2 The challenges of studying political belief systems: a multidisciplinary 
approach  
Today, research on ideology is deeply fragmented across disciplines and 
geographical borders (Leader Maynard & Mildenberger, 2018). This lack of dialogue 
between academic communities from different disciplines makes it difficult to use the 
concept without producing misunderstanding, because these schools of thought are 
largely unaware of one another (Homer-Dixon et al., 2013b; Leader Maynard, 2013). 
Some of the disciplinary fissures come from political science, which developed its 
understanding of ideology without interaction with history and political theory. Both 
groups are equally disconnected from the extensive work on ideology and discourse 
 
16 Some studies suggest that ex-combatants tend to remain divided along ideological lines long after their 
demobilization, despite asserting a common identity when confronted with other social segments (See more 






theory that research from political and social psychology is developing (Leader Maynard 
& Mildenberger, 2018). 
However, despite the differences between disciplines, it is possible to provide a 
core definition of ideology. Ideology is defined as politically-oriented worldviews or 
belief systems, across disciplines (Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2014; Leader Maynard, 
2019; Leader Maynard & Mildenberger, 2018; Nussio, 2017; J. E. Ugarriza & Craig, 
2013). The difference lies on the varying ways that ideologies influence behavior and 
thoughts. For instance, some authors use imprecise terms such as a coherent or consistent 
set of ideas to explain the extents to which ideologies influence individuals’ political 
worldviews (Leader Maynard & Mildenberger, 2018). Nevertheless, there is not a 
consensus about measuring the boundaries that explain how to identify a coherent or 
consistent ideology. In other words, what makes a set of political ideas coherent or 
consistent is still open to question. This issue become more prominent between North 
American and European scholars. North American political scientists are focused on a 
more empiricist approach to ideology. Their definition of ideological consistency is 
associated with the idea that ideology works as a constraint on the organization of 
attitudes (Leader Maynard & Mildenberger, 2018). For that reason, they prioritize the 
influence of elite doctrines on the rest of the population. As a consequence, the 
ideological spectrum of the American elite that clearly draws the differentiation between 
Republicans and Democrats shapes the framework of their understanding of ideology. 
This may also explain their methodological parochialism, expressed in their tendency to 
operationalize ideology with very large-scale ideational systems like conservatism and 
liberalism, or left and right (Leader Maynard & Mildenberger, 2018, pp. 566-568). 
On the contrary, European scholars suggest that ideologies can impact people in 
ways that they may not be aware of. For that reason, instead of a focus on the “logical 
coherence” of the ideologies, they emphasize “the psychological benefits of ideological 
attachment and the necessity of ideologies in providing subjective interpretations of the 
political world” (Leader Maynard & Mildenberger, 2018, p. 566). However, to date, no 
approach has been able to explain exactly how and to what extent ideologies are able to 
influence behaviors; why there are more devoted ideologues than others in the same 
group; how the process of socialization works to influence the level of 
internationalization of political ideologies; or under which conditions does thinking 
about oneself as a member of a group become more important than the individual-self 





This disciplinary and geographical division explains why there are some 
limitations regarding the best way to operationalize ideology. First, ideology implies the 
interaction and multilevel causality between the individual level and the group level of 
analysis (Homer-Dixon et al., 2013b). The assumption behind this is that at the individual 
level, there are ideas, values, and beliefs which provide an individual with a framework 
to understand the society and influence their political behavior. At the group level, “the 
elements are individuals minds whose interactions gives rise to discourses and power 
dynamics, which in turn guide collective action” (Homer-Dixon et al., 2013a, p. 343). 
Second, ideology implies the combination of top-down and bottom-up processes. Top-
down processes imply an organizational point of departure. For that reason, institutions 
that use channels like elite communication, political parties and media messaging explain 
the roots of ideological attachment. In contrast, bottom-up processes are focused on the 
individual level of analysis, and refer to factors at the psychological level, such as 
personality or moral institutions (Homer-Dixon et al., 2013a, p. 341). To date, the lack 
of an integrated theory of ideology makes it difficult to develop tools that can capture 
what ideology is and how it influences violent behavior. However, Homer-Dixon et al. 
(2013b) develop a map of ideology research divided into three broad categories according 
to methodological orientation. First, there is a conceptual approach to ideology that 
mainly focuses on the concept of ideology and its components; it is usually associated 
with the field of political theory. 
Another group is discursive: scholars who address this approach focus on the 
expression of ideology in text, speech, and non-verbal discourse, like symbolic messages. 
They also try to explain the influence of such discourses on political perceptions and 
behavior. Finally, there is a group of scholars that use quantitative approaches. These 
focus on the relationship between individuals’ traits and political attitudes through 
surveys and experimental analysis (p. 338). This study follow the definition of political 
ideology by Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood (2014). Despite the limitations presented above, 
these authors define ideology as a more or less systematic set of ideas that includes the 
identification of a referent group (a class, ethnic, or other social group), an enunciation 
of the grievances or challenges that the group confronts, the identification of objectives 
on behalf of that group (political change - or defense against its threat), and a (perhaps 
vaguely defined) program of action (p. 214).  
In other words, this study assumes ideologies to be a set of political ideas that 





define a group identity, so that it becomes possible to identify insiders and outsiders, 
shape threat perception, and restrain or motivate violent behavior toward outsiders 
(Leader Maynard, 2019). Additionally, this study follows two methodological 
orientations of ideology: discursive and quantitative. As will be explained in the 
methodology chapter (chapter 5), this study has a mixed method approach. In the 
quantitative component, experimental surveys and scales are used to measure ideology 
at the individual level to explain soldiers’ willingness to protect or their propensity to 
behave aggressively toward civilians. To complement this method, I adopt a qualitative 
approach, carrying out semistructured interviews with soldiers and analyzing their 
narratives to answer the following qualitative research questions:  Does ideology help 
the soldiers to frame and define enemies and threats? If so, how does it do it? How do 
these ideological biases in soldiers influence an aggressive disposition toward civilians 
as well as their willingness to protect them? Additionally, I explore how soldiers 
understand ideology, and how it influences their attitudes and behaviors towards 
civilians.  
In the following sections, I discuss the current debate around the quantitative 
operationalization approach to ideology, including quantitative scales used by 
researchers from different fields to measure ideology, its assumptions and limitations. 
Then, I introduce the scales implemented in this study. Finally, I present the theories 
around ideological internalization attachment to explain violent behavior and how I will 
address this in the qualitative methodology.  
3.3 The quantitative approach to Ideology in this study 
3.3.1 Spatial and non-spatial approaches to Ideology  
Both psychological and political science traditions of ideology use spatial 
approaches to measure ideology. The debate within these approaches concerns the 
number of dimensions that are necessary to map ideological content. For example, there 
is a one-dimensional scale usually corresponding to popular understandings of left–right 
political positioning which some authors show continues to capture and explain 
variations in political attitudes (Jost, 2009; Rodriguez-Raga, 2007; Zaller, 1992). The 
utility of the left-right schema is that it works as a mechanism for the reduction of 
complexity; it also helps to guide individuals to understand the political system and frame 





2013). However, some evidence indicates that there are individual and cross-national 
differences in the substantive meaning of left and right (Bauer, Barberá, Ackermann, & 
Venetz, 2017; Caprara, 2020; Zechmeister & Corral, 2013). The reason for this is because 
there are contextual conditions and individual characteristics that affects the meaning of 
the left-right scheme (Zechmeister, 2006; Zechmeister & Corral, 2013).  
For instance, in Latin America the degree of political polarization and the 
fragmentation in a party system influence in the meaning of left-right semantics across 
the region. Moreover, contrary to the classic expectation, in some countries in Latin 
America supporting an active state role in economic policy does not translate into a leftist 
position. Likewise, attitudes toward free trade policies do not always predict a rightist 
placement on the left‐right continuum (Zechmeister & Corral, 2010, p. 6). At the 
individual level, education, political interest and political sophistication also influence 
how citizens place themselves on the left-right continuum (Zechmeister & Corral, 2013). 
  Another spatial approach is two-dimensional and uses the Cartesian coordinate 
system. In this scale, it is possible to identify different political systems: fascism (low 
freedom, low equality), capitalism (high freedom, low equality), communism (high 
equality, low freedom), and socialism (high freedom, high equality) (Leader Maynard & 
Mildenberger, 2018; Rokeach, 1973). However, some authors criticize the 
oversimplification of these measures to understand real world belief systems. They argue 
that using such spatial metaphors, it is not possible to identify details and interactions 
such as personality predisposition, national values systems and contextual particularities 
(Leader Maynard, 2013). Also, there is little evidence of the resonance of spatial models 
in contexts outside Europe or the Americas, as in Africa, Asia or the Islamic world (Bauer 
et al., 2017; Leader Maynard & Mildenberger, 2018). 
In response to the spatial approaches, non-spatial traditions, usually from 
sociology, socio-psychology and political theory, argue that it is important to recognize 
ideology as a two-way process between the individual and collective interaction. This 
approach recognizes that individuals are always embedded in a particular context, and so 
their values and beliefs are not isolated from the social conditions they are part of; in that 
sense, this approach recognizes that individuals are situated beings. For this reason, dual-
process motivational models of ideological attitudes like right-wing authoritarianism 
(RWA) and social dominance orientation (SD) are able, through questions, to capture 





environmental influences, to measure ideology and explain intergroup behavior and 
sociopolitical attitudes (John Duckitt & Sibley, 2009).  
3.3.2 Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) 
This scale is inspired by the roots of fascism and is characterized by obedience and 
submission toward authorities. This ideological approach measures support of 
justification for aggression provided by authorities as a mechanism of control and 
sanction (Altemeyer, 1994). Additionally, the scale demonstrates when people highly 
value following social conventions (L. E. Jackson & Gaertner, 2010). As an instance of 
dual-process research, RWA reveals social conformist personalities with a view of the 
world as dangerous and threatening (See more in J. Duckitt, 2001; John Duckitt, Wagner, 
Du Plessis, & Birum, 2002; L. E. Jackson & Gaertner, 2010, p. 239). For that reason, 
people with high levels of RWA tend to value social control, stability and security.  
The motivation behind RWA explains that threats to the existing social order or 
conventions increase prejudices. It promotes negative attitudes toward groups that it 
defines as deviant according to social conventions (Larsson, Björklund, & Bäckström, 
2012). Hence, the evidence suggests that people with high levels of RWA are more likely 
to develop aggressive behavior if they feel that an out-group threatens the in-group social 
conventions (Lindén, Björklund, & Bäckström, 2016). Nevertheless, RWA has some 
limitations for this study. First, the three attitudinal clusters that are part of RWA: (1) 
conventionalism (a strong predisposition to support the social conventions and the status 
quo); (2) authoritarianism submission (a strong tendency to adopt, without evidence, 
attitudes toward authorities that are perceived as legitimate in the society in which one 
lives); and (3) authoritarian aggression (an embedded aggressiveness against people and 
groups that the establishment consider as threats) (Dallago, Cima, Roccato, Ricolfi, & 
Mirisola, 2008), are mainly focused on the individual’s in-group perceptions. Therefore, 
as Sinclair and Antonius (2013) noted, “people high in RWA are more interested in 
catching wrongdoers after they have already insinuated themselves into the in-group than 
they are in open intergroup conflict” (p. 178).  In consequence, for soldiers that are active 
and directly involved in an intra-state conflict, RWA may not be the most accurate tool 
to measure ideology.  
Second, some studies suggest that individuals who score high in RWA are usually 





Reinehr, 1970). But there is not conclusive empirical evidence for this hypothesis 
because some studies suggest that scores in RWA for soldiers and civilians are not 
particularly different (Nicol, Charbonneau, & Boies, 2007). Finally, if we take into 
account the context of Colombia, the self-selection hypothesis is not necessarily a reality 
for all the people who decide to be soldiers (see Chapter 4). 
3.3.3 Social dominance orientation (SDO) 
 This approach to measuring ideology argues that social groups are hierarchically 
organized in terms of status and resources. For that reason, the only way to prevent 
conflict is through socially shared beliefs that help to justify and maintain the existing 
hierarchy (L. E. Jackson & Gaertner, 2010). Following the dual-process research on 
ideology, the personality, values, worldviews and social motivations of SDO differ from 
RWA in that SDO implies a less empathic personality with a view of the world as a zero-
sum game for resources, motivated by the defense of dominance and superiority.  For 
that reason, in contrast to RWA which focuses its value on conservation (security and 
conformity), SDO values self-enhancement (power and achievement) (Cohrs & Asbrock, 
2009). 
In consequence, SDO will justify violence or dispositional aggression in support 
of group-based hierarchies, and the right of superior groups to dominate inferior groups 
(Lindén et al., 2016). Many studies found SDO to be a significant predictor of generalized 
prejudices against minorities (A. K. Ho et al., 2012). Moreover, SDO is associated with 
a broad spectrum of social ideologies such as conservatism, nationalism, patriotism, and 
militarism (Pratto & Shih, 2000), and policy preferences such as supporting wars of 
aggression, the death penalty, torture and opposition to humanitarian practices, social 
welfare and affirmative actions (Arnold K Ho et al., 2015; Sidanius, Cotterill, Sheehy-
Skeffington, Kteily, & Carvacho, 2016; Sidanius, Pratto, Van Laar, & Levin, 2004)17.  
In this study, I use SDO instead of the RWA scale to measure soldiers’ ideology 
because the SDO scale is closely related to the interests of this study. In contrast to RWA, 
 
17 There are some approaches in between the spatial and non-spatial viewpoints. This is the case for Moral 
Foundation theory (Haidt, 2012; Simpson, 2017). In his model, it is possible to identify six core moral 
foundations: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, purity/sanctity and 
liberty/oppression. This scale was inspired by literature from anthropology and evolutionary psychology 





which is focused on the in-group and the definition of the enemy as deviant from social 
conventions, individuals high in SDO are concerned with the intergroup power struggles 
and tend to see their enemies as a collective threat to the structure of power dynamics. 
As a consequence, they tend to support violent group behaviour when it is clear that there 
is  a “collective enemy” that is dangerous and threatening (Sinclair & Antonius, 2013). 
In this study, I assume that soldiers high in SDO justify their aggressive 
disposition toward individual civilians because they consider them as inferior and a threat 
to the power structure. Second, some studies suggest that the military socialization 
process, and not self-selection, can potentially explain why military personnel score high 
on SDO. This evidence suggests that military training and combatant experiences could 
increase SDO scores. 
Finally, the social focus of SDO to explain ideological attachment can inform us 
of the level of the influence of social context and political institutions on individuals’ 
ideology. In this view, the socialization process through social learning in groups like 
family, close friends or military education explains the individual’s ideological position 
(G. Rico & Jennings, 2016; Stoker & Bass, 2011). These group-oriented approaches 
consider the influence of political discourses, like concepts, or elites’ narratives into 
which individuals are socialized to explain the ideology attachment (Leader Maynard & 
Mildenberger, 2018). This approach is usually the most common one to explains the 
effect of ideology on collective violence. For these reasons, SDO has a particular strength 
for this study. Nevertheless, the spatial and non-spatial approaches presented above can 
complement each other and to some context are correlated with each other. But to date it 
is not possible to determine if any of the scales mentioned above is better than any other.  
After evaluating the strength and weaknesses of each scale for the purposes of 
this study, I decided to include the traditional unidimensional scale of left-right, because 
despite its limitations, it continues to be useful in explaining political behavior in the 
context of Latin America (Levitsky & Roberts, 2011; Luna & Kaltwasser, 2014; 
Obsdemocracia, 2016a; Rodriguez-Raga, 2007; Zechmeister & Corral, 2010, 2013) and 
the SDO718 scale in their Spanish version. 
 
18 The SDO-7 is the most recent scale to measuring social dominance orientation (see more in Arnold 
K Ho et al., 2015) it was validated in its Spanish version by Carvacho et al. This article is unpublished 





3.4 When thinking about oneself as a member of a group becomes more 
important than the individual self.  
The person–group relationship is the foundation to explain how ideology plays the 
role of a bridge between individual minds and collective behavior (Homer-Dixon et al., 
2013a; Leader Maynard, 2019). Therefore, to explain and understand the relationship 
between ideas and actions entails unpacking the process that make it possible for 
individuals to incorporate ideologies as an identity. First, individuals learn and change 
their personal beliefs, values and behaviors for group-based beliefs through formal and 
informal interactions with other people within the groups. An example is the socialization 
process that make possible the transition of civilians to become soldiers. This progresses 
through wearing appropriate uniforms, incorporating routines and codes of conduct, 
using new vocabulary and interacting with a particular group of people within a particular 
infrastructure, such as military units (Aranguren-Romero, 2016; Blair-Trujillo, 1993, 
1999; Checkel, 2017). 
Second, following Checkel (2017), certain social environments not only constrain 
and provide incentives to act, but also reshape interests and identities. Thus, there is an 
internalization process that makes “combatants sincerely adopt certain goals or standards 
of behaviors because they are socialized to associate such behavior with their 
membership of an armed group” (Leader Maynard, 2019, p. 6). Therefore, the mutually 
constitutive relationship between ideology and identity explains why individuals may 
adopt ideologies as worldviews and behaviors: because they are associated with identities 
or organizational roles they feel genuinely committed to. For that reason, it makes sense 
that people feel attracted to or repelled by others when they notice that there are 
similarities or differences between their belief systems (Leader Maynard & 
Mildenberger, 2018).  
Recent empirical evidence suggests the importance of considering the content of 
the training to understand group armed behavior, because this factor determines the 
repertories of violence of armed groups against civilians, or the reasons behind 
constraints on groups’ violence during irregular wars (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2008; Hoover 
Green, 2016; Steele, 2011; J. E. Ugarriza & Weintraub, 2015). 
Oppenheim and Weintraub (2017) argue that “in both formal state and insurgent 
forces, recruits undergo training and indoctrination processes that steep them in the 
political ideology of their organization, stressing the righteousness of the use of force 





military doctrine” (p. 1128). In this study, the content of the training is associated with 
the ideology, doctrine or political beliefs of the armed organization. But the 
indiscriminate use of these concepts makes unclear their conceptual differentiation (see 
more in Oppenheim & Weintraub, 2017; Siebold, 2007; Steele, 2011). In other words, 
the overlap between these concepts, ideology and doctrine, makes it difficult to measure 
and analyze their empirical impact on training and combatants’ behavior (J. E. Ugarriza 
& Craig, 2013). According to Avant (1993), doctrine is defined as that which “falls 
between the technical details of tactics and the broad outline of grand strategy. Whereas 
tactics deals with issues about how battles are fought, doctrine encompasses the broader 
set of issues about how one wages war” (cite in Oppenheim & Weintraub, 2017). In 
consequence, the doctrine goal does not “script the actions” in combatants: doctrine is 
the collection of knowledge, principles and policies that informs the decision-making 
process in battle (Oppenheim & Weintraub, 2017). In other words, doctrine refers to the 
guidelines for the decision-making process under military operations, or how to prioritize 
missions and how to implement technical and tactical agendas. 
During the training, the doctrine is revealed to combatants, but the content of the 
training in terms of ideology is presented in a more abstract way. Doctrine and ideology 
are not presented as the same in all cases. Sometimes the doctrine is an ideology in itself, 
for example, the National Security Doctrine introduced by the School of Americas during 
the cold war that was explicitly anti-communist in  military training, and helps to explain 
political violence (Dufort, 2017, p. 331; See more in Esparza et al., 2010; Ryan, 2008; 
Wolf, 2007); or the doctrine within Maoist rebels groups in Nepal (Eck, 2010); or Marxist 
ideology within rebels groups in Latin America and Africa (Balcells & Kalyvas, 2014; 
Cham, 1999; J. E. Ugarriza, 2009). But, in other scenarios, the doctrine does not 
necessarily reflect the political atmosphere in which the guidelines were designed about 
how war is waged, how norms are interpreted, how enemies and threats are defined, and 
how policies and principles are embodied in the doctrine.  
In other words, “the ideological dimension” of the doctrines in state armed actors 
is still a gap in theoretical discussions, because it is not necessarily explicit in their 
manuals. For example, the social expectation that soldiers should be more conservative 
than civilians (Sondheimer et al., 2012). The official documents of an army can hide any 
kind of political ideological preference toward civilians. They can also introduce 
themselves as politically neutral. However, decision-making process and practices can 





professionalism and apolitical ethos of state armed forces have been questioned by some 
scholars (e.g, Brooks, 2020). Brooks (2020) argues that the military’s apolitical ethos 
undermine civilian control and underestimates the political role of the army “when 
politicians make partisan comments to military audiences, or use military personnel or 
resources as props in partisan speeches or events” (p. 44). 
In the particular case of state armed actors within internal conflicts, I argue that 
ideology works as a lens that frames the interpretation of the doctrine. In different terms, 
this means that ideology is presented and socialized at a more abstract level than the 
doctrine, but allows its interpretation under an ideological term that re-shapes the 
individual preferences of the combatants and connects them at the collective level around 
a set of political ideas linked with a referent group. In other words, the relationship 
between the individual and the collective identity is explained by the bonds that ideology 
creates between combatants. In consequence, “concepts that represent the self, the group 
and the core values relevant to the group becomes thus part of the conceptual network 
constituting and individual’s belief system” (Homer-Dixon et al., 2013b). As a 
consequence, this belief system is not explicit in manuals or curriculums. It is influenced 
by the context and history of identity divisions (cleavages) that explain the conflicts.  
This study does not intend to analyze the military socialization process in 
Colombia, since this is beyond the scope of the study19. However, this study recognizes 
 
19 Although socialization studies are traditional methodological approaches to studying the military, the 
researcher decided not to follow this for the following reasons. First, a military socialization approach 
would be suitable for understanding how ideologies are transmitted and originated within armed groups. 
An analysis of this nature may need access to military curricula, which was impossible for the researcher 
in previous projects. This lack of guaranteed access to information about the content of the military 
curriculums, including the profile of the professors, limits the possibility of conducting a sociological 
study. Second, a study of socialization requires ethnographic training or an anthropological profile from 
the researcher, as well as prudent time for developing fieldwork. The researcher of this project had time, 
geographical, and background training constraints that limited her capacity to create a rigorous 
socialization study of the Colombian Army. Also, considering that the focus of this thesis is to capture the 
ideological bias and how it influences soldier’s behavior toward civilians, the researcher considers that it 
requires a different methodological approach distinct from a socialization study. Nevertheless, the 
researcher included analytic memos recorded in her field work diary of observations and engagement in 
informal conversations, daily life interaction in the School of War, and observations from events, such as 
ceremonies and rituals. Those ethnographic observations, including visual evidence to account for the 





the impact of the socialization process on the internalization of the political ideologies in 
soldiers participating in civil wars (See more about socialization and violence in Checkel, 
2017). For this reason, the qualitative approach will complement the results of the 
quantitative method to explain how soldiers understand ideology, if ideology helped 
them to frame enemies and threats, and if so, how. What are the mechanisms that make 
possible the ideological attachment and its influence on soldiers’ decisions and 
behaviors?  
To make this possible, I follow Leader Maynard’s (2019) model. Leader Maynard 
argues that in contexts of conflict, ideology influences an actor’s threat perceptions, 
strategic propensities and conflict capacities. However, before we can understand the 
effect of ideology in collective violence, it is important to recognize two basic causal 
paths that explain how ideologies influence individuals’ behavior. First, ideology 
requires that the actors involved in a conflict have a sincerely internalized political 
worldview. Second, ideology requires a structure that guarantees that the social 
environment is materialized in political norms, institutions or policy paradigms.  
Leader Maynard argues that these two paths are not mutually exclusive nor do 
they have a linear relationship. But they can configure four principal cognitive 
mechanisms that may explain causal links between ideologies and actors’ decision-
making: commitment, adoption, conformity and instrumentalization (see figure 3.1). 
Figure 3-1 Ideology´s Principal Cognitive Mechanisms by Leader Maynard, 2019, p.5 
 
Following Leader Maynard’s conceptual model, the internalization mechanism is 
the most basic way that ideologies can influence individuals’ behaviors. The author 
defined internalized ideas as individuals’ sincere beliefs, values, schemas and 
preferences. When ideologies are internalized, individuals make sense of political 
situations using the lens of this ideology. They can evaluate policies, actions and shape 
personal behaviors using ideology as a filter. Nevertheless, there are two possible ways 
to evaluate the power of internalized ideologies: commitment and adaption. Commitment 
is associated with the degree of attachment to the level of commitment with the system 
of values to justify decision-making. This requires that individuals’ beliefs genuinely 





world. On the contrary, adoption is associated with identification because people can 
adopt ideologies to fill gaps in their political worldview. In this sense, adapted ideological 
ideas do not provide deep motives or a connection with the person. Under these 
circumstances, it is possible to find weaker ideological loyalty, because individuals act 
more like ventriloquists.  
The second path in Leaders’ model is the structural mechanism. This focuses on 
the social environment that gives individuals the opportunity to incorporate certain 
ideologies. Under this mechanism, two principal cognitive elements operate: conformity 
and instrumentatlization. Conformity shapes individual behaviors and may be an effect 
of the pressure of social expectations because of group membership. Intrumentalization 
means that individuals incorporate ideology to justify their actions. This 
instrumentalization is a top-down mechanism that helps the group to regulate the 
behavior of their members. For instance, when political education is implemented on 
armed groups, ideological components are instrumentalized to maintain cohesion and the 
discipline of the group’s members. I follow the four cognitive mechanisms introduced in 
Leader Maynard’s model to analyze how ideology is internalized in Colombian soldiers, 
and how this can help us to explain soldiers’ behavior and attitudes toward civilians. In 
the next section, I introduce some of the additional factors appearing in the intergroup 
conflict literature that can complement the individual level analysis of this study to 
explain soldiers’ willingness to protect civilians or their disposition to be aggressive 
towards them after the end of the direct conflict. 
3.4.1 Intergroup conflict, psychological barriers and soldiers’ mentalities  
3.4.1.1 Emotions and Ideology  
According to Bar-Tal and Halperin (2011), psychological barriers are “barriers 
[that] pertain to the integrated operation of cognitive, emotional ad motivational 
processes, combined with a pre-existing repertoire of rigid supporting beliefs,world 
views and emotions that result in selective, biased and distorted information processing” 
(p. 220). Recently, there have been a group of studies that link individuals’ emotions, 
experiences, collective action, participation in collective violence, and ideology (Moro, 
2017; Nussio, 2017; Schubiger & Zelina, 2017). They argue that the indoctrination and 





identification of the group as a whole and between its members (Siebold, 2007; E. J. 
Wood, 2008, 2009; R. M. Wood & Thomas, 2017). As a result, group-based emotions 
contribute to armed mobilization. Under these circumstances, ideology works as a perfect 
vehicle to disseminate the “political beliefs that provide both an understanding of how 
the world works and a view of the relationships between the in-group and out-group and 
among members of the in-group” (Moro, 2017, p. 945), while also shaping the beliefs 
actors hold about how they should organize, and the group’s strategies. In other words, 
ideology works as a collective frame “that channels meandering emotions into a given 
direction and prescribes a corresponding behavioral response” (Nussio, 2017, p. 2). 
Therefore, ideology within an armed group can be considered as a prism through which 
the individuals see, and understand the reality. Also, as a “transmission belt that channels 
individual emotions and motivations, tying them to an overarching cause, ideology can 
potentially play an important role in triggering, fostering, and sustaining wartime 
collective action” (Schubiger & Zelina, 2017, p. 950). Therefore, because emotions are 
based on collective experiences and conflict events, they have a powerful influence on 
people’s motivation to violence or persistence of justification for violent behavior even 
after formal agreements (Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2016). 
In summary, the ideology of armed groups acts as a normative and emotional 
commitment to the cause (Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2014; Moro, 2017; Nussio, 2017; 
Schubiger & Zelina, 2017), and a normative behavioural constraint on strategies and 
tactics (Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2017; J. E. Ugarriza & Weintraub, 2015; Weinstein, 
2007). It also has functions instrumentally as ideas that motivate and coordinate armed 
groups (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2008; Hoover Green, 2016; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008; J. 
E. Ugarriza, 2009; J. E. Ugarriza & Craig, 2013) and the embeddedness of group 
institutions (Balcells & Kalyvas, 2014; Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010).  However, there is an 
important note mentioned by Čehajić-Clancy et al. (2016). According to them, empirical 
evidence suggests that the effect of intergroup emotions on violent behavior and 
reconciliation attitudes goes above and beyond the effect of other prominent factors such 
as ideology (p. 74). 
At the individual level, negative emotions are considered as psychological barrier 
that affects the possibility of restoring relationship between adversaries after the conflict 
(Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2016). Some scholars suggest that emotions play an important 
role in intractable and long-term conflicts, particularly because emotions provoke stimuli 





conflict, leading people to conflict, justifying violence, and guiding behaviors during 
wartime. In other words, emotions can shape individual attitudes and behaviors toward 
conflict related events (Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2016; Gross, Halperin, & Porat, 2013; 
Halperin, 2011; Pliskin & Halperin, 2016). The evidence suggests that after experiencing 
intractable conflicts, emotions such as fear, hatred, despair and anger cause selective, 
biased and distorted information processing (Halperin, 2011; Halperin, Sharvit, & Gross, 
2011). 
This explains why people and groups can resist peace or conflict resolution, 
because negative emotions lead to the rejection of positive information about opponents’ 
contributions with an extremely negative and monolithic view of the adversary (Čehajić-
Clancy et al., 2016). This is also referred to as delegitimization, self-moral glorification, 
justification, and a sense of victimhood (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011, p. 638). Moreover, 
some studies show that emotions are characterized by high stability and resistance to 
change. As a result, they can serve as a glue holding the conflict supporting beliefs 
together, leading to ideal conditions to build barriers to peace (Pliskin & Halperin, 2016). 
In this study, I test the role of emotions in Colombian soldiers to explain soldiers’ 
aggressive disposition and willingness to protect civilians. Moreover, I test emotions as 
a psychological mechanism that accounts for the effects of ideology on the soldier’s 
behaviors toward civilians.  
3.4.1.2 Out-group threat  
Previous research indicates that out-group threat is one of the key components of 
intergroup conflict and personal justification of violence  (McDoom, 2012; Riek, Mania, 
& Gaertner, 2006; Shesterinina, 2016). In general, individuals tend to view members of 
the out-group as threatening of their in-group (Henri Tajfel, 1982; H Tajfel & Turner, 
1979). Scholars indicated that perception of threat usually reinforces negative emotions, 
feelings of distrust and intolerance toward the out-group (Conrad, Croco, Gomez, & 
Moore, 2018; McDoom, 2012). Moreover, threat perceptions increase individual 
willingness to engage in or support violence against the members of the out-group and 
the development of revenge intentions (Maoz & McCauley, 2008).  
According to Hirschberger, Ein-Dor, Leidner, and Saguy (2016), out-group threat 
is a multidimensional phenomenon with four different existential threats. Each of them 





costly sacrifices in the context of political conflict. These authors recognize that threat 
can be perceived in different manners by different people, even under the same 
circumstances. For this reason, they combine different levels of analysis of threat 
(collective and individual or self vs group), the temporal nature of the threat (past and 
future), and physical or symbolic aspects of threat perception. 
Based on that, the authors develop the Multidimensional Existential Threat Model 
(MET) that incorporates previous literature and is inspired by the Palestinian-Israeli 
context. In this study, I include this model because it is the only one which is able to 
differentiate between different kinds of out-group threat perceptions. Also, it takes into 
account the long history of internal conflict in Colombia and the characteristics of my 
sample – soldiers with more than ten years of combat experience. The possibility of 
testing a multidimensional approach to out-group threat to explain aggressive disposition 
or willingness to protect civilians can enrich explanations of the contribution of state 
armed actors to the persistence of violence in post-agreement scenarios. Table 1 shows 
the four distinct existential threats that these scholars consider relevant to studying 
intergroup relations. 
The first dimension is (a) an individual future-oriented physical threat – personal 
death. Personal death threat perception considers the individual level: the nature of the 
threat is physical and it is future oriented because there is a hypervigilant cognitive alert 
of losing one’s own life. I expect that this kind of threat will be particularly salient in 
soldiers. The second dimension (b) is a collective future-oriented physical threat – 
physical collective annihilation. In this case the collective threat is to the physical 
existence of the group. In the context of intra-state conflict, combatants have the duty to 
act in a collective manner and protect their own members. Winning or losing the war are 
directly associated with the physical existence of the group. The third dimension is (c) a 
collective future-oriented symbolic threat – symbolic collective annihilation. In this case, 
the threat is the fear that the group could lose its identity in the future. 
In military terms, the end of wars is associated with military victories. For this 
reason, political negotiations that bring a potential transition from war to peace can create 
in combatants a sense of threat in terms of symbolic collective annihilation. This is 
because the transition to peace was not the product of a military victory, which may 
question the very identity of the army as unable to have won the war, condemning the 
country to fall into the hands of the enemies. The last dimension is (d) a collective past-





as a mindset of how the group views the world (Hirschberger et al., 2016, p. 4). 
Furthermore, some research has suggested that collective traumas can increase the moral 
justification of in-group violence and reduce the collective guilt toward the in-group’s 
actions (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005; Wohl et al., 2013). 
Table 1 The Multidimensional Existential Threat Model (MET) 
 
A. Individual future-oriented 
physical threat (personal 
death-PD) 
B. A collective future-oriented 
physical threat (physical 
collective annihilation-PA) 
D. Collective past oriented 
threat (past victimization- 
PV) 
C. A collective future oriented 
symbolic threat (symbolic 
collective annihilation-SA) 
 
Following the purposes of this study, it is expected that out-group threat perceptions play 
an important role in soldiers’ attitudes towards civilians after the end of the direct 
conflict.  
3.4.1.3 Delegitimization: moral justification and dehumanization  
According to Bar-Tal and Hammack (2012), delegitimization plays an important 
role in intergroup conflicts. They define delegitimization as part of group categorization, 
where a group or groups are classified into extremely negative social categories that 
exclude them from the sphere of human groups that act within the limits of acceptable 
norms or values, since these groups are viewed as violating basic human norms or values 
and therefore deserving to be murdered. Göbel (2014) argues that in a military context, 
delegitimization implies a process of dehumanization of the “enemy” because it is the 
best tool to “reduce man’s reluctance to kill” (pg.107).  
Regularly, in war contexts, the self-defense argument is a pillar argument to 
justify killing in war and reduce  postcombat guilt (Kelman, 1973). However, the sense 
of duty and protection of values and beliefs can also motivate the inclination to kill in 
war. This implies recognizing that additional to the sense of threat, it is necessary to have 
a moral justification of killing in war that make the action of “killing” morally acceptable. 
L. E. Jackson and Gaertner (2010) argue that through moral justification, for example, 





preserving world peace, saving humanity from subjugation or honoring their country’s 
commitments” (p. 238). The moral code behind the moral justification to killing in war 
responds to the in-group’s self-interest, so groups draw a line between justifiable and 
unjustifiable reasons according to their own interest and system of beliefs for legitimizing 
their actions (Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006).  
Finally, the moral justification of violence is in essence a way to mitigate the 
cognitive dissonance that killing other people causes. This is why a moral justification is 
necessary and is usually connected with a duty or moral imperative that serves a greater 
good, such as patriotism, or saving the nation from “communism”, or “Castro-
Chavismo”20 (Bandura, 2002). I expect that soldiers with high levels of moral 
justification will display more aggressive inclinations toward civilians and less 
willingness to protect them. 
Another way to measure delegitimization of the out-group is through 
dehumanization. Kelman (1973) was a pioneer in presenting the notion of 
dehumanization and its connection with the moral justification of violence. The 
dehumanization process is a vital factor in any violent conflict. It is viewed as a central 
component of intergroup violence, because it is an important precursor to moral 
exclusion, and to be morally excluded means not to inspire any sense of empathy (Goff, 
Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008). Dehumanization between adversaries implies 
labels based on a dichotomous understanding of violence. Therefore, actions may be 
approved using a friend-enemy logic to filter information as valid or invalid within this 
logic.  This is explained as the psychological construction of the “other” which requires 
shortcuts that quickly connect people with negative attributes, such as: “communists are 
bad people”, “their beliefs deny individual values and freedom”, “they want to take over 
the world”, etc (Northrup, 1989, p. 74) to classify enemies and justify violence towards 
them. Dehumanization is the denial of the full humanness of the “other” (N. Haslam, 
2006). 
In military contexts, dehumanization is associated with “object dehumanization” 
because the goal is to build “bullet-proof minds” and increase their “willingness to kill” 
(Göbel, 2014, p. 107). According to psychology scholars, dehumanization is a 
psychological mechanism serving individual, interpersonal and intergroup functions. It 
 






helps to give relief from moral emotions and authorization, self-exoneration and post hoc 
justification for violence (N. Haslam, 2006). In fact, for many authors, dehumanization 
is a key element of the justification for violence (Goff et al., 2008; Opotow, 1990; Viki, 
Osgood, & Phillips, 2013). Tendencies to dehumanize circulate through ideologies that 
link the otherness in a group and exclude them from acceptable human groups (N. 
Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Bar‐Tal (2000) exposes how the narratives of conflict help 
to “delegitimize beliefs” of the out-group and deny its humanity. For instance, in 
interethnic conflict, delegitimizing beliefs serves to explain the conflict and justify 
intergroup aggression. As a result, dehumanization reflects how the moral self-sanctions 
are selective and responds to intergroup purposes (Bandura, 2002). 
Furthermore, Kelman (1973) explores how the moral dimensions of 
dehumanization involve denying a person “identity” – a perception of the person as an 
individual with agency, independence, and different from others – and “community” – a 
perception of the other as part of a social network which cares for their members.  As a 
consequence, the person who is excluded from the moral community loses their capacity 
to evoke compassion and moral emotions (Bandura, 1999; Čehajić et al., 2009; N. 
Haslam, 2006). This exclusion is linked with the targeting based on identity explained 
above. When armed organizations label certain individuals as military targets, it is not 
because of the individual themselves, but because of what they represent, based on their 
identity as members of a social group. 
Allport (1954) and recent scholars such as Abrams, Van De Vyver, Houston, and 
Vasiljevic (2017), Amodio (2014), and Fiske (2000) mention how categories are 
associated with emotive words that are important cognitive shortcuts to deny the 
humanity and reinforce the biases and stereotypes of the out-group. Examples include 
people of color as lazy, Jewish people as excessively ambitious, and Muslims as 
terrorists. Additionally, empirical evidence from the United States show that the Black–
ape association influences the extent to which people condone and justify violence 
against this group, and how it has a link with the association to the death-sentencing 
decisions of jurors (Harris & Fiske, 2006). In this study, it is expected that categories 
such as “communist” or “leftist” in the minds of soldiers helps to create a sense of the 
despicable and embrace the total identity of the “others” in a label incapable of evoking 
empathy. This reinforces the idea that it is permissible to do anything to someone who is 





Considering the concepts presented above, it is possible to develop different 
quantitative techniques and models to measure ideological biases and individual 
characteristics of soldiers to explain their disposition to aggression and willingness to 
protect civilians after peace agreements are signed. In chapter 5, based on the theoretical 
and conceptual framework presented above, I introduce my research design and 






4 Case Selection and Research Background 
In the previous chapters, I presented my literature review and theoretical framework. 
However, before continuing with the research and methodology design, I now explain 
the context of the Colombian conflict, my case study, and the research background of 
this study. The purpose of this chapter is first, to familiarize the reader with critical 
aspects of the history of the Colombian conflict, and second, to explain the socio-political 
circumstances surrounding this study. However, the reader should be aware that 
Colombia has endured a state of war for more than five decades. For this reason, this 
chapter is an effort to synthesize this conflict, but does not take into account all its details 
and complexities. Besides these limitations, I also want to underline that this narrative 
on the conflict stresses some aspects that are useful for understanding the research 
question of this study. For this reason, the narrative presented here is oriented toward the 
present research.  
The chapter is divided into several sections. First, I provide an overview of the history 
of political violence in Colombia and the perpetuation of this violence after the peace 
agreement. Then, I  approach in general terms the history of the Colombian Army link 
with the Colombian internal conflict, showing some particular characteristics of this 
institution. I describe the historical relationship between the US army and the Colombian 
army, and its legacies, followed by the role of the military forces during the Colombia 
Peace Agreement with the FARC and the reasons behind the absence of Security Sector 
Reform in the Colombian peace agenda. Following, I introduce the agenda of the 
Colombian Peace Agreement signed in 2016, emphasizing on the aspects related to the 
roots of the conflict that are connected with this study. Finally, I close the chapter 











4.1 The Colombian democracy paradox: A history of political violence  
Colombia has suffered a long-standing internal conflict caused by paramilitaries 
and guerrilla groups. One of the oldest and most prominent guerrilla groups, The 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC after Spanish-abbreviation), emerged 
in 1964 as an armed organization with a Marxist-Leninist orientation, mainly constituted 
by young and poorly educated peasants (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2008). Influenced by Che 
Guevara’s focus model, and the “peoples wars” from the Vietnamese, FARC was part of 
the armed insurrections that the left in Latin America used to gain power (Becker, 2019; 
Villamizar, 2017). Their principal goal was to take power and change the structure of the 
state to bring justice and fair distribution for the rights of landless peasants (Gutiérrez-
Sanín, 2015, 2019b). In the fall of 2016, this conflict finished with the signing and 
ratification of a peace agreement between the main conflict actors, the Colombian 
government and FARC. 
Simplifying the Colombian history of political violence, it is possible to say that 
the status quo in Colombia is generally associated with right-wing ideology. One of the 
consequences of the civil war in Colombia was the criminalization of left-wing ideas and 
its association with the rebels (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014; Leal Buitrago, 2002; Leongómez, 
2004). This criminalization derives from the Cold War mentality, and was prolonged and 
reinforced by the political violence during the civil war, the counter-insurgency 
strategies, and the idea of the internal enemy (CNMH, 2013; Cruz-Rodríguez, 2017; Leal 
Buitrago, 2002, 2006). During the cold war, the ideology regarding national security 
spread by the US in Latin American governments was materialized in the National 
Security Doctrine (NSD)21 and the School of the Americas22, which shaped the local 
military doctrines, as it “convinced Latin American governments of an ongoing 
communist world conspiracy” (Scharpf, 2018, p. 208). In consequence, many 
governments implemented programs and military operations in order to “immunize” their 
societies against a “communist takeover”. It affected the intervention of the military in 
 
21 The National Security Doctrine (NSD) was the materialization of US ideology during the Cold 
War, and was used to justify military operations and the hunting of individuals and groups 
labelled as communist (Esparza et al., 2010; Feierstein, 2010). 
22 The School of the Americas was part of the systematic effort by the United States to provide 
Latin America with the military skills to enforce internal security and obstruct Communist 





the control of state decisions in direct terms, such as in Chile with a coup d'état, or 
indirectly with exceptional regimes as in Colombia23. In this way, an institutional and 
autonomy shield was generated for the military forces that gave legal guarantees for their 
anti-subversive actions (Aranguren-Romero, 2016; J. E. Ugarriza & Ayala Pabón, 2017; 
Velasquez Rivera, 2009). 
In Colombia, the effects of the NSD reinforced the political exclusion and the 
marginalization of ethnic, political, class, and race minorities. This doctrine stigmatized 
communities that criticized the status quo and declared them to be potential military 
targets. In other words, the doctrine facilitated the criminalization of the political 
opposition and any kind of political opponent, labeling them as enemies and turning them 
into military targets (Aranguren-Romero, 2016; Blair Trujillo, 1999; Brett & Malagon, 
2013; Leal Buitrago, 1994, 2002, 2006; J. E. Ugarriza & Ayala Pabón, 2017; Velasquez 
Rivera, 2009). The application of this doctrine (NSD), although it did not lead to a 
military dictatorship, was characterized by a systematic repression of social movements 
(students, peasants, unions, and indigenous people) and an open war against armed 
insurgent movements. Evidently, the Colombian government intended to detract from the 
legitimacy of social demands by characterizing them as subversive or as political 
manifestations of the guerrilla movements (Aranguren-Romero, 2016, p. 73). 
The idea of the “internal enemy” in Colombia, which was inspired by the 
anticommunist strategies during the Cold War, persisted through the subsequent years of 
internal conflict through counter-insurgency operations (COIN). The persistence of this 
notion of the “internal enemy” was possible because of the configuration of shortcuts, 
which facilitated an association among political opposition, anti-status quo organizations, 
social movements and rebels. As a result, peasants, social leaders, human rights 
defenders, and NGO members came to be systematically labeled as collaborators of the 
guerrillas (Cruz-Rodríguez, 2017; Leal Buitrago, 2006). This association led to the 
stigmatization of local communities, organizations and political ideas, and was even used 
to justify  massacres in public squares – a strategy used by paramilitary groups to spread 
 
23 Some authors like Gallón Giraldo (1979), Aranguren-Romero (2016), and Gutiérrez-Sanín 
(2014a) suggest that the maintenance of the state of siege had great ideological advantages for 
the Colombian political regime, which could be presented as democratic, despite maintaining 





fear, induce indifference, and gain cooperation from state actors (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2014a; 
Gutiérrez-Sanín & Baron, 2005; Romero, 2003). 
In fact, the systematic elimination of the members of a political party, Patriotic 
Union (UP), that took place during the 1980s and 1990s and the indifference of the state 
towards those atrocities were an outcome of the political ideological bias against leftist 
ideas (CNMH, 2018; Gómez-Suárez, 2007, 2010, 2011). If an organization was 
politically branded as being leftist, it was justifiably considered as being a military target. 
In this way, the state armed groups used ideology as an identity group identification to 
define threats and potential military targets. Moreover, as Leal Buitrago (2006) noted 
about the irregular war in Colombia: 
 
In Colombia, the enemies acquire the character of subversive, of rivals of the 
State (...) the internal enemy is always diffuse and its obligatory form is irregular, 
its capacity to camouflage itself among the civilian population makes its 
identification difficult and the State confronts not only those who have the 
weapons, but also their supporters and those who agree with their ideologies (...) 
also governments tend to describe their political opponents as enemies (p. 203). 
 
Much of the twentieth century in Colombia was characterized by the appeal to 
the state of emergency, state of siege or exception. This justified the use of this resource 
by the president as an instrument of political persecution, ideological control, and 
ideological submission to the ruling classes (Aranguren-Romero, 2016; Cruz-Rodríguez, 
2017; Leal Buitrago, 1994, 2006; J. E. Ugarriza & Ayala Pabón, 2017). The army 
presented itself as the savior of the nation and was rewarded for maintaining order under 
the authorization of restrictions such as the right to strike and the criminalization of any 
demonstration or attempt to oppose it.  
The Colombian Armed Forces fought in the battlefield against Marxist guerrillas 
for more than five decades. During this period, the country was considered a democracy, 
one of the oldest in the region; despite presenting levels of widespread political violence 





repression24 makes Colombia an anomaly or a paradoxical case (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014; 
Holmes, De Piñeres, & Curtin, 2010). This has generated debates around how to classify 
democratic regimes in the midst of war, specifically how to classify and define political 
regimes with the presence of elections in the midst of strong political repression (for a 
review, see Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014; Nasi, 2010) As Gutiérrez Sanín (2014) argues:  
 
In Colombia there does not seem to be a clear correlation between 
democratization and the decrease in the intensity of repressive activity. Moreover, 
the anomaly also appears in the opposite direction (...) all the mechanisms of the 
theory of internal peace25 could produce repressive cycles and the weakening of 
democracy (p.54)26 . 
 
In September 2001, President Bush once again divided the world into good and 
evil. Following the same logic of the National Security Doctrine, the Inter-American 
Defense System (SIAD) came in to existence. It had similar missions to those of the 
DSN: to repress the internal enemy, impose order and veto communism. The SIAD 
established the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking (the war on drugs) as the main 
missions. In Colombia, these missions permeated the narrative of the conflict, 
transforming the term “subversive” into “terrorist”, giving way to the justification of 
arms as the only way to end the internal armed conflict, and denying all political 
motivation of the rebels  because they were now categorized as "narco-terrorists" (Borda 
Guzmán, 2007; A. Tickner, 2007). 
Bearing in mind the anomaly of the Colombian democratic regime, it is to be 
expected that there are distortions in its notions of the role of political opposition and the 
public purpose of security. I thus argue in this study that the influence of the Cold War 
in the process of democratization and the subsequent fight against terrorism and the war 
 
24 I define repression following the definition of Stohl and Lopez (1984, p. 7): “the use or threat of 
the use of force by the authorities of the State or those who support them, against opponents or 
potential opponents, to prevent, weaken or prevent their opposition capacity”. 
25 It drives the Clinton Doctrine of peace and security through a crusade for democracy. “The best 
strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace,” the president said, “is to support the 
advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each other.” 
26 This argument is in accord with what authors such as Krain (1998) and Snyder (2000) have said 





on drugs has impacted on the willingness of members of security institutions to protect 
certain civilians. This applies especially to those who have been criminalized because of 
the idea of the internal enemy not only produced in the Cold War, but also reinforced by 
the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking. 
On 26 September, 2016, after five decades of civil war, Colombia signed a Peace 
Agreement with the left-wing Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), one of 
the oldest communist guerrilla groups in the world. According to data of the National 
Center of History Memory27 of Colombia (CNMH), the cost of this war was 260,000 
dead, more than 60,000 disappeared, and more than 7.7 million people internally 
displaced (CNMH, 2013). Right-wing parties led opposition to the peace deal with the 
FARC. Its leader, the ex-president and senator, Alvaro Uribe, supported the military 
solution to end the war. During his eight years as president, he denied the existence of an 
armed conflict in the country, to eliminate from its roots the political dimension of the 
armed groups (Borda Guzmán, 2007; Jiménez Bautista & Gonzáles Joves, 2012). 
Moreover, he started to label the members of the guerrillas “terrorists”, and replaced the 
concepts of insurgency and communism with that of terrorist threat (Cruz-Rodríguez, 
2016). This narrative started to frame the internal armed conflict and prompted the 
country to request military cooperation from the international community, and to join the 
war on terror or counter-terrorist strategies after the events of 9/11 (Borda Guzmán, 2007; 
Castañeda, 2014; A. B. Tickner, 2007). 
Since the peace agreement started, Uribe and his political party, Democratic 
Centre, instigated a major campaign against the peace negotiation. They led the “No” 
campaign that polarized the country, and on 2 October, 2016, Colombians voted against 
the peace referendum. The evidence suggests that communities that had not been touched 
by the violent conflict, tended to vote no, while the most affected ones tended to vote 
yes28 (D. Krause, 2017; Melendez, 2016). The victory of the opposition in the plebiscite 
forced the government to modify the original peace agreement. On 21 November, 2016, 
Colombia signed a new peace accord after incorporating some changes demanded by the 
 
27 Created in 2011 under the Law of Victims and Land Restitution, the Centro Nacional de Memoria 
Histórica (CNMH) has the mission of collecting and recovering written, testimonial, and any other 
materials that document the war and violations of human rights.  
28 Results also show that: “more populated and urban municipalities are found to be more critical towards 





political opponents. The revised version was submitted for approval by the Congress, but 
the country’s peace agreement still lacks sustainable political support. The opposition 
continued to argue that the agreement was too generous to the guerrillas, and their 
plebiscite victory empowered them to start a presidential campaign. Iván Duque, from 
the Democratic Centre party, won Colombia’s presidential election and assumed office 
on 7 August, 2018. Duque promises to “modify” the deal with the FARC once in power 
(for a review, see K. Johnson, 2017; K. Johnson, 2018 ). 
Today, Colombia experiences a decline in generalized violence but an increase in 
targeted violence during and after the peace agreement. The anti-opposition violence has 
intensified, with a disturbing increase in the systematic assassinations of social leaders 
and human rights defenders (Ángel & Ball, 2019; P. Ball et al., 2018; CrisisGroup, 2020; 
ONU, 2020).  The victims are generally victim’s rights activists, including for rights to 
land restitution, truth, and reparations; peace deal advocates, in particular those seeking 
to combat illicit economies like drug trafficking and illegal mining; rural and opposition 
leaders with political aspirations; and defenders of collective rights, in particular those 
relating to Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities (Baca & Jiménez, 2018; 
Sánchez-Garzoli, 2018). The victims also have strong ties with left-wing political parties 
and social organizations (Albarracín, Pablo, & Valencia, 2019). Currently, there is no 
consensus on statistics revealing the total number of victims killed. However, applying a 
statistical method called Bayesian Non-Parametric Latent-Class Capture-Recapture 
(LCMCR) led by the Ideas for Peace Foundation, a total of 380 victims were estimated 
between 2016 and 2017, and 284 in 2018 (Ángel & Ball, 2019; P. Ball et al., 2018). 
Moreover, during the first year (2019) of President Duque’s control, there was an 
18.5% increase in social movements leaders killed, in comparison with the previous year, 
according to United Nations reports (A. Jiménez, 2020). Ángel and Ball (2019) estimate 
that there is a 0.79 probability that increases in lethal violence against social leaders was 
50% or greater between 2017 and 2018. Some academics and government and non-
government organizations have tried to understand the logic behind these selective 
murders.  
On the one hand, the targeted killing of social leaders is explained as a form of 
intimidation of political activity. Therefore, the targeted violence is considered a 
deliberate strategy that seeks to interrupt social processes carried out by the murdered 
social leaders, forcing the displacement of other social leaders and intimidating the 





CrisisGroup, 2020). On the other hand, given that war is a resource to impede democracy, 
multiple social leaders have been assassinated for playing political, civic, union, peasant, 
communal and religious roles. Furthermore, public servants who fulfilled judicial, 
control or of vigilance, or that played their functions as journalists, human rights activists, 
or teachers, have also been military targets (CNMH, 2013).  
The above reaffirms previously developed theories on the strategies of armed 
actors during military readjustments, where the first periods of violence are associated 
with the extermination of the visible leaders of the opposition (Kalyvas, 2006; Rivera, 
Romero, & Vargas, 2018)29. In a report published in 2017 by the organization Political 
Violence at a Glance, it was suggested that the increase in the assassination of social 
leaders during 2016 is associated with political factors (Meuth Alldrege, Ch, Rettberg, 
Rojas, & Weintraub, 2017). Similar results were found by Albarracín et al. (2019) in their 
study. Based on statistical analyses between 2016 and 2018 that incorporate intensity, 
location and repertory of violence at the municipal level, it is possible to state the 
following.  
First, municipalities with higher levels of political and electoral competition have 
lower probabilities of experiencing violence against social leaders. On the contrary, in 
those municipalities in which few parties control the local power, this probability 
increases. Moreover, this inverse relation between political competition and the 
incidence and intensity of violence against social leaders becomes more prominent when 
left-wing forces are stronger in electoral competition. 
A second important finding indicated that the areas where FARC was present 
before the demobilization process present higher levels of violence against social leaders 
and ex-combatants. The authors suggested that they are military targets because they 
represent a threat to the local power; that is, because their claims confront the status quo. 
It is also because their ideologies can be easily stigmatized as ideological causes of the 
former guerrillas. Finally, the illegal economies have an association with the violence 
against social leaders, but they are less consistent than the political variables. 
 
29 Unfortunately, this targeted political violence in Colombia is not new. In fact, the country is a 
pioneer in recognizing the need to protect social leaders. Since 1997, the Congress of the Republic 
ordered, through article 81 of Law 418, the creation of a protection program for people whose lives, 
integrity, security or freedom are at risk for reasons related to political violence suffered in Colombia. 
Within the scope of this protection programme are the people directly involved such as activists of 





 Other studies, such as Rivera et al. (2018) suggest that targeted violence after the 
permanent ceasefire introduced at the end of 2014 with the FARC is explained by the 
fights to occupy valuable territories previously controlled by FARC. To explain this 
violence, they argue that the lack of consolidating state territorial control in Colombia 
and the persistence of armed actors creates an environment where: “Territorial 
contestation by armed groups in the context of civil war often involves the selective 
killing of civilians” (Rivera et al., 2018, p. 23). They conclude their article by stating 
that:  
“The killing of social leaders, we argue, constitutes an unintended negative 
consequence of a partial pacification process that was not accompanied by an 
effort to consolidate the state control in former FARC strongholds. Despite the 
historical importance and the tremendous opportunity of the peace agreement 
with the FARC, the killing of social leaders may be the beginning of a new and 
more sophisticated stage of social disruption in Colombia. We hope to be wrong” 
(p. 24). 
 
In consequence, the ongoing violence in Colombia is a continuation of the past in 
that many killings take place in territories that historically witnessed the highest levels 
of conflict (CrisisGroup, 2020). However, the military operations’– the only type of 
government intervention in conflict-affected areas after the peace agreement – failed, 
showing that the military presence does not guarantee a safe environment for the 
communities. According to CrisisGroup (2020), communities expressed that the mere 
presence of soldiers contributes to a clime of hostility. Furthermore, some former defence 
officials suggested that exists a pervasive prejudice in the military against social leaders. 
The security forces’ discourses are that “social leaders are guerrillas, that they are mixed 
up in drug trafficking”(p. 24). 
4.2 The Colombian internal conflict and the military forces  
During the twentieth century, the political violence in the country jeopardized the 
professionalization of the state armed actors. During La Violencia (1925-1958) period, 
regional elites politicized the state armed actors, using them as a legitimate mechanism 
for political competition; Liberals and Conservatives actively used the Colombian Army 
and police force against each other (Dufort, 2017; Leal Buitrago, 1994; Pizarro, 1995). 





that uniformed individuals cannot vote. The instrumentalization of the security sector by 
political parties justified this decision that continues until today. Nevertheless, some 
experts believe that an important price is paid in democratic terms because the military 
and police members felt like second-class citizens, because they couldn’t participate in 
the democratic debate. On the other hand, there were also experts and even members 
within the army that were afraid to give the right to vote to soldiers and police because 
they believed that it would end by further politicizing the security institutions. Since that 
time, this feature of the Colombian security sector has generated sporadic debates, 
especially at election time. However, systematic studies on the subject are very rare 
(Melo Molina, 2018; Ortiz-Ayala, 2019; Rivera-Páez, 2019a). 
In Colombia, army consolidation took place during a period known as the 
“Conservative Hegemony” (1886-1930), due to the conservative party’s dominance over 
the Colombian state of the officer corps in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
This left an imprint on the institutional mentality that persists today in the Colombian 
army. During this period, a large percentage of the officers came from rural areas and 
acted as private security providers for large landowners. At that time, officers usually 
came from the middle classes of the rural areas, which had strong Catholic ties and 
strengthened links with major landowners. In consequence, as Dufort (2017) argues, 
“these two elements, – the provincial origins of the officers and their German influenced 
professional training – converged, producing an idiosyncratic conservative mind-set that 
was closely intertwined with regional elite culture” (p. 324). Accordingly, the soldier 
elites shared the social and economic interests of the landed elite. In fact, many veterans 
became owners of large portions of land in the regions during this period. 
As a result, sharing this class interest made the soldiers and the army as an 
institution more prone to support and protect the landed elite, even when the Liberal Party 
returned to power in 1930. The military elite was opposed to agrarian reform, helping to 
suppress the mobilization of peasants in the name of the maintenance of public order. For 
this reason, despite attempts to professionalize and depoliticize the army and the police 
during the nineteenth century30, this objective was not fully consolidated.  
 
30 During the Conservative Hegemony, The Military School of Cadets (1907) and the Superior of School 
of War (1909) were funded with the support of international missions from Chile and Germany; both 
armies have a strong heredity of the Prussian professionalism concept of the army and it exacerbated elitist 





The conservative ideological rigidity and the elitist class that characterized the 
early twentieth century officer corps made them resist any social and doctrinal 
transformation (Dufort, 2017; Forero Angel, 2017b, 2017c; Wills, 2014). After La 
Violencia and previous to the National Front, Colombia experienced four years of 
military rule (1953-1957) under General Rojas Pinilla, a popular and charismatic leader 
who threatened the traditional political elites during a period when dictatorships were 
very popular in the region. For that reason, the Colombian political elite allied against 
the popular general and returned to power. However, they were afraid of another coup. 
During their first year in power, the civilian president, Alberto Lleras Camargo, who 
followed the military regime was a victim of a pro-Rojas coup. A few days after the 
attempted coup, Lleras Camargo declared in a public speech: “I do not want the Armed 
Forces to decide how the nation will be governed: rather I want the people to decide. But 
I do not, in any way, want politicians to dictate to the Armed Forces their role, their 
discipline, their regulations, or their staff” (Lleras Camargo 1983 [1958], 290; cited in 
Dufort, 2017). 
This established what is known as the “Lleras Doctrine” because it defined the 
relations between civilians and military authorities in the country, which still exist. Since 
then the military has been subordinate to the civilian power on condition of maintaining 
relative autonomy, which includes prerogatives and veto powers over its field, which 
further resulted in a delegation in the practice of policies, security and defense by 
civilians to the military and the police (Cruz-Rodríguez, 2015; Dávila, 1999; Dufort, 
2017; Grabendorff, 2009; Rafael Grasa, 2016, 2019; Leal Buitrago, 2006; Rivera-Páez, 
2019a; Schultze-Kraft, 2012).  
As a consequence, the idea of civilian control is reduced to the presence of some 
civilians in the Ministry of Defense, a very strong command from the presidential palace, 
and the lack of any parliamentary oversight (Grabendorff, 2009, p. 71; see also Schultze-
Kraft, 2012). For that reason, experts have said that the historical intention of security 
sector reform in the country was mainly to focus on increasing the effectiveness of the 
state in fighting internal conflict, but not necessarily to improve democratic governance 
(DCAF, 2018; Grabendorff, 2009, p. 83). Moreover, Colombia has a narrow separation 
of function and security responsibilities between military and police institutions; both 
institutions are part of the Ministry of Defense. For some experts, the coexistence of a 
militarized police and policing army contribute to the reproduction of violence, especially 





idea that state capacity and state presence have been reduced to the physical presence of 
military and police forces in many regions of the country (Cairo et al., 2018; CNMH, 
2013; Cruz-Rodríguez, 2017; Wills, 2014; Wills et al., 2017).  
4.3 The Colombian Army and the US Army relations  
US-Colombia military cooperation began with the Korean War. Colombia was 
the only Latin American nation that actively contributed 4,314 soldiers and its only 
frigate “Almirante Padilla” (for a review, see Ramsey, 1967). Its participation in the 
Korean War impacted the way security threats were defined in the country: the 
Colombian Army focused on how communism was the prominent source of instability 
in the region (Leal Buitrago, 2002). In consequence, some military elites started to 
consider the socio-economic and psychological dimension of counter-insurgency warfare 
(Dufort, 2017; Leal Buitrago, 2002). In 1959 and 1962, the US army advised, with special 
teams, the plan that General Ruiz Novoa called Plan Lazo, the Colombian Armed Forces 
Counter-insurgency Plan of 1962-1966 (Dufort, 2017; Leal Buitrago, 2002, 2003).  
This was a national plan to fight communism, but it was not only a military plan; 
it implicated the participation of civilian institutions because it had a development 
approach. In other words, it incorporated a socioeconomic change component that aimed 
at reducing civilian support for communism (Leal Buitrago, 2002). Moreover, this plan 
was the one which institutionalized the National Security Doctrine in the country and 
brought about the politicization of the national understanding of security, whereby the 
enemies started to be defined in terms of communist ideology (Beehner & Collins, 2019; 
Cruz-Rodríguez, 2016; Dufort, 2017; Forero Angel, 2017a; Leal Buitrago, 2002; J. E. 
Ugarriza & Ayala Pabón, 2017; Wolf, 2007). However, during the twentieth century, this 
approach divided the Colombian army leaders, each with its own narrative, and had an 
impact on the way the army approached the Colombian conflict during the twenty-first 
century. 
According to Dufort (2017), there were a group that he named “the hardliners” 
who followed the US Cold War security doctrine focused on anticommunist ideology; 
they were determined to win the war in a military way “against the communist 
insurgents”. This group of soldiers supported and encouraged the implementation of one 
recommendation of the US aim of civilian “self-defense”, that explains the origin of 
paramilitary groups in the fight against the guerrillas in Colombia (Dufort, 2017; 





On the other hand, there were soldiers like General Ruiz Novoa that focused on 
civil actions and cooperation between military and civilian sectors. Dufort (2017) called 
this group of soldiers “reformist” because they introduced the idea that the roots of the 
internal war in Colombia were linked with socio-economic inequality. For this reason, 
they advocated civil-military action to bring roads, schools, and hospitals to rural areas 
and even advocated agrarian reform. This group of soldiers was not popular, but they had 
an important influence in the counter-insurgency strategies based on the idea of winning 
hearts and minds (Dufort, 2017; Forero Angel, 2017b, 2017c, 2018a). 
In 1999, the Colombian government and the United States began a military 
support program making Colombia the third largest recipient of US aid after Israel and 
Egypt (Beehner & Collins, 2019). This cooperation was developed under the program 
called “Plan Colombia” which had as its main objectives: (1) to reduce the production 
and trafficking of illegal drugs (mainly cocaine) by 50% within a period of six years; and 
(2) to improve security conditions in Colombia by regaining control of large areas of the 
country that were in the hands of illegal armed groups31 (D. Mejia, 2016)32. 
Unfortunately, the militarized approach led by the US resulted in a rapid increase 
in the size of the drug trade and it made the Colombian cartels stronger. The counter-
narcotic strategies were mainly focused on eradication, reducing cocaine production 
through aerial spraying of coca plantation with herbicides and manual eradication of 
illegal crops involving civilian workers who had the protection of the armed forces and 
the national police. These strategies usually focused their efforts on the peasants, the 
weaker actors in the drug trafficking chain, instead of on the stages of production and 
trafficking where the greatest value added is produced (D. Mejia, 2016; Weiskopf, 
Gaviria, & Mejia, 2017). 
Moreover, an unintended consequence of Plan Colombia was that the strategies 
implemented located “the locus of battle into terrain often more favorable to the 
insurgents and more difficult for counterterrorism or counterinsurgency operations” 
(Beehner & Collins, 2019, p. 46). In fact, the US intervention was not, in theory, designed 
 
31 Government Accountability Office, “Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, But 
Security Has Improved: U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance,” GAO-09-71 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2008),http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/282511.pdf. 
32 From Plan Colombia resources, between 1999 and 2005, 40,000 men were incorporated, 10,000 per year, 





to engage in counterinsurgency operations. But the military resources provided by the 
US to increase the capacity of the counternarcotic equipment in the Colombian security 
forces, in practice, were used to engage in counterterrorism or counterinsurgency 
operations. In other words, on the ground, it was difficult to “distinguish between drugs 
traffickers and insurgents”, and in conclusion, the US forces “merge[d] counternarcotic 
with their counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts” (Beehner & Collins, 2019, p. 
37). The military focus of Plan Colombia also came with greater human right abuses by 
sectors within the Colombian military and paramilitary groups (Acemoglu et al., 2016; 
Beehner & Collins, 2019; HRW.org, 2019; Lindsay-Poland, 2018). The Falsos Positivos 
(False Positives) scandal was one of the most visible consequence. The Falsos Positivos 
were systematic extrajudicial killings by Colombian armed forces to show that the state 
was winning the war against the left-wing guerrillas.  This strategy allowed the army to 
ask the government for money33, and continued justifying the necessity of US support 
(Benavides Silva & Rojas Bolaños, 2017; Gordon, Henao, Duque, & Dolan-Evans, 
2020). Acemoglu et al. (2016), through some statistical models, showed how some top-
down state-building efforts produced several perverse side effects like killing innocent 
civilians mispresented as guerrillas as a consequence of using body counts as a measure 
of success. According to a report by Human Rights Watch (HRW.org, 2015), the 
introduction of incentives after 2002 which “rewarded combat killings with vacation 
time, promotions, medals, training courses, and congratulations from superiors, among 
other prizes” (p. 29) created pressure on the soldiers by their superiors to show positive 
results and boost body counts in their war against guerrillas. 
The report stated that: “Soldiers and officers abducted victims or lured them to 
remote locations under false pretences . . . killed them, placed weapons on their lifeless 
bodies, and then reported them as enemy combatants killed in action” (p. 1). On 10 
December, 2018, the new government of President Iván Duque selected as the new head 
of the county’s army a general who was linked to “false positive” killings and other 
abuses. Moreover, other soldiers also associated with these scandals were selected as 
leaders in other departments within the army (HRW.org, 2019). 
 
33 Based on the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Colombia invested more than 






On 18 May 2019, the New York Times published an article based on some 
denouncements made by senior officers about how the new leaders in the army started to 
pressure the troops to show results, even if this implicated “lower[ing] their standard for 
protecting innocent civilians from getting killed” (Casey, 2019). One of the senior 
officers interviewed by the New York Times journalist made a candid admission. “We 
have gone back to what we were doing before,” said one of the officers, who all spoke 
on the condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals by their superiors. Some months after 
the NYT publication, a national journal revealed a recording from a meeting where a 
commander from the army said: “The army of speaking English, of protocols, of human 
rights is over.… If we need to carry out hits, we’ll be hitmen, and if the problem is money, 
then there’s money for that” (Isacson, 2020; Semana, 2019b). 
Finally, as part of the U.S government assistance strategy to Colombia during the 
Cold War, the creation of paramilitary groups was included. During the first part of the 
twentieth century, under the National Security Doctrine, the Colombian government 
encouraged civilians to arm themselves to protect their communities from the guerrillas, 
resulting in the creation of self-defense groups (Tate, 2001; J. E. Ugarriza & Ayala 
Pabón, 2017).  In 1965 and 1966, civil defense law allowed the creation of civil defense 
units to support the army in counter-insurgency. Some were private security forces 
funded by landowners and businessmen. This dynamic persisted until 1989, when the 
president declared them illegal, because they started to form strong connections with the 
drug cartels. However, they re-emerged and were legally recognized in 1994, under the 
name “Convivir” (Avilés, 2006; Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2008, 2019a; Gutiérrez-Sanín & Baron, 
2005; Romero, 2003; Tate, 2001; J. E. Ugarriza & Ayala Pabón, 2017; Zelik & Castro, 
2015) their military capacity become stronger and their territorial presence was felt 
throughout the country (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2019a). The army, because the law allowed 
them to do it, was responsible for providing equipment, training and coordination with 
the counter-insurgency operations on the ground. As Tate (2001) has described, members 
of Convivir were authorized to carry sophisticated offensive combat weapons, including 
miniuzi machine guns, repeating rifles and revolvers. Convivir members murdered 
families and threatened numerous others, leading to their forced displacement (p. 166). 
By the mid-1990s, paramilitary activity in Colombia expanded with the creation 
of a national coordinating body, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). 
According to the Disciplinary Rules and Constitutional Statutes adopted at the AUC’s 





regimented military command structure which incorporates regional organizations (Tate, 
2001). Those structures were militarily strengthened thanks to the US support through 
the Plan Colombia. This period is also recognized by the increase in human rights 
violations in the country (Lindsay-Poland, 2018; Tate, 2001, 2009, 2015). Moreover, 
Beehner and Collins (2019) argue that during the paramilitary expansion, the national 
government turned a blind eye to military and right-wing paramilitary groups that were 
implicated in massacres or other type of violence against civilians. 
Despite the fact that in 2006 the AUC were demobilized, there were a number of 
dissident and rearmed groups (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2008; Nussio, 2020). According to 
PARES (2019), Golf Clan is the most powerful of these groups, with about 2,500 armed 
members. Some experts declare that these dissident groups that come from the AUC are 
primarily motivated by the profits from illegal economies. Even the AUC was 
traditionally identified more by their greed than by their political profile (Gutiérrez-
Sanín, 2008; Holmes et al., 2010; Tate, 2009; J. E. Ugarriza & Nussio, 2015). However, 
one of the AUC leaders, Carlos Castaño, declared that the rich have someone who 
defends them, namely, the state; while the poor have someone to defend them, namely, 
the guerrillas. As a consequence, the self-defense groups are the ones who are going to 
defend the middle class34 (see more in Castaño & Molina, 2005; Leongómez, 2004). In 
that message, there was a sense of political narrative, and for that reason, some experts 
on the Colombian conflict suggested that it is important to consider the political 
dimensions of armed group behavior and how it can coexist with economic motivations, 
suggesting that grievances and greed can coexist (Gutiérrez D & Thomson, 2020; 
Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2008; Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2014). Today, the perpetrators of the 
systematic murders of social leaders and ex-combatants are from the dissident groups of 
the AUC (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2020b; Nussio, 2020). However, the state is being very slow 
in taking judicial action.  
4.4 Absence of SSR in the Colombian peace agreement with the FARC  
The Colombian military forces played a fundamental role in the design and 
implementation of the FARC disarmament and demobilization process, a process 
 
34 This was the political discourse of the AUC leaders, although in reality they had the financial support of 
land owning elites and political elites in rural áreas (see more in Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2014b, 2019a; Gutiérrez-





catalogued by many experts as one of the most successful in the world35, not only because 
it occurred without serious incidents, but also because of the level of logistic detail that 
allowed the mobilization of more than eight thousand members of the FARC to the 
Transitory Rural Zones for Normalization (ZVTN) (Cortés & Millán, 2019; Liévano 
Bermúdez, 2018). The unprecedented active involvement of the Colombian armed forces 
in both the negotiations and the implementation of the peace agreements was part of the 
key explanations for the successful peace agreement (Cortés & Millán, 2019). That 
involvement reflected lessons learnt from the failure of previous peace talks in the 
country, demonstrating that it was important to consider the “skeptical spoilers” who felt 
excluded in the past but were involved during the peace negotiations (Nasi, 2006; 
Schirmer, 2019).  
According to the Kroc Institute, which provides technical verification and 
monitoring of the implementation of the accord through the Barometer Initiative, part of 
the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) research project36, Colombia appears in the first four 
places that predict a greater probability of success in the implementation of the peace 
agreement. After systematizing more than thirty-four peace agreements since 1989 and 
establishing fifty-one thematic categories that are part of the matrix, it was determined 
that Colombia managed to cover thirty-one categories, which would indicate a successful 
implementation process (Liévano Bermúdez, 2018). 
However, the peace agreement signed with the FARC deliberately avoids reforms 
related to the security sector (Gobierno Nacional de Colombia & FARC, 2016; Rafael 
Grasa, 2019; Liévano Bermúdez, 2018). Although little has been said about this issue, it 
was one of the most significant concessions made by the FARC, who during the 
negotiations would have requested the reconversion and reduction of the size of the 
military forces. Currently, Colombia has total of 481,100 active armed force members 
and 180,000 police force officers. Other proposals included decreasing defense spending 
to 2% of GDP (defense spending in Colombia for 2018 was 3.2%37), the transformation 
 
35 See more about the role of The Armed Forces in the Colombian Peace process in the following 
report: https://noref.no/About-NOREF/News/New-publication-The-role-of-the-Armed-Forces-
in-the-Colombian-peace-processl. See also  Schirmer (2019). 







of military education into a civilian one, and the elimination of army radio stations. For 
the Colombian government, the transformation of the army or the police were red flags. 
Former president Juan Manuel Santos in public testimony to Colombian´s truth 
commission on the 11 of June 2021 (few hours after I did the oral defence of this thesis) 
asked for forgiveness for extrajudicial killings committed by Colombian armed forces 
during the time he was defense minister. In his declaration he explain why the 
transformation of the security sector was a red flag for him during the peace negotiations, 
he said: “We made the decision not to negotiate with the FARC the future of our armed 
forces. In all the peace processes, there is not a single case where the armed forces have 
not been included as part of the peace negotiation agenda, and we said from the beginning 
no to this. That was a commitment of mine with the state forces out of some respect since 
they would feel very mistreated knowing that FARC was to determine their future, and I 
understood them,  that's why I drew a red line, and I never allowed to discuss the future 
of the armed forces at the negotiating table” (Santos, 2021). The General Mejía, a former 
army commander and government delegate in Havana, stated in a Conference in 2015: 
“The transformation of the Army is carried out by the military, the changes in our 
doctrine are made by us because we are the ones who know these issues, here, no civilians 
will come, nor will any organization come to make us do those changes” (G. Mejia, 
2015). Both statement stands in contrast to international research asserting that reforms 
to the security sector are essential to maintain peace and avoid cycles of violence (Ansorg 
& Gordon, 2019; Nicole Ball, 2010; DCAF, 2006; Hänggi & Hagmann, 2006; Sedra, 
2010). The General Mejía, statement confirmed the legacies of the Lleras Doctrine in 
which the members of the military forces declare themselves the only ones capable and 
with the authority to make reforms to their institutions, showing their autonomy from the 
security state institutions and the limitation of civilian power over them.  
In the next section of the chapter, I will introduce the points of the peace agenda. 
I will describe some of them in detail, introducing some information that is useful to 
understanding the relationship between my research questions and the current political, 
social and economic situation of the country after the agreement. 
4.5 The Colombian peace agreement and the roots of the conflict  
 The peace agreement represents Colombia’s most holistic and comprehensive effort to 
address the root causes of conflict and fulfill victims’ rights to date. The peace agenda 





represent the key roots of the Colombian conflict, and also provide a broad 
contextualization to understand the justification of the case study selection, research 
questions, and methodology of this study. 
4.5.1 Points of the Peace Agenda (Colombia, 2016): 
1) Towards a New Colombian Countryside: Comprehensive Rural Reform 
 (p. 10-33) 
2) Political Participation: A democratic opportunity to build peace (p. 34-56) 
3) End of the Conflict (p.57-103) 
This point refers the bilateral cease-fire, which agreed that FARC guerrillas will 
hand in all weapons to the United Nations. 
4) Solution to the Problem of Illicit Drugs (p. 104-131) 
5) Agreement Regarding the Victims of the Conflict (p.132-203) 
This point refers to the “transitional justice”. 
6) Implementation and Verification mechanisms (p.204-231) 
This item stablishes the mechanisms of the agreement implementation. 
4.5.1.1 Point 1. Comprehensive rural reform 
This point recognizes that rural poverty and unequal land distribution was a 
fundamental reason for FARC’s justification to take up arms in 1964, following the 
Marxist-inspired agrarian movements that fought to defend the rights of landless 
peasants. An OXFAM report published at the end of 2016 shows that 84% of small 
Colombian farms controlled just 4% of productive land. Moreover, only 7 of the 22 
million hectares with agricultural potential that the country has are used. But 82% of this 
proactive land is in the hands of only 10% of the total owners, while 68% of the farms 
are less than 5 hectares, and only 50% of the land is formalized (OXFAM, 2016).  
The Colombian conflict was mainly perpetrated in rural areas of the country and 
entire communities have been forcible displaced, and most of them were indigenous and 
Afro-descendant communities38 (see more in Steele, 2011, 2017b). One of the promises 
with the peace agreement is that the State will support the process of communities 
 
38 After Colombia, comes Afghanistan with 4.7 million, and Iraq, with 4.2 million people 





returning to their lands and it will create a Land Fund (Fondo de Tierras) for the free 
distribution of land to rural people without land, or with insufficient land. The Summary 
of Colombia’s Agreement states in this point (Colombia, 2016): 
The Comprehensive Rural Reform (Reforma Rural Integral - RRI) seeks to lay 
down the foundation for the transformation of rural Colombia, create the 
conditions to ensure the health and well-being of the rural population and, in 
doing so, contribute to guarantee non-repetition of the conflict and to the 
construction of a stable and long-lasting peace.  
 
The scope of this point is to strengthen the state’s role as guarantor of property 
rights for both small and large farmers, to provide security and quality standards of life. 
In consequence, the state also promised to provide roads, schools, health clinics, and 
economic support for rural communities (LeGrand, van Isschot, & Riaño-Alcalá, 2017). 
These elements are part of the “territorial peace” concept that is part of the spirit of the 
Colombian peace agenda (see more about "territorial peace" in Cairo et al., 2018; A. J. 
Lederach, 2017; J. P. Lederach & Lederach, 2014; Meléndez, 2017). A major obstacle in 
the implementation of this point of the agenda is the history of displacement, in which 
more than 40% of peasants lost their lands in the process because they were stolen or 
bought at very low prices by powerful landlords or national and transnational companies. 
Some companies started economic projects in conflict areas that were previously 
subjected to forced displacement, and where the rural communities’ rights to the land 
were never legally recognized. The National Center of Historical Memory, in its 2016 
report, Land and Rural Conflict, argues that one of the effects of the armed conflict was 
that “transient crops planted by the peasants are replaced by agro-industrial crops such 
as oil palm, sugar cane and teak” (see more in CNMH, 2016; Romero, 2003; 
Volckhausen, 2018).  
This occurred with the collaboration of the state – politicians, notaries, and rural 
agencies of the state were massively complicit in these confiscations. But these 
phenomena go beyond dispossession and eviction; they also include coalitions between 
paramilitary groups, the agrarian rich sector and narcotraffickers. For instance, 
paramilitaries were involved in massive processes of displacement, land theft, and land 
transference to some of their allies (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2014b, 2015, 2019a, 2019b; Steele, 
2017b). Today, as mentioned above, social leaders in the rural areas that support the 





(for a review, see Prem, Rivera, Romero, & Vargas, 2019; Rivera et al., 2018; Rural, 
2019). 
4.5.1.2 Point 2. Political participation: a democratic opportunity  
 This point incorporates the reintegration of FARC into a political party, and it 
also acknowledges the historical legacies of political exclusion and political violence 
toward the opposition and left-wing political parties. In the formal document of the 
Colombian agreement, this point opens with the following paragraph: 
 
Building peace requires taking advantage of a democratic opportunity to 
strengthen pluralism and, as such, the representation of the different visions and 
interests of society, in order to promote and strengthen citizen participation in 
matters of public interest, and to outlaw violence as a method of political action.  
 
The political party successor to FARC (with shares the same acronym but stands 
for Common Alternative Revolutionary Party) has public financial and security support, 
and access to the media. Moreover, to guarantee the participation of FARC in the 
Congress, the agreement declares that for the first two elections, FARC will have ten 
special seats in Congress. Nevertheless, the Colombian civil war’s coexistence with 
democratic politics reveals that political participation and democratization reforms do 
not guarantee the end of political violence. In the words of Steele and Schubiger (2018): 
“Asking civilians to participate in public, political decisions in an unstable environment 
puts them at grave risk of suffering violent retribution by armed actors” (p. 588). As a 
consequence, without the protection for both politicians and civilians, this can create the 
incentive to request the assistance of external armed actors with the capacity to protect 
them. Colombia has a history of political exclusion, and along with this, a long tradition 
of seeing political adversaries as an enemy to be eliminated. Before the birth of the 
guerrillas in the 1960s, regional elites were involved in a painful cycle of internal conflict 
along bipartisan lines, the liberals and conservatives, in the period known as La 
Violencia (1948-1956), in which more than 160,00 people were killed (Ferreyra & 
Segura, 2000; Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2015; Henderson, 1985).  
This conflict was solved through a consociational agreement called the National 





development device (Dufort, 2017; Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2007). Although this pact mitigated 
the levels of political violence, it generated unintended consequences because it 
eliminated the legitimacy of the political and electoral democratic system. The national 
front restricted competitive elections due to the two traditional parties closing the doors 
to other political parties. Under these conditions, new social groups that were emerging 
doing the 1960s faced a lot of obstacles using political and institutional channels to 
express their political ideas and concerns (for a review, see Groves, 1974; Leal Buitrago, 
1989, 2002; Sánchez & Bakewell, 1985). For that reason, many guerrilla movements 
emerged, inspired by the Cuban revolution and other Marxist movements in the region. 
In consequence, a large number of citizens and new political leaders who did not identify 
with the traditional parties, were considered outsiders of the system. This was the 
beginning of the criminalization of the opposition (Aranguren-Romero, 2016; Cruz-
Rodríguez, 2017; Leal Buitrago, 2002), and the materialization of the Colombian long-
standing tradition of defining social contestation as a violation of public order and 
essentially criminal (LeGrand et al., 2017, p. 261).  
A few years later, when the National Front came to an end in 1976, a law 
established the National Security Doctrine39, and both traditional parties supported the 
military’s objective of fighting the communist enemy (Ferreyra & Segura, 2000; Leal 
Buitrago, 2002, 2003). In 1982, the president initiated different peace negotiations with 
multiple insurgent groups, and in 1985, the Colombian government adopted two 
important democratization reforms: 
1. They approved a new Political Party, Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica-UP) 
a left alternative to the two traditional parties created by the FARC leader 
Jacobo Arenas who “conceived of the UP as filling a gap in the war on all 
fronts strategy, which called for the FARC to pursue revolution through 
violent and nonviolent means, including elections.  
2. Second, it amended the constitution to allow the direct election of municipal 
mayors (alcaldes) (Steele & Schubiger, 2018, p. 589). 
 
39 This doctrine, implemented in various countries in Latin America, had three main 
consequences: it replaced national sovereignty with national security as the objective of the 
military, it singled out an internal enemy, and it politicized the intervention of the armed forces 





The consequence of these reforms was an intensification of political violence. 
The UP voters not only attracted the attention of paramilitary groups, the reforms also 
increased the incentives of traditional political leaders to make allies with paramilitary 
groups because they felt threatened by the new political party. This was an opportunity 
for the paramilitaries to expand and consolidate in the territories (Gutiérrez-Sanín & 
Baron, 2005; Romero, 2003; Steele & Schubiger, 2018). The paramilitaries, with the 
support of the state armed forces, targeted left-wing parties, new civil society 
organizations, penetrating regions and communities by force, especially those where the 
guerrillas had influence and were committing selective massacres (Avilés, 2006; 
Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2008, 2014b; Gutiérrez-Sanín & Baron, 2005). Women, peasants, 
indigenous and Afro-Colombian people, human rights organizations and labour unions 
were frequently threatened and attacked (Aranguren-Romero, 2016; Gómez-Suárez, 
2007, 2010; LeGrand et al., 2017).  
Despite the Colombia government opening elections to the UP, it failed to protect 
them and more than half of their candidates and supporters were assassinated or exiled, 
even after they officially declared that they had broken relations with the FARC in 
February 1989 (see more in CNMH, 2018; Gómez-Suárez, 2007, 2010, 2011; Steele, 
2011; Steele & Schubiger, 2018). Similar consequences occurred after the political 
reintegration of M-19, an urban Marxist guerrilla group that existed between 1974 and 
1990. This group mostly operated in cities. It attracted university students and presented 
itself as an armed intellectual protest against the Colombian government (Le Blanc, 2013; 
Messaoudi Rodriguez, 2011). During the demobilization of M-19, about 7,000 members 
laid down their arms, but at least 600 of them, including one of their leaders, a popular 
presidential candidate, Carlos Pizarro Leon Gómez, were murdered in the 1990s 
(Semana, 2000).  
Systematic resistance of the political system to the opposition and left-wing 
political ideologies is part of the Colombian history of conflict and democratization. 
Unfortunately, since the last peace agreement, more than 400 social leaders have been 
targeted and killed, and more than 185 former combatants of the FARC have been 
murdered. This historical legacy of political exclusion and violence against the 
opposition persisted, even after institutional democratization processes. For this reason, 
some authors like Nussio (2020) suggest that the country is living under another partial 





4.5.1.3 Point 4: Solution to the problem of illicit drugs  
One important contextual factor that explains the perpetuation of violence in 
Colombia is the issue of illegal economies, particularly narco-trafficking (Duncan, 2014; 
Gutierrez, Tobón, Suarez, Vanegas, & Duncan, 2016; Weiskopf et al., 2017). Currently, 
cocaine production in Colombia is at historic levels: enough coca is grown to produce 
almost 1,400 tons of cocaine a year. The FARC dissident groups benefit from flourishing 
coca production since the peace negotiations, as do the dissident and rearmed groups 
from the United Self-Defense Forces (AUC). AUC was an illegal paramilitary group that 
fought alongside the government against the insurgencies and was responsible for more 
than 1,000 massacres, forced displacements and human rights violations (Nussio, 2020; 
Tate, 2001, 2009, 2015). 
The government and FARC delegations announced in May 2014, through  
legislative decree 896 prior to the formal signing of the final agreement in 2016, the 
creation of a “Comprehensive National Programme for the Substitution of Crops for 
Illicit Use” (Programa National Integral de Sustitutición de Cultivos de Uso Ilícito 
(PNIS) “in order to generate the material and intangible conditions for well-being and 
good living amongst populations affected by crops for illicit use, in particular for rural 
communities in situations of poverty that currently derive their subsistence from these 
crops.” By the middle of 2019, 100,000 rural families that had been involved in the crop 
substitution program eradicated 30,000 hectares of coca and this program showed 
extremely low levels of recidivism (Mejía, Prem, & Vargas, 2019). 
Nevertheless, the current government has failed to comply with this program. 
These families who used to depend economically on illegal crops to survive are caught 
between government priorities. The impact of the program is not effective in the eyes of 
the United States, and so the national government has submitted to international pressure 
and has decided to return to the strategies of forced eradication and aerial glyphosate 
fumigation, even though these strategies, implemented in the past, proved insufficient to 
eradicate or reduce the problem of illegal crop cultivation (Franz, 2016; Gordon et al., 
2020; Loveman, 2006; Nussio, 2020; Weiskopf et al., 2017) . In fact, these strategies 





international market (Lindsay-Poland, 2018)40. The right-wing political parties in the 
country support the eradication measures. The opposition, mostly left and center-left 
parties, oppose this, arguing that forced eradication measures do not have tangible effects 
in reducing the planting of illegal crops. They have also cited studies that argue that 
glyphosate has negative impacts on human health and the environment, such as cancer, 
skin problems, miscarriages, deforestation, water pollution, and harm to amphibians 
(Camacho & Mejia, 2017; Cimino, Boyles, Thayer, & Perry, 2017; Isacson, 2019; 
McDade & Christians, 2000; Peñaranda, 2019; Regidor, Ronda, García, & Domínguez, 
2004; Sherret, 2005; Thompson, Solomon, Wojtaszek, Edginton, & Stephenson, 2006).  
Some experts reported significant increases in coca cultivation after the 
announcement of the government about the crop substitution program (Ladino, Saavedra, 
& Wiesner, 2019; Mejía et al., 2019; Nussio, 2020; Prem et al., 2019). They suggested 
that the earlier announcement created a perverse incentive because peasants interpreted 
the “material conditions” as understanding that the government would provide direct 
money transfers in exchange for voluntary substitution of illegal crops (Mejía et al., 
2019). Peasants believe that if they have coca crops they will finally have the attention 
of the state, providing not only the possibility of a decent income, but also infrastructure 
like schools, hospitals and other basic services. This increase in cultivation makes the 
success of the crop substitution program look insufficient in the eyes of the government 
and the United States, who prefer to continue support economically and militarily the 
country  with forced eradication strategies. Additionally, the social leaders who advocate 
for crop substitution have been systematically killed by illegal armed groups that consider 
them a threat because they affect their finances (Gutiérrez-Sanín, Marín, Machuca, 
Parada, & Rojas, 2020; Nussio, 2020; ONU, 2020). The government is continuing with 
a narrative that criminalizes civilians involved in illegal crops and even the social leaders 
who support the crop substitution program. Then as Gordon et al. (2020) states: “coca 
growers are trapped between the slow implementation of the voluntary eradication 
programme, the pressure of illegal groups to stop eradication, and the forced eradication 
program” (p. 9). The soldiers that died during the forced eradication because coca crops 
are full of landmines are often part of a narrative of sacrifice, while civilian victims are 
 
40 Most of the cocaine produced in Colombia is exported, with about 55% of production sold in 





regarded with suspicion because “they must have been doing something [wrong]” (ONU, 
2020).  
The Army has entered this debate. Soldiers are sent to the territories to support 
forced manual eradication operations of these crops, and they fly the aircraft that carry 
out aerial herbicide fumigation. Furthermore, The Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioners for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) wrote in paragraph 56 in their recent 
report on Colombia that security forces put civilians at risk from landmine or improvised 
explosive device explosions (IED) by employing them in illicit crop eradiation (ONU, 
2020). The US government pressure in the country to increase coca eradication is making 
it more difficult to implement the substitution programs, forcing the state to focus on 
eradication. The soldiers in these scenarios face the civilian population, who, on 
occasion, respond aggressively and there have been clashes (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2020a; 
Observatorio de Tierras, 2020). The criminalization of civilians as a consequence of the 
war on drugs puts the soldiers in a difficult position. They have the duty to follow the 
orders of the Government. However, one of the soldiers that I interviewed as part of this 
study said: 
 
The government puts us between a rock and a hard place. We must protect 
civilians, but at the same time they send us to face them by taking away what 
feeds them. What remains in the memory of these families is not: the government 
came and eradicated the coca plant, no, they say: the soldiers came and took our 
bread from our mouths. 
 
In Colombia, the war on drugs converged with counter-insurgency strategies, the 
notion of the communist enemy, and the war on terror. These factors together produced 
an idiosyncratic framing of the internal enemy in Colombia. In other words, the internal 
enemy in Colombia was not only the rebels in illegal groups, or the civilians who 
supported them; they were also the civilians with left-wing identity, and those who have 
coca crops. Sometimes the intersectionality of these identities converges as the same 
identity of military targets: peasants, natives and anti-status quo activists. This way to 
frame the enemies resonated with the anachronistic, conservative political character 
developed during the early decades of the twentieth century in the military culture 
(Dufort, 2017). An essential faction of the army resisted understanding the Colombian 





comprehend the context that explain the roots of the armed conflict, and ignored the 
demands of the peasants. 
As a consequence, the security sector has struggled to make distinctions between 
the illegal armed groups and the populations of the regions (Wills, 2014). With this in 
mind, I argue that Colombian soldiers developed biases against civilians because of the 
war on drugs that not only ended up criminalizing peasants, they also ended up 
contributing to the perpetuation of violence through the stigmatization of peasants, 
because they considered them security threats (EAFIT, 2016). For this reason, in the 
second experiment of this study (see chapter 7), I use a trolley dilemma experiment to 
test if the soldier’s willingness to make costly sacrifices is affected by the policy 
preferences of the civilians connected with one of the points of the peace agenda on 
illegal drugs. Furthermore, I also explore some of the individual characteristics of the 
soldiers associated with the devoted actor model to test the impact of the war on drugs 
on Colombian soldiers’ self-sacrifice. Although the devoted actor model was not 
specified in the theoretical chapter, it may be of interest to investigate whether the 
variables associated with this model can complement the individual’s understanding of 
ideology internalization. 
4.6 Why talking about legacies of conflict in the context of Colombia  
Some scholars may argue that the idea of talking about legacies or post-conflict in 
a context like Colombia is inaccurate. However, the debate about this terminology is very 
much alive and needs further research and theoretical development, which is enough for 
another doctoral thesis. However, I will like to acknowledge the debate behind this 
terminology and argue why I decided to use it despite its criticisms.  
The origin of the term post-conflict is attributed to the former UN Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who used it, for the first time, in his 1992 document An 
Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). After this, the term was part of the lexicon used 
among international relations scholars and practitioners (Hozic, 2014). Some of them 
link the term post-conflict with the UN’s intention to create the political space necessary 
to justify state-building and peacebuilding international interventions (Heathershaw & 
Lambach, 2008; Hozic, 2014; McLeod, 2011). The dominant approach of the post-
conflict refers to a period after signed peace treaties, and rebel combatants are no longer 
participating in an official war (McLeod, 2011). For some scholars, “the ‘post-conflict’ 





and this violence are being addressed in new modalities of internationalized governance” 
(Heathershaw & Lambach, 2008, p. 278). Scholars denounced that the post-conflict 
narrative assumes a simplistic linear problem-solving understanding of conflict 
resolution by creating a metaphor that draws a path from the horrors of war to the 
promises of peace. However, How can we differentiate between periods of conflict and 
post-conflict? When exactly does the post-conflict begin, and when is it over?  How do 
we come to think of post-conflict as better or worse than war? (Hozic, 2014, p. 20). Those 
are questions that arise due to the continuation of violence and the ambiguousness that 
characterizes those times after formal agreements or demobilization, or combatants took 
place. Thus, scholars have debated the limitations and consequences of talking about 
post-conflict for more than two decades now (Collier & Collier, 2003; MacGinty, 2016; 
Ssorin-Chaikov, 2018).  
One of the most significant theoretical and empirical contributions to this debate 
comes from feminist peace and conflict studies scholars and their understanding of 
security in the imaginary continuum of violence between peace and wartime (Wibben, 
2019). Feminist studies extend from domestic violence to structural violence of poverty 
challenging  the simplification that the post-conflict terminology imprint in the temporary 
comprehension of violence by showing a nuanced view of the spaces of violent conflict, 
peace negotiations, and the afterwards. For example, Annick Wibben (2019) argues that 
“feminist studies reveal how the context of war brings new women roles as combatants 
or new positions in the formal economy, it simultaneously can lead to greater scrutiny of 
their activities, such as their sexual relations” (p. 117) while peace agreements may end 
up reinforcing societal exclusion conditions by excluding women from the negotiations 
in the first place (See more in Ahäll, 2015; Benzing, 2019; Henshaw, 2017; Vastapuu, 
2018).  
In Colombia, as in other so-called post-conflict societies, violence continues 
despite the agreement and the formal political reintegration of the FARC-EP. Then, why 
talking about legacies of conflict? I argue that Colombian policymakers and members 
within the security forces believe that state forces did not have an ideological identity 
preference that may affect their perception toward civilians. They consider this a question 
of the past, associated with the  Cold War times, and the counterinsurgency strategies 
implemented after the Colombian Army participated in the Korean War (J. E. Ugarriza 
& Ayala Pabón, 2017). Despite their acknowledgment of the influence of the US anti-





as something that has been overcome (Rojas Guevara, 2017). They assumed that because 
the criminalization toward the left-wing political ideas is not explicit in the manuals 
anymore, the state security forces are politically neutral.  
While I am writing, Colombia is living two months of protest, where at least 43 
people have died at the hands of the state, and hundreds of protesters are reported missing. 
The state violence disclose the persistence of the counterinsurgency mentality within the 
police and the military by treat government political antagonists as public enemy’s 
(Gómez Delgado, 2021). The government deploys military assistance for the police and 
criminalize the social mobilization by describes and labels their actions as violent, 
vandalism, and low-intensity urban terrorism (BBC, 2021; CrisisGroup, 2021).  In May 
2021, the former president Álvaro Uribe, leader of the political party of President Ivan 
Duque, tweeted about “dissipated molecular revolution” (DMR) as the cause of the 
cycles of protest in Colombia, after one of his tweets where eliminated by Twitter for 
glorification of violence due to encouraging the use of the arms by the military forces to 
deal with the protesters. Later on, a local newspaper revealed that the concept of 
“dissipated molecular revolution” was introduced by a member of neo-nazi groups in 
Chile that was formally invited by the Colombian military to give  presentations and 
advice to the country security sector about an intercontinental communist conspiracy that 
aims to take over Latin America (Gómez Polo, 2021).  
I decided to use the terms of legacies of conflict because I consider how local and 
international actors comprehend the temporality of the conflict. After all, the audience in 
this thesis is not exclusively academics. I aim to introduce a discussion among 
policymakers and members within the security forces in Colombia and beyond about the 
importance of considering wartime cleavages and how they may impact the behavior of 
members within the security sector towards civilians during the conflict, and even after  
peace agreements are signed. In the imaginary of these state forces in Colombia, the 
notions of the internal enemy, the criminalization of the opposition, and the association 
of left-wing political ideas with the identity of the threats and enemies are assumed, as 
long as they are not explicitly described in the doctrine as non-existent. However, I intend 
to empirically show how these mentalities shaped by war cleavages are may maintained 
in the social practices within the institution and manifest themselves in the way in which 








One of the biggest challenges that Colombia confronts after signing the peace 
agreement is to build peace in the midst of high levels of violence. According to the 
international community, security and development are connected, and are vital 
foundations for the sustainability of peace. Nevertheless, in Colombia “there is still an 
emphasis on a security-first approach that aims at state-building and subordinates 
development concerns to that overall goal, which creates an imbalance that translates as 
well into actor choices for the peacebuilding policies to be applied locally” (M. Nilsson, 
2018).  
The securitization of development or subordination of development objectives 
and activities for security concerns have negative consequences because the initiatives of 
security are short-term oriented, and intended to regulate and control citizens instead of 
being inclusive, long-term development policies. The security strategies are usually 
focused on the hard-line idea of security, understood as those concerning capability, 
equipment, and efficiency – in practical terms, policy and military patrols, and equipment 
for those institutions (Buur, Jensen, & Stepputat, 2007; Duffield, 2010). 
This vision ignores that the security institutions themselves need to change the 
way they understand security and how they define enemies and threats after conflict ends. 
Without these changes, the security objectives could contribute to the perpetuation of 
violence. As M. Nilsson (2018) argues, in Colombia all the development activities are 
subordinated to the idea of “Security, state consolidation and the control of the criminal 
actors and the illicit economy as their financial bases” (p. 39) and the enemy-centric 
understanding of security. The persistence of the internal enemy logic in the mentality of 
members of the state security institutions will bring new debates to the literature of peace 
and conflict.  
For that reason, the methodological and theoretical approaches of this study 
challenge the traditional approaches that study the role of states in the dynamics of 
internal armed conflicts. In this study, using the Colombian case, the aim is to stimulate 
new theoretical and methodological discussions on how state armed actors can contribute 
to the perpetuation of violence, transcending traditional arguments about state weakness 
and institutional approaches.  
The history of the Colombian armed conflict suggests that illegality and violence 





actors carry out a process of moral disengagement, such as Bandura (1999, 2002, 2016) 
suggested, to deal with cognitive dissonance, distorting reality, and turning violent, 
illegal behavior into acceptable conduct when it is carried out by actors with the same 
political ideology. To the best of my knowledge, the methodological and theoretical 
approaches implemented in this study have not been studied in previous literature. My 
argument is that state institutions that have been most exposed to the conflict, such as the 
security institutions and, in particular, their members, develop biases, which makes it 
possible to question the willingness of state agents to protect civilians or their 
justification for exercising violence against them after the direct conflict ended. In the 






5 Research Design and Methods  
This chapter outlines the research design and methods of this study. First, I 
introduce the justification of mixed methods as the methodological design of this study, 
and explain the data collection design, data analysis and the advantages and 
disadvantages of this methodology. Then, I explain the quantitative component by 
presenting the field-work preparation, some contextual challenges, and the sample 
studied. Subsequently, I introduce the qualitative section, focusing on the structure of the 
interviews, the participants studied, some contextual challenges and the qualitative 
techniques applied to enrich and expand the initial quantitative findings. I close this 
chapter with some personal reflections about the research field work experience, and data 
analysis of this study. 
5.1 Mixed methods research design  
In order to explain and understand the influence of political and ideological bias 
in the behavior of members of the Colombian Army, I applied a mixed methods approach. 
In this study, the mixed method strategy emphasises the quantitative data for the analysis 
and interpretation of the results.  Nevertheless, to gain a more nuanced understanding of 
the quantitative results, qualitative data was gathered. According to Creswell and Plano 
Clark (2011) and Creswell (2013), the recommended mixed methods design in this case 
is an explanatory sequential mixed methods design (ESMM). The ESMM is common for 
researchers who have a quantitative background and are relatively new to qualitative 
approaches. In theory, this design involves two distinct phases: quantitative, followed by 
qualitative. In this order, the quantitative results usually guide the qualitative phase in 
terms of participant selection and the questions to be included in the interviews (Creswell, 
2013, p. 224). 
  The logical relation between the two methods is that the data and analysis of the 
quantitative component provides an overall understanding of the research problem. As a 
result, the qualitative section is intended to enhance and explain the statistical results by 
exploring the participants’ views in more depth (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 104). 
In this study, some logistical and contextual constraints concerning the contextual timing 
of the data collection made it impossible for the researcher to follow the model in the 
precise way recommended in the literature. For this reason, in the following subsection, 





and analysis procedure. I also emphasize the potential limitations and general advantages 
of this study design. 
5.2 Data collection design and data analysis  
The databases from the quantitative and qualitative approaches were collected 
concurrently, rather than sequentially, as the literature recommended for an ESMM 
design, due to some constraining external factors: access to the participants for this study 
(soldiers), in the context of the transition from war to peace, corresponding to the first 
year of the new government (2018-2019); the historical distrust between local academics 
and the security institutions in Colombia and the region (I will explain this later on); and 
finally, the impact of the new government on my contacts in the army.  
As mentioned in chapter 4, the new government in Colombia was opposed to the 
peace negotiations. The electoral competition – between a left-wing political leader who 
was an ex-member of an urban guerrilla group called M-19 in the 1970s, and who actively 
supported the peace agreement, and a right-wing political leader who was a member of 
the political party opposed to the peace negotiations – was very tight. The right-wing 
candidate won the elections in June 2018, and this had repercussions for my initial plans. 
According to the literature, the first years after a peace agreement are turbulent and 
violence can increase (Carey & González, 2020; Steenkamp, 2005). Moreover, postwar 
governments struggle to adapt to the new context and regulate the social and political 
conflict (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2015).  
Colombia was no exception, and as mentioned in previous chapters, the 
systematic assassination of social leaders, human rights defenders and ex-combatants 
increased since the peace agreement was signed, and this worsened with the new 
government. This situation exacerbated the historical difficulty of conducting studies that 
involve the security institutions, which are uncommon not only in Colombia also in the 
region (Aparicio Barrera, 2016; Schirmer, 1998a, 2012). The legacy of dictatorships in 
Latin America and the influence of Marxism in the social sciences made studying 
security institutions in the region a taboo. Hence, the type of studies about the police and 
the military forces oscillated between apologetic and condemnation studies of the state 
security sector behavior (Aparicio Barrera, 2016; Couselo, 1999; Heresmann, 2011). By 
this same politicization, academics have been classified into those who work to favor the 






In the case of the military forces in Colombia, researchers have mostly focused 
on historiographic studies, and institutional approaches to the relationship between 
institutions, the government and the society (e.g. Blair Trujillo, 1999; Blair-Trujillo, 
1993; Cruz-Rodríguez, 2015; Dufort, 2017; Leal Buitrago, 2006; Pizarro, 1995). 
However, individual level approaches are still very limited, with some exceptions in 
recent years (e.g. Forero Angel, 2017a, 2017b; Forero Angel et al., 2018; Rivera-Páez, 
2017, 2019a, 2019b). These authors have faced the dilemma of being classified as anti-
military, accused of being ideologically biased or as propaganda voices for the security 
institutions. I expand this point in chapter 9. 
Additionally, in Colombia, there is a historical distrust between the security 
institutions and academia, especially toward local academics (Rafael  Grasa, 2017; 
Schirmer, 2019; Wills et al., 2017). Traditionally, there is a sector within the army that 
associates local academics with liberal ideas or “leftists” ideas. Therefore, they consider 
local academics as potential threats. Moreover, the academy has been associated with the 
ideological affinities of the insurgent groups on multiple occasions (CNMH, 2013). 
Evidence of this appears in the article by Schirmer (2019), where the author points out 
that her project was possible because she was a foreigner; actually, her local colleagues 
were the ones who persuaded her to be the leader of the project because the soldiers will 
trust her more easily than them, just for being a foreigner. This point become more crucial 
during the presentation of some previous findings of this thesis in conferences and 
seminars to international audiences. I usually get comments about: why you did not ask 
to the soldiers more direct questions about their ideological preferences or opinions about 
the peace agreement such as the political reintegration of the rebels. These questions 
usually revels the level of ignorance about the context, the lack of positionality by the 
foreigners researchers, and lack awareness of the challenges and risk that local 
researchers need to face. For a foreigner asking some questions to soldiers may be easier 
than as a local researcher. In fact, in my experience, soldiers tend to trust more in none 
Colombian academics, especially if they come from the global north. However, there is 
a lot of risk and dilemma for local academics. Therefore, if we want to address some 
questions and keep the trust and the relationship with the institutions, we need to develop 
alternatives mechanisms to collect reliable data about sensitive topics. 
 This may also explain the lack of academic research on the security sector in the 
country by local academics. Unlike other countries, such as the United States or some 





army, in Latin America, in general, and Colombia in particular, access to members of 
these institutions is very much restricted.  
Finally, the window of opportunity to access the participants was narrowing due 
to the current political situation. Since 2014, I began my position as a consultant and 
academic researcher in different projects with the military forces in Colombia. These 
years of building trust occurred under the umbrella of the peace negotiations and the 
contacts I managed to make in the country were skeptical, but they mostly supported the 
intentions of peace and the peace agreement. However, the political landscape changed 
after the presidential elections in 2018. As a consequence, the window of opportunity to 
access the population was narrowing.  
5.3 Advantages and disadvantages of data collection design and data 
analysis 
With the new president coming to power, a majority of the military elites who 
had participated during the peace negotiation was replaced within the army by a 
generation of soldiers called “warriors” (troperos in Spanish) in the media, because of 
their recognition in military operations; some of them were accused of human rights 
abuses (Betín, 2018; HRW.org, 2019). This created a difficult environment in which to 
conduct a project like as the present one, and together with the reasons presented above, 
resulted in some limitations in the design of this study. First, even though the quantitative 
and qualitative databases are analyzed separately, a third form of interpretation is 
employed, where the qualitative findings help to improve the explanations of the 
quantitative results. This is contrary to the template suggested in the ESMM design 
described by Creswell (2013) and Creswell and Creswell (2018b), where the quantitative 
results are used to plan the qualitative follow-up. In this study, because the data was 
collected concurrently, the qualitative questions were not based on the quantitative 
results.  
This creates two disadvantages, one in terms of the qualitative sampling 
procedure. In the ideal ESMM model, the quantitative results inform the sampling 
selections in the qualitative approach. The other issue is that the qualitative results should 
indicate the type of qualitative research questions. However, to mitigate these 
disadvantages I tried to guarantee that the samples for both methods were as similar as 
possible: low ranks, middle and high-middle ranks were privileged. Also, to guarantee 





structural and contextual challenges, the research questions in the qualitative interviews 
tried to address the same topics and variables that the quantitative survey adopted, 
following the recommendations of Creswell and Creswell (2018b) concerning data 
collection in the sequential mixed-methods. Ideally, the key concept with this design is 
to collect both forms of data using the same or parallel variables, constructs or concepts 
(p. 219). Then, during the interpretation phase the qualitative finding are used to explain 
the quantitative results. Figure 5.1. represents the mixed-method design applied in this 
study. 










Despite the limitations of this design, it has some advantages in studying the 
influence of ideological bias on soldiers’ attitudes and behaviors in post-peace agreement 
societies. The first benefit of this study’s design is the unit of analysis, the individual 
level. Second, the experimental survey approach makes random distribution of the 
independent variables possible. Third, the online mobile research methods guarantee an 
increased response rate, real-time access to the data, low cost and larger samples. Some 
researchers have been reflecting about the advantages but also the limitations of mobile 
phones in hard-to-access populations and difficult contexts (see more in Firchow & 
MacGinty, 2020).  
Fourth, the factorial experiment design of the survey experiment reduces the 
social desirability bias, specially around sensible topics. Finally, a mixed methods 
approach complements the statistical results with a better understanding of soldiers’ 
attitudes and beliefs. 
The benefit of using individual level data in an experimental survey is that it can 
reveal the potential heterogeneous treatment effect across the participant’s treatment 
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soldiers. This makes it possible to study the differences within two levels, one between 
treatment groups, and also between individuals controlling the social desirability biases 
(Sundberg, 2015). Furthermore, random assignment guarantees that, on average, all the 
treatment groups have similar characteristics, eliminating omitted variable bias. In other 
words, a random assignment implies that there is an equal probability of picking each 
unit from the population being studied when creating the sample. Hence, the potential 
human bias in the selection of cases is reduced. It is thus possible to make statistical 
inferences from the sample to the population, which are more likely to have external 
validity (Mujere, 2016). Another major advantage of a web-based survey is the capability 
of collecting a large quantity of data from a population that has access to the online survey 
at the same time. In this way, a relatively large sample size can be achieved within very 
short periods of time (Wright, 2019).  
Compared to traditional surveys methods, online surveys are much cheaper and 
mitigate human errors during data collection, through digitalizing the responses of the 
participants. Nevertheless, there are some particular disadvantages that need to be 
considered (see more in Wright, 2019). The challenge of using an online survey was one 
of  the participants’ concerns about anonymity. As Wright (2019) shows, people who 
participate in such surveys that ask sensitive questions may be hesitant to participate 
because it is possible to obtain the person’s IP address. A careful online informed consent 
format should be applied to avoid missing participants and data. Furthermore, it is vital 
that researchers are transparent with their participants, informing them about the 
strategies employed to guarantee their anonymity and security (Couper, 2008). 
 The factorial design of the survey experiment has high statistical power, and can 
reduce the social desirability, because it can be combatted by varying many dimensions 
at once, making it difficult for the participants to ascertain what is the research question 
or the manipulations of interest (see more in Auspurg, Hinz, & Sauer, 2017). Lastly, the 
mixed methods approach can guarantee a better drawing of causal inferences because of 
the combination of complementary strengths from different methods (Creswell, 2013; R. 








5.4 Quantitative approach   
The following list summarizes the steps of the quantitative research design.  
5.4.1.1 Literature Review  
Prior to data collection, an extensive review of the literature about state violence, 
intergroup conflict, ideology in armed group behavior and military socialization 
processes was conducted. During this process, I tried to build a theoretical connection 
between these bodies of literature to identify concepts and connect variables that at the 
individual level explain aggressive behavior, support, justification and motivation for 
violence.  
5.4.1.2 Survey development: identification of scales, translation and pilots  
In order to develop the survey, I identified the concepts that were systematically 
mentioned in the literature to explain why people support and justify violence. Then, I 
explored the operationalization of those concepts, and considered how other scholars 
applied them to see how I could incorporate them in my own study (see Codebook 
Appendix 1). The majority of the scales were in English, and some of them were easy to 
access because they were explicitly introduced in the articles. In the cases where the 
scales were not accessible, I contacted the authors. For instance, I wrote to Dr. Eran 
Halperin, who shared a scale for measuring positive and negative emotions. The social 
dominant orientation scale (SDO) has a Spanish version which was previously validated 
by Dr. Hector Carvacho, and he shared the instrument to incorporate in my survey. After 
the selection of the scales, I asked two colleagues in Dunedin who are native Spanish 
speakers to help me with the translation of the scales. Then, in 2018, I conducted 20 pilots 
on Colombian colleagues and Spanish speakers in Dunedin, to test the translation of the 
scales. My Colombian colleagues, academics and other practitioners, also provided 
feedback about the content of the survey. They contributed to verifying if the 
measurement instruments from the literature were suitable for the Colombian context.  
5.4.1.3 Ethics approval 
I started the ethics application process by obtaining a formal letter on the 31th of 





and convince the Otago Ethics Committee that I would be safe during the data collection 
process. The letter from the School of War accepted my request to be a visiting scholar 
between March and June 2019. Subsequently, the University of Los Andes also accepted 
me as a visiting Ph.D. student.  I obtained approval from the University of Otago Ethics 
Approval Committee, 18/166. The committee agreed that my methodology and thesis 
achieved the standards for a human subject project, including participants’ confidentiality 
and informed consent.  
5.4.1.4 Compensation  
Compensation of participants is a consideration within both the literature and the 
University of Otago ethics application. In the last years, there is a growing debate, mainly 
in qualitative research, about the responsibility of the researcher to provide participant 
compensation to acknowledges the time and effort they have provided in participating in 
the research. Until today, few studies report or discuss about what are the best practices 
or the best type of compensation like payment or non-monetary reward given to the 
research participant. Therefore, it is not a universal practice and usually it is left to the 
discretion of the researcher (Head, 2009). After reflecting on how compensation might 
be possible, given the context of this study, After reflecting on how compensation might 
be possible, given the context of this study, I decided to provide compensation to 
participants. I provided snacks to all the soldiers who participated in the survey (N=920). 
I also invited for coffee or lunch to those who agreed to participate in the interviews 
(N=28) (see Appendix 3).  
5.4.1.5 Experimental design and scale improvements 
In November 2018, I had the opportunity to visit the Department of Peace and 
Conflict Studies at Uppsala University, Sweden. During my visit, I introduced my project 
to some professors who found resonate between my project  and their personal research 
interests and gave me input, especially on methodological design.  
An important aspect of the criticisms made by my colleagues in Colombia who had 
been part of the pilot of the original survey indicated that the nature of the questions was 
so delicate that there was a high risk of the participants lying or not answering them. My 
goal during this visit to Uppsala was to consult experts in the field with experience in 





the disadvantages of my original survey design. During this visit, I met Dr. Jonathan Hall, 
who suggested that I design an experimental survey to reduce the desirability bias and 
increase my response rate. He also introduced me to Qualtrics, a software program that 
allows the researcher to develop experimental surveys and distribute them online. I 
originally designed a paper based survey, and this new tool not only allowed for an 
increased response rate, it also reduced the risk of human error in the codification of 
answers, because this software automatically saves the responses on Excel. He also 
shared new literature with me that suggested more suitable scales for the type of unit of 
analysis of my study. I incorporated these suggestions into my research, and adapted the 
original survey questions to design an experimental survey. By the beginning of 2019, 
the survey was ready and Dr. Hall become part of my team as an external adviser.  
5.4.1.6 Quantitative data collection  
5.4.1.6.1 Pilot test  
In March 2019, two pilot tests were carried out. After these pilots, interviews with 
soldiers who participated in the test were conducted. They helped to improve the wording 
of some questions, and contributed to adapting some of them to military language. 
Finally, thanks to their help, it was possible to design a protocol in which I incorporated 
feedback about how to introduce myself and the project to the soldiers. This also helped 
me to maintain consistency in the survey application procedure: every time I applied the 
survey to a group of soldiers, I used the same words and followed the same process. This 
was a way to reduce external factors in the environment that can impact participants’ 
answers (see the protocol in Appendix 4). Finally, the pilot-tested survey was to assess 
the reliability of the instruments and test their internal consistency based on the 
measurement of Cronbach’s alpha.  
5.4.1.6.2 Final survey  
Between April and June, 2019, a total of 920 online surveys were distributed.  
5.4.1.7 Quantitative data analysis  
Descriptive statistical information about dependent and independent variables, 





using STATA16 (see chapters 6 and 7 for the quantitative findings). Parallel to the data 
collection, a research assistant from the Economics Department at the University of Los 
Andes was consulted. This person has knowledge in experimental design and STATA 
analysis. Despite having experience conducting quantitative analysis, this was the first 
time I conducted an experimental survey using factorial design. Here, I learned some of 
the mathematical assumptions behind the statistical models that I needed, as well as 
statistical tests and programing in STATA16.  
5.4.1.8 Field work preparation  
On 7th August, 2018, the newly-elected president of Colombia, Iván Duque, took 
office, and a few months later, I realized that it was important to begin data collection as 
soon as possible. As one of my professors in Colombia told me, this was a one in a million 
chance. The lack of willingness to implement the peace agreement shown by the new 
government and the president’s passive attitude to the systematic murders of social 
leaders and ex-combatants showed me that my project could potentially be considered a 
threat, and so I needed to act fast.  
This intuition was confirmed by some contacts in the army and colleagues that 
suggested I start informal conversations and contacting some people to guarantee my 
field work with the Colombian army, during the first year of the new government, before 
it settled down. By the end of October 2018, I obtained a formal document from the 
School of War accepting me as a visiting scholar to carry out my field work between 
March and June, 2020 (see Appendix 2)41. This document was crucial because by 
December 2018, the highest ranks of the Army changed and some of my contacts were 
moved to other dependencies or departments inside the army, and their level of influence 
might not be the same. Moreover, it was highly possible that the new leaders would reject 
my visit. My anxiety about not being able to collect the data for this project continued 
even after arriving in Colombia. Before planning my data collection schedule, I needed 
to win the trust of the new leaders within the School of War who didn’t know me. To 
achieve this, it was important to consider how to introduce myself and my project.  
 






 Fortunately, I found an article during my literature review by Gerras and Wong 
(2013) from the Army School of War in the United States, called “Changing minds in 
the army: why it is so difficult and what to do about it”. I used this article to frame my 
project during my first meeting with the head of research from the School of War. I knew 
about the close relationship between the two armies, so I thought that it was a worthwhile 
idea. The head of the research department in the School of War was a Colonel who had 
the power to accept or reject my research project and my visit as a researcher, even after 
I had received the letter of acceptance, and he was the person who had the power to 
approve my access to the participants to apply surveys and conduct interviews. 
 Fortunately, one of the authors of the article that I used to frame my project was 
one of this Colonel’s former professors, so without asking many questions he agree to 
support me with the necessary logistics. In return, I had to support whatever was 
necessary to the Centre of Research of Military Historical Memory (the institution where 
I had worked four years before), and comply with a weekly schedule between 8:00 am 
and 5:00 pm, or later. The staff of the Centre were willing to support me with their 
contacts, especially a Major in the process of promotion to lieutenant colonel who had 
many contacts within the middle ranks and was fundamental to my data collection 
process. He also completed the survey and the interview. 
 Lastly, before beginning data collection, I read about other experiences of female 
researchers working with soldiers, and particularly followed the experiences of a 
researcher who adopted an ethnographic approach with elite soldiers in Guatemala and 
Colombia, Schirmer (1998b, 2012, 2019) and also another anthropologist from 
Colombia, Ana Forero Angel (2017b, 2018a). In both scholars, I recognized most of my 
personal challenges since I had started worked with soldiers – gender issues, ethical 
consideration, moral dilemmas and emotional challenges. I will expand on these aspects 
in chapters 8 and 9. 
5.4.1.9 Sample selection considerations  
The study’s quantitative component was developed around a unique experimental 
survey. From the beginning of this study, I determined that the participants included in 
the survey would be front-line soldiers, middle and high-middle ranks. After much 





service and private basic42. This was because I wanted to understand the worldviews, 
experiences, and opinions of the soldiers who decided to pursue a military career, and 
who were most exposed to direct combat. Also, because the current high ranks may have 
viewed my project with more distrust, I decided to avoid the military elite.  
I considered that the elites in the army have little contact with the civilians and 
the soldiers, as their positions are much more administrative than operational in the 
military field. In the words of one soldier from the lower ranks that I interviewed: “They 
are more politicians than soldiers”. 
 There is also empirical evidence that demonstrated that the internalization of 
ideologies and doctrines varies across ranks in the military institutions (Hoover Green, 
2016; Oppenheim & Weintraub, 2017; Scharpf, 2018; Sondheimer et al., 2012), despite 
the assumption that in hierarchical institutions the elites’ narratives reveal the overall 
mentality of the institutions. Empirical evidence suggested that narratives, beliefs and 
mentalities can differ between ranks (Forero Angel, 2017b, 2018b). As a consequence, I 
decided to focus on the lowest ranks and the officers, not only to identify the patterns of 
the army as a group of individuals, I also wanted to unpack the army as an institution and 
recognize the potential individual differences between the soldiers, especially among the 
soldiers who are most affected by and exposed to the dynamics of war (Forero Angel, 
2017a). Moreover, studies of the military forces in Latin America and Colombia have 
usually focused on the military elites and are mainly qualitative studies (Blair Trujillo, 
1999; Blair-Trujillo, 1993; Dufort, 2017; Forero Angel, 2017b; Schirmer, 1998a, 2019). 
To my knowledge, this study represents the first attempt to explore the role of ideology, 
at the individual level, of members of the state security sector using a quantitative 
approach to explain the influence of the army in the perpetuation of political violence 
after peace agreements43.  
 
42 These are two different categories under compulsory military service. The private under 
obligatory service (soldado bachiller) is for males who have completed high school and they 
need to serve 12 months. The private basic (soldado regular) are young males who haven’t 
finished high school, and they need to serve 18 months’ compulsory military service. 
43 An unpublished article by Ugarriza, Ortiz-Ayala, and Quishpe (2018) studies ideological biases 
in Colombian front-line soldiers using quantitative tools like Implicit Association Test (IAT). 
There is also a recent book which is the PhD thesis of an ex-veteran from the navy, who studied 





Lastly, Colombia has compulsory military service for all 18-year-old males. 
However, if the family of the man is prosperous, he can buy something called libreta 
military (military card) that allows him to avoid military service. Usually, the people who 
are able to do this are those of the middle and high classes, mostly located in urban areas. 
As a result, the low ranks of soldiers and police in Colombia usually come from the rural 
and poorest socio-economic backgrounds. Some of them saw in the armed state 
institutions a better future because of their lack of education and job possibilities. For 
instance, Forero Angel et al. (2018) showed that professional soldiers, the lowest ranks 
in the army, justified their decision to join the army by saying that it allowed them to 
enjoy economic stability (p. 5). Besides, because military service is mandatory, almost 
any kind of job includes in its application requirements that the man needs to have a 
military card. So, many low ranked soldiers originally joined the army to be able to access 
a monthly salary or be eligible in the job market. More systemic studies are needed to 
ascertain how many and why some decided to stay and continue with a military career, 
whereas others decided to leave. But, in a country where if you are born poor it can take 
eleven generations to achieve a middle income average of the OECD countries (OECD, 
2018), the army offers a valuable economic option, as soldiers receive monthly pay, and 
have access to medical services and a pension.  
Also, in some conflicts, some young males decide to join an armed group, illegal 
or legal, in order to be safe  (Duffy, 2017; D. Rico, 2016). However, choosing the national 
army over an armed group outside the law is seen as a way to gain access to citizenship 
and curb the prevailing poverty in their family and regional context (Forero Angel et al., 
2018, p. 5). As a result, in Colombia, being a soldier is mainly attractive for members of 
the lower classes due to socioeconomic circumstances. As a result, the privileged 
members of Colombian society don’t go to war.  
Nevertheless, the study of Rivera-Páez (2019a)44 reveals some interesting socio-
economic differences between the lowest ranks and the officers ranks in Colombia. His 
 
44 Samuel Rivera-Páez is a veteran of the navy.  The data presented here comes from his PhD 
thesis in Social Science about the identity of military officers. He had access to this population 
because he is a professor in the School of War. In an informal conversation with him, he stressed 
that he made a significant effort to deinstitutionalize himself, and described this process as a very 
hard one because it required him to be open to self-criticism, and also he had to develop a critical 





study comprised a total of 1,185 officers from the navy, air force and army in the country. 
The results revealed that the majority of officers of the military forces identified 
themselves with the middle class. These results were not different from my own study 
which is focused on the army (see Table 2). Rivera-Páez also showed that officers in the 
military forces in Colombia come from urban areas. According to the author, this data 
can be explained by the way the country has recruited their officers since the twentieth 
century. On the one hand, unlike other countries, in Colombia, those who aspire to a 
military career must pay an entry fee and a biannual tuition fee, which is equivalent to 
the cost of a university degree in a private university (usually those classified as “garage 
universities”)45. The cost of entry varies by force. This value is used for the purchase of 
the initial supply of uniforms and materials for their stay in the respective service. In the 
case of the army, this is approximately 9,300 NZD, in the navy 11,650 NZD and in the 
air force of 11,150 NZD. The cost of biannual tuition is 2,100 NZD in the army, 2,325 
NZD in the navy and 1,700 NZD in the air force (Rivera-Páez, 2019a). This creates a 
socioeconomic barrier between the ranks and explains why there is little rural 
representation in the officers members, and also why most of them come from the big 
cities. 
Table 2 Socioeconomic Status and Ranks of the Colombian Army Soldiers who 
Participated in the Study. 















 Lowest Ranks Officers  
Lower 15 7 17 0 0 39 
Low-Middle 50 25 162 24 3 264 
Middle 59 13 239 87 43 441 
Upper and Upper-Middle 4 4 19 11 10 48 
Total 128 49 437 122 56 792 
 
45 The current tuition fees for the best private universities in Colombia are around $NZ 5,000-
6,000. There are public universities in the country but the admission exams are so hard that people 






On the other hand, the circumstances explained above show why the promotion 
system of the Colombian army is linked with the economic capacity of its members. In 
Colombia, it is possible to be a front-line soldier for 20 years without being promoted. 
The private professionals are the front-line soldiers. They are the only ones who don’t 
pay and remain in the same rank for the duration of their careers. As a consequence, from 
the beginning, the soldiers know that if they pay to be, for example, sub-officers (they 
pay less than the middle and high rank officers), they are never going to achieve the 
highest rank within the officers ranks of the army. They will perhaps achieve the higher 
ranks within a sub-officer’s career. The sub-officers in the army are the ones who interact 
in the daily lives of the troops and the junior subalterns, and serve as commanders of a 
platoon46 and company47: they are the leaders on the ground.  
Additionally, the research of Rivera-Páez (2019a) indicated that there is a self-
recruitment phenomenon within the officers. In this data, approximately 48% of the 
officers have a close family member in the institution (father, mother, grandfather or 
uncle). This implies that an important percentage of the officers in the military had a 
previous relationship with military culture. Moreover, 24% of the officers are the child 
of an active or veteran member of the military. There is a very interesting additional 
finding in this study within these percentages: 27.6% are children of high-ranked officers, 
63.2% of sub-officers and 9.2% of fathers who served as front-line soldiers. According 
to the researcher, self-recruitment in the case of Colombia may indicate that soldiers, 
especially the sub-officers, are using the institution as a mechanism of social mobility. 
Last, despite the fact that Rivera-Paéz did not measure ideology like in this 
research, he addresses something that he called “political beliefs”, and he applied a scale 
from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. The question used to evaluate political 
orientation was: Please think about your way of being, thinking and acting in your daily 
life: 
1. Extremely conservative 
2. Conservative 
3. Somewhat conservative  
4. Somewhat Liberal 
5. Liberal 
6. Extremely Liberal  
 
46 A platoon is a military unit typically composed of 41 soldiers.  





98. I cannot choose48  
99. Does not respond, refuses to answer.  
 
The results indicated that 71.6% of officers identified as conservative and 28% as 
liberal. The army was the most conservative service of the three. Rivera-Paéz argues that 
these results were not different from the Colombian adult population. Indeed, the results 
of my study were similar to Rivera’s research (see Table 3). I applied a one-dimensional 
scale, from left to right, that is also applied to Colombians in the Latin American Public 
Opinion Project. My study focused on the army, and the results, comparing the ranks, 
indicate that 52.6% of the members of the Army (low, low-middle, middle and high-
middle ranks) in my sample identified themselves with the right, 44.5% with the Centre 
and only 2.8% with the left (see Appendix 1 to see the questions in the survey).  
Table 3 Ideology and Rank in the Colombian Army 
















 Lowest Ranks Officers  
Left 8 0 9 5 0 22 
Center 57 26 223 68 35 409 
Right 64 21 193 48 20 346 
Total 129 47 425 121 55 777 
 
The results of soldiers’ ideologies compared with a national sample of Colombia in 2018 
showed that Colombian soldiers identified themselves significantly less with the left-
wing than Colombian civilians in the national sample (Obsdemocracia, 2018). However, 
the identification with the right-wing and the center were similar in the two samples (see 
















Based on the previous research about the sample characteristics presented above 
and the context introduced in chapter 4 about the role of the military forces and the history 
of the Colombian conflict, I considered that the sample characteristic decided for this 
study contributes to the identification of patterns and generalizations, as well as 
individual particularities to comprehend the role of ideology and how soldiers internalize 
it to frame enemies and threats. In other words, the possibility of assembling different 
ranks that have different reasons to join the army, as well as diverse personal experiences, 
will provide, for the quantitative component, a useful internal variation within the sample 
of participants of the Colombian army.  





5.4.1.10 Experimental survey procedure 
The Spanish language survey was designed and distributed using the Qualtrics 
Web-based survey platform, which guarantees random distribution of the treatments or 
conditions in my experiments. This platform has a facility to create a link that can be 
distributed and anyone who clicks on it will be able to take the survey. Likewise, it is 
possible to configure from Qualitrics that the link created prevents multiple responses 
from the same respondent. This option was possible using “The Prevent Ballot Box 
Stuffing” option that keeps respondents from taking a survey multiple times by placing 
a cookie in their browser when they submit a response. I also blocked access to the 
questionnaire after each survey session, and activated access to the link again some 
minutes prior to the distribution of the survey. That helped me to guarantee that only the 
soldiers that were physically present in the room for the activity had access to the link to 
answer the survey. Moreover, all soldiers had to read and accept the consent statement at 
beginning of the survey to gain access to the survey questions. This guaranteed that all 
the participants were informed of the confidentiality rules and the objective of the 
research. See Appendix 4 for access to the protocol of the survey application.  
All the participants answered the survey using their personal cellphone. The 
surveys were applied within the facilities of the Superior School of War in Bogotá49 and 
the Military Base in Tolemaida50. These two locations are the most important ones for 
soldiers’ careers. They offer different training courses and classes that enabled 
promotion. For that reason, at different times in their military career, all the soldiers that 
are distributed in the territories return to these bases to be trained or retrained. The 
advantage of being in the Superior School of War and in the military base of Tolemaida 
 
49 It is currently the highest level Institution in the Military Forces. Its mission is “to train the superior 
officers of the Military Forces as integral Commanders, leaders and strategists, experts in planning and 
conducting joint operations and advisers in national security and defense.” According to their web page: 
“This School also contributes to the creation of a culture of national security and defense in citizenship; to 
win the war, consolidate peace and contribute to the development of the country.” 
50 Tolemaida is the largest and most important military training garrison in Latin America; it is considered 
a militia temple where the main training schools that train, retrain and conduct different combat courses 
and their specialties, to Officers, NCOs, Soldiers, special units of the Military Forces and members of the 
international community are located. Tolemaida was to become primarily a center for training, here in anti-






was that it allowed access to soldiers who came from different military units around the 
country in one place. The School of War is located within a military complex called 
Canton Norte that includes the Army Cavalry School, the Infantry School and other units. 
Therefore, I was able to approach and interview sub-officers and front-line soldiers from 
these schools.  
In March 2019, two pilot tests were carried out. After these pilots, I conducted 
interviews with some of the soldiers who participated in the test. I involved them in the 
research, which resulted in them suggesting ways to improve the wording of some 
questions. This was also the reason why I deleted some questions to ensure that soldiers 
felt that the survey was anonymous51. Finally, with their advice, I designed a protocol 
(see Appendix 4). This procedure helped me to guarantee a successful process of data 
collection.  
I arranged different bureaucratic processes in the different training and retraining 
military schools in the School of War and Tolemaida to obtain the corresponding permits 
and organize survey sessions. Then, it was possible to set a date for the activity. On some 
occasions, I was able to gather more than 100 soldiers in an auditorium (see Table 4 and 
Appendix 352). Before each session, the soldiers were informed by their commanding 
officers, sometimes one week or the day before about the survey activity, that 
participation was voluntary. For ethical reasons, during the session the voluntary 
component and the anonymity53 of the activity was repeated. In all sessions, I had access 
to a projector to share the link. The entire activity lasted one hour, including the 
distribution of snacks for all participants. 
 
51 Some of the questions that I eliminated from the original survey were questions about where 
they were born, or what areas in the country they spent more time during their careers. Some of 
the soldiers felt that with this information it would be possible to identify them.  
52 In Appendix 3 there are two links that showed the field-work procedure; with one of those 
videos I won a competition of Red Cross New-Zealand to join a workshop for a group of 
emerging humanitarian leaders. The workshop took place in Wellington in August of 2019.  
53 Anonymity, to some extent, can mitigate the potential social desirability bias, incentivizing 





Table 4 Sessions, Dates Location and Attendees of Quantitative Data Collection 
Number of 
Session 
Session Date Location Number of Attendees 
1 1/04/2019 Canton Norte  50 
2 2/04/2019 Canton Norte 49 
3 4/04/2019 Canton Norte 41 
4 5/04/2019 Canton Norte 62 
5 8/05/2019 Canton Norte 22 
6 9/05/2019 Canton Norte 134 
7 10/05/2019 Canton Norte 173 
8 18/05/2019 Canton Norte 112 
9 7/06/2019 Canton Norte 54 
10 19/06/2019 Tolemaida 131 
11 20/06/2019 Tolemaida 92 
   Total: 920 
 
5.4.1.11 Manipulation checks  
It is typical in web-based survey research, particularly in experimental surveys, 
that researchers apply manipulation checks (MC) to guarantee the validity of the 
experiment. Broadly defined, MCs are “used to check whether the manipulation 
conducted in an experiment is perceived by the subjects as the experimenter wishes it to 
be perceived” (Morton & Williams, 2010, p. 108). According to Kane and Barabas 
(2019). In practice, there are three types of MCs: subjective, instructional and factual (pp. 
235-236).  
In this study, I applied a factual manipulation check (FMC). This FMC usually 
works with one question that is asked of all the participants in the experiment. The 
question is asked immediately after the treatment. The question is about the experiment’s 
material and the question is objective in nature; that is, a response is either correct or 
incorrect (Kane & Barabas, 2019, p. 236). As a result, participants who answer the 
question correctly allow the researcher to identify respondents who were attentive to the 
experiment. Furthermore, the FMC also helps the researcher to identify not only the 





experimental groups significantly differ in their FMC responses. In general, factual 
manipulation checks give researchers an important and unique opportunity to evaluate 
their findings. However, some scholars have recently raised concerns over the 
misinterpretation of the manipulation checks. They argue that post-experimental 
treatment can introduce analytical bias and distortions in the data analysis (Kane & 
Barabas, 2019). For instance, the advantages of randomization are compromised when 
scholars decide to drop participants who fail the manipulation checks. This is because 
conditioning on these post-treatment measures can create an imbalance between the 
experimental sample. According to Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres (2018), dropping 
observations based on MCs is not a recommended practice; in their words, conditioning 
on post-treatment variables can undermine experiments and the experimentalist should 
avoid post-treatment bias. The logic for dropping observations based on manipulation 
checks is that the estimated treatment effect is larger among compliers, which might 
appear to suggest that the treatment works through the researchers’ proposed mechanism.  
Nevertheless, this logic is problematic, because when the experimentalist decided 
to drop samples, a biased estimate is induced among an endogenously selected group 
(Coppock, 2019; Kane & Barabas, 2019; Montgomery et al., 2018). In fact, manipulation 
checks itself are unable to guarantee that the participants who fail the manipulation check 
under one treatment have the same characteristics as those who fail under a different 
treatment, even if manipulation check passage rates are equal between conditions 
(Aronow, Baron, & Pinson, 2019).  
Otherwise, manipulation checks can be used to determine an overall view of the 
sample. However, if there is clear effect, despite a sizable presence of inattentive 
respondents, this is a clear indicator that the treatment has strong effects on the outcome 
(Kane & Barabas, 2019). For that reason, after considering the limitations of 
manipulation checks, I decided to identify the participants who failed or passed the FMC, 
and provide a comprehensive view of my sample (see Appendix 5). However, to avoid 
any negative alteration in my experiment, I decided to run the models of the study using 
the total sample of participants, including those who failed the FMC. 
5.5 Qualitative approach 
The study’s quantitative element is complemented by a qualitative component based 
on semistructured interviews carried out with the participants. Only some soldiers 





criteria. The addition of this qualitative component serves the goal of studying the role 
of ideology in the identification of enemies and threats, and how ideology can help 
soldiers’ disposition of aggression and willingness to protect civilians because of 
civilians’ group identity. Moreover, the qualitative data combined with the statistical 
finding enriches the explanation of the results, but also makes independent contributions 
associated with the soldiers’ understanding of the ideology labels of “right” and “left” 
and the cognitive mechanisms that makes possible the causal link between ideologies, 
actors’ decision-making and behaviors. Studying the cognitive mechanism of ideology 
introduced in the theoretical framework is valuable because it enhances the statistical 
evidence proposed in the hypothesis. A qualitative interview component provides details 
and perspectives that can illuminate the explanation of the statistical results (Sundberg, 
2015). The steps of the qualitative approach are as follows. 
5.5.1 Structure of the interviews  
In an explanatory sequential mixed method design (ESMM), the qualitative data in a 
second phase is intended to follow up the quantitative findings in phase one (Creswell & 
Creswell, 2018b). However, the constraints presented above impeded me from following 
the template design for the qualitative data collection. For that reason, even when the 
interviews were conducted simultaneously with the quantitative data, the structure of the 
interviews tried to capture the same variables, constructs or concepts in both databases. 
As a result, 28 semistructured interviews, in which all respondents answered the same 
core questions but with several open-ended questions, were conducted. 
Before the conversations began, I asked permission to record, and all participants 
agreed. Before starting the interview, I recorded their answer to the following question: 
Are you here voluntarily to have a conversation with me? All the participants answered 
in the affirmative. The questions were divided into six thematic groups:  
1) Ice-breaker questions related to soldiers’ personal lives, such as motivations to join 
the army, the opinion of their family members about their decision to pursue a 
military career in a context like Colombia, the family relationship with the wartime 
cleavages etc.  
2) Questions associated with their opinion, and feelings about the peace agreement 
and the political reintegration of the rebels.  





4) The security priorities after the peace agreement (Which are the principal threats 
after the peace agreement?).  
5) The war on drugs, forced eradication and stigmatization of civilians.  
6) Their meaning of peace.  
I deliberatively avoided asking them directly about political ideology. I framed the 
questions in such a way that the concept of ideology preferences was implicitly 
introduced. If they brought the topic into the conversation, I asked additional questions 
about their political ideological preferences and how that impacted their work. Moreover, 
the interviews were intended to be conversational, and the goal was to allow ideas to 
develop organically. See Appendix 6 to see the guide of the qualitative questions.  
5.5.2 Contextual challenges and sample selection 
Usually, in the ESMM design, the sample selection in the qualitative approach is 
informed by the results of the qualitative results. However, in this study it was not 
possible. For that reason, I tried to keep the same sample in both databases:  
1) Professional Soldier or Private Professional Soldier (lowest rank in the Army). 
This category includes: 
Regular soldiers that stay in the army after completing their 22 months’ mandatory 
conscription service, making it a permanent career. 
2) Private First Class, This category includes: 
Soldiers who have gained recognition through their achievements and have special 
training. They have a certain degree of authority over regular soldiers. 
3) Sub-Officers or warrant officers (ranking below the commissioned officers and 
above the noncommissioned officers). This category includes: Third Corporal, 
Second Corporal, First Corporal, Second Sergeant, Sergeant First Class, First 
Sergeant, Sergeant Mayor, Command Sergeant Major.  
4) Sub-Alter Officers (is a junior commissioned officers). This category includes: 
Joint Command Sergeant Major, Second Lieutenant, Lieutenant, Captain.  
5) Superior Officers or commissioned officer. This category includes: Major and 
Lieutenant Colonel.  
After conducting the surveys, I asked the soldiers if they wanted to talk to me and 
participate in an interview about similar topics presented in the survey. I shared with 





were conducted in cafes inside the School of War or in other public places like malls. I 
always offered them refreshments. It was difficult to convince lower ranks to talk to me 
because they usually needed the permission of their superiors to talk with civilians. This 
was also the case in the ethnographic study conducted by Forero Angel (2017a, 2018a), 
who mentioned that she was unable to meet the same person more than once, and that the 
superiors were the ones who selected the soldiers that she could interview. In my case, 
nobody selected or indicated the people that I could interview. But some of them were 
anxious to talk with me without the permission of their superior, even if it was not 
necessary. 
This fear increased after two events that occurred during my data collection. First, 
on 22 April, Dimar Torres, a militiaman of the FARC, was murdered by the soldiers from 
the army54, and second, on May 18, 2019, the New York Times published an article called 
“Colombian Army’s New Kill Orders Send Chills Down Ranks” (Casey, 2019). In this 
article the author reported that the commander had ordered his troops to duplicate the 
number of criminals and militants captured or killed in military operations, even if that 
meant more civilian causalities. These events impacted the environment inside the 
institution such that few soldiers wanted to talk to me, because the reporter of the New 
York Times obtained this information from middle ranks who disagreed with their 
commanders. Furthermore, next month, in June a national journal reported that the 
commanders started something that they called “operation silence”. First, they wanted to 
identify the people who talked with the reporter from the New York Times, some of them 
receiving death threats (Semana, 2019d). This was also a way to send a message to their 
soldiers that no one should speak with civilians without the authorization of their 
superiors (see Appendix 7). Later on, the same year (2019), a local magazine exposed 
the existence of a secret network within the army intelligence unit. The unit was provided 
with U.S. surveillance equipment and it was used to build intelligence profiles to target 
political opponents of Duque’s government, including activists, and journalist, human 
right defenders, among others (Isacson, 2020). 
 
54 Although the institution and the Ministry of Defense tried to deny these facts, the investigation showed 
that Dimar was killed as a result of a plan organized by a group of army members. Today part of those 






Under these circumstances, I needed to complete 28 interviews, because, 
according to my supervisors recommendations, I needed this number of surveys if I 
wanted to achieve an acceptable sample for a robust qualitative study. For that reason, I 
decided to interview veterans and soldiers who did not participate in the surveys to 
complete my sample. I obtained a total of seven veterans who did not fulfill the sample 
criteria55 and the rest were divided between soldiers who were in the survey and others 
who did that not participate in the survey but fitted the sample criteria. All interviews 
were voluntary (see Table 5). 
Table 5 Qualitative Sample Characteristics 
Number of 
Interview 
Participate in the 
Survey (Yes/NO) 
Rank Total years as 
Soldier  
1 No Sub-Officer 23 years 
2 No Sub-Officer 17 years 
3 No Superior-Officer 18 years 
4 No Superior-Officer 15 years 
5 No Superior-Officer 23 years 
6 No Veteran 23 years 
7 No Veteran 40 years 
8 Yes Superior-Officer 10 years 
9 No Superior-Officer 15 years 
10 No Veteran 35 years 
11 No Superior-Officer 27 years 
12 Yes Superior-Officer 23 years 
13 Yes Veteran 36 years  
14 Yes Superior-Officer 20 years 
15 Yes Sub-Officer 20 years 
16 No Superior-Officer 21 years 
   Continue  
 
55 All the veterans included were Colonels, high ranking soldiers. Despite the disadvantage about being 
unable to replicate the sample of the survey in the interviews, there was also one potential advantage. In 
the qualitative analysis, I would be able to determine if there are significant differences between the 





17 Yes Professional Soldier 20 years 
18 No Sub-Officer 16 years  
19 No Sub-Officer 22 years 
20 Yes Professional Soldier 20 years 
21 Yes Sub-Officer 7 years 
22 No Veteran  30 years 
23 Yes Professional Soldier 20 years 
24 Yes Professional Soldier 20 years 
25 Yes Sub-Officer 12 years 
26 Yes Professional Soldier 20 years 
27 No Veteran 25 years 
28 Yes Professional Soldier 20 years 
5.5.3 Ethical Issues of semi-structured interviews  
Conducting semi-structured interviews on sensitive topics in a turbulent environment 
requires a careful reflection on ethics on the part of the researcher. Some aspects were 
included for ensuring an ethical approach in this study: voluntary participation, and 
complete anonymity for the participants. The need of anonymity is associated with the 
content of the interviews: personal motivations, feelings, ideas about violence, the use of 
force, and political views are sensitive topics. For this reason, ensuring that the soldiers’ 
feelings and opinions on these topics could not be associated with a specific individual 
is an ethical principle. Moreover, soldiers could share views or experiences that may 
impact negatively on their employment56. Complete anonymity was guaranteed for all 
participants in the interview, and all research material was kept under lock and key or 
behind digital firewalls.  
The voluntarism of the participants is also important, not only for ethical 
considerations, but also for reliability and validity (Sundberg, 2015). For that reason, to 
ensure voluntary participation, first, I provided my personal contact details to let the 
soldiers who participated in the survey contact me directly if they wanted to participate 
in the interviews. Others did not participate in the survey, but contacted me or were 
 
56 Some soldiers shared with me controversial experiences that could potentially put them in jail or involve 





suggested by other soldiers, and I contacted them to participate in the interviews, 
knowing that the interview was anonymous. Second, I repeated this message before 
starting each interview. Third, all the participants were informed that they could end an 
interview at any time or even refuse to respond to questions that made them feel 
uncomfortable without the risk of repercussions.  
Another ethical consideration is associated with the type of job of the participants. 
Some of them could have developed traumas or even physical injury, and others could 
have powerful experiences of combat or traumatic situations where their own lives or 
those of their comrades were directly threatened. The design of the interview was thus 
made in the safest possible way. From my previous experience working with soldiers, I 
prepared myself to hear traumatic experiences. Sometimes, without this being the 
intention of the interviews, the soldiers felt a need to share traumatic experiences to make 
their point about their personal opinions about war, violence or politics. Avoiding a 
judgmental attitude is crucial: it requires close attention to the interviewee’s body 
language, to read anxiety and be able to change the topic if the topic makes the participant 
uncomfortable. Sometimes, facial expressions or body posture can impact the 
participants, especially when they are talking about difficult topics. 
Finally, it is important to avoid interrupting or abruptly changing the subject in case 
the participant shows the desire and sometimes the need to share details not related to the 
interview, but related to traumatic events. This is not only a demonstration of respect, it 
also contributes to the construction of a relationship of trust, which increases the 
possibility of truthful responses from the interviewee. In chapter 9, some details about 
the management of emotions and the moral dilemmas of the researcher during this study 
are presented. 
5.5.4 Qualitative data analysis  
An IC recorder was used to record the 28 interviews conducted in Bogotá and 
Tolemaida in Colombia. Interviews were conducted in Spanish and transcribed and 
uploaded into NVivo. NVivo is software available through the University of Otago, 
which allows for the storing, coding, and analysis of qualitative data (NVivo, n.d). The 
qualitative findings are presented in two chapters. Chapter 8, enriches the quantitative 
findings and addresses the questions: Does ideology help the soldiers to frame and define 





aggressive disposition toward civilians, as well as their willingness to protect them? To 
answer these questions, a thematic analysis and development of codes focuses on the 
patterns and themes, providing insights into the role of ideology on soldiers’ enemy 
images in their narratives (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). 
Forero Angel (2018a, p. 6) argues that the analysis of narratives is useful in accessing 
the forms of knowledge that a certain group has constructed by itself, the ways in which 
it relates to other groups, the way in which the subject lives, signifies its context and 
establishes moral codes that guide its behavior. Approaching the narratives of the soldiers 
in this way allows me to understand how these individuals make sense of themselves, 
their work, how they justify their actions, values, and beliefs, what their dilemmas are 
and how they resolve them.  
In chapter 9, I explore the narratives of the soldiers to answer the questions:  How 
do soldiers understand the ideological labels of “right” “left”, and what are the 
ideological cognitive mechanisms. To answer these question, I conducted a deductive 
content analysis, taking the paragraph as the unit of analysis of each announcement 
(Creswell & Creswell, 2018a, 2018b; Daniel & Harland, 2018; Mayring, 2004). For the 
first question, How do soldiers understand ideology labels, I used the studies introduced 
in the theoretical framework about ideology in Latin America conducted by Zechmeister 
and Corral (2010, 2013) to identify and categorize the components of ideology. I follow 
the same method to answer the next qualitative question: What are the cognitive 
mechanisms that makes possible the translation of ideology attachment into behavior? I 
used the cognitive mechanisms of ideology developed by Leader Maynard (2019) as 
categories for the codification process in Nvivo.  
5.5.5 Qualitative Data Analysis using Nvivo  
5.5.5.1 Coding  
Before the coding process, my first contact with the transcriptions was through 
immersion, with the goal of letting the interviews speak for themselves. This process, 
recommended by Saldaña (2016, p. 22), is a stage of precoding that allows the researcher 
to ask questions such as: What surprised me (to track your assumptions); What intrigued 
me (to track your positionality); What disturbed me (to track the tensions within your 





patterns in the data, but also unexpected findings. After this step, I followed the coding 
cycles also suggested by Saldaña (2016) using the holistic coding technique that is 
applicable when the researcher already has a general notion of what to investigate in the 
data,  from my quantitative findings. During the first cycle, I made notes on the themes 
from the qualitative interview questions. Based on those notes, I generated a short list of 
codes in Nvivo, taking into account the quantitative findings and the research question 
(Bloomberg Dele & Volpe, 2008, p. 192).   
During the second round, I reviewed each of the codes following the theoretical 
framework. For chapter 8, I compared the previous quantitative findings with the 
inductive information from the narratives. However, for chapter 9 the qualitative 
technique was different. To answer the research questions in this chapter, I conducted a 
content analysis, following the categories that were defined by Zechmeister and Corral 
(2010, 2013) and Leader Maynard (2019) to create the codes. Then I checked the 
frequencies to identify the patterns. Finally, I selected quotes that I believe were powerful 
to present the main findings and to assist in narrating the principal findings. 
5.5.5.2 Memos  
According to Bloomberg Dele and Volpe (2008) and (Saldaña, 2016) memos are 
the places were the researcher can develop a conversation with herself about the data. 
Here, it is possible to think critically about our assumptions, confront our interpretation 
of the data and track our decisions. I was in constant dialogue with myself during the data 
analysis, thanks to the memos because they helped me to revisit my thoughts. They were 
especially useful to reflect on the best way to frame my findings in the chapter.  
5.5.5.3 Limitations  
The limitations of this research concern the design and methods of this study, as 
well as those that were unanticipated and emerged during the data collection process. 
Where possible, efforts were made to address the limitations, but if this was not possible, 
implications of those limits on the study were acknowledged. However, this study is 
unique for three main reasons that may outweigh some of its limitations: First, it conducts 
a unique experimental study on how ideology shapes threat perceptions in the Colombian 
Army. The methodology implemented provides an advantage over other methods (i.e., 





the study of the behavior of the military toward civilians is rare in peace and conflict 
studies. Thus, this study contributes to expanding our knowledge about those particular 
actors in contexts that aim to overcome protracted conflicts. Third, existing studies of 
how ideology shapes perceptions of the enemy in the armed groups are mainly based on 
observational data, and they are often focus on non-state armed actors in civil war 
contexts. Therefore, this study’s unique sample and methodological design help us 
overcome the shortcomings of existing studies on ideology and armed group behavior,  
by considering an experimental approach to test how ideological biases linked to wartime 
cleavages have behavioral implications in armed groups toward civilians after the 
conflict ends. Moreover, this study contributes to our knowledge about the role of the 
state security sector in the perpetuation of violence in post-peace agreement contexts. 
5.5.5.3.1.1 Sample Selection: low rank and middle ranks of the Colombian Army 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the experimental survey and most of the 
qualitative interviews were conducted with low and middle ranked solders of the 
Colombian Army. Potential transferability of these findings to all the armed forces and 
all ranks is thus not possible, because the air force and marines were not included in this 
study, as well as higher ranks. Moreover, the quantitative sample is not a representative 
sample of the Colombian Army. These limitations indicate future paths of research to 
explore ideological bias in the other armed forces, and in higher ranks. 
5.5.5.3.1.2 Project scope 
This research project was constrained by contextual challenges, time constraints, 
researcher expertise and resources. The time frame, the contextual challenges, and 
resources imposed limits on exploring longer-term methodologies such as ethnographic 
analysis that are the traditional and most common ways to analyse the potential effects 
of training on soldiers when studying ideology. However, the research question in this 
study did not intend to look at the socialization process, but rather develop an empirical 
test to measure the existence of an ideology bias, as a legacy of the conflict in soldiers’ 
minds, and see if this bias impacted the way soldiers developed an aggressive disposition 
toward civilians or a willingness to protect them. Moreover, the researcher’s expertise, 
which is mainly in quantitative studies, introduces a preference for developing 





was applied, with the intention of applying the best of each methodology. Most of the 
contextual challenges have already been discussed in this chapter. The timing of the data 
collection introduces a unique element to this study, which was conducted in the third 
(2019) year after the peace agreement was signed (2016), under the first year of a new 
government that opposed the peace agreement. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the 
topic of ideology can cause controversy within the armed forces, and so innovative 
approaches were explored to study ideology, such as experimental surveys and different 
qualitative techniques to measure and comprehend ideological bias and its impact on the 
behavior of the soldiers. 
5.5.5.3.1.3 Semi-structured interviews and translation of the transcriptions.  
Face-to-face interviews provide unique advantages, and silences and body 
language, facial expressions were an important aspect of the data collection and analyses. 
The nature of semi-structured interviews allows for a natural conversation to emerge. 
While I deliberately created themes of questions that were related to the survey variables 
and the research question, not every participant answered the same set of questions. 
However, I ensured that many of the major themes were raised during the conversation 
(see Appendix 6). I attempted to guarantee consistency within the qualitative database, 
and to form a connection between the two databases, the qualitative and the quantitative. 
The interviews were conducted in Spanish, and extracts from them were selected to 
include in the findings and the appendixes, and they were translated into English. Some 
of the participants spoke non-standard dialect, so that for a local researcher it is possible 
to recognize that they were from rural areas, or certain regions because of their accents. 
Unfortunately, this data is missing in the translation. Some slang and idiosyncratic terms 
were excluded because they don’t make sense in English, but in the original language 
can provide information that goes beyond the literal sense of the words.  
5.5.5.3.1.4 Self-selection participants and gender  
In this study, there were two levels of self-selection by participants. The first was 
into the army itself. As mentioned earlier, military service is obligatory for males in 
Colombia. However, there are no systematic studies explaining why men decide to stay 
in the army, or what the specific demographic and sociodemographic characteristics are 





the survey distribution helps to mitigate this limitation. The second level of self-selection 
concerns the soldiers accepting my invitation to participate in an interview.  
This self-selection likely meant that I interviewed soldiers who were predisposed 
to participating in a conversation with a civilian that they didn’t know. Almost half of 
the interviewees (13) participated in the survey so they had an idea of my research, and 
the other half (15) were soldiers that I contacted or who contacted me because some of 
their colleagues recommended that they participate in the study (see table 5.4). Finally, 
another limitation is associated with the gender aspect of my sample. In the survey, just 
22 females participated and none of the females that I contacted accepted the invitation 
to participate in the interviews, although the proportion of females in the army is lower 
than that of males (see table 6).  However, without official data, I am aware that most of 
them have administrative positions and only in 2018 was a female promoted to a frontline 
combat role (esmic, 2018).  
Table 6 Gender and Sample 
Gender  Freq. Percent Cum. 
Male  774 97.24 97.24 
Female  22 2.76 100.00 
Total 796 100.00  
 
5.6 Mixed methods: validation, reliability and trustworthiness 
In this study, mixed methods were employed. In the design of the quantitative 
component of this study, I considered external and internal validity. Internal validity is 
the extent to which the investigator can determine that there is a cause and effect 
relationship among variables (Creswell & Creswell, 2018b). In this study, I apply a 
survey experiment which controlled the random assignment of participants to variation 
of the independent variable in order to observe their effects on a dependent variable 
(Mutz, 2011, p. 2). 
 These kinds of survey are regarded as excellent for internal validity. However, 
they can have low external validity because it is not possible to ascertain the relationships 
that you observe in a given sample, and if they would be the same if the entire population 
were examined. Furthermore, the reliability or the accuracy of an instrument was 





were conducted before distribution of the surveys. However, because of the research 
methodology, I considered it important to raise the issue of trustworthiness: the 
relationship of trust between research and participants, and the researcher and readers. 
This notion is not universally accepted in mixed methods research, and another 
researcher may choose to retain the positivist notions of reliability and validity. However, 
recent scholars from qualitative studies have started to use the term more frequently 
(Bloomberg Dele & Volpe, 2008; Daniel & Harland, 2018).  
As I designed the research project, I found it was important to include the concept 
of trustworthiness because it reflected the context of the study, the identity of the 
researcher and the subjects analysed. There are two recognized criteria for establishing 
trustworthiness in qualitative research: credibility and dependability. Credibility is 
intimately connected with the role of reflexivity. In the qualitative chapters 8 and in 
section 5.8 of this chapter, I provide transparency through reflecting on my background 
and what position I take in this study, including my assumptions, biases, personal 
challenges and limitations (Creswell & Creswell, 2018b). I also address dependability – 
the way that I ensured the “processes and procedures used to collect and interpret the 
data” (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2016, p. 163) – were recorded in detail as I progressed 
through the project. All of these procedures have been provided in detail in this chapter 
and in each of the qualitative and quantitative findings chapters and appendixes.  
5.7 Integration of Quantitative and Qualitative Results 
In the final analysis of this mixed methods study, quantitative and qualitative data 
analyses  were integrated and triangulated to answer the research questions of the study 
(Creswell & Creswell, 2018b). I use the integration of both data sets to draw the 
discussion and conclusion chapters. 
5.8 When they see me: Identity issues in peace and conflict research during 
and beyond the field-work 
5.8.1 In the “eyes of the locals”  
You scold me for my objectivity, calling it indifference to good and 
evil, lack of ideals and ideas, and so forth. When I am writing about 
horse thieves, you want me to say that it is evil to steal horses. 





Let the members of the jury pass their judgement. My job is merely to 
show what sort of people these horse thieves are. 
 Anton Checkhov, Letter to Alexei Suvorin, Moscow, April 1, 1890 
My reflections on my experience conducting research with the army resonate with 
the thoughts of another Colombian female who conducted an ethnographic study on the 
Colombian Army. Forero Angel (2018a) wrote a text for a conference on “Social Science 
and the Study of the Military in America Latina”, called Difficulties in understanding the 
Colombian National Army. In that text, she expressed some challenges that I also 
experienced in this context, and I introduce some of them here.  
First, in the eyes of other local academics, activists and victims of the conflict, 
researchers can be accused of being like public relation managers of the army. Some local 
academic circles will view us and our work with suspicion. Our ethical standards will be 
questioned because our research implies interaction with members of an institution that 
is involved in human rights violations. I have activist and academic friends who told me 
that they prefer to work with former rebels or listen to victims, but they would never be 
able to work with the army. It was common for me to hear questions like: How can you 
do it? Are you helping them to clean their image? Are you ignoring all what they did? 
Are you displacing their responsibility? Forero Angel (2018a) argues that behind those 
comments there is one element in common, an association between understanding, 
justifying and forgiving. As an anthropologist, she argues that this arises from the fear of 
moral ambivalence or ethical relativism that emerges from anthropological debates about 
the interaction between researchers and communities. However, citing Geertz (1996), she 
explains that understanding otherness does not imply an act of conversion of the 
researcher’s moral codes and values. On the contrary, it means being able to understand 
the meaning of their narratives and actions in the context of their production. In the 
particular case of soldiers, it is understanding their narratives within the military 
institution, where tensions and contradictions can emerge (Forero Angel, 2018a, p. 8).  
Second, as researchers we need to deal with the expectations and self-image of 
the community that we study, and the way that we portray our findings, especially if they 
contradict the community’s view of itself, or raise aspects that can be uncomfortable for 
the community being studied. As researchers, we want to avoid harming the trust that we 





them in their own environment was crucial in being able to conduct this research. 
However, I also need to clarify my ethical considerations as a researcher, knowing that 
my research could be received in a negative way, and even place me in an unsafe 
situation.  
Finally, how to acknowledge the role of the researcher’s emotions in the field 
without resulting in an extreme subjective narrative was another question during my 
research. I don’t have an answer, but as Forero Angel (2018a) and other researchers such 
as Rafferty (2017) experienced during their research and writing process as local 
researchers, emotions play a fundamental role. During my field work, and then analyzing 
the interviews, I found myself in constant reflection about my positionality: I needed to 
think very deeply how to formulate questions about delicate topics and prepare my 
reaction. My body language and tone of voice were crucial in this.  Mental and emotional 
preparation to engage in difficult conversations and being prepared to deal with 
uncomfortable opinions was part of my research process. I often found myself alternating 
between empathy and aversion toward my interviewees. Therefore, I needed to deeply 
reflect on how my emotions influenced and shaped my research and analytical decisions. 
For similar experiences, see Rafferty (2017), Schirmer (1998b, 2012) and Forero Angel 
(2018a).  
 An anecdote during field work illustrates some additional emotional challenges. 
After a lot of work, I was finally accepted to visit Tolemaida, the most important military 
unit in the country, as I described in chapter 5. On my first day, I was invited to participate 
in firing practice. I accepted, thinking that this would be a perfect environment to talk 
about the process of firing training and learn how soldiers deal with the identity of the 
targets. Some of the soldiers asked me many times if I wanted to participate in the 
practice, but I tried to ignore the question. The general who gave me permission to stay 
in the military unit for two nights arrived unexpectedly, asked me how I was doing, then 
he told the soldier in charge of the firing practice, his close subordinate, “Prepare a rifle 
for Alejandra and me”. He looked me in the eye and said, “If you want to understand 
soldiers’ mentality at least you need to know how to fire a gun”. I thought, “That’s fair 
enough”, and that day I fired a gun. The only question I asked was, “Where is this weapon 
from?” One of the sub-officers told me that it was made in Israel (see a video about the 
experience in Appendix D). After I finished, another sub-officer who helped me organize 
the logistic of carrying out my surveys for the next day said, “Imagine carrying that 





you will encounter the enemy and you need to use it to save your life”. At that moment, 
I realized that the general was testing me. They wanted to prove if I was genuine in my 
intentions to understand them.  
Later in one of the interviews, one soldier told me: All the best in your research, 
and please don´t be hard on us. Another sent me a message saying, “Take care, your 
research is very important, but take care”. I still don’t know how to include my emotions 
as part of my research without the fear of being labelled less rigorous, or being too 
attached, or that my research can be accused of not achieving a “certain level of 
intellectual distance” and produce “fair-minded and theoretically-useful findings” 
(Rafferty, 2017, p. 104). That night, I couldn’t sleep, I was thinking that I would be 
labeled unprofessional and subjective, and that my field work would not be appropriate 
for academic standards. But I asked myself why I was thinking that way. Who “tests” if 
we as local researchers from divided societies achieve or do not achieve the level of 
intellectual distance? Who sets those standards? 
5.8.2 In the “eyes of the global north” 
When they speak, it is scientific; 
when we speak, it is unscientific. 
When they speak, it is universal; 
when we speak, it is specific. 
When they speak; it is objective: 
when we speak; it is subjective. 
When they speak, it is neutral; 
when we speak; it is personal. 
When they speak, it is rational; 
when we speak, it is emotional. 
When they speak it is impartial; 
when we speak, it is partial. 
They have facts, we have opinions. 





We are not dealing here with a “peaceful coexistence of words”, but 
rather with a violent hierarchy, which defines Who can speak and 
What We can speak about. 
Grada Kilomba, 2016 
 
After fieldwork, a colleague asked me how was my vacation. Then, a friend who 
also studied overseas told me that her colleagues and professors talked about her findings 
as “good stories”, but not as scientific findings, or describing her and other local 
researchers from the global south as good “storytellers” but not as good scientists.  
It is true that we as local researchers from deeply divided societies face 
methodological challenges. Scholars argue that for local researchers it is particularly 
important to be highly self-aware and explicit about the role of our identities and how 
this affects our fieldwork decisions and findings (Rafferty, 2017). However, some of 
these arguments could be destructive as well as constructive. 
First, self-awareness and the role of identity in fieldwork is an exercise that is not 
particularly important for “local” researchers. In the field of peace and conflict, I consider 
that self-awareness should be part of the methodological consideration for all researchers, 
including those who employ quantitative methods. For instance, those who are not local 
should be reflective about how they deal with their lack of local or cultural knowledge, 
language or how their theoretical framework and epistemological predispositions shape 
their research decision and interpretation of their findings. If we accept the idea that we 
as local researchers have a unique responsibility to be aware of the impact of our identity 
in our research, we can replicate the existing power dynamics in academia. In other 
words, we can reinforce the notion that local researchers can potentially be less rigorous 
or produce unreliable research. For that reason, local researchers need to constantly 
defend their research, as a consequence of double standards behind the analytical 
accountability which discloses the unfair underlying logic of knowledge production 
(Curtis, 2019). 
Second, it is important to acknowledge the power dynamic in the field and the 
production of knowledge (Curtis, 2019; MacGinty, Brett, & Vogel, 2020). Vlassenroot 
(2020) raises two important questions. First, when local views rarely find their way into 
debates, how can we trust the resulting narratives? Despite genuine intentions of more 
collaborative and participatory approaches, he argues that “ research agendas and guiding 





cases based in the global north) and taken as given by the rest of the research team (in 
the most cases yet not exclusively in the global south)” (p. 3). Therefore, the research 
agendas and theoretical frameworks are usually taken for granted, which leave in 
evidence the overlooking of self-reflection from academics commonly located in the 
global north, when they conduct research on the global south. Dominant epistemologies 
thus lead the projects and decide the research agenda. Research assistants based in the 
south position themselves as mere facilitators and data collectors without having the 
opportunity to talk or participate as equals in the construction of knowledge. Frequently, 
researchers from the South end up adopting the dominant perspectives to read their own 
world because it may be the only way to be part of the academic discussion thus 
“preventing us from making progress in the understanding, of, and the redefinition of 
views on, existing realities” (p. 5).   
Vlassenroot (2020) raises the second question. To what extent are researchers in 
the global north ready to allow collaborators in the global south to challenge  their 
frameworks and views? Third, as Džuverović (2018) emphasizes, “even in the critical 
paradigm (liberal peace), locals are understood more as objects of analysis than as 
subjects of systematic change” (p. 112). Despite debates about the importance of 
including local voices in the academic debates of peace and conflict studies, local 
researchers are used as tokens, and are still not recognized as valid interlocutor 
(Džuverović, 2020). 
 As a colleague told me, they need to talk with us, not to us. Local researchers 
need to fight to be part of the theoretical construction of producing knowledge. However, 
this is not an easy job. Let me unpack this idea by mentioning some of the challenges 
that scientists from the global south, but not the local north, face, which make our 
acceptance in the debate much more difficult. Alvarez Rivadulla (2017) and Hanafi 
(2011) discussed one dilemma that social science from the global south face: publish 
globally and die locally, or publish locally and die globally. If we accept the idea that 
part of the collective construction of science is peer review, publishing globally allows 
us, on the one hand, to submit to demanding knowledge validation systems and to 
communicate with researchers from other latitudes with problems similar to ours 
(Alvarez Rivadulla, 2017). However, we risk losing national dialogue and interaction 
with the academic and nonacademic communities closest to us.  
On the other hand, when we publish globally, we enter a dynamic of unequal 





statement, “local researchers are often rejected, sometimes not even considered, for 
reasons of bad command of English or lack of proficiency in English” (Džuverović, 2018, 
p. 118). Then, we start a dialogue that reminds us of something that we already know: 
“You are not a native speaker”, which apparently means that we are less capable of being 
part of the debate (Alvarez Rivadulla, 2017). Even considering that peer review is a blind 
process, editors recognize that we are “outsiders” and do not come from recognized 
universities from the global north. Therefore, we are evaluated by a different standard 
and usually our papers are unlikely to reach the stage of peer review evaluation. I already 
experienced some of those obstacles when, instead of useful and constructive feedback, 
I received comments such as, “Please don’t make me waste my time checking your 
English”, or “You need to double check your literature sources” referring to those 
published in Spanish, or comments such as “You should be grateful that I’m teaching 
you baby steps”. Even though I had more than five years’ experience working and 
teaching those topics, I should be grateful to learn again.  
Finally, local researchers are embedded in the international academic setting, and 
especially countries that experienced conflict receive a significant flow of academics 
from the global north who visit our countries to do their research. The “Can I pick your 
brains?” question is common for some of us, but we also know that many of our 
contributions are not included when this academic work is published (Alvarez Rivadulla 
& Luna, 2019). Local knowledge production is usually little valued and recognized in 
the international context. As Alvarez Rivadulla and Luna (2019) expressed with black 
humor in their text, “the professors in the south also have good ideas, sometimes (…) in 
the south people also have ideas about the world. They are called theory too. You can 
commit to these ideas, discuss them, and suddenly, quote them” (p. 1). 
I have seen the name of my country misspelled so many times in recognized 
journals and by major figures in the field that I’m very aware of the double standards. 
My research journey was also a realization of how the field of peace and conflict studies 
perpetuates structural inequalities, which inspires me to think about what I can do to 
deconstruct those dynamics. Introducing some cultural differences may be possible, as 
Alvarez Rivadulla and Luna (2019) said: in the south, not everything is instrumental 
relationships and networking. Nor are we desperate for tokens of gratitude. We can invite 
you to a barbecue without having to do anything, relax; or I can give you a souvenir from 





To answer the question of the previous section, about the “academic standards”.  
From someone who is coming from a quantitative background inserting positionality it 
is atypical considering that this methodology often avoids it and sees itself as “objective”. 
I want to believe that positionality is an ethical responsibility for peace and conflict 
scholars independently of the methodology that they use, because it helps us to encourage 
self-accountability and provide much more transparency to the academic debate. Then, 
it can help to disclose assumptions, biases, and dismantle the structural inequality making 
it more inclusive and provide even more rigorous standards to evaluate the knowledge 
and contribution that we all bring in this field. I want to close this chapter with a comic 
strip by an Argentine humorist (see figure 9.4) who used the image of a little girl to 
“innocently” pose uncomfortable questions or comments, which represents the heart of 
my thesis. My mother, an activist, bought me several books by this artist when I was a 
child. Today, I want to believe that it is possible to be an activist within academia and 
make a change, despite the barriers that my identity involves. 
 
Figure 5-3 You see it? This is the little stick that dents ideologies by Quino57 
 
 
57 Popular comic strip by the Argentine humorist Quino (1932-2020). The comic strip depicted 
the well-known character Mafalda pointing to a police baton with the caption, “¿Ves? Este es el 
palito de abollar ideologías (You see it? This is the little stick that dents ideologies). Regarding 
the image, this cost Quino censorship in 1973 and then exile. In 1975, the Argentine State 
published a modified version of this comic strip saying: "You see, Mafalda. Thanks to this stick 






In this chapter, I described with details the research design and methods of this 
study. I displayed the justification of choosing mixed methods to answer the research 
questions addressed in this study. I also described the quantitative approach and the 
qualitative approach, including the challenges and limitations faced during the data 
collection and creation of each of the data sets. This chapter also incorporates the steps 
that I followed for each of the methodological approaches, including ethical 
consideration, sample selection criteria and questions regarding the validity and 
trustworthiness of the study. 
In the next chapters, I will present the findings of the research chapters. First, in 
Chapter 6, I introduce the quantitative instrument that I designed to measure the 
ideological bias of soldiers. This chapter, among other things, explains the role of 
ideology on soldiers aggressive disposition and willingness to protect civilians. 
Furthermore, this chapter also tests psychological mechanisms such as emotions and 
threat perception to develop a causal path about the impact of ideological biases on 
soldiers behaviours toward civilians in Colombia after the peace agreement.  
Chapter 7, address the point of the peace agreement about the illegal crops 
substitution program, using a trolley experiment to test the willingness of self-sacrifice 
in Colombian soldiers. This chapter addresses the ideological bias through the civilians’ 
policy preferences regarding the war on drugs.  Both these chapters (chapter 6 and 7) test 
the hypothesis using the experimental survey material, and begin with the study about 
how state armed actors can contribute to the perpetuation of violence after the peace 
agreement was signed, due to their ideological bias. Chapter 8, analyses the interview 
material. I study the soldiers’ narratives to complement the previous findings from the 
quantitative chapters. Chapter 9, I develop additional analyses using the interview 
material to answer the questions about how soldiers understand ideological labels of left 
and right, and what are the ideological cognitive mechanisms that explain the translation 
of ideology into behaviour. Both qualitative chapters (8 and 9) enrich and complement 






6 Quantitative Findings: Experiment 1  
This chapter explains in detail the quantitative approach implemented in this 
study to answer the following research question:  
To what extent do state armed actors contribute to the persistence of violence 
because their ideological bias influences their willingness to: 
1. withhold their protection from certain civilians because of their group identity? 
2. have the disposition to support aggressive behavior towards civilians because 
of their group identity? 
To answer this question, I designed a survey with two embedded experiments. The first 
one is a social categorization experiment with four treatments, in which it will be possible 
to identify if the Colombian soldiers have biases against civilians due to their ideological 
identity (left-wing vs right-wing). Moreover, this experiment will reveal soldiers’ 
potential attitudes toward civilians who support or oppose the political reintegration of 
the rebels, the heart of the Colombian peace agreement58.  
This study shares the thesis of Balcells (2010, 2012, 2017) that challenges the 
literature that argues that there are differences between ethnic and non-ethnic wars. Her 
research indicates that dynamics of targeted killing in ideological conflicts are similar to 
those in ethnic civil wars. For instance, in a study that compares Spain and Colombia, 
both cases have as war cleavage ideological lines (left-right) which were reflected in 
national elections. The findings indicated, that political identities explain armed groups 
behavioral dynamics of displacement at the sub-national level (Balcells & Steele, 2016; 
see also for the colombian case Steele, 2009; Steele, 2011). Therefore, similar to the 
dynamics of ethnic cleansing, armed groups “use violence to identify civilians that they 
perceive to be disloyal in order to conquer territorial control” (Balcells & Steele, 2016, 
 
58 In section 5.4.1.11, I discussed in detail the disadvantages of excluding participations that fail the 
manipulations checks of experiments—considering that I have clear effects despite the presence of 
participants that fail the experiments and the lack of consensus among academics about the benefits of MC. 
I decided to run the experiments without eliminating samples to avoid introducing analytical bias and 
distortions in the data analysis. Nevertheless, for those that consider sample removal a useful practice for 
the  interpretation of online experiments, I should warn that the results of this thesis include the answers 
of those who fail the MC. Some implications that could arise is that some treatment groups may have 
higher levels of random error, while others have less, making it more likely that differences are found 
across treatment groups that reflect attentiveness of participants rather than the effects of the treatment 





p. 16). Also, civilians are able to calculate who can be a potential collaborator of armed 
groups based on identities like political affiliation (Steele, 2009). Thus, armed group 
repertories of violence, and processes of political and social mobilization that lead to 
conflict and collective violence are not exclusive to ethnic conflict, but they can also take 
place along ideological lines (Balcells, 2017, p. 183). 
Additionally, empirical evidence indicates that there are important consequences 
of wartime violence: on the one hand, the rejection of the identity represented by the out-
group (Balcells, 2012, 2017); on the other hand, in politics, individuals are more likely 
to adopt exclusionary political attitudes toward the out-group (Daphna et al., 2009). 
Exclusionist political attitudes reflect the desire to exclude minorities or marginalize 
communities by using social or political mechanisms (Daphna et al., 2009, p. 365). In 
consequence, following this literature, I consider that attitudes toward political 
reintegration it is a sign of soldiers’ preferences regarding the treatment of their former 
enemies (out-group). For that reason, I decided to include two distinct variables to 
measure the in-group and out-group divisions in this study: the wartime cleavages (left-
right) and exclusionary vs inclusionary attitudes regarding the treatment of the out-group 
associated with the political reintegration of the rebels (see table 7).  I expect that soldiers 
will present variation in their behavioral intention toward civilians based on those 
variables. 
Table 7 The In-group and Out-group Divisions in this Study 
Wartime cleavages  Treatment of the out-group regarding 
political reintegration  
Out-group Identity  In-group Identity  Exclusionary 
attitude toward the 
out-group 
Inclusionary 
attitude toward the 
out-group  





The results of the experiment #1 will expose if the ideological identity and the 
civilians’ opinions about the reintegration of the ex-rebels impact soldier’s willingness 
to protect or their disposition to behave aggressively toward civilians. In the second 
experiment, I address a particular aspect introduced in chapter 4 about the Colombian 





ideological biases linked with policy preferences in soldiers’ disposition to make costly 
sacrifices in order to protect civilians. See figure 6.1 to see the survey flow of both 
experiments. 
Figure 6-1 . Survey Flow 
 
The quantitative findings comprise two chapters for each experiment. In this 
chapter, I describe the first experiment and its dependent and independent variables, as 
well as the hypothesis of the experiment and the characteristics of the sample. I provide 
a justification for the statistical model implemented and the results of the experiment. I 
then introduce a subsection that adds another layer to the analysis of experiment 1, 
because it explores two psychological mechanisms introduced in the theoretical 
framework that account for the effect of the treatment variables in the experiment. Then, 
I introduce an individual level background of the experiment. Here, I retain the same 
dependent variables of the experiment, but I test additional variables that include 
characteristics of the sample specified in the theoretical and conceptual chapter.  
In the next quantitative finding chapter, I will describe the second experiment and 
its hypothesis. Then, I introduce the methods implemented and the results. In this 
experiment, I explore some hypotheses from variables that were not specified in the 





willingness to make costly sacrifices, and their relation with ideology. In Appendix 1, 
the codebook of all variables included in the database is presented.  
6.1 Social categorization and soldiers’ behavior toward civilians based on 
identity group: Factorial design of Experiment #1  
6.1.1 Description of the experiment  
Factorial designs are useful to judge whether there is a link between variables, 
whilst reducing the possibility of confounding variables of experimental error. They also 
effectively reduce desirability bias59, especially regarding studying sensitive issues 
(Mutz, 2011). A two-by-two factorial design means that there are two independent 
variables, each of which has two levels. Then, a 2x2 design implies four conditions. Table 
1 represents the 2x2 factorial design that I applied with the soldiers, in which one 
independent variable (X2) is the political-ideological affiliation of the civilians (left-
wing, or right-wing), and the other (X1) is the position of the civilians related to one of 
the points of the peace agenda, the political reintegration of the ex-combatants or ex-
members of FARC (support political reintegration, or oppose political reintegration).  
Each cell in the table represents one of these four distinct conditions of the 
experiment. Using Qualtrics, it was possible to have a random and balanced distribution 













59 Social desirability bias is the tendency of some respondents to report and answer in a way they deem to 







Figure 6-2 2x2 Factorial Design: Left / Right and Support / Oppose 
 
  X2 Political Ideological Identification 

















































Reintegration- Left  
 Support Political 
Reintegration- Right  
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Reintegration- Left  
Oppose Political 
Reintegration- Right   
 
With these conditions in mind, I designed four scenarios that include the 
combination of the conditions presented in Table 6.2.  These scenarios were randomly 
distributed amongst the participants (see the scenarios in Table 6.3). 
Figure 6-3 Scenarios or Experiment Treatments 
 
 Left Right 
Support Political 
Reintegration of the ex-
FARC members 
José is a peasant leader linked to Left-
wing social organizations. Despite 
all the challenges and after much 
consideration, José has decided to 
support the political reintegration 
of the ex-FARC members. Recently 
you received an anonymous tip 
suggesting that José may pose a threat 
to the maintenance of public order.  
José is a peasant leader linked to 
Right-wing social organizations. 
Despite all the challenges and after 
much consideration, José has decided 
to support the political reintegration 
of the ex-FARC members. Recently 
you received an anonymous tip 
suggesting that José may pose a threat 
to the maintenance of public order.  
Oppose Political 
Reintegration of the ex-
FARC members 
José is a peasant leader linked to Left-
wing social organizations. Despite 
all the challenges and after much 
consideration, José has decided to 
oppose the political reintegration of 
the ex-FARC members. Recently 
you received an anonymous tip 
suggesting that José may pose a threat 
to the maintenance of public order.  
José is a peasant leader linked 
to Right-wing social organizations. 
Despite all the challenges and after 
much consideration, José has decided 
to oppose the political reintegration 
of the ex-FARC members. Recently 
you received an anonymous tip 
suggesting that José may pose a threat 





6.1.2 Dependent variables 
This section will introduce the dependent variables used during the social 
categorization experiment (Experiment #1). As outlined above, after a peace agreement 
has been signed, political violence persisted. In this study, I suggested that the state and 
its security institutions could contribute to the perpetuation of political violence after the 
end of direct conflict. My argument is that members of the security institutions can 
maintain the legacies of past violence through the way they define enemies and threats. 
As a result, the political-ideological identity bias can influence soldiers’ aggressive 
disposition against civilians or their willingness to protect civilians. To measure these 
two attitudes, I introduced the following questions after each treatment was presented 
(see Table 8).  
How much would you agree that José:  
Table 8 Operationalization of Dependent Variable: Experiment 1 
Aggressive Disposition  Was arbitrarily arrested. 
Was aggressively questioned.  
Was threatened.  
Was deserving of a violent attack. 
 
Willingness to Protect  Was protected by members of the state armed forces. 
Was defended by member of the state armed forces. 




The answer options were presented in the following scale:  
 Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
 
These items were added together to build each scale measuring aggressive 
disposition toward José and willingness to protect him. Under a factorial design, I am 
able to discern whether the ideological identity of civilians matters in justifying the 
aggressive disposition towards them or the willingness to protect them. This also applies 





to civilians’ opinions on the political reintegration of ex-FARC members. Finally, I can 
determine the interaction effect between these variables on each of the outcomes. 
For both dependent variables I calculate the Cronbach’s alphas. Cronbach’s alphas is 
common measure used to assess the reliability, or internal consistency, of a set of scale 
or items of a scale. For both dependent variables: aggressive disposition and willingness 
to protect the Cronbach’s alpha was 0.8, which means that there is an internal consistency 
between the items60 (see Appendix 9, Table 1 for descriptive statistics of treatment, Table 
2 for descriptive statistics of the treatment variables, and Table 3 for descriptive statistics 
for the main dependent variables of the experiment).  Table 9 shows the means of the 
dependent variables among the treatments.  
Table 9 Means of the Dependent Variables by treatment.  
Dependent Variable  Treatment 1  
Left-oppose  
Treatment 2  
Left-support  
Treatment 3  
Right-Oppose  
Treatment 4  
Right-Support  
Aggressive Disposition  2.8 3.3 3.0 3.0 
Willingness to Protect  5.5        5.0          5.6           6.0 
 
6.1.3 Independent Variables  
Following the previous sections, the independent variables of this experiment are 
associated with two characteristics of civilians’ identities that represented the in-group 
and out-group divisions. The first one is particularly related with the wartime cleavage 
of Colombia. Then, in this case, the civilian is represented by José and one characteristic 
is his political ideological identity (left-wing, or right-wing). The second characteristic it 
is related with the civilian inclusive or exclusive opinion toward the political 
reintegration of the ex-members of FARC which is one of the core points of the Colombia 
peace agenda (support political reintegration, or oppose political reintegration)61. As I 
 
60 The reliability ranges are from 0 to 1, when all the scale ítems are entirely independent of each other, 
then the α = 0, but if all the ítems have high covariances then the α will be close to 1. Normaly a scale 
with an α of 0.7 or more is considered as reliable.  
61 One potential limitation of this study is the gender of the civilianss and the association with the peasants. 
In this study it is male peasants. For that reason, it is not possible to determine if there is an impact of 





presented in the contextual chapter of the case study, the political ideological identity of 
civilians in Colombia was a way to classify enemies and threats during the conflict (the 
wartime cleavage).  
6.1.4 Hypotheses of the experiment  
Considering the design of Experiment 1, the following hypotheses are derived: I 
expect that if soldiers have inclusionary attitudes about political reintegration (support 
political reintegration), but rejects the identity of the out-group (left-wing):  
H1. Soldiers are more willing to be aggressive towards those that oppose political 
re-integration of the FARC, and that this effect is stronger if civilian are left-leaning than 
if they are right-leaning. 
Moreover, I expect that the rejection toward the identity of the out-group will be 
a stronger predictor of soldiers’ intentional behavior than their preferences regarding the 
treatment of the  out-group.  
H2. Soldiers are more willing to be aggressive towards those with left-wing 
identities, and that this factor is a more significant predictor of aggressive 
disposition than the oppose or support of the reintegration of the FARC.  
Last, I expect that if soldiers have exclusionary attitudes (oppose political reintegration) 
and reject the identity of the out-group (left-wing): 
H3. Soldiers are more willing to protect those that oppose re-integration, 
but only if they are right-leaning. 
6.1.5 Sample characteristics  
Between March and June 2019, a total of 920 surveys were distributed to 
Colombian soldiers, and 803 were completed, representing an 87% response rate of 
soldiers who filled out the survey almost completely62. The sample has a total of 97% 
 
Future studies that evaluate gender and other dimension of civilians’ identity are recommended. For 
example, including a student, a social leader or a civilian who lives in the city. It is possible that these other 
characteristics may play a role in the soldiers’ attitudes. 
 
62 To calculate the correct sample size for this study, I used the sofward G*power. G*Power indicates that 
a sample size of 280 (1 – β > .95) is sufficient to detect a medium effect (effect size f=.25), given the four 





males and 2.7% females; 9.5% were aged 18-24 years, 45% were 25-35 years, 43% were 
35-44 years and 2% were 45-55 years. 23% of the soldiers in this sample declare that 
they had a university level of education (bachelors, specialization and masters). 1.4% 
reported their maximum level of education primary school, 31% completed high school 
and 42.4% technical education. Finally, in the one-dimension scale of ideological 
identification (left-wing) from 1 to 10, the median was 7.1 3% identified themselves as 
left-wing, 52.5% center and 44.4% right-wing. In Appendix 8, the sociodemographic 
characteristics of the Colombian soldiers’ participants in the study are presented. 
6.1.6 A selection model 
This section describes how the hypotheses of this experiment are going to be 
empirically evaluated, since this experiment focusses on exploring the impact of soldiers’ 
ideological bias on their willingness to protect or their disposition to be aggressive toward 
civilians. The 2x2 factorial designed in the Social Categorization experiment 
(Experiment #1) will be tested using a two-way ANOVA statistical test. A two-way 
ANOVA tests the effect of two independent variables on a dependent variable, and also 
allows for an interaction between the independent variables: ideology of the civilians 
(left-wing or right-wing), and opinions about the political reintegration of the rebels 
(support or oppose political reintegration). In this study, the political ideology of civilians 
might contribute to soldiers’ aggressive disposition or willingness to protect civilians, 
but that effect in soldiers’ attitude might differ depending on civilians’ opinions towards 
the reintegration of former combatants from the rebel group (support or oppose the 
political reintegration of the ex-rebels). To complement the ANOVA model, I also fitted 
the corresponding linear regression model to allow estimation of important model 
coefficients.  
After running the ANOVA, some post estimations analyses were applied to check 
the model’s assumptions. It was then possible to identify that the residuals of aggressive 
dispositions were not normally distributed, which means that there is a violation of one 
of the statistical assumptions of the ANOVA model63, and a limitation on the reliability 
of the results (see the residuals distribution in Graph 2 and 3, Appendix 10). For that 
 
 





reason, an alternative method was applied: the generalized lineal model (GzLM) with a 
gamma error distribution. This extension of the general lineal model (GLM) relaxes the 
assumption that the residuals be normally distributed and homoscedastic (see more in Ng 
& Cribbie, 2016). However, the GLM with a gamma distribution results showed similar 
results (see Appendix 11).  
6.2 Results Experiment 1  
The results for Experiment #1 are divided by each dependent variable. I first 
introduce the results for aggressive disposition and then for willingness to protect. The 
dummy codification of the independent variables is presented in Table 1, Appendix 10. 
See also Figures 1 and 4 for the differences in the aggressive disposition mean and 
willingness to protect mean by treatment in Appendix 10.  
6.2.1 Aggressive disposition  
A two-way ANOVA tested the political-ideological identification of civilians 
(left-wing or right-wing), and civilian’s opinions towards political reintegration (support 
or oppose the political reintegration of the rebels), and were associated with the levels of 
Aggressive Disposition of soldiers toward civilians (see Table 2 and 3, Appendix 10). In 
this experiment, civilians are represented by José. When José was presented in the 
treatment scenario as left-wing, the model did not show a significantly higher level of 
Aggressive Disposition (F (1,762) = 0.07, p=0.8, η2=0.000) than José from the right-
wing. Conversely, José’s opinion towards the reintegration of the former combatant’s 
rebels in the model had a significant effect on the levels of Aggressive Disposition: when 
José opposes the reintegration of the rebels, the disposition of aggression is higher (F 
(1,762) = 4.48, p=0.03, η2=0.005) than when José supported the reintegration. Moreover, 
according to the model, the interaction between José as left-wing and opposition toward 
political reintegration of the rebels was statistically significant: (F (1,762) = 4.04, p=0.04, 
η2=0.005). Finally, the F-statics for the entire model was statically significant (F=2.84, 








Figure 6-4 Margins plot. Political Ideology and Political Reintegration Aggressive 
Disposition 
 
According to Figure 6.4, the lines in the margin-plot indicate that there is an 
interaction between the independent variables, which corroborates the previous results 
from the ANOVA model. Soldiers increase their aggressive disposition toward civilians 
that are left-wing only if they also oppose reintegration of the rebels. Moreover, the 
aggressive disposition decreases significantly if the civilians are left-wing and support 
reintegration of the ex-rebels. For civilians who are right-wing, there are no differences 
in the levels of aggressive disposition between support or oppose the political 
reintegration of the ex-rebels.  
Finally, it is possible to reformulate the same model using one group as the 
reference category and compare the three other treatment groups to this reference 
category. Therefore, I executed a lineal regression, keeping aggressive disposition as an 
outcome, but this time using the treatment groups as predictors (see Table 5, Appendix 
10; see also figure 1 for the differences in the aggressive disposition mean by treatment 
in the same Appendix). With Treatment 1 (José left-wing and support) as a referent 
group, we can interpret that on average, we expect that the aggressive disposition of the 
soldiers under treatment 2 (Jose left-wing and oppose political re-integration) is 0.6 





significant at p<0.01. The contrast with the other treatment groups was not statistically 
significant. Figure 6.5 more clearly displays the previous results, showing that the 
average of the dependent variable, aggressive disposition, is distributed for each one of 
the treatments. The model estimates 95% confidence intervals using robust standard 
errors (Long & Ervin, 2000). The results of the linear regression model confirmed the 
results of the ANOVA model. Colombian soldiers who participated in this study show a 
significant increase in their aggressive disposition toward civilians who are left-wing and 
oppose reintegration, and decrease their aggressive disposition if the civilian is left-wing 
and supports political reintegration. 
Figure 6-5 Margin plot. Linear Regression between Treatment Groups and Aggressive 
Disposition with 95% Confidence Interval and Robust Standard Errors 
. 
6.2.2 Willingness to protect  
Following the hypothesis addressed above, I expect that soldiers are more willing 
to protect those that oppose re-integration, but only if they are right-leaning. This 
hypothesis assumes that if soldiers have ideological biases and exclusionary political 
attitudes toward the out-group then they will have a mental and behavioral resistance to 





held by combatants of the Colombian conflict (left-wing civilians). As in the previous 
model, an ANOVA model was used to test soldiers’ willingness to protect civilians (see 
Table 6, 7 and 8, Appendix 10; see also figure 3 for the differences in the willingness to 
protect mean by treatment). When a civilian was presented in the experiment as left-
wing, the model showed no significant difference in levels of willingness to protect (F 
(1,748) = 9.67, p=0.0005, 2=0.012) in comparison with a right-wing civilian. Likewise, 
the model shows that civilian opinion towards the reintegration of former combatants 
does not present differences in soldiers’ levels of willingness to protect (F (1,748) = 0.00, 
p=0.9797, 2=8.73). Nevertheless, the interaction of civilian left-wing and opposition 
toward political reintegration of the rebels was significant (F (1.748) =8.64, p=0.003, 
2=0,011). 




Figure 6.6. corroborates the results in Table 6 in Appendix 10. The crossed lines 
suggest that there is an interaction effect between ideology and opinion towards political 
reintegration of the ex-FARC members. The figure shows that willingness to protect 
decreases in soldiers when they are exposed to the treatment where a civilian was from 





when the soldiers were exposed to the treatments where a civilian opposed political 
reintegration, the effect becomes significant, but only if a civilian was left-wing. 
Moreover, the margins (see Table 9 in Appendix 10) also showed differences between 
the treatment groups. For that reason, in order to offer a better interpretation of these 
results, I executed a linear regression model, using the treatment groups as independent 
variables (see Table 10 in Appendix 10). 
 Using treatment 1 (Jose left-wing and supporting political reintegration) as a 
referent group, we can interpret that on average the soldiers’ willingness to protect under 
treatment Jose left-wing and oppose political reintegration is -0.52 lower than those 
soldiers who were in the referent group. At p<0.05, this difference is significant. 
Furthermore, on average, we expect that levels of willingness to protect in treatment 4 
(Jose right-wing and oppose political reintegration) are 0.544 higher than the level of 
willingness to protect under the referent group. This evidence highlights the findings 
presented above in the ANOVA test. On the one hand, opposition to the political 
reintegration affects soldiers’ willingness to protect. On the other hand, this effect 
depends on whether the civilian was right-wing or left-wing. Figure 6.7 is a 
straightforward visualization of these results. The average of willingness to protect is 
significantly different between the treatments that oppose political reintegration. 
Nevertheless, the average willingness to protect in soldiers is statistically lower if the 
civilian who opposes the political reintegration is presented as left-wing in the treatment, 
















Figure 6-7 Margin Plot. Linear Regression between Treatment Groups and Willingness 
to Protect with 95% Confidence Interval and Robust Standard Errors 
 
6.2.3 Discussion  
The results presented above confirm some of the hypothesis suggested for this 
experiment. On the one hand, for the outcome, aggressive disposition, the Colombian 
soldiers who participated in this study showed higher levels on aggressive disposition 
towards those civilians who hold exclusionist attitudes toward the ex-rebels, which refers 
to those who oppose political reintegration of the FARC ex-members, and that this effect 
is stronger if the civilian is left-leaning rather than right-leaning, such as FARC 
dissidents. This result may suggest that Colombian soldiers support the political 
reintegration of the rebels. This finding is not completely surprising because Colombia 
has a history of political reintegration with a series of armed groups that have been 
demobilized over recent decades (see chapter 4). However, these political reintegration 
experiences did not guarantee the end of political violence. For this reason, some authors 
have suggested that the current Colombian peace process with the FARC insurgency is 
only another partial peace (Nussio, 2020). As a consequence, because of this historical 





political reintegration, but this doesn’t entail an acceptance of political identities similar 
to their former enemies. In other words, despite of soldiers inclusive political attitudes 
regarding political reintegration of the rebels. The findings reveal soldiers’ rejection of 
the political identity represented by their former enemies. As I suggested, previous 
experiences of political reintegration of rebels or institutional approaches of 
democratization of the political system in Colombia, as was mentioned in chapter 4, does 
not guarantee the end of political violence.  
 Another potential interpretation of this results is that soldiers may unlink the 
political reintegration process of the rebels from accepting them and their political ideas 
in the democratic system. For them, political reintegration can be a practical way to 
disarm their enemies. As a consequence, the previous results that suggest soldiers have 
inclusive attitudes towards the out-group does not necessarily mean that they will accept 
the ideological identity associated with their former enemies or that they will support 
their participation in politics. In fact, ideological biases can persist and cause a mental 
and behavioral resistance to protect civilians who can be related with the political identity 
of the internal enemy. The results for the outcome, willingness to protect, confirms this 
resistance. The findings for this outcome indicated that soldiers will significantly 
decrease their willingness to protect civilians if they are left-wing and oppose political 
reintegration. But they will significantly increase their willingness to protect civilians if 
they are right-wing and oppose the reintegration. These results suggested that the political 
ideological identification of the civilians matters in soldier’s willingness to protect 
civilians after the end of the direct conflict and the political reintegration of the ex-rebels. 
These findings indicate that soldiers,  in terms of protection, reject those with the identity 
of their former enemies and they may likely protect more those with exclusionist political 
attitudes toward their former enemies, only if they share the in-group ideological identity.  
Finally, an alternative interpretation of the experimental results could be to 
separate how José would be treated by the individual respondents, from how they feel 
what is likely to happen to José, given the post-peace agreement violence circumstances.  
Following that separation, the interpretation of the dependent variables instead of 
suggesting that: “willingness to protect decreases in soldiers when they are exposed to 
the treatment where a civilian was from the left-wing and opposed the reintegration of 
ex-FARC”, could be: “soldiers predicted that José was less likely to be protected by 
soldiers when they learned that he was left-wing and opposed reintegration”. Similarly, 





José opposes the reintegration of the rebels, the disposition of aggression is higher”, the 
interpretation could be framed as: “soldiers predicted that José would be mistreated when 
they learned that he opposed reintegration”. Even though this alternative interpretation 
sounds logical and plausible, there are three main reasons why I did not interpret my 
results in this way. First, some of the items that aimed to capture soldiers’ aggressive 
disposition are linked with duties that only members of the security sector can do, such 
as the right to “arrest” or “question” civilians. Second, the scenario is framed in a way 
that Colombian soldiers can associate as a familiar experience as a soldier. I constructed 
it this way by suggesting: Recently, you received an anonymous tip suggesting that José 
may pose a threat to the maintenance of public order. Staff members within the security 
sector are used to receiving warnings about potential threats. As I mentioned in Chapter 
5, I did some pilots with the soldiers, and part of what I tried to see in the interviews that 
I did in the small focus groups was checking if they felt the questions were personally 
relevant and realistic. When I asked what they think about these questions, they 
atomically felt that I was asking about their behavior or about an in-group member and 
how they would react toward José. This connection happens automatically for them. 
Some argue that the tip toward José makes the scenarios closer to their life experience as 
soldiers because this is a normal procedure that military intelligence does before they do 
patrols or while they study the risks and plan military operations. The wording also helps 
because I used terms that sounds familiar for them, such as  “public order” which resonate 
with them and their duty. Finally, the items that measure willingness to protect are more 
direct by considering who is doing the actions of protecting because all the options 
explicitly say that state armed forces are the ones protecting, defending, and supporting 
José. Then, I argue that the wording of the scenario and the operationalization of the 
dependent variables allowed me to assume that these experiments are predicting how 
state combatants would treat civilians like José. 
Figure 6.8. shows both outcomes, aggressive disposition and willingness to 
protect, distributed by treatments. I standardized the variables, which means that I 
rescaled the variables to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. 
Standardizing makes it easier to compare scores, even if those scores were measured on 








Figure 6-8 Z-score for Willingness to Protect and Aggressive Disposition 
 
6.3 Summary of results of Experiment 1 
1. Soldiers are more willing to be aggressive towards those civilians that oppose 
re-integration of the FARC, and this effect is stronger if the peasant is left-
leaning. This result confirms hypothesis 1 proposed for this experiment.  
2. Soldiers are more willing to be aggressive towards those civilians with left-
wing identity. But the average of aggressive disposition changes according to 
the opinion of civilians concerning political reintegration of the ex-rebels. If 
the civilian is left-wing and supports political reintegration, the average of 
aggressive disposition decreases significantly in comparison with the 
treatments where civilians are left-wing and oppose the reintegration of the 
FARC. In this case, the average of aggressive disposition increases 
significantly. This result rejects the hypothesis 2 proposed for this 
experiment. 
3. Soldiers are more willing to protect civilians if they oppose reintegration, but 






6.4 Psychological mechanism: emotions and out-group threat perception  
Some studies consider that emotions and out-group threat perceptions are 
psychological barriers of peace and drivers of violence (Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2016; 
Hirschberger et al., 2016; Pliskin & Halperin, 2016; Sharvit & Halperin, 2016; 
Shesterinina, 2016). In this study, I defined psychological barriers as “the barriers pertain 
to the integrated operation of cognitive, emotional ad motivational processes, combined 
with a pre-existing repertoire of rigid supporting beliefs, world views and emotions that 
result in selective, biased and distorted information processing” (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 
2011, p. 220). Following the theoretical framework of this study, emotions and out-group 
threat perception play an important role in explaining intergroup conflict and violent 
behavior (Gross et al., 2013; Halperin, 2011; Halperin et al., 2009; Hirschberger et al., 
2016; McDoom, 2012; Moro, 2017; Nussio, 2017; Riek et al., 2006). Both variables in 
this study can act as psychological mechanisms (perceived threat and emotional reaction 
to the target) that account for the effects of the treatment variables. For this reason, to 
operationalize these variables, I subjected them to the same treatment variables using the 
treatment experiment scenarios (see Appendix 13, Tables 1 and 2).  
6.4.1 Emotions 
To measure emotions, I replicated the same 2x2 factorial scenario in the survey 
(see table 1 appendix 12) and I asked the participants: To what extent do you experience 
the following feelings when thinking about people like José?64 I used a scale from 1 to 9, 
where 1 means “not at all” and 9 means “extremely”.  
1) Hate  
2) Hostility  
3) Anger  
4) Irritation  
5) Rage  
6) Anxiety 
7) Fear  
8) Worry 
9) Empathy  
10) Compassion  
11) Respect  
 







The list of emotions presented above includes positive and negative emotions. The 
items included in this scale followed studies led by Halperin (2011) and Halperin et al. 
(2009). I emailed Dr Halperin to gain access to the list of emotions that he applied in his 
studies, translated them into Spanish, and tested and adapted them for the Colombian 
context in the pilots of the survey. In the scale, reverse codes were applied for positive 
emotions (empathy, compassion, respect). The Cronbach of alpha for this scale was 0.77. 
6.4.2 Out-group threat perception  
A similar procedure was followed to measure out-group threat perception. I replicated 
the treatment scenarios and added the following question (see table 2 appendix 12): To 
what extent do you believe that this type of person poses a threat because they (I used a 
scale from 1 to 9, where 1 means “not at all” and 9 means “extremely”):  
1. Jeopardize your physical existence (personal death); 
2. Jeopardize the physical existence of the Colombian people (physical collective 
annihilation); 
3. Put at risk the identity of Colombia as a democratic state (symbolic collective 
annihilation); 
4. Represent the perpetrators of the Colombian people (past victimization).  
 
The items included in this scale come from the Multidimensional Existential Threat 
Model (MET) introduced in chapter 3  (Hirschberger et al., 2016)65.  The Cronbach of 
alpha for this scale was 0.85. See Table 3 for the descriptive statistics for both variables, 
emotions and out-group threat perception and Figures 1 and 3 for the difference in the 
variables means by treatment in Appendix 12. Table 10 shows the means of emotions 
and out-group threat perception among the treatments. 
Table 10 Means of the Dependent Variables by treatment.  
Dependent Variable  Treatment 1  
Left-oppose  
Treatment 2  
Left-
support  
Treatment 3  
Right-
Oppose  
Treatment 4  
Right-
Support  
Emotions  1.8       1.9         1.8 1.23 
Out-group Threat Perception 5.0        5.1          4.2          3.8 
 







In Figure 6.9, it is possible to see and compare the behavior of the main outcomes of 
Experiment 1, and the emotions and out-group threat perception scores by treatment. 
Comparing the figures, it seems plausible that emotions and out-group threat mediates 
the effects of the treatments on the main dependent variables: willingness to protect and 
aggressive disposition. This can add another layer to the analysis of the Experiment 1.  
6.4.3 Hypotheses  
Following the theoretical framework for emotions and out-group threat 
perception, and the argument of this study about the soldiers’ rejection of the identity of 
their former enemies (in-group identity vs out-group identity) and treatment (exclusive 
or inclusive political attitudes) of the out-group regarding political reintegration of the 
rebels, following hypotheses are derived: 
H1. Soldiers’ emotions become more positive toward civilians that oppose 
political reintegration of the FARC, and that this effect is stronger if the civilian 
is right-leaning than if civilians are left-leaning. 
H2. Soldiers out-group threat perception increases toward civilians that 
support the political reintegration of the FARC, and that this effect is stronger if 
civilians are left-leaning than if they are right-leaning. 





6.4.4 A selection model 
To test this potential mediation relation, I started with a two-way ANOVA 
statistical test to analyse the effect of the treatment variables in emotions and out-group 
threat perception. I also applied some linear regression to test the direct effect of the 
treatment variables on the outcomes. Then I used structural equation modeling for path 
analysis, using emotions and out-group threat perception as mediator variables. 
Mediation variable is an integral part of a relationship between an independent and a 
dependent variable, which represents the generative mechanism through which the focal 
independent variable is able to influence the dependent variable of interest (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986). Particularly, mediator variables help to specify how the association 
between an independent variable and an outcome variable occurs. The researcher needs 
to explain how and why the inclusion of the mediator variable is more interesting than 
the independent variable (Bennett, 2000). For this reason, in this study, I argue that 
emotions and out-group threat perception can enrich the explanation suggested in 
Experiment 1 about the impact of political ideology of civilians and their opinion about 
political reintegration of the rebels in soldiers’ levels of aggressive disposition and 
willingness to protect civilians.  
Structural equation models are a form of multiple regression statistical analysis, 
and provide estimates of the magnitude and significance between sets of variables in a 
diagram. Moreover, these models can provide information about two or more variables 
at the same time, testing the direct effects across outcomes, and are also useful to test 
indirect effects among them (e.g., mediation) (see more in Acock, 2013). In the path 
model designed for this study, I explore the relation of out-group threat perception and 
emotions as mediation variables between the treatment variables and the main dependent 
variables of Experiment 1. It is important to recognize that path models cannot be used 
to establish causality, but they are useful to test models that are more realistic than 
multiple regression. The path models presented below followed the steps introduced by 
Acock (2013) to determine the best fit models data using STATA software. Finally, the 
interpretation of the models was based on suggestions from Acock (2013) and Grace and 





6.5 Results  
6.5.1 Emotions  
A two-way ANOVA tested the political identification of civilians (left-wing or 
right-wing), and civilians’ opinions regarding political reintegration, (support or oppose), 
to see if they were associated with emotions of soldiers toward civilians (see Tables 4 
and 5, Appendix 12). The emotions scale included positive and negative emotions. An 
increase in the emotion scale means an increase in negative emotions. Contrarily, a 
decrease in the scale means positive emotions. 
The ANOVA results indicated that when civilians are left-wing, soldiers showed 
a significant increase in the emotions scale, which means higher levels of negative 
emotions (F (1,773) = 3.88, p=0.05, η2=0.005) than when civilians are right-wing. 
Similarly, civilians’ opinion on the reintegration of the former rebels have a significant 
effect on soldiers’ emotions: when civilians oppose the reintegration of the rebels, the 
levels of emotions are higher, meaning that they become more negative than when 
civilians support reintegration (F (1,773) = 1.98, p=0.1, η2=0.002). In sum, the F statistic 
for the main effect of the two independent variables of the model is statistically 
significant. Furthermore, in accordance with the model, the interaction between the 
ideology of the civilians as left-wing and opposing the political reintegration of the rebels 
is statistically significant (F (1,773) = 5.39, p=0.02, η2=0.006). The parallel lines in the 
margin-plot indicate an interaction between the independent variables, showing that there 
is a significant difference between the emotions of soldiers toward civilians when 
civilians are left-wing and oppose political reintegration (see Figure 6.10). The results 
showed that there is a significant increase in soldiers’ negative emotions toward civilians 
only when civilians are left-wing and oppose reintegration. But if the civilian is right-











Figure 6-10 Margins-plot. Political Ideology, Political Reintegration and Emotions. 
 
Figure 6.11 showed the results of the linear regression of the same model but 
using the treatments as independent variables (see Table 7, Appendix 12). The findings 
confirm the results from the ANOVA model. There is a significant difference in soldiers’ 
emotions when civilians are right-wing, especially if they oppose political reintegration. 
The emotions of soldiers are negative if the civilian who opposes reintegration is leftist, 
but when the civilian who opposes reintegration is rightist the emotions in the soldiers 
become statistically significantly positive. These results are also confirmed by Figure 1 












Figure 6-11 Margin Plot. Linear Regression between Treatment Groups and Emotions 
with 95% Confidence Interval and Robust Standard Errors. 
 
6.5.2 Out-group threat perception  
The ANOVA result indicated that when civilians are left-wing, soldiers showed 
a significant increase in out-group threat perception (F (1,763) = 32.49, p=0.000, 
η2=0.041) than when civilians are right-wing. Contrarily, civilians’ opinion on the 
reintegration of the former combatant rebels do not show a significant effect on soldiers’ 
out-group threat perception (F (1,763) = 0.24, p=0.6, η2=0.000) (see Tables 8 and 9, 
Appendix 12). However, in accordance with the model, the interaction between the 
ideology of the civilians who are left-wing and oppose political reintegration of the rebels 
is statistically significant (F (1,763) = 2.25, p=0.1, η2=0.002). The parallel lines in the 
margin-plot indicate an interaction between the independent variables, showing that there 
is a statistically significant difference between the out-group threat perception of soldiers 
toward civilians, when civilians are left-wing, and oppose the reintegration (see Figure 
6.12).  The results showed that there is a significant increase in soldiers’ out-group threat 
perception toward civilians only when civilians are left-wing. Moreover, there is a 
significant decrease in out-group threat perception in soldiers when civilians are right-









To complement the previous results, Figure 6.13 shows the results of the linear 
regression of the same model but using the treatments as independent variables (see Table 
11, Appendix 12). The findings confirm the results from the ANOVA model. There is a 
significant difference in soldiers’ out-group threat perception when civilians are right-
wing than when they are left-wing. The out-group threat perception of soldiers decreases 
statistically significantly only if the civilian is right-wing. These results are also 
confirmed by Figure 3 in Appendix 12, which shows the mean of out-group threat 
perception by treatment. The out-group threat perception is statistically significantly 
higher when the civilian is left-wing independently of whether the civilian supports or 
opposes reintegration. However, the out-group threat perception decreases only if the 





Figure 6-13 Margin plot. Linear Regression between Treatment Groups and Out-group 
Threat Perception with 95% Confidence Interval and Robust Standard Errors. 
 
6.6 Summary of results: psychological mechanism as outcomes 
The results presented above indicate that soldiers’ ideological biases toward 
civilians can be expressed in their emotions and threat perception. On the one hand, 
emotions become significantly positive only when the soldiers were exposed to the 
treatment when a civilian was rightist, and opposed the political reintegration of the ex-
rebels. This results confirm hypothesis 1 proposed for emotions in this experiment. On 
the other hand, out-group threat perception is statistically significantly higher in soldiers 
when civilians are leftist. This results confirm hypothesis 2 proposed for out-group threat 
perception. Furthermore, the results also indicated that threat perception decreases 
significantly when civilians are rightists and oppose the political reintegration of the ex-
rebels. These results confirm soldiers’ rejection of the ideological-identity represented 
by the ex-rebel group. The fact that we are observing a variation across emotions and 
out-group threat perception along the left-right cleavage, not only supports the 
ideological bias against the left-wing by the soldiers; they also suggest that if we consider 





exclusionist political attitudes toward the ex-rebels by being against the political 
reintegration of the rebels. 
6.7 Path Models  
 In this section, I explore some path analysis keeping as the main outcome: 
willingness to protect and aggressive disposition. I use emotions and out-group threat 
perception as mediation variables, and Experiment 1 variables as independent variables: 
political ideology (left-wing or right-wing), and political reintegration (support or 
oppose). The results presented include both the unstandardized and standardized 
coefficients. According to Grace and Bollen (2005), the unstandardized coefficient 
represents the slope and the standardized coefficient represents the square root of the 
variance explained in the outcome variable. For this reason, it is recommended to report 
both results, because they give different information about the models and the relations 
of the variables. 
6.7.1 Emotions and aggressive disposition mediation models 
6.7.1.1 Political ideology  
In the model presented below, only political ideology and emotions can have a 
direct impact on aggressive disposition. Political ideology can also have an indirect effect 
on aggressive disposition through emotions (see figure 6.14). 
 






First, I interpreted the unstandardized coefficients and then the standardized 
coefficients (see Table 1, appendix 13). The effects of political ideology on aggressive 
disposition includes both direct and indirect effects. The direct path estimates that the 
dummy variable for political ideology is not statistically significant (p-value=0.66), 
meaning that aggressive disposition levels of those who are left-wing are not different 
from those who are right-wing, on average, controlling for emotions. Among the direct 
effects on aggressive disposition, those soldiers with negative emotions have 30% higher 
levels of aggressive disposition than the mean (p-value=0.001). For the emotions 
equation, the direct effects of political ideology on soldiers’ emotions is statistically 
significant, meaning that soldiers` emotions become negative when civilians are leftist 
(p-value=0.04). 
The indirect effects on aggressive disposition indicate that political ideology is 
statistically significant, meaning that the aggressive disposition of soldiers toward left-
wing civilians are higher than for right-wing civilians, through emotions, on average (p-
value=0.05). In other words, the mediation effect of soldiers’ emotions with the civilians’ 
political identity increases their aggressive disposition: when civilians are left-wing, 
soldiers’ emotions become more negative and their aggressive disposition increases.  
Second, the standardized coefficients show the relationship between the variables 
expressed in terms of standard deviation (see Table 9). Based on an estimated total effect 
of political ideology on aggressive disposition of 0.001 = ((0.07*0.3) + (-0.02)), we can 
see that if civilians are left-wing, without holding emotions constant, aggressive 
disposition would increase by 0.001 standard deviations. Thus, in terms of standardized 
units, the direct effect of being left-wing on aggressive disposition is less in magnitude 
(sign ignored) than the effect of emotions (0.02 vs 0.3) and this difference is statistically 
significant, although the total effect of political ideology on aggressive disposition is 
smaller (0.001). In other words, negative emotion increases the levels of aggressive 
disposition in soldiers toward left-wing civilians. If emotions increased by 1 standard 
deviation (SD) while political ideology was held constant, aggressive disposition would 
be expected to increase by 0.3 SDs. But if civilians are left-wing and emotions was held 





Table 11 Path Model Political Ideology, Emotions and Aggressive Disposition 
(standardized coefficients) 
 
6.7.1.2 Political Reintegration  
In the next model, emotions continue to be the mediator variable but this time 
mediate the effect of political reintegration on aggressive disposition (see figure 6.15) 
Figure 6-15 Path Model of Political Reintegration, Emotions and Aggressive Disposition 
 
The unstandardized coefficient indicates that aggressive disposition includes both 
direct and indirect effects (see Table 2, Appendix 13). In the emotions equation, all 
effects are direct effects. The dummy variable for political reintegration showed that 
opposition to political reintegration of the ex-rebels is statistically significant (p-
value=0.04), meaning that emotions become more positive in soldiers when civilians 





than the mean. In the aggressive disposition equation, in this model, the direct effects 
indicated that soldiers increase their levels on aggressive disposition by 30% when they 
have high levels of negative emotions (p-value=0.001). Similarly, soldiers’ aggressive 
disposition increases by 40% when civilians oppose reintegration. Moreover, the indirect 
effects on aggressive disposition are somewhat different. The dummy variable for 
political reintegration is statistically significant (p-value=0.04), meaning that, on 
average, aggressive disposition levels on soldiers toward civilians is lower if civilians 
oppose reintegration, than when civilians support reintegration, through emotions. In 
sum, the mediation role of emotions affects the type of relation between political 
reintegration and aggressive disposition in soldiers. When civilians oppose reintegration 
and soldiers’ emotions are negative, aggressive disposition in soldiers toward civilians, 
decreases in a statistically significant way.  
Subsequently, based on an estimated total effect of political reintegration on 
aggressive disposition of 0.079 = ((-0.07*0.3) + 0.10) see table 10), we can see that if 
civilians oppose reintegration without holding emotions constant, then aggressive 
disposition increases by 0.08 standard deviations. Hence, in terms of standardized units, 
the direct effect of opposition to political reintegration on aggressive disposition is less 
(sign ignored) than the effect of emotions (0.1 vs 0.3), although the total effect of 
opposition to political reintegration on aggressive disposition is 0.08. If emotions 
increased by 1 standard deviation (SD) while political reintegration was held constant, 
aggressive disposition would be expected to increase by 0.3 SDs. Likewise, when civilian 
opposition to political reintegration increases by 1 SD while emotions are held constant, 
aggressive disposition would be expected to increase by 0.1 SDs. However, when 
emotions take place as mediator, aggressive disposition decreases. In other words, an 
increase in negative emotions decreases the levels of aggressive disposition in soldiers 






Table 12 Path Model of Political Reintegration, Emotions and Aggressive Disposition 
  
6.7.1.3 Political ideology 
For the next two models, emotions continue to be the mediator variable, but this 
time willingness to protect is the main outcome (see figures 6.16 and 6.17). 
Figure 6-16 Path Model of Political Ideology Emotions and Willingness to Protect 
 
The unstandardized coefficients of the effects of political ideology on willingness 
to protect includes both direct and indirect effects. In contrast, in the emotions equation, 
all effects are direct effects (see Table 3, Appendix 13). The direct path between emotions 
and the dichotomy variable for political reintegration is statistically significant at p<0.1, 
meaning that soldiers’ emotions differ between left-wing and right-wing civilians on 





higher than the mean, which means that they become more negative than when civilians 
are right-wing. 
Furthermore, the direct path of emotions on willingness to protect is statistically 
significant (p-value=0.001), indicating that willingness to protect decreases to 17% in 
soldiers when emotions increase, that is, it becomes negative. Similarly, the dummy 
variable for political identity is statistically significant, meaning that soldiers’ levels of 
willingness to protect civilians would decrease 50% more than the mean if civilians are 
left-wing (p-value=0.006). Moreover, the indirect effects suggest that the dummy 
variable for political reintegration is statistically significant at p<0.1 (p-value=0.08), 
meaning that soldiers levels of willingness to protect decreases in a statistically 
significant way if civilians are left-wing than when they are right-wing, through 
emotions, on average. 
Now, based on the standardized coefficient of an estimated total effect of political 
ideology on willingness to protect of -0.11= ((0.07*-0.15) + (-0.10)), we can see that if 
civilians are left-wing without holding emotions constant, willingness to protect in 
soldiers would decrease by 0.11 standard deviations (see table 11).  Thus, in terms of 
standardized units, the direct effect of political ideology is similar to the effect of 
emotions (sign ignored) (0.1 vs 0.15), although the total effect of political ideology on 
willingness to protect is smaller (-0.11). If civilians are left-wing while emotions are held 
constant, willingness to protect would be expected to decrease by 0.1 SDs. Also, if 
emotions increase by 1 SD, meaning that emotions become more negative, while political 
identity is held constant, willingness to protect would decrease by 0.15 SDs. 







6.7.1.4 Political Reintegration 
Figure 6-17 Path Model of Political Reintegration, Emotions and Willingness to Protect 
(standardized coefficients) 
 
The unstandardized coefficients of the effects of political reintegration on 
willingness to protect include both direct and indirect effects (see Table 4, Appendix 13).  
In the equation of willingness to protect, for the direct effect, the dummy variable for 
political reintegration is not statistically significant, meaning that the levels of 
willingness to protect in soldiers do not differ between civilians who oppose or support 
reintegration, on average, controlling for emotions. Nevertheless, concerning willingness 
to protect, in this model, when soldiers’ emotions become negative the levels of 
willingness to protect decrease 18% more than its mean, and this effect is statistically 
significant at p<0.01 (p-value=0.001). However, the indirect effect of political 
reintegration on willingness to protect is somewhat different. The relation between 
political reintegration on willingness to protect civilians in soldiers becomes not 
significant, meaning that there is no difference in soldier’s levels of willingness to protect 
civilians, if the civilian’s opinion about reintegration are mediated by soldiers` emotions. 
For the emotion equation, the direct effect is not statistically significant either, meaning 
that soldiers’ emotions levels do not differ between civilians who oppose or support 
reintegration. Based on an estimated total effect of political reintegration and willingness 
to protect civilians of -0.002= ((-0.05*-0.16) + (-0.01)), we can see that if civilians 
oppose reintegration without holding emotions constant, then willingness to protect 
decreases 0.002 standard deviations (see Table 12). Consequently, in terms of 





the effect of emotions (0.01 vs 0.16), although the total effect of political reintegration 
on willingness to protect is smaller (-0.002). But only the direct effect of emotions is 
statistically significant, meaning that the levels of willingness to protect in soldiers are 
only different across the levels of emotions. If emotions become negative, willingness to 
protect would be expected to decrease. 
Table 14 Path Model Political Reintegration, Emotions and Willingness to Protect 
 
6.7.2 Out-group threat perception and aggressive disposition mediation model 
6.7.2.1 Political ideology 
For the next four models, out-group threat perception becomes the mediator 
variable across Experiment 1 treatment variables: political reintegration and political 
ideology for the main dependent variables, aggressive disposition and willingness to 











Figure 6-18 Path Model of Political Ideology, Out-group Threat Perception and 
Aggressive Disposition  
 
The effect of political ideology on aggressive disposition includes both direct and 
indirect effects. Based on the unstandardized coefficients (see Table 5, Appendix 13), the 
direct path predicts that if out-group threat perception increases in one unit, aggressive 
disposition would be 32% higher than the mean, and it is statistically significant (p-
value=0.032). The dummy variable for political ideology indicated a statistically 
significant effect, meaning that levels of aggressive disposition in soldiers will decrease 
by 30% if civilians are left-wing. However, the indirect effect on aggressive disposition 
is somewhat different. The dummy variable of political ideology is statistically 
significant, meaning that levels of soldiers’ aggressive disposition will increase in 
soldiers when civilians are left-wing than when civilians are right-wing, through out-
group threat perception, on average (p-value=0.001). In other words, when out-group 
threat mediates the relationship between the political ideology and aggressive 
disposition, aggressive disposition increases significantly if civilians are left-wing. 
Moreover, for emotions, the effects are only direct. Among the direct effects on emotions, 
the dummy variable for political ideology is statistically significant, meaning that the 
emotion levels of soldiers become more negative when civilians are left-wing than when 
they are right-wing (p-value=0.001). 
Now, considering the standardized coefficients (Table 13), the estimated total 
effect of political ideology on aggressive disposition of 0.012= ((0.21*0.39) + (-0.07), it 
is possible to see that if civilians are left-wing without holding out-group threat 





Therefore, in terms of standardized units, the direct effect on aggressive disposition is 
0.07 (sign ignored) than the effect of out-group threat perception (0.07 vs 0.39), although 
the total effect of political ideology on aggressive disposition is smaller (0.012). 
Moreover, if civilians are left-wing while out-group threat perception is held constant, 
aggressive disposition would be expected to decrease 0.07. If out-group threat perception 
increased by 1 SD while political ideology was held constant, aggressive disposition 
would be expected to increase by 0.39 SDs. 
Table 15 Path Model Political Ideology, Out-group Threat Perception and Aggressive 
Disposition (standardized coefficients) 
 
6.7.2.2 Political Reintegration  
Figure 6-19 Path Model of Political Reintegration, Out-group Threat Perception and 






Following the unstandardized coefficients results (see Table 6, appendix 13), the 
aggressive disposition equation can be divided into direct and indirect effects. The direct 
effect of out-group threat perception on soldiers’ levels on aggressive disposition is 
statistically significant, meaning that one unit of increase in out-group threat perception 
increases by 30%, on average, controlling for political reintegration, the levels of 
aggressive disposition in soldiers (p-value=0.001). Moreover, aggressive disposition in 
soldiers increases by 31% when civilians are opposed to reintegration (p-value=0.02). 
Nevertheless, the indirect effect of political reintegration on aggressive disposition is not 
statistically significant, meaning that the levels on aggressive disposition do not differ 
between civilians who support or oppose reintegration, through out-group threat 
perception.  For the out-group threat equation, all effects are direct effects. The dummy 
variable for political reintegration is not statistically significant, meaning that the 
aggressive disposition levels on soldiers toward those who oppose reintegration are not 
different from those civilians who support reintegration. 
Then, looking at standardized coefficients (see Table 14), based on an estimated 
total effect of political reintegration on aggressive disposition of 0.072 = ((-0.02*0.38) + 
0.08)), it is possible to see that if civilians oppose reintegration, without holding out-
group threat perception constant, aggressive disposition would increase 0.07 standard 
deviations. Thus, in terms of standardized units, the direct effect of political reintegration 
is less than the effect of out-group threat perception (0.08 vs 0.38), although the total 
effect of political reintegration on aggressive disposition is smaller (0.07). Moreover, if 
opposition to political reintegration while out-group threat perception is held constant, 
aggressive disposition would be expected to increase by 0.08 SDs. Also, if out-group 
threat perception increased by 1 SD while political reintegration was held constant, 





Table 16 Path Model Political Reintegration, Out-group Threat Perception and 
Aggressive Disposition (standardized coefficients) 
 
6.7.3 Out-group threat perception and willingness to protect mediation model  
6.7.3.1 Political ideology  
Figure 6-20 Path Model of Political Ideology, Out-group Threat Perception and 
Willingness to Protect  
 
The model presented above tests the mediation role of out-group threat perception 
between the political ideology of civilians and levels of willingness to protect in soldiers. 
According to the unstandardized coefficients, the effects for willingness to protect can 





protect (see Table 7, Appendix 13), out-group threat perception is not statistically 
significant, meaning that the levels of willingness to protect in soldiers are not different 
according to the levels of threat (p-value=0.9). Contrarily, the direct effect of the dummy 
variable of political ideology is statistically significant, meaning that levels of soldiers’ 
willingness to protect civilians are different between left-wing and right-wing civilians 
(p-value=0.002). The results indicated that levels of willingness to protect in soldiers 
decrease if civilians are left-wing by 50%, on average, controlling for out-group threat 
perception. However, the indirect effect on willingness to protect showed that out-group 
threat perception is not statistically significant, meaning that soldiers’ willingness to 
protect is not different if civilians are left-wing or right-wing, via out-group threat 
perception. 
On the other hand, the direct effect on out-group threat perception is statistically 
significant, meaning that civilians who are left-wing increased by 96% the out-group 
threat perception in soldiers (p-value=0.001). Now, looking at the standardized 
coefficients (see Table 15), the total effect of political ideology on willingness to protect 
-0.11 ((0.20*0.00) + (-0.11)), the results indicate that if civilians are left-wing without 
holding out-group threat perceptions constant, then willingness to protect would decrease 
0.11 standard deviations. Therefore, in terms of standardized units, the direct effect of 
political ideology on willingness to protect in soldiers is more (sign ignored) than the 
effect of out-group threat perception (0.11 vs 0.00), although the total effect of 
willingness to protect is the same as political ideology (0.11). So, if ideological identity 
increased by 1 SD while out-group threat perception was held constant, willingness to 
protect would be expected to increase 0.004 standard deviations. But if civilians are left-
wing while out-group threat perception is not held constant, willingness to protect would 





Table 17 Path Model Political Reintegration, Out-group Threat Perception and 
Aggressive Disposition (standardized coefficients) 
 
6.7.3.2 Political Reintegration 
Figure 6-21 Path Model of Political Reintegration, Out-group Threat Perception and 
Willingness to Protect  
 
The last path model showed the mediation effect of out-group threat perception 
between the political ideology of civilians and levels of willingness to protect in soldiers. 
According to the unstandardized coefficients, the effects for willingness to protect can 
be divided into direct and indirect effects (see Table 8, Appendix 13). For this model, 
neither the direct nor the indirect effects are statistically significant, meaning that 





oppose or support reintegration. Also, the direct effect of out-group threat perception 
indicated that there is no effect on willingness to protect. Furthermore, the indirect effect 
on willingness to protect showed that out-group threat perception is not statistically 
significant, meaning that soldiers’ willingness to protect does not differ if civilians 
support or oppose reintegration, via out-group threat perception. 
Based on standardized coefficients (see Table 16) an estimated total effect of 
political reintegration on willingness to protect of 0.0004 ((-0.02*-0.02) + (-0.00)), we 
can see that if civilians oppose reintegration without holding out-group threat perception 
constant, then soldiers’ willingness to protect civilians would decrease 0.0004 standard 
deviations. Therefore, in terms of standardized units, the direct effect of oppose political 
reintegration on soldiers’ levels of willingness to protect is less (sign ignored) than the 
effect of out-group threat perception (0.004 vs 0.02), although the total effect of political 
reintegration on willingness to protect is smaller (0.0004). However, any of these 
relations are statistically significant. 
Table 18 Path Model Political Reintegration, Out-group Threat Perception and 










6.8 Summary Path Models 
In this section, I summarize the indirect effect that were statistically significant from 
the meditation models presented above. 
1. Levels of aggressive disposition increase when civilians are left-wing and this 
relationship becomes stronger and statistically significant when emotions are 
involved. In other words, when emotions increase (which means they become 
negative), levels of aggressive disposition toward leftist civilians’ increases. 
2. Levels of aggressive disposition in soldiers toward civilians decreases if 
civilians oppose political reintegration through emotions. To put it differently, 
when emotions are involved and they become negative, levels of aggressive 
disposition of soldiers toward civilians who oppose reintegration decreases. 
Here it is important to remember that the direct effect between opposition to 
political reintegration and aggressive disposition was positive, meaning that 
levels of aggressive disposition in soldiers toward civilians who oppose 
reintegration increases. However, when emotions mediates the relationship 
between aggressive disposition and political reintegration, aggressive 
disposition decrease on soldiers toward civilians that oppose political 
reintegration.  
3. Soldiers’ levels of willingness to protect left-wing civilians decreases through 
emotions, meaning that when soldiers experience negative emotions, their 
levels of willingness to protect civilians decreases in a statistically significant 
way, only if civilians are left-wing. 
4. The average levels of aggressive disposition in soldiers increases when 
civilians are left-wing more than when they are right-wing, through out-group 
threat perception. The direct effect between aggressive disposition indicated 
that soldiers will decreases their aggressive disposition toward civilians who 
are left-wing. However, when out-group threat perception acts as a mediator 
variable, the levels of aggressive disposition in soldiers increases in a 
statistical and significant way toward leftist civilians. 
6.9 Individual level background characteristics: Experiment 1 
In order to complement the results presented above, I decided to explore 





intergroup conflict literature in my theoretical framework. Following this literature, I 
identify variables that may influence soldiers’ disposition to be aggressive or their 
willingness to protect civilians.  
6.9.1 A selection model 
To test the individual characteristics of the soldiers’ aggressive disposition and 
willingness to protect civilians, a multilinear regression model was applied. Multiple 
regression is a statistical technique that uses several independent variables to predict the 
outcome of the dependent variable. In this model, a multiple linear regression was 
calculated to predict aggressive disposition based on soldiers ideology (SDO and left-
right scale), negative emotions, MET model to measured Out-group Threat, Moral 
Justification, and Dehumanization. Control variables were also included, such as 
combatant exposure, hypervigilance and Experiment 1 independent variables. All these 
variables were tested in the previous section using main effects. In Appendix 14, it is 
possible to see the matrix correlation model previous to the multivariate regression. The 
results suggested that all the variables are not highly correlated with each other and there 
is no risk of multicollinearity66. The theory behind the independent variables included in 
the multilinear regression was outlined in Chapter 3 and the operationalization of these 
variables is presented in Appendix 15 (see also Appendix 9, Table 4 for descriptive 
statistics of independent variables of the multilinear regression model). 
6.9.2 Dependent variables 
The dependent variables in this analysis are the same as those presented in the 
social categorization experiment: aggressive disposition and willingness to protect. 
6.9.3 Main independent variables and hypothesis 
The ideology of the soldiers is central to this study. Nevertheless, considering 
Chapter 4 there are different ways to measure ideology. In this study, I use social 
dominant orientation and the traditional one-dimensional self-identification scale left-
 
66 In statistics, multicollinearity is a phenomenon where there is a high intercorrelation among 





wing-right-wing (see table 4 Appendix 9 and Appendix 15 to see the operationalization 
of this variables). These two ways to measure soldiers ideology help to capture the effect 
of their ideological-identity on the dependent variables. 
6.9.3.1 Ideology  
To measure ideology, I incorporate the traditional one-dimensional left-right and 
the non-dimensional scale of social dominance orientation (SDO). Multiples studies find 
SDO to be a significant predictor of generalized prejudices against minorities (A. K. Ho 
et al., 2012). Moreover, SDO is associated with a broad spectrum of social ideologies 
such as conservatism, nationalism, patriotism, and militarism (Pratto & Shih, 2000), and 
policy preferences such as supporting wars of aggression, the death penalty, and torture, 
and opposition to humanitarian practices, social welfare and affirmative action (Arnold 
K Ho et al., 2015; Sidanius et al., 2016; Sidanius et al., 2004)67. Thus, the following 
hypotheses on ideology can be proposed: 
Hypothesis 1a: Soldiers with higher scores on SDO will experience high levels of 
aggressive disposition, and low levels of willingness to protect.  
Hypothesis 1b: Soldiers with right-wing ideologies will experience high levels of 
aggressive disposition, and low levels of willingness to protect.  
6.9.3.2 Emotions  
A recent group of studies has linked individuals’ emotions, collective action, 
participation in collective violence, and ideology (Moro, 2017; Nussio, 2017; Schubiger 
& Zelina, 2017). They argue that the indoctrination and socialization process inside 
armed groups impacts on cognitive and emotional identification with the group as a 
whole and between the members (Siebold, 2007; E. J. Wood, 2008, 2009; R. M. Wood 
& Thomas, 2017). Moreover, group-based emotions contribute to armed mobilization, 
and ideology acts as a normative and emotional commitment to the cause (Gutiérrez-
 
67 There are some approaches in between the spatial and non-spatial viewpoints. This is the case for moral 
foundation theory (Haidt, 2012; Simpson, 2017).  In this model, it is possible to identify six core moral 
foundations: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, purity/sanctity and 
liberty/oppression. This scale was inspired by literature from anthropology and evolutionary psychology 





Sanín & Wood, 2014; Moro, 2017; Nussio, 2017; Schubiger & Zelina, 2017). At the 
individual level, emotions play an important role in intractable conflicts or long-term 
conflicts, particularly because emotions provoke stimulus that can activate past 
memories. This information can be associated with intergroup conflict, leading people 
and groups to conflict and justifying violence, and guiding behaviors during wartime. In 
other words, emotions can shape individual and group attitudes and behaviors (Gross et 
al., 2013; Halperin, 2011; Pliskin & Halperin, 2016). The evidence suggests that after 
experiencing intractable conflicts, emotions like fear, hatred, despair and anger cause 
selective, biased and distorted information processing (Halperin, 2011; Halperin et al., 
2011). In this study, I test the role of negative emotions in Colombian soldiers to explain 
their displays of aggressive disposition and willingness to protect civilians (see Appendix 
15 for more details about the operationalization of this variable).  
Hence, the following hypotheses about negative emotions are proposed:  
Hypothesis 2a:  Soldiers with higher scores on negative emotions will experience 
high levels of aggressive disposition.  
Hypothesis 2b:  Soldiers with higher scores on negative emotions will experience 
low levels of willingness to protect.  
6.9.3.3 Out-group threat perception 
Previous research indicates that existential threat is a key component of 
intergroup conflict (Hirschberger et al., 2016; Hirschberger, Pyszczynski, & Ein-Dor, 
2015). Indeed, previous research indicates that out-group threat is one of the key 
components of intergroup conflict and personal justification of violence (McDoom, 
2012; Riek et al., 2006; Shesterinina, 2016). The theory suggests that threat is present 
whenever “one group’s actions, beliefs, or characteristics challenge the goal attainment 
or well-being of another group” (Riek et al., 2006, p. 363). In general, individuals tend 
to view members of the out-group as threatening their in-group (Henri Tajfel, 1982; H 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Scholars indicate that the perception of physical and symbolic 
threat usually reinforces negative emotions, feelings of distrust, intolerance toward the 
out-group, and the reaffirmation of one’s collective identity (Castano, 2004; Castano et 
al., 2019; Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002; Conrad et al., 2018; McDoom, 
2012). Moreover, threat perception increases individuals’ willingness to engage or 





(Maoz & McCauley, 2008). Some studies have focused on the threats in terms of personal 
fear of death (Pyszczynski et al., 2006), while others have focused on understanding the 
perception of threat at collective levels (Halperin, Porat, & Wohl, 2013). According to 
Hirschberger et al. (2016), threat is a multidimensional phenomenon. These authors 
recognize that different people, even under the same circumstances, can perceive threats 
differently. For this reason, they combine different levels of analysis of threat (collective 
and individual or self vs group), diverse temporal natures of the threat perception (past 
and future), and different types of threat perceptions (physical or symbolic) to develop 
the Multidimensional Existential Threat Model (MET). See Appendix 15 for more details 
about the operationalization of these variables.  
They suggest that each dimension can correlate in different ways with political 
violence. Following this model, the following hypotheses are derived:  
Hypothesis 3a:  Soldiers with an individual future-oriented physical threat will 
experience high levels of aggressive disposition and less willingness to protect.  
Hypothesis 3b:  Soldiers with a collective future-oriented physical threat will 
experience high levels of aggressive disposition and less willingness to protect.  
Hypothesis 3c:  Soldiers with a collective future-oriented symbolic threat will 
experience high levels of aggressive disposition and less willingness to protect.  
Hypothesis 3d:  Soldiers with a collective past-oriented threat will experience 
high levels of aggressive disposition and less willingness to protect.  
6.9.4 Additional independent variables68  
6.9.4.1 Delegitimization of the enemy: Moral justification and dehumanization 
As was mentioned in chapters 3, delegitimization plays an important role in 
intergroup conflicts. The scholars reviewed there define delegitimization as a method of 
group categorization. A group, or groups, are classified into extremely negative social 
categories – subsequently excluded from the human groups’ sphere. Consequently, these 
excluded groups are perceived as a violation of basic human norms or discounts and 
therefore deserve to die. Göbel (2014) argues that in a military context, delegitimization 
 






implies a process of dehumanization of the “enemy” because it is the best tool to “reduce 
man’s reluctance to kill” (p.107).  
The self-defense argument is a key argument to justify killing in war and to reduce 
post-combat guilt (Kelman, 1973). However, the sense of duty and protection of values 
and beliefs can also motivate the disposition to kill in war. This implies that, in addition 
to the sense of threat, it is necessary to have a moral justification for killing in war that 
makes the action of killing morally acceptable. L. E. Jackson and Gaertner (2010) argue 
that through moral justification, for example, persons engaging in violence view 
themselves as “protecting their cherished values, preserving world peace, saving 
humanity from subjugation or honoring their country’s commitments” (p. 238). The 
moral code behind the moral justification to killing in war responds to the in-group’s self-
interest, such that groups draw the line between justifiable and unjustifiable reasons 
according to their own interests and their own system of beliefs in order to legitimize 
their actions (Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Roccas et al., 2006).  
6.9.4.2 Moral justification  
To operationalize delegitimization, I use the moral justification scale presented in 
the L. E. Jackson and Gaertner (2010) study, generating the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 4a:  Soldiers with higher levels of moral justification will experience 
higher levels of aggressive disposition.  
Hypothesis 4b:  Soldiers with higher levels of moral justification will experience 
low willingness to protect. 
6.9.4.3 Dehumanization  
To measure dehumanization of the out-group, I used the scale developed by 
Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, and Cotterill (2015). In this model, I include leftist as the out-
group and rightist as the in-group in the dehumanization scale. Hence, the following 
hypotheses concerning out-group dehumanization are formulated: 
Hypothesis 5a: Soldiers with higher scores on the left-wing dehumanization scale 
will experience lower levels of aggressive disposition.  
Hypothesis 5b: Soldiers with higher scores on the left-wing dehumanization scale 





6.9.4.4 Control variables 
Combatant exposure69and hypervigilance70 were included as control variables, as 
well as the variables of the treatments experiment from the social categorization political 
ideology of civilians, and their opinions about the political reintegration of the ex-rebels 
and the interaction between them. 
6.10 Results  
Before presenting the results for the multilinear regression models for each outcome, 
I tested the main effects of each independent variable included in the models. The results 
are then divided into four blocks. First, I introduce the main effects for aggressive 
disposition. Second, I present the results of the multilinear regression model for 
aggressive disposition. Third, I introduce the main effects for willingness to protect. 
Finally, I show the results of the multilinear regression model for willingness to protect.  
6.10.1 Main effects: aggressive disposition  
The main effect is the effect of one-unit change in independent variable on the 
dependent variable, ignoring the effect of all other independent variables. Tables 1 to 8 
in Appendix 16 show the results of the main effects of the independent variables 
introduced above using aggressive disposition as an outcome. 
The main effect of soldiers’ social dominance orientation (SDO) on aggressive 
disposition was significant, such that the soldiers who had high levels of SDO had higher 
levels on aggressive disposition than those who had low levels of SDO. The average of 
aggressive disposition increases by 0,56 units in the SDO index. Finally, the SDO levels 
 
69 I used a modified version of the combatant exposure scale (CES) presented in Sundberg’s (2015) thesis. 
This scale includes items that capture a range in severity, from going on combat patrols and performing 
other dangerous duties, to the percentage of comrades killed, wounded, or missing in action. This scale 
commonly applies to Western soldiers in military operations and peacekeeping or enforcement missions. 
After some conversations with Colombian soldiers, I adapted this scale for the Colombian soldiers who 
are directly involved in an internal conflict.  
70 Hypervigilance is one of the central features of PTSD in soldiers because it is connected with the nature 
of their work. Soldiers are constantly on guard and prone to reaction. They need to maintain an intense 
awareness of their surroundings. For that reason, I control my model including the brief hypervigilance 





explain 2% of the variability on the levels of aggressive disposition (see Table 1, 
Appendix 16).  Similar results but with less significant effect was on the main effect of 
soldiers’ ideology (left-right scale), where 1 is extreme left and 10 extreme right. Soldiers 
who are closer to the right-wing had higher levels on aggressive disposition than those 
from the left-wing. Increasing by one unit on the scale of ideology (1-10), the average of 
aggressive disposition increases by 0.07. Last, ideology levels explain 0.6% of the 
variability on the levels of aggressive disposition (Table 2, Appendix 16). The above 
results confirm hypotheses 1a and 1b proposed for these independent variables. 
Afterwards, I tested the main effects of negative emotions on aggressive disposition. 
The main effect established that a high score on negative emotions could statistically 
significantly predict aggressive disposition. High scores on negative emotions accounted 
for 2.7% of the explained variability in aggressive disposition. Moreover, if one unit 
increases in the negative emotion index the average of aggressive disposition increases 
by 0.53. This result supports hypothesis 2a suggested for this variable (see Table 2, 
Appendix 16).  
Next, I tested with a multilinear regression the effects of each of the dimensions 
introduced in the Multidimensional Existential Threat Model (MET), which measures 
out-group threat. The individual dimensions of the MET were examined further and 
indicated that physical collective threat and symbolic collective threat are not statistically 
significant. However, personal death threat could statistically significantly predict 
aggressive disposition, t = 2.90 (p<0.01) and past victimization threat as well, t = 2.16 
(p<0.05). So, if one unit increases on personal death threat perception (scale 1-9), the 
average of aggressive disposition increases by 0.10. Similarly, if one unit increases in 
past victimization threat perception (scale 1-9), the average of aggressive disposition 
increases by 0.063 (see Table 4, Appendix 16). These results corroborate hypotheses 3a 
and 3d, and reject hypotheses 3b and 3c that connect aggressive disposition as an 
outcome. 
Subsequently, I tested the main effect of moral justification and dehumanization 
predictors on aggressive disposition. The main effect established that high scores on 
moral justification could statistically significantly predict aggressive disposition, but the 
relationship between the variables is negative. This means that high scores on moral 
justification predict lower levels on aggressive disposition. Furthermore, if one unit 
increases in the moral justification index (scale 1-9), the average of aggressive 





the variability noted in aggressive disposition (see Table 5, Appendix 16). This result not 
only rejects hypothesis 4a; it also shows an opposite relation between the variables. 
I tested with a multiple linear regression the effect of dehumanization using the 
dehumanization scales for left-wing and right-wing. I transformed the original scale of 0 
to 100 to 1 to 10, where zero represents a complete dehumanization of the left-wing or 
right-wing people (the image of the ape) and 10 represent the image of a human (Homo 
sapiens) (see Appendix 15). The individual predictor indicates that dehumanization right-
wing is not statistically significant, but dehumanization left-wing could statistically 
significantly predict aggressive disposition. This means that the soldiers who consider 
people from the left-wing as humans reduces significantly their levels of aggressive 
disposition than those that consider people from the left-wing as less than human. In fact, 
if one unit increases in the dehumanization left-wing (scale 1-10), the average of 
aggressive disposition decreases by 0.078 (see Table 6, Appendix 16). This result 
supports hypothesis 5a.  
Finally, I use main effects models to test the control variables combatant exposure 
and hypervigilance. The main effect model recognized that hypervigilance has no relation 
with aggressive disposition. However, combatant exposure could statistically 
significantly predict aggressive disposition. However, this relationship is negative. High 
scores on combatant exposure accounted for 0.5% of the variability noted in aggressive 
disposition. Besides, if one unit increases in the combat exposure index, the average of 
aggressive disposition decreases by 0.15. This result not only rejects hypothesis 6a, it 






6.10.2 Multilinear regression model of aggressive disposition  
Figure 6-22 Multilinear Regression Model Aggressive Disposition 
 
Figure 6.22. represents the multilinear results presented in Table 9 in Appendix 
16, clearly revealing regression results, making comparisons and seeing the confidence 
intervals of the explanatory variables (see more in Jann, 2014). All coefficients whose 
confidence intervals (marked by the horizontal lines) do not touch the zero line are 
significant. The results indicated that negative emotions and opposing reintegration were 
the only variables that have a statistically significant impact on the aggressive disposition 
in soldiers. One unit of increase on negative emotions increases the average of aggressive 
disposition by 0.43. Similarly, soldiers who answer the treatment where civilians oppose 
reintegration increase the average of aggressive disposition by 0.3. This result is similar 
to the results from the ANOVA model introduced earlier in the analysis. However, the 
interaction between the treatment variables was not statistically significant. Finally, 
contrary to what the literature suggested and the hypothesis for moral justification 
expected, this variable was statistically significant, but it has an opposite effect on the 
outcome variable. One unit of increase in moral justification scale decreases the average 





6.10.3 Main effects: willingness to protect  
This section replicates the same procedure above using the same independent 
variables, but this time with willingness to protect as the dependent variable. In Appendix 
16, from tables 10 to 16, are the results of the main effects of the independent variables 
on willingness to protect. The main effect established is that high scores on social 
dominance orientation (SDO) could statistically significantly predict a decrease in 
willingness to protect. Willingness to protect decreased by 0.4 on the SDO index, and 
SDO explains 1% of the variability on the levels of willingness to protect. This results 
supports hypothesis 1a. In contrast, ideology (left-right scale) and negative emotions 
were not significant in the main effects models for this outcome. These results reject 
hypotheses 1b and 2b (see Tables 10, 11 and 12, Appendix 16). A multilinear regression 
was calculated to predict willingness to protect based on each of the dimensions 
suggested in the Multidimensional Existential Threat Model (MET). The results show 
that there is a collective significant effect between the dimensions to explain willingness 
to protect (F, (4,637) = 4,53, p = 0.001), with an R2 of 0.028. However, each of the 
dimensions had a different effect on the dependent variable. For instance, personal death 
threat (this variable was significant for aggressive disposition) and physical collective 
threat were not significant. However, symbolic collective threat could statistically 
significantly predict lower levels on willingness to protect, t = -2.59 (p<0.05). 
Willingness to protect decreases by 0.14 on the Likert scale of symbolic collective threat 
(1-9). Additionally, the average of willingness to protect increases by 0.075 in the past 
victimization threat scale 1 to 9 (p<0.1) (see Table 12, Appendix 16). These results 
supports hypothesis 3c, but contradicts hypothesis 3d, which considers willingness to 
protect as an outcome. 
I tested the main effect of moral justification and dehumanization variables on 
willingness to protect. Dehumanization scales do not have any significant statistical 
relation with the outcome, so it is possible to reject hypothesis 5b (See Table 14, 
Appendix 16). However, moral justification statistically significantly predictS 
willingness to protect. High scores on moral justification increase willingness to protect. 
Further, with the increase of one unit in the moral justification index, the average of 
willingness to protect increases by 0.13. Moreover, high scores on moral justification 





hypothesis 4b, it also suggests a different relation between the variables (see Table 13, 
Appendix 16). 
In the next section, a multilinear regression model for willingness to protect is 
calculated (see Table 17, Appendix 16). Figure 6.63 shows in a more accessible way the 
results of this model. All coefficients whose confidence intervals (marked by the 
horizontal lines) do not touch the zero line are significant.  
6.10.4 Multilinear Regression Model of Willingness to Protect  
Figure 6-23 Multilinear Regression Model Willingness to Protect 
 
 The results of the multilinear regression model for willingness to protect indicate 
the following. First, one unit of increase on the social dominance orientation scale 
decreases by 0.4 the average of willingness to protect civilians in soldiers. This result 
corroborates hypothesis 1b. Second, symbolic threat perception in soldiers decreases by 
0.16 the willingness to protect civilians, and this finding makes it possible to accept 
hypothesis 3c suggested for this outcome. Third, contrary to hypothesis 3d suggested for 
this variable, soldiers who had a past victimization perception of threat increased their 
willingness to protect civilians by 0.08. This particular finding may suggest that past 
traumas and memories about the conflict can increase the willingness of soldiers to 





decreasing their levels of willingness to protect by 0.09. Finally, the interaction between 
the treatment variables (Experiment 1) left-wing and opposition to reintegration indicates 
that soldiers reduces their willingness to protect civilians if they are left-wing and oppose 
reintegration. These results confirm the findings of the ANOVA model presented above 
for this outcome. 
6.11 Summary of results of individual level characteristics of soldiers by 
aggressive disposition and willingness to protect 
In this section, I summarize the main results of the multilinear regression model 
presented above. The results for aggressive disposition indicated that ideology, by its two 
measures (SDO and left-right scale), does not explain the increase in aggressive 
disposition. However, negative emotions, along with opposition to reintegration are 
statistically significant and explain the increase of aggressive disposition. Nevertheless, 
surprisingly, the levels of aggressive disposition decreases in soldiers with high levels of 
moral justification.  
On the other hand, the multilinear regression results for willingness to protect 
suggest that social dominance orientation and symbolic collective threat perception 
explain less willingness to protect civilians within the soldiers. These results resonate 
with the theory and the hypotheses suggested for these variables. Contrarily to the 
hypothesis, soldiers who consider civilians with left-wing political identity as humans 
decreased their willingness to protect civilians. Additional unexpected results were also 
found. Past victimization perception threat increases the willingness to protect civilians 
in soldiers, suggesting that traumas or victimization experiences of some soldiers affect 
their willingness to protect civilians. Finally, as in the ANOVA model, the interaction 
between left-wing and oppose political reintegration was statistically significant, 
suggesting that soldiers will decrease their willingness to protect civilians who are left-
wing and oppose political reintegration. These results of this exploratory analysis of the 
individual characteristics on soldiers suggested that there are differences among the 
threat dimensions which is suggested by the literature. Further, studies should explore 
those differences in a deeper way. Also, the fact that dehumanization and moral 
justification are not acting as the literature suggested is an invitation for future studies to 
continue studying the soldiers’ socio-psychological processes in relation to the civilians 
that share the identity of the out-group and their attitude regarding the treatment of the 






This chapter introduced the quantitative approach to answer the main research 
question of this study: To what extent do state armed actors contribute to the persistence 
of violence because their ideological bias influences their willingness to: 
1. withhold their protection from certain civilians because of their group identity? 
2. have the disposition to support aggressive behavior towards civilians because 
of their group identity? 
Therefore, based on the wartime cleavages of Colombia and the civilians’ opinion 
of the political reintegration of the ex-rebels of FARC, I tested the soldiers’ behavioral 
intention toward civilians based on those variables using an experimental design. The 
main results point firmly at an overall pattern identified among the different models, and 
it is the rejection of the identity represented by the out-group (leftist) in soldiers. The 
findings indicated that soldiers may not be directly involved in violent behavior toward 
civilians that share the identity of the ex-rebels but they have a tendency to reveal low 
levels of willingness to protect those civilians. Furthermore, some of the results indicated 
that soldiers may has inclusionary political attitudes regarding the political reintegration 
of the rebels. However, when some causal mechanisms are involved as mediators, like 
emotions or out-group threat perception, the attitudes of the soldiers toward civilians’ 
changes across the war cleavages (left-right) and civilians’ inclusionary vs exclusionary 
political attitudes (support vs oppose political reintegration). The findings indicate that 
soldiers’ behavior toward civilian might be affected if the civilians are left-wing and 
support the political reintegration of the rebels. Some of the results suggest that soldiers 
may not agree with the political reintegration as a treatment of their former adversaries. 
In the next chapter, I introduce another experiment that tests how civilians’ policies 
preferences associated with the treatment of the issue of the illegal crops affect soldiers’ 






7 Quantitative Finding: Experiment 2 
7.1 War on drugs, ideology and soldiers’ self-sacrifice  
As mentioned in chapter 4, the so-called war on drugs reinforced the 
counterinsurgency strategies by stigmatizing civilians who lives in areas controlled by 
FARC (Beehner & Collins, 2019; Gutiérrez D & Thomson, 2020). Peasants, indigenous 
communities and Afro-Colombians have been considered suspect communities, labelled 
as criminals and confronted as armed enemies by the Colombian Army who treated them 
as potential collaborators of the rebels for having coca crops (Acero & Machuca, 2021; 
Acero & Thomson; Ramírez, 2001). The Army confrontation against civilian coca 
growers has been widely documented (Observatorio de Tierras, 2020). Thus, I believe 
that the trolley dilemma introduces an important layer to my analysis because it 
acknowledges the complexities of researching the role of ideology in the context of 
Colombia within the state forces. By including the war on drugs, and the policies derived 
from it, I add another layer by showing how policy preferences among civilians may also 
create state forces bias towards them. According to the peace accords, the government 
will invest in crop substitution programs as part of the National Comprehensive Program 
for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de 
Cultivos Ilícitos – PNIS). This program was a vital part of the peace agreement because 
it challenged the militarized strategy that has been implemented to deal with the problem 
of the illegal crops (Castro & Martínez, 2019; Dávalos, 2016). With the peace agreement, 
the illegal crops is no longer a security problem but as a social concern that comes from 
lack of infrastructure and socioeconomic opportunities for the civilians who live in areas 
abandoned by the state beyond its temporary military presence. Recent literature has been 
trying to approach the question of ideology in armed groups by considering the 
disposition of individuals to make costly scarifies for their in-group (William B. Swann 
et al., 2014; William B Swann, Gómez, Huici, Morales, & Hixon, 2010). This is a way 
to identify those that they call “devoted actors” which may exemplify the people who 
deeply interiorize ideologies. Consequently, I believe that it was worth exploring this 
relatively new way to approach the role of ideology in armed groups because it can 
provide clues about the differences within a group. If not all members within armed 
groups are devoted actors, then there are some characteristics that may help us to explain 
the characteristics or the profile of those that are more likely to interiorize and have very 





Given the Colombian context, I designed a trolley dilemma experiment, 
considering the notion of the devoted actor model, to measure how war on drugs 
strategies, led by right-wing parties in the country, can affect the willingness of 
Colombian soldiers to sacrifice themselves for a certain group of civilians. I included the 
trolley dilemma experiment along with a 2 x 2 factorial experiment. I randomized it to 
align with the above experiment (Experiment 1), so that all those who saw the treatment 
where the civilian is left-wing in the 2 x 2 experiment would see the left-wing policy in 
the trolley experiment, and all those who saw the treatment where the civilian is right-
wing in the 2 x 2 experiment would see the right-wing policy in the trolley experiment 
(see figure 7.1) 
In the trolley dilemma, I wanted to test if the willingness of self-sacrifice which 
is presented as a constitutive value of being a soldier can be affected by the policy 
preferences of the civilians. In theory, soldiers are trained to make costly sacrifices in the 
name of causes, values, beliefs, groups or their comrades (Scott Atran, 2016; Scott Atran, 
Sheikh, & Gomez, 2014; Gómez, López-Rodríguez, Vázquez, Paredes, & Martínez, 
2016; Sheikh, Atran, & Gómez, 2014). I argue that in the context of Colombia, the war 
on drugs could impact on the willingness of soldiers to make costly sacrifices for certain 
kind of civilians – in this case, peasants who are criminalized by the rationalities of the 
war on drugs. This experiment is an attempt to measure whether the war on drugs affects 
the way soldiers relate to their willingness to protect civilians. I designed the trolley 
dilemma following the study of  Sonya, Rumen, Hamed, and Morteza (2015). I then 
created two scenarios based on point four about illicit drugs. Based on the contextual 
details introduced in chapter 4, I created two scenarios.  
One scenario is in favor of the eradication of coca crops, which means the 
reactivation of aerial spraying and the forced manual eradication of coca crops. The other 
is against eradication and is associated with the crop substitution program, included in 
the peace agreement. The second scenario is usually framed as a left-wing policy, and is 
usually supported by politicians from left-wing political parties, whereas the first 





Figure 7-1 Trolley Dilemma and War on Drugs Policy Preference71 
 
Source: Sachdeva, Sonya, Rumen Iliev, Hamed Ekhtiari, and Morteza Dehghani. "The role of 
self-sacrifice in moral dilemmas." PLoS one 10, no. 6 (2015): e0127409. 
7.1.1 Scenario: Left-wing policy  
A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five people on strike against the 
eradication of illegal drug crops who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present 
course. You are on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and 
the five protestors. The only way to save the lives of the five protestors is to jump off the 
bridge and onto the tracks below where your body will stop the trolley. You will die if 
you do this, but the five protestors will be saved. What should you do? 
– Jump onto the tracks 
– Allow the trolley to proceed along the main track 
7.1.2 Scenario: Right -wing policy  
A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five people on strike in favor of the 
eradication of illegal drug crops who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present 
course. You are on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and 
the five protestors. The only way to save the lives of the five protestors is to jump off the 
bridge and onto the tracks below where your body will stop the trolley. You will die if 
you do this, but the five protestors will be saved. What should you do? 
– Jump onto the tracks 
 
71 Traditionally, the trolley dilemma does not include the subject as the one that is sacrificed. However, 
Sachdeva, Sonya, Rumen Iliev, Hamed Ekhtiari, and Morteza Dehghani, 2016 study the role of self-
sacrifice in moral dilemmas by manipulating the visual perspective of the sacrificial action using  different 
drawings that shows self-sacrifice in 1st and 3rd person. I pick the drawing that successfully captures the 





– Allow the trolley to proceed along the main track 
7.1.3 Experiment Hypothesis  
Soldiers are more willing to sacrifice themselves on behalf of civilians 
who support right-wing policy.  
7.1.4 A selection model: individual characteristics of Colombian soldier and self-
sacrifice by policy preference. 
To test the hypothesis introduced above, I address logistic regressions models and 
GLM models. The central mathematical concept behind the logistic regression is the logit 
– the natural logarithm of an odds ratio. The odds or probability (or probability/[1–
probability]) means that the resultant predicted or the even happening is defined as the 
likelihood that an even will occur. In this case, it is possible to test if the soldiers are 
more willing to jump in the dilemma with the right-wing policy than those who were 
presented with the left-wing situation. Normally, logistic regression is well suited for 
describing and testing hypothesis about relationships between categorical outcome 
variables and one or more categorical or continuous predictor variables (Peng, Lee, & 
Ingersoll, 2002, p. 4). 
7.2 Results  
The results of the logistic regression indicated that despite the difference 
presented in Figure 7.2, statistically they are not significant. That is, the willingness to 
self-sacrifice is not different in the two trolley dilemma scenarios. Table 1 in Appendix 
17 shows us that there are not significant differences between the soldiers who decided 
to jump for the right-wing policy and the soldiers who decided to jump for the left-wing 
policy. 
Previous studies show that people have a tendency to make costly sacrifices for their in-
group (William B. Swann, Gómez, Dovidio, Hart, & Jetten, 2010; William B Swann et 
al., 2010). In this experiment, I assumed state combatants are likely to make costly 
sacrifices for saving someone who is in favor of leading right-wing policies because those 
policies are associated with the militarized approach to deal with illegal crops over the 







Figure 7-2 Self-sacrifice and War on Drugs Policy Preference 
 
 
Nevertheless, the trolley dilemma experiment was followed directly after 
Experiment 1. So, it is plausible to expect some priming effects. In other words, it is 
possible to answer the question: how does the trolley outcome look in relation to the 
treatment variables from Experiment 1? The figure 7.3 below suggested that there may 
be a priming effect. 






Indeed, the results of the GLM model between the willingness to jump in the 
trolley experiment and the treatments indicate that there is a priming effect, (see 
Appendix 17, table 2)72 where those primed with right-wing civilians that oppose the 
political reintegration of the rebels in Experiment 1 were significantly more likely than 
the rest of the soldiers in the other experiment treatments to sacrifice themselves p-
value<0.01. See the figure 7.4 below which illustrates this result. 
Figure 7-4 Margin-Plot GLM model Self-sacrifice by Treatment 
 
However, as A. Owen (2018), a British soldier argues, in a military context trolley 
dilemmas can be criticized for lacking other elements faced by soldiers on the ground, 
such as personal bias, physical discomfort, and psychological pressures. In fact, between 
2009 and 2018, 126 members of the security sector and civilians died during eradication 
operations and 664 were seriously injured. The coca crops are full of landmines and until 
September 2019 nine soldiers and civilians involved in coca eradication have been killed 
with almost 50 injured, mostly mutilated by landmine explosions (Acosta, 2019 ; Vergara 
Garzón, Gelvez, & Aparicio Silva, 2019). The human cost of the forced eradication of 
coca crops has been paid with the blood of soldiers, with a significant increase in 2017 
 





as a result of the Trump administration’s pressure to cut cocaine production. This can 
partially explain why in general the soldiers exhibit low levels of self-sacrifice.  
For this reason, in the next section, I evaluate some individual characteristics of 
Colombian soldiers that may be affecting their disposition to self-sacrifice. Moreover, 
these characteristics will be tested  within soldiers and between the two scenarios of the 
trolley dilemma. The variables introduced were not specified in the theoretical and 
conceptual framework because they are part of an exploratory dimensions of this study.   
7.3 Individual level background characteristics of Experiment 2 
Following recent literature that tries to understand what compels costly sacrifice 
and extreme behavior in intergroup conflicts (Gómez et al., 2017; J. Jiménez et al., 2016; 
Sheikh et al., 2014; Sheikh et al., 2016; William B. Swann et al., 2014), I decided to 
explore some variables suggested in those studies to identify who are the devoted actors 
within the Colombian army. Following the scope of this study, I want to identify if there 
are differences between the soldiers who express willingness to make costly sacrifices 
for left-wing and right-wing policies; if so, what are these differences, and what do they 
tell us about the effects of the ideological approaches over war on drugs policies on 
Colombian soldiers? These findings can complement the argument concerning the 
impact of the ideological cleavage of the Colombian conflict on soldiers’ contribution to 
the perpetuation of violence after the end of the conflict (see Appendix 9, tables 5 and 6 
for descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables of multilinear 
regression model). 
As mentioned in chapter 4, since 1999, Colombia has been involved in an 
agreement with the United States government though the program known as “Plan 
Colombia”. More than 15 years later and after more than $10 billion invested in foreign 
and military aid, the war on drugs has become a priority within the army. However, this 
policy is focused on eradication (Alpert, 2016). A recent survey of army members shows 
that drug trafficking and illegal crops are the main concerns in security matters in 
soldiers’ opinions (FIP, 2018). Under these conditions it is worth identifying what are 
the characteristics of the soldiers who would be willing to sacrifice themselves for 
civilians who, according to the war on drugs, represent a threat to national security, and 
evaluate if they are different from those of the soldiers who are willing to jump to save 





7.3.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in this experiment is self-sacrifice. This variable is 
measured, in the trolley dilemma experiment, by the number soldiers who decided to 
jump onto the tracks and save the people who participated in the protests. It is possible 
to identify the soldiers who jump in general, but also those who decided to jump by policy 
preference. In other words, it describes those who jump to save people participating in a 
strike in favor of a right-wing policy (support forced eradication of coca crops) or a left-
wing policy (against forced eradication). 
7.3.2 Independent variables and hypothesis 
The independent variables involved in this analysis come from studies that test 
the devoted actor hypothesis. The devoted actor hypothesis proposed that, “people will 
become willing to protect sacred or morally important values through costly sacrifice and 
extreme actions, even being willing to kill and die, particularly when such values are 
embedded in or fused with group identity, becoming intrinsic to who I am and  who we 
are” (Scott Atran, 2015, p. 69). Recent empirical studies suggest that there are three main 
variables to understand devoted actors involved in intergroup conflict, and their 
willingness to make costly sacrifice (Gómez et al., 2017): sacred values, identity fusion, 
and spiritual and physical formidability. In the following subsection, I explain the theory 
behind these concepts, and how I related them to this study (see Appendix 18 for 
examining the operationalization of the independent variables presented below and table 
6 in Appendix 9 to see the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables of this experiment). 
7.3.2.1 Sacred Values  
Sacred values are understood as values that people refuse to trade for material or 
money compensation (Scott Atran, Axelrod, & Davis, 2007; Gómez et al., 2017; Sheikh 
et al., 2016). Different studies confirm that sacred values predict the willingness to make 
costly sacrifices, including using violence and being willing to die. In this study, I 
replicate the question of the study conducted by Sheikh et al. (2016) who considered 






1. Soldiers who consider democracy a sacred value are more likely to express 
willingness to die.  
2. Soldiers who consider democracy a sacred value are more likely to express 
willingness to die to save civilians who support a right-wing policy.  
7.3.2.2 Identity Fusion 
According to William B Swann et al. (2010) identity fusion is a feeling of oneness 
with the group that induces people to tether their feelings of personal agency to the group. 
This feeling amplifies pro-group behavior and reduces the capacity of people to think of 
themselves as individual actors with personal agendas (p. 824). Indeed, recent research 
suggests that people with personal identities fused with a group are more willing to die 
in the name of the group as an expression of loyalty. In fact, fused people express a 
willingness to sacrifice their own lives to save the lives of in-group members (Gómez & 
Vázquez, 2015; William B. Swann et al., 2010; William B. Swann, Gómez, Seyle, 
Morales, & Huici, 2009). In the context of the trolley dilemma introduced in this study, 
civilians who are against the eradication of coca crops are classified as out-group 
members, and those who are in favor of the eradication of the coca crops can be classified 
as in-group members.  
Following these assumptions, the following hypotheses are suggested: 
3. Fused soldiers are more likely to express a willingness to die.  
4. Fused soldiers are more likely to express a willingness to die to save civilians 
who support a right-wing policy. 
7.3.2.3 Spiritual formidability and physical formidability  
Following the studies of (Gómez et al., 2017) 
Gómez et al. (2017); and Sheikh et al. (2016) the perception of physical size and 
strength matter in providing motivation to engage in violent behavior. These studies 
suggest that when people perceive their own group members as physically formidable, 
they increase their aggressive solutions to intergroup conflict. On the other hand, when 
people perceive that their in-group has high levels of spiritual formidability in terms of 
inner conviction, there are more likely to accept costly sacrifices for the in-group’s 
interest. The results of previous studies suggest that combatants have a particular way to 





However, in both cases, spiritual formidability is more strongly associated with costly 
sacrifices than is physical formidability. These findings indicate that non-material 
concerns have an important influence on violent behavior motivation. Based on these 
studies the following hypothesis are presented:  
5. Soldiers with high levels of spiritual formidability are more likely to sacrifice 
themselves.  
6. Soldiers with high levels of spiritual formidability are more likely to express 
willingness to die to save civilians who support a right-wing policy.  
7.3.2.4 Control variables  
As control variables, I included self-identification as a victim of FARC, the rank 
of the soldiers, negative emotions and the identification of the treatments linked with 
Experiment #1. For the victimization variable, I used the same question that was applied 
to civilians in Colombia in the study conducted by A. Rettberg, Beil, and Kiza (2008). 
The variable “rank” was created following the grades within the Colombian army; at the 
beginning of the survey the soldiers had the possibility to choose their rank as part of the 
sociodemographic characteristics included. Finally, for negative emotions I used the 
same scale as for Experiment 1.  
7.4 Main effects results  
Similarly, to the analysis of the Experiment 1, I first tested the hypotheses 
introduced above using main effects models, then I calculated a multi-variable logistic 
regression model (see tables 3 to 12 in appendix 17 for the results of these models and 
appendix 19 for the pair correlation between the variables included in the multi-variable 
logistic model). To analyze the results of this experiment, I created three different 
dependent variables, all dichotomous (1-0). The first variable is “self-sacrifice”, which 
measures soldiers’ willingness to jump independent of the trolley dilemma experiment 
that they were shown. Second, the variable “self-sacrifice left-wing policy” measures the 
soldiers who were in the trolley dilemma experiment where the civilians were against the 
forced eradication of the coca crops. Finally, a variable called “self-sacrifice right-wing 
policy” presents the results of the soldiers who answer the trolley dilemma where the 
civilians were in favor of the right-wing policy (eradication of the illegal crops). I 





consequence, I tested three different models, each corresponding to each dependent 
variable.  
Finally, to test the main effects and the multivariable regression I used a logistic 
regression analysis, which is a suitable model when the outcome or dependent variable 
is dichotomous. The dependent variable in logistic regression is often coded as 0 or 1, 
where 1 indicates the presence of the dependent variable, and 0 indicates its absence. For 
that reason, in this kind of model the odds73 of an outcome occurring (or not) are 
interpreted.  In a simple logistic regression analysis, which is the model that I used to test 
the main effect of the independent variables, the result represents the probability of an 
event that depends on the independent variable. In the multi-variable regression model 
the interpretation is the same, but now with more than one independent variable. 
7.4.1.1 Physical and spiritual formidability  









Figure 7-6 Main Effects Spiritual Formidability and Self-sacrifice 
 
The figures 7.5 and 7.6 above showed the main effects for physical and spiritual 
formidability. The results indicate that none of these variables were statistically 
significant to explain the willingness of self-sacrifices in the Colombian context (see 
tables 3 and 4, in Appendix 17).  
Inspired by previous empirical studies, people will become involved in extreme 
actions when they feel that values that they consider sacred or that are associated with 
their in-groups are under threat (Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007; Sheikh et al., 
2016). In this experiment, I expected that soldiers who considered democracy as sacred 
were most willing to make costly sacrifices. In that sense, those who believe that coca 
crops are a threat to democratic stability in the country would be more willing to jump. 
Furthermore, I expected that the soldiers who were in the trolley dilemma experiment 
where the civilians were in favor of the forced eradication program would be more 
willing to jump to save them, because the soldiers would consider these civilian as 
members of their in-group. However, the main effect of this variable (see figure 7.7 
below) indicates that democracy as a sacred value were not statistically significant model 





7.4.1.2 Sacred values  
Figure 7-7 Main Effects Sacred Value and Self-sacrifice 
 
7.4.1.3 Identity fusion army  
According to the literature, identity fusion is one of the most robust variables 
explaining why people will accept making costly sacrifices. For this experiment, I tested 
the main effects of identity fusion of the soldiers for the next set of groups and institutions 
–the army, the military unit and Colombia (see Appendix 17, Tables 6-8). For the first 
model (Model 1: Self-sacrifice as an outcome), the odds ratios for identity fusion army 
was 1.54, which implies that soldiers that have a fused identity with the army are 1.5 
times more likely to jump than soldiers that don’t have such an identity. This variable 
has a p-value<0.01 and 95% CI: 1.14, 2.09. Additionally, the main effect of this variable 
was not statistically significant for model 2 (self-sacrifice left-wing policy), but it was 
significant for model 3 (self-sacrifice right-wing policy). In this model identity fusion 
army has a p-value<0.01, OR = 1.91 (95% CI: 1.24, 2.92), suggesting that soldiers who 
were in the trolley dilemma experiment, when the civilians were in favor of the forced 
eradication of coca crops, and who have a fused identity with the army will be 1.9 times 





p values of this variable between the two trolley dilemma scenarios, the results indicated 
(p-value=0.16) that we can’t confirm that there is a statistically significant difference 
between the two scenarios. In other words, we can’t state that soldiers that are fused with 
the army will be more likely to jump to save civilians who support a right-wing than 
those who support a left-wing policy. In figure 7.8 presented below, the results of the 
main effects for the three models are displayed (see Table 6, Appendix 17). 
Figure 7-8 Main Effects Identity Fusion Army and Self-sacrifice 
 
7.4.1.4 Identity fusion military unit  
The main effects of identity fusion military unit for model 1 indicates a p 
value<0.05 OR =1.41 (95% CI: 1.04, 1.91), proposing that soldiers that are fused with 
their military unit are 1.41 times more likely to jump or sacrifice themselves than soldiers 
who don’t have a such a fused identity. Similar results were presented in model 2. In this 
model, the main effects indicated that soldiers with a fused identity with their military 
unit are 1.62 times more likely to jump to save civilians that are against the forced 
eradiation than soldiers who don’t have a fused identity with the military unit. In this 
model the main effect presented a p value<0.05 and 95% CI: 1.04, 2.52. For model 3, the 





between the two trolley dilemmas scenarios, the results indicate (p-value=0.24) that there 
is not statistical support to say that soldiers fused with the military unit are more likely 
to express self-sacrifice to save civilians who are against the force eradication of the coca 
crops. Review figure 7.9 for the results presented below and table 7 in Appendix 17. 
Figure 7-9 Main Effects Identity Fusion Military Unit and Self-sacrifice 
 
7.4.1.5 Identity fusion Colombia  
Finally, I calculated identity fusion with Colombia. For model 1, the results 
indicated p value<0.1, OR =1.31 (95% CI: 0.97, 1.8), suggesting that soldiers that are 
fused with Colombia are 1.31 times more likely to jump or sacrifice themselves than 
soldiers who don’t have a fused identity with Colombia. The main effect of this variable 
was not statistically significant for model 2, but they were significant for model 3. In this 
model, the p value<0.05, OR =1.74 (95% CI: 1.13, 2.7) indicates that soldiers with fused 
identity with Colombia will be 1.74 times more likely to express willingness to sacrifice 
themselves to save civilians that are in favor of forced eradication than soldiers who are 
not fused with Colombia. However, as in the previous variables of identity fusion, the p-
value=0.101, that checks if there is a difference between the trolley dilemma scenarios, 





more likely to express their willingness to self-sacrifice to save civilians who are in favor 
of the forced eradication of the coca crops than for those who are against it. Review figure 
7.10 to see the results presented below and table 8 in Appendix 17. 
Figure 7-10 Main Effects Identity Fusion Colombia and Self-sacrifice 
 
7.4.1.6 Control variables  
For this experiment, I included a set of control variables: rank, victim of guerrilla, 
negative emotions and the treatment condition related to the political participation of the 
rebels presented in Experiment 1. I expected that there is a possibility that the previous 
experiment impacts on the results of the trolley dilemma experiment.  Likewise, I 
expected that soldiers who experience negative emotions and identify themselves as 
victims of the guerrillas would be less willing to make costly sacrifices. Finally, I aimed 
to explore if there is a difference between the ranks and the self-sacrifice within soldiers.  
7.4.1.6.1 Victim of guerrilla  
The main effect of victimization by guerrilla showed a p value<0.1, OR =0.738 
(95% CI: 0.536, 1.01), suggesting that soldiers who identified themselves as victims of 





that are not such victims. A similar effect is presented in model 2. The p value<0.05, OR 
=0.583 (95% CI: 0.37, 0.921) indicates that soldiers that identify as victims of guerrillas 
will be 0.368 times less likely to sacrifices themselves to save civilians who are against 
the forced eradication of coca crops than soldiers who are not victims. The main effect 
of this variable was not significant for model 3. Also, the p-value= 0.133 that was 
calculated to test the difference between the two trolley dilemma scenarios suggested that 
it is not possible to say that solders who are victims of guerrillas are more likely to express 
willingness to sacrifices themselves by civilians’ policy preferences (see figure 7.11 for 
the results presented above and table 9 in Appendix 17). 
Figure 7-11 Main Effects Victim of Guerrilla and Self-sacrifice 
 
7.4.1.6.2 Negative emotions 
For negative emotions, the main effects have a p value<0.05, OR =0.920 (95% 
CI: 0.85, 0.99), suggesting that soldiers that have high levels of negative emotions are 
0.9 times less likely to jump or sacrifice themselves than those with low levels of negative 
emotions. For model 2, the results were similar; the p value<0.01, OR =0.807 (95% CI: 
0.71, 0.91) suggesting that soldiers that have high levels of negative emotions will be 0.8 





eradication of coca crops. This is despite the fact that in Model 3 this variable was not 
significant, the p-value= 0.003 that was calculated to test the difference between the two 
trolley dilemmas scenarios, suggesting that negative emotions is the only variable that 
has a main effect statistically significant in one of the trolley dilemmas, and it is also 
significantly different between the trolley dilemmas. This means that it is possible to say 
that soldiers who have high levels of negative emotions are more likely to express less 
willingness to sacrifice themselves for civilians who are against the forced eradication 
programs than for civilians that are in favor of the forced eradication (see figure 7.12 for 
the results presented above and table 10 in Appendix 17). 
Figure 7-12 Main Effects Negative Emotions and Self-sacrifice 
 
7.4.1.6.3 Rank  
The main effect for rank in the Model 1, using private professional soldiers as a 
referent category, indicates with a p value<0.05, OR =0.519 (95% CI: 0.3, 0.91) that 
subaltern officers are 0.51 times less likely to jump than private professional soldiers 
(lowest rank). This result is the same as in Model 2. In this model, the p value<0.1, OR 
=0.45 (95% CI: 0.200, 1.004) suggesting that subaltern officers are 0.45 times less likely 





ranked soldiers. The main effect for this variable was not significant for model 3. In fact, 
the p-value=0.97 calculated to test if there is a difference between the two scenarios of 
the trolley dilemma suggested that they are not statistically different. In other words, it is 
not possible to argue that there is a significant difference between the ranks and their 
willingness to make costly sacrifices to save civilians according to the civilians’ policy 
preference (see figure 7.13 for the results presented above and table 11 in Appendix 17). 
Figure 7-13 Main Effects Rank and Self-sacrifice 
 
7.4.1.6.4 Treatment political reintegration Experiment 1 
Finally, the main effect for the variable that identified the treatment of Experiment 
1 associated with the political reintegration of the rebels (support or oppose political 
reintegration) suggested that for Models 1 and 2 this variable was not statistically 
significant. However, for Model 3, the p-value<0.1, OR =1.5 (95% CI: 0.953, 2.3) 
indicating that soldiers that were in the treatment of the Experiment 1, where José 
opposes the reintegration of the rebels will be 1.5 times more likely to sacrifice 
themselves to save civilians who are in favor of the forced eradication of coca crops than 
those who were in the treatment where José supported reintegration of the rebels. 





two trolley dilemmas scenarios suggested that there were no differences between the two 
scenarios by the effects of the previous experiment (see figure 7.14 and table 13 in 
Appendix 17). 
Figure 7-14 Main Effect Oppose Political Reintegration and Self-sacrifice 
 
7.5 Multi-variable logistic regression model  
After calculating the main effects of each of the independent variables that may impact 
the willingness of soldiers to make costly sacrifices by civilians’ ideological policy 
preference, I decided to test a multi-variable logistic regression model for each of the 
dependent variables (see table 14, appendix 17).  
7.6 Results 
For model 1 (self-sacrifice), only one of the independent variables was statistically 
significant along with two control variables. First, spiritual formidability which in the 
main effect was not statistically significant for this outcome became significant in the 
multivariable logistic model the p value<0.1, OR=0.84 (95% CI: 0.714, 1.00) suggesting 
that soldiers with high levels of spiritual formidability are 0.84 times less likely to jump 
than soldiers with low levels of spiritual formidability. This result rejects hypothesis 5 





rank showed significant results. On the one hand, the result for negative emotions 
suggested that soldiers with high levels of negative emotions are 0.9 times less likely to 
sacrifice themselves: p value<0.05, OR=0.893 (95% CI: 0.818, 0.973). On the other 
hand, subaltern officers are 0.50 times less likely to express willingness to jump in 
comparison with the lowest ranked soldiers: p value<0.05, OR=0.47 (95% CI: 0.2521, 
0.8902). Similarly, superior officers are 0.47 times less likely to express willingness to 
jump in comparison with the lowest ranked soldiers: p value<0.1, OR=0.47 (95% CI: 
0.2160, 1.020). Sacred values were not significant, so it is possible to reject hypothesis 
1. See figure 7.15 for the results presented above and table 14 in appendix 17 for the 
models 1,2, and 3. 
Figure 7-15 Multi-variable Logistic Regression Model and Self-sacrifice (model 1) 
 
The results for model 2 (self-sacrifice left-wing policy) indicated that none of the 
independent variables suggesting an explanation for the willingness to jump in the trolley 
dilemma experiment were statistically significant. The only variables that remained 
significant for this model were control variables: negative emotions and rank. For 
negative emotions the p value<0.01, OR=0.78 (95% CI: 0.68, 0.89), suggests that high 
levels of negative emotions are 0.78 times less likely to sacrifice themselves to save 
civilians who are against the forced eradication. Besides, the results for rank indicated 





themselves to save civilians who are against the forced eradication than the lowest ranked 
soldiers, p value<0.05, OR=0.311 (95% CI: 0.123, 0.78). Similarly, superior officers are 
0.3 times less likely to demonstrates a willingness to sacrifice themselves to save civilians 
who are against the forced eradication than the lowest ranked soldiers, p value<0.05, 
OR=0.305 (95% CI: 0.096, 0.963) (see graph 7.16 for the results presented above). 
Figure 7-16 Multi-variable Logistic Regression Model and Self-sacrifice Left-wing 
Policy (model 2) 
 
Finally, the results for model 3 (self-sacrifice right-wing policy) showed that 
spiritual formidability, and identity fusion army were statistically significant. Contrarily 
to the main effect results of this variable for model 3, spiritual formidability becomes 
significant in the multivariable logistic regression model; p value<0.1, OR=0.77 (95% 
CI: 0.71, 1.00) suggesting that soldiers with high levels of negative emotions are 0.77 
times less likely to jump in front of the trolley to save civilians who support the forced 
eradication policy. This result rejects hypothesis 6 and contrasts with other studies that 
suggest that these variables play an important role in explaining the motivation of 
combatants’ willingness to make costly sacrifices. For instance, in the study of Gómez et 
al. (2017), frontline combatants from the United States report high in physical 
formidability, but low spirituality, in contrast with ISIS combatants, who reported low 





sacrifices correlates with those with a high self-perception of spiritual formidability. 
Nevertheless, in this study, the soldiers with high self-perception of spiritual 
formidability are less likely to make costly sacrifices. It is recommended that the effect 
of these variables in the dynamics of intrastate conflicts is explored in more detail in 
future studies. 
Additionally, identity fusion army results p value<0.05, OR=1.991 (95% CI: 
0.92, 2.13), suggesting that soldiers fused with the army are 1.99 times more likely to 
jump to save civilians who support the forced eradication policy than soldiers who were 
not so fused. This result corroborates hypothesis 6. Finally, the control variable 
associated with the previous experiment confirm that soldiers who in Experiment 1 were 
exposed to the treatments where civilian opposed the reintegration of the rebels are 1.5 
times less likely to express willingness to jump than the soldiers who were in the 
treatment where civilian support the reintegration of the rebels: p value<0.1, OR=1.50 
(95% CI: 0.90, 2.2) (see graph 7.17 for the results presented above). 
Figure 7-17 Multi-variable Logistic Regression Model and Self-sacrifice Right-wing 






7.7 Summary of results Experiment 2 
Summarizing the results of Experiment 2, it is possible to state that there is no 
statistical evidence indicating that there is a difference in the willingness of soldiers to 
make costly sacrifices by policy preferences. However, the priming effect from 
Experiment 1 indicates that soldiers who were in treatment 4, where right-wing civilians 
oppose the political reintegration of the rebels, are the ones who have more willingness 
to sacrifice themselves. This result suggests that the identity of the civilians in the 
previous experiment activates soldiers’ decision to make costly sacrifices. Then, the 
results of the multivariable logistic regression model suggest that spiritual formidability 
it not always positively correlated with willingness to make costly sacrifices. In the 
context of this study, the soldiers who have higher levels of spiritual formidability display 
less willingness to make costly sacrifices even for people who can be associated with the 
in-group. In contrast, the results for identity fusion army suggest that soldiers fused with 
the army are more likely to express willingness to make costly sacrifices in general and 
also for civilians who can be related with the in-group. Finally, the control variables result 
suggest that negative emotions are associated with less willingness to make self-
sacrifices, and is also significant if the civilians can be related with the out-group. The 
variable rank was significant for models 1 and 2, indicating that subaltern soldiers are 
less likely to express willingness of self-sacrifice than low ranked soldiers. Lastly, for 
model 3 (right-wing policy preference), the soldiers who were in the treatment where 
civilians oppose the political reintegration of the FARC were less likely to express 
willingness to self-sacrifices than those who were in the treatment where the civilian is 
in favor of the political reintegration. 
7.8 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I explored some variables to test soldiers’ attitudes toward 
civilians based on civilians’ policy preference. The results suggested that soldiers may 
have more willingness to make costly sacrifices for civilians that share the in-group 
ideological identity, oppose the reintegration of the rebels and prefer the forced 
eradication of the illegal coca crops. More studies are needed it to develop a more 
comprehensive model of the individual characteristics and soldiers’ incentives to make 





 In the next chapter, I present the qualitative part of this study. In this chapter, I 
intend to answer the qualitative research questions concerning ideology introduced in 




Note of the author:  
The first round of statistical analyses was conducted during massive strikes in 
Colombia in November 2019. Thousands of students and others demanded better 
funding for public education, particularly public universities; the protests were 
against the government's plans to reform higher education by privatizing 
education. Dylan Cruz, aged 18, was shot and killed by a member of the ESMAD 
(riot police) during the protests. Brandon Cely, 21 years old, a nurse soldier, 
committed suicide because he supported the student protests. His peers accused 
him of being a left-wing extremist. Brandon decided to make a video of himself 
saying: "They have left me no choice but to record this video to protest and 
support the students, and I invite all of you to fight. Fight for our education". I 
finalized my quantitative analysis in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, and 
I was thinking about them. Thousands of young people in Latinamerica will not 
be able to study. The pandemic has further widened the education gaps between 
wealthy and low-income families. Public education is the only path that many 
Colombians have to overcome poverty, and my family is proof of that. For that 
reason: 
 
Incistir, persistir, resistir y nunca desisitir. ¡Qué viva el paro nacional! 
 








8 Qualitative findings: Social categorization and ideological 
bias  
As mentioned in chapter 5, mixed methods is the methodology of this study, and 
so to complement and enrich the quantitative findings, in chapters 6 and 7, I present the 
analysis of 28 semi-structured interviews of Colombian soldiers. In this chapter, I 
enhance the explanation of the quantitative findings by addressing the following 
qualitative questions: Does ideology help the soldiers to frame and define enemies and 
threats? If so, how does this work? How do these ideological biases in soldiers influence 
an aggressive disposition toward civilians as well as their willingness to protect them? 
This chapter is divided into several sections. First, there is a general 
contextualization of the researcher’s strategies that made it possible to address 
controversial topics with the soldiers. This section begins with some reflections on 
researcher positionality, and how past experience working with soldiers and the identity 
of the researcher influenced the study. Second, I analyse the soldiers’ narratives to 
explore how they expressed their ideological biases. Here, I explore answers to the 
interview questions concerning soldiers’ emotions and threat perceptions of the peace 
agreement in general, and particularly the points of the agreement concerning political 
reintegration of the ex-combatants. Additional topics such as the political participation 
of the soldiers and the increase in murders of social leaders were deliberately selected 
themes to introduce ideology in the interviews indirectly. Subsequently, I analyse the 
narratives for the justification of aggressive disposition toward civilians, or how ideology 
influences soldiers’ willingness to protect them. Here, I tackle some of the variables 
introduced in the theoretical framework about moral disengagement and delegitimization 
of the enemy. Finally, I introduce the soldiers’ narratives regarding the war on drugs, 












8.1 Positionality: Who am I in relation to this research?  
I consider that for a reader to trust the perspective of this research, I need to 
disclose my position as a researcher in relation to the data. I begin this chapter describing 
my experience working with the soldiers, as I believe that this life experience has an 
impact on the way that I approached and interpreted the data. This exploration also helped 
me to become aware of my own biases and allowed me to rethink my ideas, values and 
beliefs during the process of data analysis.  
8.1.1 Previous experience  
 Some researchers have frequently asked me how I, as a civilian, gained access to 
the military to conduct this research in a context like Colombia. Others have asked me 
whether it is an advantage being a woman asking delicate questions, or if being a woman 
makes the research process easier in a male-dominated institution like the army. Perhaps 
readers of this thesis are asking similar questions.  
As mentioned in previously in this chapter, I have been working with the 
Colombian Military Forces since 2014, first, as a consultant for the first Centre of 
Military Historical Memory74 located in the School of War. I secured this position 
without having any previous relationship with the institution, an atypical characteristic 
because the civilians who regularly work for the army are usually wives, siblings or 
family members of soldiers. My role in the Centre was to follow National and 
International Humanitarian Law, to identify under what circumstances Colombian 
soldiers can be considered victims. Colombia is one of the first countries to include 
combatants as victims in their law, following International Humanitarian Law. I was 
asked to provide policy recommendations about how the institution and the state should 
address the reparation of soldiers who would be recognized as victims of the conflict.  
To develop this role, I did more than read legal documents: I interviewed soldiers 
who were victims of kidnapping and improvized explosive devices [IEDs]. In addition 
to this task, I participated in meetings on the role of the army in the disarmament and 
 
74 The Centre of Military Historical Memory in 2014 had the responsibility to contribute to the Disarmed, 
Demobilization and Reintegration process of the FARC, to recognize the voices of the soldiers as victims 
of the conflict following the International Humanitarian Law that is part of the country’s constitution, and 





demobilization process of the rebels. I provided advice to the Colombian Army, using 
lessons learnt from international experience about how to prepare their personnel for this 
process. I also had the chance to participate in confidential discussions (where only 
military personnel were invited) about the contribution of the army to Transitional 
Justice.75 I was exposed to narratives that not many civilians hear. For instance, during 
this experience, I recognized one of the biggest challenges that persists within the army: 
the intersectionality of soldiers’ identities as victims and perpetrators, and their self-
image as heroes of the conflict. Dealing with the conflict of those identities was a 
challenge for the soldiers. They usually felt more comfortable in portraying themselves 
as victims and heroes, but they had struggles accepting that they were also perpetrators 
which is also present in other contexts (Breen-Smyth, 2018b). Consequently, the 
reparation of victims of the state armed actors during the armed conflict is one of the 
great challenges in Colombian transitional justice (see more in Güiza Gómez, Santamaría 
Chavarro, & Uprimny Yepes, 2020). Finally, despite their resistance, but with the support 
of key actors within the army, I was able to coordinate the first seminar on Security Sector 
Reform (SSR) in the School of War.   
After this experience, I worked as a consultant for the National Center for 
Historical Memory76 in many projects financed by the Swiss Embassy, focusing on the 
prevention of spoilers during the peace negotiation, and the implementation phase of the 
peace agenda. My role was to build a bridge between civilians and members of the police 
and armed forces in order to start conversations around the transitional justice 
mechanisms of the peace agenda. I was involved in the recognition and symbolic 
reparation of victims who were members of the security sector, and more critical topics, 
such as the contribution of the security forces to the right to the truth as a measure of 
reparation for civilian victims of the armed conflict.  
As a consultant, I conducted surveys, focus groups, meetings and seminars. I 
recorded and analyzed them, with a special focus on soldiers’ narratives, their war 
 
75 I was also a lecturer in a university and the leader of a research group which published an article on this 
topic (Benítez, Quintero, Márquez, & Ortiz-Ayala, 2015). 
76 Colombia’s National Centre for Historical Memory (NCHM) is in charge of contributing to the 
state’s duty of memory regarding the violations committed during the Colombian armed conflict. 
Also, it helps towards comprehensive reparation and the right to the truth to which victims and the 





experience, their perceptions about transitional justice and memories of the conflict. I 
wrote reports and summarized the meetings. All these activities took place under 
confidential conditions. At the end of 2017, Maria Emma Wills, the leader of this project, 
María Juliana Machado and I published a document titled Unpublished conversations 
between the Public Force and the National Center of Historical Memory: Lessons from 
an experience 2012-2017, which contains the majority of the reflections that emerged 
from those meetings (see more in Wills et al., 2017). Parallel to these activities, I worked 
as a research assistant on an academic project on political reconciliation. I traveled 
around the country conducting experiments and interviews with civilians victims of the 
conflict, ex-rebels of the guerrillas, ex-paramilitary members and soldiers77. 
All these experiences inspired the research questions and methodology of this 
project. They also gave me an important baseline about how I should approach my 
research and make it possible, despite its inherent controversy and the turbulent 
environment. On the one hand, I recognized that I had some advantages having access to 
the institution and its members. First, I could introduce myself as an insider because I 
was working with the army. Second, unintentionally, I had developed unique knowledge 
that helped me communicate with different actors within the army. I personally learnt 
their jargon, slang and private jokes. I developed a kind of dictionary that helped me 
address and frame difficult conversations and even pose uncomfortable questions without 
receiving a negative response; on the contrary, in most cases, I obtained genuine answers. 
At that time, I didn’t realize that this curiosity about learning these aspects of military 
culture would help me develop trust with some of its members. I believe, or rather want 
to believe, that I became, over the years, a critical friend. Some key actors within the 
institution accepted me despite my uncomfortable questions. It was common for me to 
hear phrases like, “She is a civilian, but she knows us”. This allowed me to adopt a 
convenient position as both outsider and insider. In other words, I did not feel so attached 
that I stopped or held back asking questions, but at the same time, I did not feel a complete 
outsider.  
On the other hand, I also needed to acknowledge that I had the support of a veteran 
colonel who acted as a sponsor during these years. He helped me to navigate within the 
army, introduced me to key members and invited me to meetings where I was the only 
 






civilian. His trust and support were fundamental in gaining the acceptance of the School 
of War to conduct this research. This veteran has a particular profile; he was the first 
member of the army to start internal conversations about the impact of transitional justice 
and its implications. He took the initiative to contact the National Center for Historical 
Memory, with the argument that the soldiers should have a voice in the reconstruction of 
the national memory of the Colombian conflict. At the beginning, he was very focused 
on the recognition of soldiers as victims, but over time he understood that this also comes 
with the recognition of soldiers as perpetrators in the history of the conflict. He, and other 
soldiers, dealt with the tension, accepting that it is naïve to ignore the institutional 
responsibilities behind individual actions. However, I found him to be in a constant 
dilemma between his attachment and duty of loyalty toward the institution, and 
acceptance of the abuses committed by the institution and its members. Despite our 
differences, our relationship was based on the genuine intention of improving the role of 
the army after the peace agreement.  He believes that my point of view and this particular 
research can help to better understand the impact and legacies of the conflict in the 
institution and assist with a transformation. During my fieldwork, I met other active 
soldiers like him who supported me in making this research possible.  
8.1.2 Gender and age challenges  
During this experience working directly with the army, I was in my mid-twenties. 
In the beginning, I suffered a lot of discrimination because of my age and gender, but 
ironically this was more prevalent among male civilians than soldiers. The soldiers were 
more open; one of them told me that I was the first person that he was able to talk with 
frankly about the peace agreement and its impacts on the security sector.  
From my experience, I believe that being a woman helped me to raise delicate 
topics with less negative predisposition from the soldiers. But I also think that over time 
they recognized that I was less afraid than other civilians to say things to them, because 
I didn’t have a personal attachment to the institution. Moreover, I never felt intimidated 
by the highest ranks to express my opinion or ask questions, regardless of their nature. 
Finally, I interacted in the same manner with all the soldiers, despite their rank. This 
behavior helped me to build a special bond with the middle and lowest ranks. 
I believe that this was the potential that I had and which some of soldiers wanted 





the position in the School of War was that the veteran mentioned above explicitly wanted 
a civilian without any attachment to the institution, but with the same profile as civilians 
who worked for the National Center for Historical Memory. He deliberately chose me 
because he wanted a consultant with a different profile than usual – someone who could 
see the institution with fresh eyes and a critical mind. I had the exceptional feeling of 
being free to speak without fear, saying things like: ‘I’m not here to say: Sir, yes Sir! 
That’s not my job’ when someone complained about my questions or opinions.  
For that reason, even when some officers assumed that, as a woman, I was 
ignorant of the male world of security, they also recognized that I had knowledge that 
they didn’t. At this point, I felt connected with Jennifer Shirmer, who had years of 
experience conducting ethnographic studies of soldiers. She said that the question of 
gender might reflect that in general: 
 
Women researchers may have some advantage in interviewing people about their 
worldview because we may be more willing to listen and learn about others’ 
political and cultural habits of mind. Whether this is true or not, by availing 
myself of traditional gender roles, I turned the tables by accepting their innocent 
presumption about my naïveté. But men, too, can find ways to present themselves 
as students, wanting to learn from the respondent’s experience (Schirmer, 2012, 
p. 41).  
 
As a result, with time, we learned how to talk and learn from each other, making 
our interaction transcend gender. Finally, an anecdote from my fieldwork makes me 
believe that discourses about gender equality are in some way changing the image of 
being a female within the army beyond the traditional idea of being “assistant” or 
“secretary”. There is a generational change that is transforming traditional gender 
stereotypes, even in institutions like the army. During my fieldwork, two soldiers asked 
me to talk with their daughters because they considered me a role model for them. This 
experience showed me that they respected and trusted me, and did not underestimate me 
because of my gender. One of them participated voluntarily in the survey and the 





8.2 Interview Strategies  
8.2.1.1 Sample selection  
Another influence of my previous experience working with the army concerned 
the sample criteria for this research. During my experience, I recognized that the 
motivation to join the army and experience war varied significantly across the ranks. The 
literature also suggested this (Forero Angel, 2017a, 2017b; Forero Angel et al., 2018; 
Hoover Green, 2016; Rivera-Páez, 2019a). As a consequence, if I wanted to see patterns, 
but at the same time recognize the variations in soldiers’ narratives about their ideological 
biases, I needed to guarantee the internal variation of the sample, and so I included in my 
interviews questions about motivations to join the army and war experiences. However, 
I do not analyse these questions in detail here, because it is beyond the scope of this 
study. Nevertheless, they help me to verify the internal variation of the sample. For this 
reason, in some of the qualitative analysis, I address, if necessary, variations in the 
narratives across the ranks. 
8.2.1.2 Strategies for the interviews 
My previous experience guided me in the best way to frame delicate questions. 
For instance, direct questions are usually less successful if you want a genuine answer. 
Moreover, you increase the risk that participants avoid answering the questions and lose 
interest in the interview when you ask direct questions about controversial topics. If I 
asked direct questions, I received an automatic negative reaction, even fear. For example, 
in the following interviews, I address the topic too directly (Participant #17) and too early 
(Participant #21) and these were the reactions: 
 
We, as the constitution states, are neutral (...) we do not participate in anything that is 
called politics. It is something political [the question asked by the interviewer] and 
politically we can neither speak, nor approach [any topic], nor say anything, as I told you, 
as the constitution mandates. I do not answer this question because of my profession, my 
job, because of a situation that can suddenly occur, so I cannot answer it. 
(Participant #17) 
Ah, well, I don't really know what it is, but we, as I was saying, are apolitical, so we, not 
from the right-wing or from the left-wing, we have to protect all people equally, that is 





or whatever happens to them". No, regardless of who the person is, from the left-wing, 
from the right-wing, from the party, from the class, we have to protect everyone and 
provide security equality to everyone. 
(Participant #21)  
 
 In my experience, a direct question was only successful after building trust and 
if it was embedded in the conversation, but not to open the conversation or to initiate a 
new topic. Moreover, in my fieldwork I deliberately made decisions to increase the 
authenticity of my conversations. For instance, I created an informal environment: we 
usually met in public places such as cafeterias. I tried to avoid their feeling that I was 
interrogating them. For that reason, I framed my interviews as a conversation in which I 
wanted to know their views on certain topics or situations to understand the mentality of 
a soldier in Colombia. I also encouraged a previous informal conversation off the record, 
where I allowed them to ask questions about myself to create a feeling of reciprocity. 
This usually happened before and after the interview. Nevertheless, I avoided talking 
about the project before the interviews to avoid any predisposing or biases during the 
interview. But, after the interview, I generally spoke without filters about my project. I 
also felt the necessity to provide compensation; as in the quantitative data collection, I 
provided my participants with refreshments. I found that this was the best way to make 
them and our relationship real. This personal context, as well as the language that I used, 
showed that I was familiar with military terminology and made them feel relaxed: their 
body language, their jokes in the middle of the conversation and the openness that some 
of them exhibited, even when we were talking about difficult topics showed me that. All 
of this gave me the impression of taking part in genuine conversations.  
Additionally, I identified two successful techniques that explain why I achieved 
engagement in conversation on topics that were taboo for soldiers. First, I spoke about 
events or topics that are generally related with ideological bias without overtly addressing 
it. I divided the interviews into themes such as the peace agreement, political 
reintegration, and the current situation of social leaders, activists and former combatants. 
Under these themes, the notion of ideology usually arose in the conversation in an organic 
way. Sometimes, I pushed a little to gain clearer information, but usually in a way that 
felt natural within the flow of the conversation. However, even with this technique it was 
always a challenge to address the notion of ideology, because the soldiers were very alert, 





preferences, they contradicted themselves or changed their answers. For instance, the 
following extract exemplifies this kind of reaction. In the middle of the conversation, and 
after building trust, I felt confident to ask a direct question without sounding suspicious. 
Still, the soldier was nervous talking about politics and despite the fact that his first 
answer was clear, and automatic, he then had regrets:  
 
Researcher: Do you think that if the military could vote, they would do it for the left-
wing or from the right-wing? 
Participant 23: For the right-wing 
Researcher: Why? 
Participant 23: No, although the majority would vote for the right-wing, more than one 
would vote for the left-wing. Most of the military are victims of the conflict. Before they 
were soldiers, they were displaced, or they have a close relative who was killed by 
guerrillas or self-defence groups. Most of the soldiers are here because of that. Therefore, 
they are not for or against an illegal group, which is why they defend themselves with 
the weapons that the state lent them to defend sovereignty. But the army is apolitical and 
does not have that doctrine or preference towards a certain candidate or political party. It 
is neutral, apolitical, we do not even touch the issue of politics in the institution. 
 
A second strategy was to ask questions in terms of their emotions, and I found 
this successful as an incentive to make the conversation more sincere. Again, I had mixed 
feelings about the role of my gender, but I found that framing a difficult topic around 
emotions is a useful means of breaking the taboo and negative predispositions towards 
the issue of ideology with the soldiers. For instance, when I asked about the peace 
agreement and the political reintegration of the rebels, I asked, “How do you feel?”, 
rather than “What do you think?”: 
 
We feel, betrayed, abandoned. Totally abandoned, betrayed because many times and 
many of our colleagues obviously made mistakes, yes? Because many times it is human 
and many times in the heat of war, the escalation of war, mistakes were made. There are 
people who are suddenly in jail serving a sentence, but today seeing FARC leaders who 
had committed heaps of atrocities, who I think if they were in jail would have a life 
sentence, may be enjoying this privilege today while we as the army cannot do anything, 







Finally, reading literature about war and soldiers helped me to maintain the 
human aspect of my research without reducing my thesis intentions to a one-sided goal. 
This attitude had helped in the past when I was conducting interviews with soldiers, ex-
rebels and civilian victims. For this particular study, I found myself deeply connected 
with Svetlana Aleksándrovna Aleksiévich and her book, The Unwomanly Face of War: 
An Oral History of Women in World War II (2017), to prepare myself mentally and 
physically to talk with people who have experienced war on the battlefield. I kept in my 
mind one of her quotations: “I listen when they speak … I listen when they are 
silent … Both words and silence are the text for me”. 
I also found the thesis Moral Imagination by J. P. Lederach (2007) very useful in 
reflecting my research. As a local researcher, I feel responsible for making my work 
useful for the real world and for academic achievement. This work helped me to locate 
my work, understanding that building peace is a process that includes difficult 
conversations, self-confrontations and willingness to talk, and recognize those whom we 
fear and about whom we feel strongly ambivalent. The strategies mentioned above and 
my personal experiences make the data collection possible and influenced the perspective 
that I used for the data analysis in this study.  
8.3 Narratives of Colombian soldiers after the peace agreement. 
Interviewer: How do you manage to differentiate between combatants and civilians? 
That is difficult, that is the most difficult, and generally when you are attacked by people 
or when you are attacked by a guerrilla fighter and then he hides in the camp and then they 
take you and accused you and tell you “– no, you attacked a peasant, you attacked an 
indigenous person”, then one begins to feel that distrust and not differentiate people, to 
feel that everyone is bad. 
(Participant, #5) 
 
In this section, I navigate through the soldiers’ narratives to answer the following 
questions: Does ideology help the soldiers to frame and define enemies and threats? If 
so, how does this work? How do these ideological biases in soldiers influence an 
aggressive disposition toward civilians as well as their willingness to protect them? This 
qualitative analysis enriches the quantitative findings presented in the previous chapters, 





soldiers’ relationships and behavior toward civilians after the peace agreement was 
signed. 
8.3.1 The enemy is left-wing? Social identification among soldiers  
As mentioned in the previous section, discussing politics or ideologies with 
soldiers is considered taboo. I used apparently unrelated topics as incentives to subtly 
direct the conversation around these topics and to be able to analyze their narratives about 
ideology. For instance, I introduced questions around the social mobilization of peasants 
and indigenous communities because of the lack of government compromise with the 
peace agreement, and the murders of social leaders and ex-combatants since the peace 
negotiations with the FARC began. 
In general, there is a prominent negative connotation about left-wing identity in 
soldiers, which is reflected in their tendency to link enemies and threats with the left. 
These narratives confirm suggestions in the literature about the social identification 
process of combatants. First, combatants develop an essentialist negative interpretation 
of the out-group. Second, the social identification process in combatants is more salient. 
Therefore, the perception of the other as homogenous and bad develops cognitive and 
emotional barriers that explain a rigid perception of the conflict. This black-and-white 
thinking sets up filters and distorts the processing of information about the reality 
(Castano et al., 2008; S. A. Haslam et al., 2005). As a consequence, soldiers’ narratives 
reveal a collective in-group identity in which the left-wing, as the out-group, comprises 
enemies and threats. For this reason, civilians whom soldiers associate with the left-wing 
are automatically criminalized. In other words, the narrative of soldiers indicated that the 
label “left” is part of the psychological mechanism of construction of the “other”. This 
negative stereotyping around the label “left” as the identity of the enemy held by 
combatants was reinforced by the counterinsurgency operations during the conflict. After 
analyzing soldier’s narratives, it is thus possible to see the persistence of a 
counterinsurgency mentality that incentivizes the criminalization of civilians associated 
with the left-wing for being potential collaborators of insurgent groups. As a 
consequence, soldiers have assumed that enemies and threats are leftist, and this is 






Obviously, it must generate mistrust because the left has, the left is characterized by the 
masses, for wanting to administer the masses, for the revolution, for shouting (...) they 
sell an ideology that what they do is look for the masses, and we are concerned, without 
a doubt. The security forces are not strongly aligned with many of the leftist ideologies 
at the moment. If a leftist government arises, it will have power and the ability to reduce 
our army and prevail over others and give it income, and that will lead the country to end 
up in a dictatorship or with some social problem such as Venezuela.  
(Participant, #16)  
I say that there are armed and unarmed people who are threats. I have seen it for myself 
because while studying at a public university, I saw situations there, I saw the people 
who mobilized the masses. They were the unarmed wings of the criminal groups. As it 
was my chance to see the hooded men, to see many things, and you could see that the 
masses were moving, a lot of people, "We are going to go on strike, that and that", we 
saw all that; then there are armed people who are threats, and people who are not armed 
who move masses, which interferes with the development of activities in the country, 
and so there are many threats in this country. 
(Participant, #21)  
 
Social leaders are viewed with suspicion, are often equated with militias78 from 
insurgent groups, and are therefore viewed as potential threats. The literature suggests 
that threat perception is a key component of intergroup conflict and personal justification 
of violence (McDoom, 2012; Riek et al., 2006; Shesterinina, 2016). Moreover, threat 
perception increases the individual’s willingness to inflict violence on the out-group 
(Maoz & McCauley, 2008).  The quantitative findings introduced in chapter 6 indicated 
that out-group threat is statistically higher in soldiers when civilians are leftist. 
Furthermore, the path models reveal that out-group threat perception increased soldiers 
disposition to be aggressive toward leftist civilians. 
In the interviews, it was common among the soldiers that I interviewed to argue 
that social leaders had become instruments of the insurgent groups; and that these groups 
were often associated with the left-wing. Soldiers thus justified the vulnerability of social 
leaders because of their inevitable association with the leftists and the rebels:  
 
 





I am not saying that social leaders are bad, but the vast majority are not well educated, 
prepared, and many have achieved the position of social leader by means of deterrence 
or fear in their region. That helps them to maintain power, it is not the social leaders, but 
they have friends who have that dissuasive power that has put them in that position. 
 (Participant, #6)  
 
There are left-wing groups who see this as an opportunity and infiltrate them, they get 
closer, they permeate people. Those on the left are going to look for them for a terrorist 
purpose, those on the right are going to attack them because they are going to say that 
they are allies of the terrorists. Do you see what I mean?  
(Participant, #5)  
 
They [left wing people] are not considered threats because of their political ideas, they 
are considered threats because of what they bring with those political ideas and all the 
people who infiltrate their groups. Everyone [soldiers], for example, when one is 
patrolling in the municipalities, all the guerrilla auxiliaries, all the militiamen who 
infiltrate there for the protests, that is what happens.  
(Participant, #2)  
 
Furthermore, most of the soldiers that I interviewed believe that left-wing people 
are potential threats, and even part of the FARC plan to take over political power. Some 
soldiers used that as an implicit justification of their lack of willingness to protect 
civilians. In the following extracts, it is possible to identify a sense of self-justification 
and moral disengagement which resonates with the literature that established how 
combatants tend to develop self-justificatory arguments to maintain their positive image 
and self-evaluation (Castano et al., 2019; Littman, 2018). Additionally, those narratives 
indicated a moral exclusion or delegitimization of left-wing people, creating a permissive 
argument of violence against them (Bar-Tal, 2013; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012). Soldiers 
thus tend to criminalize the social leaders to justify the lack of protection that the security 
sector in general offers them. This criminalization is also a way to normalize the violence 
against social leaders, blaming them, devaluing their suffering, and making them 
responsible for their misfortune:  
 
Participant 3: You know how many social leaders, that is, how many there are in 






Participant 3: Almost 10 million people, almost 10 million people, and how many 
security forces are there? We are, ah, I don't know, 400,000, let's say 500,000 people, 
500,000 military, we cannot defend… apparently we can defend with military operations, 
but we cannot be escorting each one. Now, I know with full knowledge of the cause, 
because I come from Córdoba and Bajo Cauca. Yes, that several social leaders were 
assassinated, there are several things that resulted. First, the FARC, the enemy, when 
they attacked the military bases, they did not have intelligence for a week, or a month, 
two months, they did have intelligence for eight months to attack, what is my point here? 
That they are very patient, the enemy is very patient, so they had to drop seeds in many 
places, because they know that at some point they will prosper, and one of those things 
was the seeds in the Community Action Boards of Colombia (Juntas de Acción Comunal, 
JAC)79. It turns out that in the JACs, they [the enemy] have already permeated many 
people and today, the numbers that I gave are numbers that I know where they come 
from, that is, an official source. Today, they are all social leaders, so what happens? The 
first thing is that the left is taking advantage, and I say that the left because it is the 
opposition that is taking advantage of this. 
 
There were two frequent responses when I asked the soldiers about the current 
situation of the social leaders. On the one hand, they denied that the murders of social 
leaders are systematic. They question the status of social leaders who were killed—this 
is a common way for them to minimize the problem. They argue that the pressure that is 
put on the security institution, because of the murders of the social leaders, is unfair, and 
is part of a left-wing plan to make them look responsible of those murders. Those 
narratives reflected what the literature defines as self-justification arguments that 
displace the responsibility, in this case toward the situation of the social leaders. 
Likewise, those arguments implied that soldiers tend to portray themselves as victims to 
reinforce their positive self-evaluation and integrity, increasing the bias to critically 
evaluate the in-group actions (Sullivan et al., 2012; Wohl et al., 2013).  
 
79 Community Action Boards of Colombia (Juntas de Acción Comunal, JAC). These are important entities 
that have been part of the Colombian democratic apparatus since 1958, and enable communities to advocate 
for their needs. Some recent studies showed that in the officially recorded numbers, killings of 
democratically elected leaders of community organizations, in particular those belonging to JACs have 





On the other hand, even when they accepted that there are members of the army 
involved in those murders, they reduced their responsibility by devaluing and 
normalizing the violence against those groups of civilians, which represents another 
mechanism of moral disengagement (Bandura, 2016; Villegas Posada et al., 2018). For 
that reason, these narratives also indicated a self-exoneration of the soldiers such that 
there is no room for criticism. If mistakes occurred, they minimized them in such a way 
that they refused to take responsibility. As other studies suggest, people who identify 
strongly with their in-group are more likely to deny or ignore the negative actions of their 
in-group and express less empathy towards the out-group (Bandura, 2002, 2016; Čehajić-
Clancy et al., 2016; N. Haslam, 2006). For that reason, they also have a tendency to 
trivialize the consequences of their actions: 
 
Anyone who leads a cause is already a social leader. There is nowhere, either in the 
Ministry of the Interior, or anywhere on paper that defines who is a social leader. Anyone 
representing a social cause, and who is recognized within the community, ends up being 
a social leader. Second, do you believe that if a government of the left or of the right 
came to power, it would stop the murders because of political ideas? This will always 
happen, the left will always look for a way to assassinate, to look for any situation as a 
weapon or to go against the state, that is the case. 
(Participant, #4) 
 
Now, let's remember something, no war is fair, that is, in war there is degradation, it has 
happened in all wars. As we are an underdeveloped country we look bad, but when this 
happens in a developed country and there are fatalities caused by the military; of course 
they are deplorable events, they are sad, but they do not have the same connotations that 
they have in our Colombian society. Because here everything is politically motivated, all 
these left parties, the socialist, green parties, they took advantage of all these 
circumstances that arise to try to show that we still have ideological thoughts that go 
against communism and socialism because we see it like our enemies and that’s really 
not the case. I am telling you with all the security of the case, because I know my 
institution, I know the command structures, the high command, the middle command and 
the low command. That some sheep go astray, that does happen in all institutions with 
sad and unfortunate consequences, but these actions do not reflect the politics of the 
institution.  






The self-victimization and persecutory delusions were another way to see in some 
soldiers’ narratives how they associate their enemies and threats with the left-wing. For 
them, any criticism of the army is a conspiracy by leftist groups80. For the soldiers, the 
enemy have been shifting the war to the political and judicial spheres81. Consequently, 
the accusations of human rights violations by the army are part of the strategies of the 
left to delegitimize the institution. These narratives also disclose that some soldiers 
perceive themselves and the army as infallible. Therefore, unjustifiable violence only 
occurs outside of state structures. As the literature of state violence suggests, the legal 
framework draws a line that creates a moral license toward the members of the state 
institutions to engage in violence without question (Denyer Willis, 2015; Schirmer, 
1998a). The uncritical attachment with the in-group is reinforced by the status of the 
“legality” of the army and its members82:  
 
If we kill someone, he was a social leader, and many people that are being killed are not 
social leaders, that is false, many people like to make our army, our armed forces look 
bad. That he was a social leader, he was not a social leader, he moved the masses and 
had friends, but he was not a social leader. Therefore, they [left-wing people] made a 
“boom”[Spanish slang to refer to something that has become popular], saying that he was 
a social leader and making the army, the police, the prosecution look bad – that he was 
doing nothing and that is totally false, he was not a social leader. So many times they 
[left-wing people] focus on that, on judging, judging, judging and not first knowing for 




80 Schirmer (1998a) showed a similar pattern in the narratives of the soldiers in Guatemala. For Guatemaln 
soldiers, all denunciations of human rights violations were part of a campain against the State of 
Guatemala.  
81 Benavides Silva and Rojas Bolaños (2017) in their work, that also included interviews of soldiers and 
policeman, suggested that for the Army there exist a judicial war designed to protect the subversives and 
attack the Security Forces. In their findings, they also showed that soldiers believe that the judicial 
framework favors the human right organizations and the lawyers of victims, and infiltrates the cases where 
soldiers or policeman are involved to violate their judicial rights (p. 54). 
82 Benavides Silva and Rojas Bolaños (2017) mentioned in their work that soldiers participated in 
psychological operations that they had the mission to make the soldiers aware that assassinating enemies 





I do not consider them [left-wing people] as threats, but you have to be careful, why? 
We, as soldiers, have been living through something very strong, the judicial-political 
war. All of us military, you see, are under judicial investigation because of military-
operational results. They [the left-wing] are always looking, always looking for a reason 
to discredit the name of a state institution, and we represent the state. How many victims 
say, sorry, the Colombian socialist-communist left, left, that they are “Falsos 
Positivos”83, a thousand what? Like a thousand ... if you considered the Alvaro Uribe 
government where we gave them the hardest hits [guerrillas] those were the same 
operational results that occurred at that time.  For the leftists, all [military operational 




The self-victimization and persecutory, delusional narratives presented above 
resonate with another legacy from the counterinsurgency strategies (COIN), that creates 
the notion that war is not only waged on the battlefield. According to the COIN mentality, 
wars have many fronts, such as social, psychological and political. This was part of the 
idea of winning hearts and minds, which justifies nontraditional military operations 
involving direct interaction with civilians. In Colombia, it is assumed that soldiers 
provide medical assistance, infrastructure or help with socioeconomic activities. For that 
reason, soldiers consider the political arena as a new battlefield, where the left-wing 
political parties are threats, and social mobilization and even the political reintegration 
of the rebels are part of a bigger plan to make it possible for left-wing groups to gain 
political power. Similar to Clausewitz’s contention that “war is the continuation of 
politics with the addition of other means” (Clausewitz, 1873, p. 87), the Colombian 
history of political violence creates in soldiers’ minds the notion that “politics is the 
continuation of war with the addition of other means”:  
 
We cannot be innocent looking at that—suddenly a political party [the FARC Political 
Party], with these tendencies, it is something that arose from one moment to another, no, 
they have a plan, it is a strategic plan that goes through the years until they manage to 
arrive at a position of power. 
 
83 He is talking about the scandal described in chapter 4 about the extrajudicial executions committed by 





(Participant, #13)  
 
Even if you don't believe so, war is fought on many fronts: social, psychological, 
political, from an economic point of view. So, [with a suspicious tone] do you think that 
what indigenous people in Cauca are doing right now is not to ease pressure from what 
is happening right now with Venezuela? The war has many strategies to destabilize the 
capacity of the state.  
(Participant, #4) 
 
A dictatorship of the proletariat, which is what they want to achieve, the dictatorship of 
the proletariat will sound a bit anachronistic, but not for me. If you look at the theses of 
the FARC party right now, they continue to defend their socialist model (...) then for me 
it is a risk that Colombia falls into that sophistry of the left dictatorship, it does seem to 
me a risk (...) In Colombia the peace processes have served to revive the threats, not to 
end them. We are seeing that everywhere and that circumstance is what makes violence 
in Colombia endemic. 
(Participant, #10)  
 
Nevertheless, the identity of enemies and threats associated with the left-wing are 
not always outside the institution. Another way that soldiers disclose their tendency to 
associate the enemies and threats with the left-wing is labelling soldiers who criticize the 
institution as threats. In the army, there is a nickname within the institution to refer to 
those who criticize the institution. They call them “disociador”. A disociador is someone 
who declares that he is not connected with or is not a supporter of someone or something. 
They also use expressions like “You are thinking like a rebel or guerrillero” as a 
mechanism of social pressure and control that reduces their incentive to express 
complaints, or contradict or question the institutions or its members. Those who are 
labelled as “dissociate” are usually excluded, silenced and stigmatized because it is 
considered a sign of disobedience and even “subversiveness”84.  
I gained this information from my personal experience working with the soldiers 
and during my informal conversations with them during my fieldwork. This fear to be 
associated with the “left-wing” was also expressed in some of the interviews. Moreover, 
 
84 Similar findings were indicated by Benavides Silva and Rojas Bolaños (2017) they suggested that the 
institution eliminates any possibility of having a critical spirit. Soldiers who dare to raise questions are 





some soldiers recognized that it is because of this stigmatization of those who think 
differently or express a critical mindset, that soldiers have a very conservative mentality 
or a natural preference toward the right-wing, showing that it is negative and even a 
betrayal to have a critical mindset and to be associated with the left-wing.  
The literature suggested that a default psychological defense mechanism is to 
protect the in-group, which inevitably implies distorted beliefs and negative emotional 
orientation toward “others” (Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2016). However, this psychological 
processes is more prominent in military institutions. The essence of military cohesion is 
bonding between soldiers, their group and the army as the institution which incentivizes 
in-group attachment (Siebold, 2007). Soldiers are thus less likely to critically evaluate 
in-group behavior and more likely to develop psychological defense mechanisms to 
justify and defend the image of the in-group (Göbel, 2014; Mihaela Macovei, 2018). This 
is why soldiers are usually described as rigid or as individuals who possess unchangeable 
beliefs, making it difficult for them to change their mindset (Gerras & Wong, 2013).  
Questioning the institution’s authorities, orders, values, beliefs, and behaviors of the in-
group can be considered treason in itself:  
 
In the army, it is not uncommon to see that there are military personnel, uniformed 
military personnel who suddenly have left-wing ideologies, there is, there is, 
unfortunately there are, I say this because I heard them, saw them, and many times in 
situations that arise within the army for disuniting the military in front of the government 
and making very destructive comments. But, of course if they [the government] gave us 
the opportunity to vote, the vast majority [of soldiers] would do it for people on the right-
wing, not on the left-wing. 
(Participant, #19)  
 
I started to watch a video of Tirofijo's death85 (...) If I were in another era, like when I 
just started training as a military officer, in 1996 and I had seen those videos in front of 
a colleague, they would have told me: “You are not in the right-wing, you are on the left-
wing ”(...) but, as I told you, if I suggested a debate about this [the history of the FARC)] 
in a setting where I was, they would say, “This man is a guerrillero”.  
(Participant, #5)  
 
 





Here [in the army] you follow orders, you have no right to discuss them, you have no 
right to think differently, in the army you have money to go to lunch and if they don't let 
you go to lunch, you can't go because you have to do a job or you have to accomplish a 
mission. So, all that structure that is demanded of soldiers in order to connect makes us 
very conservative, that’s why conservative tendencies fit predominantly within military 
groups.  
(Participant, #13)  
 
It is that being a soldier is the best vocation, one of the most beautiful and at the same 
time, it is dumb and stupid because the soldier does not even have to think, the soldier 
who thinks screws up. So, the only thing that soldiers need to do is obey, he does not 
have to do anything else, he does not have to think: take a bath, shave, put on his boots, 
form, stand in line, have breakfast, that is, you do not have to think, you have to obey. 
                       (Participant, #26)   
 
The notion of having a critical mindset, being vocal to express concerns or ideas 
that may question the status quo within the army are characteristics viewed with 
suspicion, or even associated with the enemy, because these attitudes oppose one of the 
most important attributes of a soldier, obedience. Soldiers recognized that part of the 
transformation from civilian to soldier is internalization of the logic of subordination. 
This process can be painful, even literally for some of them, because violence was 
employed as a method to “transform” civilians into soldiers. Being leftist is connected 
with being critical of the status quo, and this can be part of the legacy of the conflict, 
although today there is no explicit indication that proves a deliberate socialization of 
ideological preferences. The narratives suggest that these are embodied in their culture, 
the everyday language, internal jokes, and then in their mentality in a way that is not easy 
for soldiers in general to recognize. Those who think differently or are against the status 
quo are considered threats, and this goes beyond the traditional association of being 
leftists. 
Thus, despite the fact that today there is not an explicit ideological military 
doctrine, such as in the 1960s that had the influence of the School of the Americas, the 
legacy of this ideological bias is covertly embedded within the meaning of security, and 
the role of the soldier based on subordination and unquestioned defense of the status quo. 





Therefore, the adoption of the ideologies is more likely under military conditions making 
more salient among combatants the monolithic view of the identity of its enemies: 
 
The army, to be successful, requires disciplined people. It is necessary to be conscious 
that what they are doing is to develop the country, the society. You also need to have a 
taste for desiring, feeling and enforcing the sense of subordination (…). Subordination is 
a very important aspect so that a person can be part of the army. Subordination is learning 
to abide, to obey the orders of a superior, and that is also related to that vocation and to 
that sense of belonging that the person has toward the uniform, and a military mission, 
and then fulfill it. 
 (Participant, #18) 
 
[with laughter] That transformation that there is of the civilian, that one arrives without 
knowing anything, that one arrives a fool, arrives and they shave you; and you become 
stupid, and they yell at you, and you don’t know anything about the military terminology. 
This adaptation from the civilian life to the military life is very hard, hard, hard. 
Especially at those times. At that time, it was, rather, hard, hard. Ahh, for example, at 
those times, the sub-officers still hit you with a club. In the past, in the army they hit you 
with a club. It is no secret to anyone, myself being part of the last generation where sub-
officers beat you with a club: heavy hand, heavy hand, for one to come out good, right? 
Demanding him [laughs] So, at the beginning it was very hard, one was not used to that 
treatment and the subofficers, imagine, they have very heavy hands, they hit you hard, 
and one ehhhhh, insulting them internally. Learning to follow orders ... get used to a 
military regime, to a discipline. You come from home with another idea, one didn’t 
imagine that this was so hard, but then you arrive and they direct you to a discipline 
because you come from home undisciplined. 
(Participant, #2) 
 
Finally, although most of the soldiers in their narratives agreed with the notion 
that the enemies and threats have a left-wing identity, there is a minority that considered 
that these ideological biases are matters of the past. They argue that there has been some 
internal transformation within the army that has made them more professional and 







For us there is no right-wing or left-wing forces. Personally I say it is protection for civil 
society. That we have differences of ideas, of course. But we have been maturing ... Of 
course, there is already a percentage that is already very mature, there are others that are 
not yet mature in that regard. But one is already too mature to know that one does not 
have any [allegiance], that one goes neither to the left-wing, nor to the right-wing. 
Finally, what interests us is the civilian population, independent in what they think (...) 
We have changed. People still think that we are the same arbitrary, rude, radical, 
incompetent [group], that we are on the right-wing. But it turns out that's a lie. Like, I'm 
talking to you, we are already many. Too many. 
(Participant, #12) 
8.3.2 Unpacking the ideological bias 
In this section, I unpack the ideological bias corroborated in the previous section 
and the quantitative findings. I explore soldiers’ emotional narratives and their threat 
perception, analyzing their responses about the peace agreement in general and the 
political reintegration of the ex-rebels. Here, I want to address how soldiers use the 
ideological bias to make sense of their beliefs and actions after the peace agreement. This 
analysis will help to contextualize how they justify aggression towards civilians and their 
willingness to protect civilians. 
The peace agreement generates a mix of feelings among the soldiers. There is a 
group of soldiers who feel betrayed by the peace agreement with the FARC. For them, 
the peace agreement ignores the efforts that many soldiers made to weaken the FARC as 
an armed group. In other words, the agreement was a political strategy that ignores the 
sacrifices of soldiers who lost their lives during the war. For them, the only way to 
achieve peace is through the defeat of the enemy on the battlefield. 
 
Winston Churchill said: Those who kneel for peace ... get humiliation and war. So, who 
kneels to make peace has to live on his knees. 
(Participant, #3) 
 
I am convinced, Alejandra, that peace is not negotiated, peace is conquered and from the 
military point of view it is conquered by defeating the enemy. 






The FARC, if they received forceful strategic blows, this weakened them, led them to 
accept the negotiation. But the government in charge of negotiating, said that the war 
would never end. For the military forces, to make themselves feel good, said to them that 
we had defeated them, and for that reason, we brought them to the table. In many 
seminars and speeches, the president when he was abroad said that we did not win the 
war, that we could not come to an end. He denied that it was a military defeat. 
(Participant, #13) 
 
These narratives revealed soldiers’ negative emotions around the peace 
agreement in general, and the political reintegration of the ex-rebels in particular, 
confirming the quantitative findings. The path models introduced in chapter 6 show that 
when emotions are activated, soldiers’ ideological bias becomes more prominent and has 
an important influence on soldiers’ attitudes toward civilians. On the one hand, when 
emotions mediate the relation between the identity of civilians and the attitude of soldiers 
toward civilians, the results showed that the levels of aggressive disposition within 
soldiers increased significantly toward civilians who were left-wing than when civilians 
were right-wing. Likewise, when negative emotions mediate the relation between the 
civilian opinion toward the political reintegration of the rebels, the aggressive disposition 
of the soldiers toward civilians decreases, revealing that soldiers do not emotionally 
support the political reintegration of the rebels. Furthermore, negative emotions decrease 
soldiers’ willingness to protect civilians only when civilians are left-wing. Finally, in the 
linear regression models, negative emotion was one of the statistically significant 
variables to explain aggressive disposition in soldiers in general.  
According to some scholars, negative emotions are an important psychological 
barrier to achieving reconciliation between former adversaries (Čehajić-Clancy et al., 
2016; Halperin, 2011). Also, negative emotions motivate individual and group violence 
and reinforce group identification (Moro, 2017; Nussio, 2017). Considering  emotions in 
soldiers’ narratives helped me to understand how they perceive and frame their opinions 
about the peace agreement and the political reintegration of the rebels on a more personal 
level. For instance, despite the soldiers who reject the peace agreement and oppose the 
political reintegration, there is another group, a minority, that recognized the direct 
benefits of the peace agreement, in terms of lives, especially those of members of the 





unique in Colombia; other countries shared the same experiences, and the army needed 
to accept the “cost” of the peace: 
 
To tell you the truth, at the beginning I was in disagreement. Do you know what I mean? 
But, I was in an operating unit and one realized how it was that the soldiers’ mortality 
rate, the amputees, dropped by 80%. Even in the military hospital it came out that the 
rate of amputees and wounded soldiers was very low, 90%, I think . But many times I 
did not agree with that because they have to pay something, just as they judge the 
military, they also have to pay whatever, jail. The rest of the Peace Agreement I did agree 
with because those who live it, those who have lived through it [the war] realized that it 
is something cool and something by which human lives are not in danger. That’s my 
point of view. 
(Participant, #25) 
  
And thank God, as I say, thank God, for the peace process [because] those two years I 
remain relaxed, relaxed in what sense? That I didn't have that stress of shooting, of having 
combat (…) The thing was that they don’t know how to explain the process to the 
military, that’s the reason why they speak badly about the peace agreement. 
 (Participant, #2)  
 
I am clear that for there to be peace, we had to give in. You had to give in, it was more 
the cost of staying at war than the cost of being at peace. So for me, I have no problems 
regarding that. I know that since there was the peace process, I myself have felt that my 
life has improved. Well-being in us has improved. So I do not see any problem that they 
make that political transition, it seems to me that it is a process that had to happen as it 
happened in Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Honduras. So, it is a transition that 
I do not have any problems with. 
(Participant, #11) 
 
However, the majority of the soldiers that I interviewed, and even some of those 
who recognized the benefits of the peace agreement, disagree with the concessions that 
come with the agreement. For soldiers, the political reintegration of the ex-rebels, and 
the transitional justice mechanisms are unfair, and are ways to reward their former 






The truth is that it has been difficult seeing the people who hurt good people, such as the 
soldiers, going to have a seat in congress, in the senate, that is complicated because one 
says, “The people who did so much damage to the country they put them over there as 
political party where they are effectively kings and are not in prison where they should 
be”. For more than one soldier, for more than one member of the army, this situation is 
very difficult because they will say, “Those people committed a number of crimes and 
what they give them is practically a reward for accepting the peace process, and suddenly 
a soldier who suddenly commits an error or something, they judge him with all the weight 
of the law”. 
(Participant, #21) 
 
It seems to me then, the truth, personally, it seems hard to me, it is hard to see that a 
terrorist, one of these bandits who have done so much harm to the country are making 
laws, this one up in congress, it is in the senate, arguing about peace. That is, I think they 
do not have the moral authority to be where they are discussing peace, discussing 
corruption, discussing so many things, knowing that while they were undercover they did 
a lot of harm. 
(Participant, #19)  
 
I never thought of those people who were on the posters for which rewards were offered, 
for their terrorist acts; and who were assigned as high value targets in our constitutional 
mission. They are now fathers of the country, making laws in the Congress of Colombia. 
Even more when I’m looking at them, and the image of my kidnapped, tortured and 
murdered brother return to my mind and heart; the death of my soldiers; and so many 
towns destroyed and people kidnapped, and that they are now heroes and we are 
victimizers, the soul hurts. 
(Participant, #7) 
 
The narratives of the soldiers exposed the emotions that surround the peace 
agreement and its implications in their lives. They helped me to reaffirm Brewer’s (2010) 
thesis about how peace brings psychological and ontological costs. In conversations with 
the interviewees, they made me feel that war for them was tangible, physical through the 
constant fear of losing their own life, and they were facing death every day. A front line 
soldiers that I interviewed told me that when he enrolled in the army he was part of a 
group of twenty-six of whom just two survived, including him. This could be part of the 





the people who became their family in the war. Some of them were responsible for 
military operations in which soldiers died, and then they needed to face the widows, the 
mothers, the families. Others lost members of their family because of the war or were 
unable to come back to their hometown because their family might be put in danger.  
For these reasons, I noticed in their narratives that the idea of peace demands a 
questioning of one’s existence, especially of those who have wielded weapons and feel 
genuinely justified. For them, peace with the enemy does not feel rational or morally 
acceptable. The peace agreement creates cognitive inconsistencies in their values, beliefs 
and actions, because it demands from them a willingness to accept their former enemies 
in the congress or as political leaders and beneficiaries of extraordinary legal measures, 
and after years of feeling justified killing them, they have the duty to protect them. Some 
authors argue that such an uncomfortable state of cognitive dissonance sometimes 
overlaps with the anticipation of self-condemnation, which increases the need to alleviate 
the dissonance (Bandura, 2016; Villegas Posada et al., 2018).  
For that reason, it was common to assume a defensive attitude and self-
victimization narratives as a way to alleviate the dissonance. They use the argument of 
being on the “good side”, the side of the law, supporting and defending the state as a 
defense mechanism86.This explains why the mechanisms of transitional justice make 
them feel humiliated and betrayed by the state, because the state had treated their former 
enemies as equal to the soldiers. They disclose a sense of moral superiority for acting 
within the law, and so should not be questioned or judged. Moreover, as part of the self-
victimization narrative, they develop the argument that there is a political-legal war or 
lawfare (guerra juridica) against the army, and then blame the transitional justice process 
for the perpetuation of the conflict, since on the ‘good’ ones fall the full weight of the 
law, and the bad ones are rewarded. Moreover, those narratives reinforce an essentialist 
negative interpretation of the out-group behavior which creates a rigid image of the other 
as evil by nature and which therefore will never change its violent behavior: 
 
 
86 A similar phenomenon was introduced by Schirmer (1998a) in her research on soldiers in Guatemala. 
Officers interviewed disclosed narratives that assumed that operating within the law created a distinction 
between the violence of the State (necessary and inherent to the legal order) and the violence outside the 
law occupied by the enemy. Then, this separation created a sense of moral superiority or self-justificatory 
use of violence supported and defended by the “status” of legality located the soldiers simultaneosly above 





We [soldiers] will always lose by being in the hands of the state for acting under the 
norm. But when a criminal, a criminal does what he wants: he murders, kidnaps, works 
with drug trafficking, and says no, for the good of the country [short silence] And if you 
saw it with the peace plebiscite, it won the “no” vote, that is, it [the peace agreement] 
was imposed against the will of the people, against what they wanted by looking for 
certain benefits, because seriously that is the image that we are selling: be a criminal, the 
most evil [person] is the one that gains the most benefits. 
(Participant, #4)  
They modified everything for the FARC, they give them power over everything, while 
for us, they never modify anything. They give them a seat in the senate they reward them, 
a state who reward the criminals, and for people like us, they punish us. For that reason, 
many people said bad things about the army and the state, and most of the time I 
understand why. Nothing happened to me, but many people [soldiers] went to jail or were 
kicked out, and they did bad things to them. For that reason, there are a lot of people that 
became leftists, that’s why those groups are born, that’s why drug trafficking is born, for 
things like that; today we see the FARC rewarded.  
(Participant, #20) 
 
Those narratives revealed again the tendency of the soldiers to suggest an 
unquestionable innocence, where errors are minimized; they become almost non-existent 
compared to the acts of the enemy. Here, the idea of legality is amplified and used as an 
unquestionable moral path. Then the transitional justice mechanisms reinforce the 
identity group division which intensifies the view of the soldiers that the in-group is 
superior and more moral than the out-group. Moreover, this legality has an ideology: the 
right-wing ideology in the mentality of the soldiers helped them to draw the line between 
what is legal and what is not. The notion of being illegal is thus commonly associated 
with the left-wing: 
 
The truth is that everything that is against the law is bad, that is, if they are not within the 
law, how are they going to come to ask for rights and ask for equality. For me, well, I 
believe that socialism, the left is a disease, it is a plague that sells false illusions to a 







Furthermore, it was possible to find within the narratives of the soldiers how the 
peace agreement, especially the transitional justice mechanisms, are developing new 
grievances and consolidating old ones. Cognitive dissonance encourages the self-
victimization narratives and reaffirms their ideological biases: 
 
Alejandra, in the third world countries, underdeveloped countries and in poor countries, 
especially in African nations like Nigeria and Rwanda, one of the strategies of this left-
wing political system is to use human rights as a political instrument of retaliation. 
(Participant, #25) 
When we didn’t have human rights, we had more power to act, then when human rights 
arrives, they took one of our hands and tied it. So, the security forces have to say, “No, I 
do respect human rights”, even if you don't agree, even if you don't respect it, but it 
touches you, because if it goes against it, then … But human rights has been the worst 
thing that has happened here in Colombia, and here in Colombia now everyone walks 
with the white flag, everyone demands, everyone goes on strike; the only ones who do 
not protest are us, but they take us and massacre us in the courtrooms.  
 (Participant, #20) 
 
Some soldiers even developed arguments that help them to reduce their feelings 
of responsibility and to alleviate their cognitive dissonance in situations where they are 
accused of being perpetrators of human rights violations. For example, in the following 
interview, it is possible to see how a soldier alleviates the dissonance when there is 
evidence of the army’s participation in human rights violations. This soldier was talking 
about the “Falsos Positivos” scandal mentioned in chapter 6. In his narrative, it is possible 
to see his struggle to accept the “Falsos Positivos” without feeling that it is not a way of 
being disloyal to the army. At the end, he argues the necessity in the army to develop a 
double discourse, since civilians do not understand military language and therefore those 
who died under military operational results are misinterpreted as victims of human rights. 
Therefore, it is better to hide this information and only show outwardly “the greatness of 






Participant 22: For example, the sub-officer who disclosed the “Falsos Positivos”. For 
those who entre comillas87 were making military operational results, this sub-officer 
turned out to be a betrayer. But he is not a betrayer, this sub-officer was caught between 
ethics and morals. But, in front of those ones who supposedly were conducting the 
military and juridical operations, he turned out to be a traitor. I mean, one cannot 
distinguish, what side you are on. Today, talking about the “Falsos positivos”, yes, it was 
a reality, but it represented only 001% of all operational results, I mean, wars are heinous 
and atrocities are committed. The “Falsos Positivos” represent the lowest percentage of 
any atrocity in comparison with any other war. Compared with the Russians or the Nazi 
Holocaust, it is a minimum, is minimum, in comparison with other wars. I mean, the 
institution [the army] has been transparent, but we do not talk about the good, we always 
talk about the bad and it is a lower percentage, a minimum, and does not even reach 1%. 
The military structure needs reform, obviously, but not to avoid military results, to learn 
to handle the double speech. However, to learn how to handle the double discourse it is 
necessary to be intellectually brilliant people.  
Interviewer: What do you mean by double discourse?  
 Double discourse means military operational results are for inside the army. Showing 
the greatness of what the army does for the people is what is shown outwardly. 
Outwardness is showing all the good things that you do, that you help the enemy, the 
sick, the helpless, the woman who is going to give birth, the park, the cemetery, 
everything that is called “acción integral”88;  the rest, the banalities are a theme for the 
inside, it is not to be shown outwardly. We cannot speak openly about military 
operational results. Such as the scandal of General Martínez89, this is a valid discourse 
[the discourse of the general], but this is our speech. But it takes strength, training, 
intellectual strength, permanent training, do you know why that news came out? Because 
I cannot demand results if I don’t have the means. 
(Participant, #22) 
 
87 Between quotation marks, is the literal translation of this Spanish expression, referring to something 
that it is not completely true. 
88 Acción Integral, or integral action, makes reference to the efforts that state security institutions do 
to help with the consolidation of the stat’s territorial control through social programs or actions in 
territories controlled by illegal groups.  
89 He is talking about the scandal that the New York Times report that I mentioned in the contextual 
and methodological chapters, where officers denounced the Commander in Chief of the Army, 
General Martinez, who pressured the army to produce operational results putting  civilians’ lives at 






Finally, with the peace agreement, for some of the soldiers, the differences 
between soldiers and ex-rebels in relation to political rights became more evident. As 
mentioned above, politics is seen by the soldiers as a war by other means. So, the war 
mentality persists, the political reintegration is seen as a way to disarm the enemy that 
must now be defeated at the ballot box. This suggests that within the framework of 
politics, the enemy is better “controlled”. 
 
It is better to have them here, under control and not outside committing crimes. What 
happens is that it is a message, a message that is difficult to assimilate because one would 
not want to see a criminal with a long trajectory so relaxed.  
 (Participant, #3)  
I believe that the best thing is to take them to the field of politics and there to defeat them 
again, as we defeated them in the armed field in the military field. 
(Participant, #10) 
 
Furthermore, political reintegration incentivizes new grievances because it 
questions the reasons why active soldiers in Colombia cannot vote, showing as evidence 
the unequal allocation of democratic rights between soldiers and former rebels: 
 
This has to be completely revalued and we as the military also have the right because we 
are citizens. We have the right to have in power the people who represent our political 
ideas, you cannot say that a military man is not castrated for his ideology, it cannot be 
expressed or materialized because the constitution prohibits it.  
(Participant, #13)  
We should vote. I think it is a process that over time will have to take place. They say 
that culturally we could be affected by ideology, especially on the right. But I think all 
the armies in the world have gone through the same process. So at some point we would 
like to have the opportunity to vote. Sure, in an internal conflict it is not easy. But I think 
we should vote. And culturally it would be good to break that taboo. 
 (Participant, #11)  
 
But at the same time as they disclose the reasons why they want to vote, there is 
a feeling of revenge in the soldiers that confirms the persistence of a war mentality. They 





the political arena. This confirms the notion proposed by some authors, where the 
coexistence between democracy and political violence in Colombia has created the logic 
of seeing the political opponent as an enemy which must be eliminated, like on the 
battlefield, which is itself a distorted view of democratic values (Aranguren-Romero, 
2016; Blair Trujillo, 1999; Gutiérrez Sanín, 2014; Leal Buitrago, 1994, 2002, 2006; 
Leongómez, 2004; Velasquez Rivera, 2009): 
 
I agree with the reintegration of the FARC, but with equal conditions and what are the 
equal conditions? The victims, the members of the security forces that are victims of the 
conflict should have a seat there, just like the one the FARC has, but the government and 
all the politicians are not going to agree that there is a political movement, clean, clear, 
transparent and that can counterbalance a whole corrupt policy. So, of course I agree 
[with the political reintegration], but not as designed, because right now we have bandits 
with many powers without someone who can contradict them, who can tell them “You 
were a murderer, a kidnapper”.  
 (Participant, #22)  
8.4 Summing up: Ideology and the enemy image held by soldiers  
Both qualitative and quantitative findings confirm that ideology works as a means 
of social categorization in the mind of the soldiers, and helps them to differentiate “the 
in-groups” and “the out-group”. The left-wing is classified by the soldiers generally as a 
negative social category, and negative emotions and threat perceptions are developed 
around this identity. As a consequence, because most soldiers consider the left-wing 
outside the sphere of the moral code, they exonerate themselves from the responsibility 
to protect those civilians whom they link with a left-wing ideological identity. But this 
exoneration is not always explicit in their narrative. Some of them use mechanisms of 
moral disengagement, such as self-victimization or blaming the victims, by minimizing 
their responsibility for the suffering of left-wing activists, social leaders and people. 
Additionally, in their narratives, it is possible to see that security is comprehended 
as the defense of the state and law. This idea of security maintains the internal enemy 
logic that was developed during the years of internal conflict through the criminalization 
of the left-wing. For that reason, even after the peace agreement, unarmed civilians that 
expressed their grievances against the status quo are considered by soldiers as threats. As 





the cognitive dissonance that soldiers experience in their unwillingness to protect certain 
civilians due to their political identity. It also helps them to justify the violence 
perpetrated by soldiers or by others toward those civilians because they are “suspicious”, 
so they may “deserve” that violence.  Some also feel that there is support from the status 
quo that they protect, because it allows the criminalization of the political opposition. 
The history of political violence in Colombia has revealed a permissive environment of 
violence against left-wing civilians. For that reason, the narratives of some soldiers 
disclose the complicity of the status quo that makes possible the coexistence of 
democracy and political violence. Hence, the ideological bias in the soldiers is a mirror 
of a situation that encourages political exclusion. The quantitative models and the 
narratives presented in this chapter show that despite the formal peace agreement with 
the FARC, the relationship that soldiers have with their former enemies and the out-group 
image that they developed during the internal conflict remains damaged. The persistence 
of the monolithic view of the left-wing as the ideological identity of the “enemy” still 
creates emotional and cognitive barriers in some soldiers. That sense of “othering” 
reveals the persistence of warrior mentalities. When those mentalities remain active, the 
possibility of (re-)establishing sustainable, peaceful and positive relations between 
adversaries becomes harder. For this reason, many scholars suggest that peace requires 
psychological changes that includes alterations in the system of values, beliefs, identities 
and behavioral intentions (Bar-Tal, 2007; Brewer, 2010; J. P. Lederach, 2007), and 
without such changes the impact of the agreements can be superficial and the possibility 
of returning to violence increases.  
However, the state-building and institutional bias in studies of post-conflict 
violence does not just overestimate the capability of the state to change and achieve 
peace. It also romanticizes the idea of the state as neutral in the internal conflict. For that 
reason, the findings of this study open a new path of research in terms of the potential 
contribution of the state in the perpetuation of violence in post-conflict scenarios. 
Moreover, this study indicates that some members of the state security institutions, such 
as the army, may feel betrayed by the political elites who signed the agreement. They can 
act as spoilers of the implementation of the peace through conflict-supporting narratives 
that continue delegitimizing the opponent and glorifying the in-group, or a lack of 
willingness to protect those that they associated with the identity of their enemies.  
 Consequently, it is important to question the willingness of the state security 





terms of the impact of the transitional justice among the members of the state security 
institutions and their contribution to the reparation of the victims. The findings of this 
study suggest that some combatants tend to develop an uncritical attachment toward their 
institution, and the lack of cooperation from the security sector because of denialist 
attitudes or refusal to acknowledge in-group responsibility may affect the process of 
reconciliation. More studies are needed to investigate the process of healing relationships 
between the state and its citizens. Finally, the identity of the victims in post-agreement 
violence in this study suggests that violence can continue with the complicity of the state. 
Planned intervention that helps to modify the image of the enemy held by combatants in 
postconflict situations is an important goal that should be included in security sector 
reform. 
In the next section of this chapter, I introduce the analysis of the narratives related 
to one of the points of the peace agenda: solutions to the problem of illicit drugs. In these 
narratives, I found that there was a turning point in the narratives of some of the soldiers 
and their relationship with the “legal framework”, a development of self or group-critical 
acceptance reflections and identity re-categorization that may impact the attitudes of 
soldiers toward civilians. For that reason, I devote the next section to analyzing the 
narratives of the soldiers around this issue. 
8.4.1 Between the sword and the wall: war on drugs and violence toward civilians 
The defense of the crop substitution programs and the rejection of forced 
eradication is one of the reasons behind the social mobilization of peasants and 
indigenous people in recent years. It has also been an important cause of the murder of 
social leaders, former rebels and clashes between civilians and soldiers (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 
2020a; Gutiérrez-Sanín et al., 2020; Nussio, 2020; Observatorio de Tierras, 2020). 
 For that reason, I decided to introduce this aspect of the Colombian conflict into 
this thesis, because I believe that the war on drugs amplified and reinforced the logic 
regarding the internal enemy in the minds of the soldiers. As explained in chapter 4, 
traditional strategies to fight the war on drugs introduced a new mission for the soldiers, 
who are members of the groups conducting manual eradication and aerial herbicide 
fumigation of the illegal crops. The substitution of coca crops, that is in the peace agenda, 
questioned the traditional paradigm behind the war on drugs that sees illicit drug 





opportunities, economic inequalities and sustainability. This new intention to solve the 
problem of illicit crops seeks to change the relation that the state has been developing 
with communities involved in the cultivation of illicit crops. However, on the ground, 
the face of the state in the areas where illegal crops are located is the state armed actors. 
In many cases, they are the only ones who have access to those remote areas. In my 
interviews, I found that there is an important division within the army in the way that 
soldiers see the civilians involved in this “illegal activity”.  
For one group of soldiers, this topic becomes very personal because it touches on 
their personal identity, beyond their role as soldiers. Some of them, especially those in 
the front lines and middle or low ranks, come from rural areas and peasant families. This 
background makes them feel bad, confronted, and frustrated in their personal dilemmas 
of following orders that they internally disagree with: 
 
It literally breaks your heart and you have to carry out orders, and more so the soldier 
who is below others in the pyramid, so you have to carry out the order. 
(Participant, #3) 
 
Because more than one soldier have been peasants and most are peasants, then doing that 
is as if he will suddenly touch the relative of one of his companions.   
(Participant, #23) 
 
The law is badly applied, but we cannot do anything, there is no way, we can have the 
best intentions, but if we go beyond that norm we will have problems. So, everyone is 
allowed to think what they want, but, no… thinking is one thing but acting is another, 
and under these conditions, then… no, no, there is nothing to do, you have to comply 
with the constitution and the law and that is what compels us. 
 (Participant, #12) 
 
The state’s institutions became inadequate in reaching out and convincing the peasant 
that he must substitute his crops. The last recourse must be the use of force, but they as 
the executive and the judicial branch also use force as the first resource. Force, so we do 
not enter into dialogue but rather we subdue the peasant, then the peasant who has his 
son serving in the army, who has his son in the state security forces, says, But why me? 
if I lent you my son, if my son is there, my son is a policeman, why do they have to do 







However, despite the orders and the sense of powerlessness, some of them 
developed and expressed a critical attitude toward the decision of the state to use the 
army to fight the war on drugs because they recognized that this is a social problem: 
 
The forced eradication thing is quite complicated, very, very complicated and the military 
forces place them between a rock and a hard place, why? Because there are many places 
in Colombia where there is coca, where one carries out forced eradication is where the 
state has never been. The only way for the state to get there is with soldiers, with a marine 
or often with a police officer, that is the only way for the state to get there, so they put 
you in the position of fighting with the civilian population, the civilian population that 
has been abandoned by the state. 
 (Participant, #2)  
 
Furthermore, they also recognized that the militaristic strategies to fight the war 
on drugs erode the relationship between the state and its citizens and incentivizes hatred 
of the soldiers. Some soldiers struggle with following orders that force them to confront 
civilians. I felt during the interviews that many do not want to convince me, they wanted 
to convince themselves that they were doing the right thing, even if they are not 
completely convinced of it: 
 
When you get to a place and suddenly eradicate what you can, like one hectare, whatever 
you can, suddenly that population are going to develop resentment, they are going to be 
left with resentment because they are going to say, “The soldiers came here and finished 
us with the little crop we had”. They do not say, “The president came and promised us 
and this, and nothing happened”. They always say, “Soldiers came here and they finished 
our cultivation”. The word “soldier” always remains, yes? 
(Participant, #1)  
 
When I was in those towns doing eradication, they saw us as the enemy. Enemy number 
one. So, of course, yes. They put us in the middle, in a sandwich [laughs]. You see that 
people suffer, that children have nothing to eat. That the peasant has no other option. 
Well, and that one is against allowing them to have their basic needs. Well, of course we 
are the enemy. And we are supposed to be the state that is fighting against something 





(Participant, #11)  
 
This lack of substitution of illegal crops is replaced by force, and we used force to 
eradicate them. We earn the title “enemies” by the peasant because they will see in us an 
enemy. They will not say, “it was the state”, they will say that it was the army. Any 
chance that they have to cooperate with an illegal group to take revenge they are going 
to do it, they are going to do it. So we begin with that cycle of conflict that will not end, 
and will, it will end and it will not end. 
 (Participant, #15)  
Some of those soldiers that confront the state, portray themselves as a separate 
entity from the state, particularly the middle low ranks and lowest ranks. They usually 
feel powerless and frustrated because they have become the “oppressors” of the people: 
 
This is where we as an institution cannot afford to be the repressors of the state either, 
because they send us where there are problems and that is not right because those 
problems are not generated by us, they are generated by the state itself. Even if we bear 
the state’s responsibility of responding to those issues, the institution cannot throw those 
problems on itself. In the past the politicians used us to repress the people. No, under no 
circumstances because we are the people's army, we owe it to the people.   
 (Participant, #13)  
 
There is something logical and clear and that is that these are illegal crops and must be 
eradicated, if you see what I mean. But, you see, that that is a chain that begins in a small 
way, and where does that chain begin? In the peasant, in the poor peasant who is stuck 
in the most remote part of the country where he has no support from the state, where the 
state has not been. The only thing that they have is us, the bad force. The military boot 
enforces, but I enforce what the state mandates but no, the state does not fulfill its duties. 
 (Participant, #16)  
 
Despite the sense of powerlessness of the lowest ranks, the middle ranks that 
make decisions on the ground develop mechanisms of resistance to deal with 
confrontation with the civilians and the pressure that they feel to follow the orders of 
eradication. Some of them expressed their changing mentality when they realized the 






What happens is that from above the United States conditions the government in 
Colombia a lot. But this is to raise self-awareness because I also used to say: coca is bad 
and then everyone who has anything to do with the coca is bad and you have to finish 
them. But I am telling you, I questioned myself. Yes, I questioned myself. However, if 
you put someone of the same level of military rank as myself, a contemporary and you 
ask the same thing, you will hear: those who grows coca, we have to finish them, we 
need to use glyphosate, eradicate. But I started to think differently because I went there 
and I saw other things. The peasants told me, we eat from this. Then, I even negotiated 
with them. I told them that I have to report some statistical data with the GPS and drones 
that the USA gave us to show our eradication progress. Then let’s negotiate, how many 
hectares do you have? ten? let me eradicate five, you happy, me happy, then no conflict. 
 (Participant, #5)  
 
Some soldiers recognized the risks of these forced eradication tasks, as they were 
not trained or prepared to confront civil society. They acknowledged that the military 
commanders were aware of the risks, but they still sent the soldiers to confront the 
civilian population. Moreover, they said that there were commanders who suggested that 
the peasants and civilians they will face in the eradication are mostly infiltrators of illegal 
armed groups: 
 
The confrontation between civilians and soldiers, the high command knew since the 
moment they formed the troops to form the groups to eradicate. They [high commanders] 
knew that we [soldiers] were going to meet, face to face, a population, some peasants. 
Some of them [high commanders] said that they [civilians] were infiltrated by insurgent 
groups, or that they were going to come out to defend what is theirs. In my case, I would 
have done it too, if someone comes to my farm, and I didn’t have anything else to 
cultivate, and that crops gave me something to eat. Go out and fight the soldiers and the 
police, and that was what they were doing there.  
(Participant, #28) 
  
Nevertheless, there were also voices in the army that denied that illegal crops 
were a social problem. For them, this an issue of greed and easy money, so everyone who 






To be honest, everything that is outside the law is bad (…) they have those crops because 
they want to, because they are so used to how easy it is to earn money, and more quickly, 
because the amount of money is not much either.  
(Participant, #4) 
  
I would say that they cultivate these drugs, the truth is not out of necessity because they 
have other resources, other crops that are legal, such as cocoa, coffee, corn and others, 
so I see that it is not the need, I see that it is the custom, it is, in everyday terms, easy 
money.  
(Participant, #17)  
During the interviews, it was possible to recognize that the lowest ranked soldiers, 
due to their subordinate status, tend to follow orders because of pressure, fear or threats 
from their superiors. In the Colombian context, where unemployment, inequality and 
lack of opportunity are so evident, a front line soldier has a lot to lose, but this does not 
mean that some have not tried to resist: 
 
They [the army] threatened me with death. I had to remain silent and stop working on a 
topic that I was working on. It was something that was going to come to light which 
would affect a high-ranking person and that it was going to be bad for him. In short, he 
was going to jail and what happened to me? I had to shut up. Here in this country we are 
like this, that the person who wants to speak too much, who wants to tell the truth, who 
wants to speak out against the state is ordered to be silent, then what happens? We are 
like this here in Colombia, the person who wants to talk about more is told to shut up, if 
someone knows too much they have to shut up and so on, and if you don't have resources, 
if you don't have the financial security, well, you have more reason to keep quiet and say 
nothing. 
 (Participant, #28)  
 
I always refused, the order can come from whoever, they can offer me a month of leave, 
they can offer me money, but if I see that it doesn't work for me, I don't [respond]. They 
[some soldiers] were offered vacations, many times, even money to present combatant 
casualties, for everything, but not me, no, I cannot kill someone who has done nothing, 
no, no . . . The generals and colonels are not imprisoned because, as I am telling you, 
these people believe that they are the most important, with the most important ranks and 
above everyone else. They look over their shoulders and ride in their cars, with all their 





man and I am a man just like him, and he does not tell me to come and do this, no sir, 
come and do it yourself.90  
(Participant, #20) 
  
Finally, during my interviews, especially the lowest and middle low ranks were 
always grateful to me for wanting to hear them. Many found in my interview an 
opportunity to express their thoughts and some, off the record, expressed their gratitude 
for being able to speak their minds freely. This opened important reflections during my 
research since it reaffirmed the importance of recognizing the plurality that exists within 
a military institution. This can shed light not only on a deeper understanding of how these 
institutions operate, but also how transformation processes can be carried out: 
  
It is generalized, there is an idea that those guys [social leaders] are in favor of the left 
and so on, that has always happened in Colombia... you know, that in the army there are 
also people who go and kill them, just to make the ... I mean, it’s very difficult. In the 
army, what is happening with the “Falsos positivos” and those things, here the generals, 
and the military, but the generals got used to counting the people by deaths that they 
caused. Then, I don´t know... let me give you an example. In Cundinamarca, that region, 
they will say, “You are responsible”. But, if in that region where I was responsible for a 
month, or a week, I do not record deaths in the report, then they will say that I´m doing 
nothing, and they will say, “What happened, jerk?” In other words, they got used to 
measuring by deaths and as long as we continue in a war counting the number of deaths, 
it will never end, so I do not know if it is happening, if it happens. 
The social leaders are 100% threatened, I´m not saying that it is the security forces, but 
by members of the security forces who have a different vision than that of serving and 
protecting. They take advantage of their strength, their uniform, their status, for what 
reason, I don’t know, to put their personal interests and their values above. 
 (Participant, #26)  
8.5 Summing up: Soldiers narratives about the war on drugs  
Recognizing the narratives of the soldiers about the war on drugs policies and 
their role in forced eradication was important, because it nuances the argument about the 
inability of soldiers in general to question orders that they consider unfair or that may 
 
90 According to the Human Rights Watch report most of the soldiers involved in violations of 





encourage violent behavior. There were spaces and moments of agency and resistance, 
above all, around the issue of forced eradication. Furthermore, these qualitative findings 
may explain why the trolley experiment results were not statistically significant (see 
chapter 7). According to the results introduced in chapter 7, there is no statistical evidence 
that indicated a difference in the willingness of soldiers to make costly sacrifices related 
to the war on drugs by policy preferences of civilians. However, there was a priming 
effect from Experiment 1 that suggested that soldiers who were exposed to the treatments 
where civilians were right-wing, significantly increased their willingness to sacrifice 
themselves. Therefore, the ideological identity of civilians matters in soldiers’ attitudes 
towards making costly sacrifices to protect civilians. But after analyzing the soldiers’ 
narratives from the perspective of the war on drugs, explanations of soldiers’ attitudes 
becomes more complex.  
The dilemmas and tensions surrounding soldiers around forced eradication open 
the way for further investigations into recognizing the voices of soldiers on the ground, 
who are confronting the civilian population because of eradication. Another important 
feature of this study was to give a voice to the military beyond the elite ranks. The 
plurality of voices in this study makes visible the patterns of their narrative, but also 
reveals tensions and differences between the members of an institution such as the 
military. The effects of rank were also important in the linear regression models 
introduced in chapter 7 for Experiment 2. For model 1, with self-sacrifice as a general 
outcome, subaltern officers and superior officers do not have a willingness to sacrifice 
themselves in general, and these findings persist for the same ranks when the civilians 
support crop substitution programs which represent a left-wing policy (model 2). 
However, rank ceases being an important variable when civilians support the forced 
eradication (right-wing policy, model 3). 
Finally, the impact of the war on drugs policies in the role of the soldiers and their 
relationship with the civilians opens, for some of the soldiers, an opportunity to question 
the status quo and the law. Some are able to confront themselves and develop empathic 
understanding about the situation of the civilians who had illegal crops.  
Therefore, there is a reduced defensiveness about the misdeeds of one group, and 
this raises difficult questions about the notion of following orders that increase the 
conflict and damage the relationship between soldiers and civilians. In this case, the 
perception of the “other” changes, and some can even perceive commonalities through 





drugs allowed me to see a more inclusive and less biased understanding of the conflict in 
the soldiers. The threat perception toward coca growers civilians suggests that not all  
soldiers “truly” believe that those civilians are war enemies. The presence of soldiers 
with critical views of their institutions and the way that they approach the problem of the 
illegal crops corroborate previous studies that suggest that deeply internalizing 
ideological identities in war, convictions, and beliefs are rare. Therefore, they are not 
necessarily the main reason that shapes members of armed groups’ behaviour. Their 
actions may answer institutional pressure that creates incentives to encourage all 
members of the army to conform to the idea to perceive peasants as potential threats 
(Leader Maynard, 2022); it may also explain the variation of convictions among 
members of the army, as other studies suggest (Scharpf, 2018).  
8.6 Conclusion  
 This chapter presented the qualitative analysis of the 28 semistructured interviews 
to answer the following questions: Does ideology help the soldiers to frame and define 
enemies and threats? If so, how does this work? How do these ideological biases in 
soldiers influence an aggressive disposition toward civilians as well as their willingness 
to protect them? The findings helped to enrich, and nuance the quantitative findings 
introduced in chapters 6 and 7 that showed ideological bias in soldiers and its impact on 
the attitudes and emotions toward civilians among Colombian soldiers. In the next 
chapter, I present another qualitative analysis to answer two complementary research 
questions. This analysis will help to unpack the soldiers’ understanding of the ideological 






9 Meaning of ideological labels of “left” and “right” and 
ideology’s cognitive mechanisms in Colombian Soldiers 
The impact of ideological bias on soldiers’ behavior, particularly their willingness 
to protect civilians and their aggressive disposition, was studied using quantitative 
methods, in Chapter 6; and in Chapter 8, soldiers’ narratives concerning their ideological 
bias and attitudes toward civilians were explored, using a qualitative approach. In this 
chapter, I address two complementary research questions with regard to soldiers’ 
understanding of the ideological labels of “left” and “right” and the cognitive 
mechanisms that make possible the conversion of ideologies to attitudes and behaviors. 
This chapter relies on the analysis of the interview material and is divided into three 
sections. In the first section, I explore the meanings that soldiers attach to the labels “left” 
and “right”, applying some categories developed in previous studies for the Latin 
American context. In the second section, I move to the cognitive mechanisms suggested 
by Leader Maynard (2019) to identify the most prominent ideological cognitive 
mechanisms that take place in Colombian soldiers. Finally, this chapter closes with some 
reflections on the researcher’s fieldwork experiences, and data analysis of this study. 
9.1 How soldiers understand “left” or “right” ideological labels  
As mentioned in the theoretical framework, it is common to use the terms “left” 
and “right” to refer to some ideological or political preferences. However, what these 
terms mean generally and also among scholars is something that is still subject to debate. 
As I introduced in chapter 3, there are not only diverse means of measuring ideology, 
there are also different epistemological approaches to studying ideologies. Moreover, 
there are contextual differences that make constructing generalizations about what people 
mean when they refer to “left” or “right” ideologies difficult. However, to answer the 
question, how soldiers understand “left” and “right” ideological labels, I explore the 
soldiers’ narratives, following the results of Zechmeister (2006) and Zechmeister and 
Corral (2013) based on Latin America Zechmeister (2006) suggested that the meaning of 
ideology may possess one or more of at least three components: symbolic, policy and 
valence. I added a new category “values and beliefs”, because I found it important to 
consider the context and the identity of the participants, and it is different from the other 





knowledge, one of the first attempts to explore what these labels mean to Colombian 
soldiers using the following categories. 
9.2 Components of Ideology 
Political Symbolic: The symbolic content of an ideology includes political 
parties, references or other referent groups such as unions, or social classes references, 
such as the poor. Moreover, it is also expected that in contexts where politics is highly 
personalized, people may also understand ideological labels to refer to individual 
political characters (Zechmeister, 2006). Political competition in Latin America 
frequently revolves around strong personalities rather than institutionalized entities. 
Moreover, political symbols are typically conceived of as having both affective and 
cognitive components (García-Sánchez & Rodríguez-Raga; Merolla & Zechmeister, 
2011; Ortiz-Ayala & García-Sánchez, 2014). For that reason, I expected to find many 
politicians’ names when soldiers made references to “left” and “right” labels in their 
narratives.  
Emotional valence: This category makes reference to positive or negative 
emotions, unpleasant or negative connotations around the labels “left” and “right”. I 
decided to adopt the meaning of the term “valence” from psychology because I found it 
most appropriate considering the quantitative and qualitative findings of the previous 
chapters. While this is not the focus of the meaning of valence91 in Zechmeister (2006), 
she mentioned that individuals can develop an affective or emotional attachment toward 
the “left” and “right” labels (see more in Cobb & Elder, 1973; Conover & Feldman, 1981; 
Medvic et al., 2014). Then, following the scope and the previous findings of this research, 
I found this approach to the term more suitable for this research than the term that 
Zechmeister (2006) applied in her study.  
Economic Policy preference (role of the State): The classic conception of the 
left-right semantic field sees the terms as distinguishing between those who prefer more 
state (left) or less state (right) intervention in the economy and provision of services such 
as education, health, or subsidies to reduce inequality. Nevertheless, the studies for Latin 
 
91 For Zechmeister (2006), valence makes reference to the position of the “left” and “right” 
regarding their capability or approach to handling certain issues. For instance, a valence issue of 
the left can be their way to convince the people that they are the most capable group to deal with 





America suggested that contrary to the classic expectation, some countries supporting an 
active state role in economic policy do not adopt a leftist position. Likewise, attitudes 
toward free trade policies do not always predict a rightist placement on the left‐right 
continuum (Zechmeister & Corral, 2010, p. 6).  
Values and Beliefs: I added this category, considering the values and beliefs that 
can be active in soldiers’ minds, such as religion, family, respect for traditions and 
authorities, and also including patriotism narratives. My fieldwork experiences showed 
me that this component was crucial in order to comprehend the meaning of ideology in 
soldiers’ minds. On the one hand, during the four months that I spent as a visiting scholar 
in the School of War, I realized that an informal rule was that all staff in the institution 
needed to have a printed picture of their family on their desk (see figures 9.1 and 9.2). I 
asked one of those of higher ranks why they have that “requirement” and he answered: 
“I cannot believe in someone who is not committed to their family”. The interesting thing 
for me was the case of a woman who was divorced without children. She was a consultant 
and decided to display a picture of herself with her ex-husband just to “fill the 
requirement and avoid people asking questions”. This kind of informal rule showed me 
that for the army the model of a Christian family is important and part of the values and 
beliefs system. Another element noticed was that all the military units had a Catholic 
church, and in front of the building of the division in charge of military doctrine and 
education they have a Virgin Mary (see figures 9.3). Those symbolic elements are part 
of the legacy of the Prussian doctrine of the Colombian Army that I mentioned in chapter 





Figure 9-1 An officer’s desk in the School of War 
 






Figure 9-3 Statue of the Virgin Mary in front of the building of Education and Doctrine 
in the School of War 
 
9.3 Procedure 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, I conducted a deductive content analysis, taking the 
paragraph as the unit of analysis (Daniel & Harland, 2018; Mayring, 2004). The content 
of the paragraph was classified into one of the four categories. Nevertheless, there were 
many times when the categories were interconnected. Theoretically, this is possible, as 
individuals may exhibit one or more of those four components to make sense of the 
ideological labels. The classification of the paragraphs in one of the categories thus 
requires a deep understanding and interpretation of the context of the conversation. For 
that reason, four rounds of codification were applied to increase the accuracy of the 
classification. Additional information was also considered to classify those paragraphs 
that revealed multiple categories. The context of the conversation, the tone of voice of 
the participant,92 and the personal notes that the researcher developed after each 
interview, were considered as part of the codification process. 
 
92 This helped me to gain a sense of the soldiers’ emotional reactions to particular events or topics 






Table 19 Ideology Components 
Ideology component Frequency (N) 
Affective or emotional valence 
toward “left” or “right” labels 
10 
Values and Beliefs 15 
Role of the State 22 
Political symbolic 23 
                                                             Total N: 28 Interviews 
Based on the previous results, the most notable components for understanding the 
meaning of ideology labels in soldiers were: political symbolic and the role of the state 
in the economy (see appendix 20 for the illustrative extracts of each component). The 
symbolic components suggested that soldiers make sense of ideology labels in 
association with political characters and groups. Particularly, the history of the 
Colombian internal conflict with left-wing guerrillas has an important effect on the way 
that soldiers understand the label “left”. For them, political characters, political parties 
and even social organizations such as unions, agrarian movements, social leaders or 
activists fall under the same umbrella of ideology label, the “left”, where they also located 
the guerrillas. Thus it was not surprising that soldiers’ narratives expose a negative 
connotation toward the “left” label of ideology. This phenomenon was also described in 
the previous chapter. Moreover, this finding also resonates with another study of 
Colombian soldiers that showed that there is a systematic and generalized idea within the 
military to consider left-wing political leaders as threats (Rivera-Páez, 2019a; see 
appendix 21).  
During the time that I was in the School of War, the division who managed the 
education and doctrine of the Army had as frequent guests politicians from the extreme 
right-wing political party. These daily life decision and behaviors showed the ideological 
bias and the stigmatization toward the “left”. Moreover, it is possible to suggest that even 
though the military declare themselves a “neutral” institution, the ideological bias is part 
of the military culture in response to the more than five decades of armed conflict with 
leftist groups. In other words, the legacies of the conflict are now embedded in the army. 





and narratives suggested that there is a “politization” or “ideologization” of the army in 
favor of the right-wing and against the left-wing. 
Additionally, the symbolic component was sometimes very closely connected with 
the emotional valence component. Usually, the association between political characters, 
and social groups with the “left-wing” was characterized by negative emotions toward 
the left. For that reason, as we saw in chapters 6 and 7, an important psychological 
mechanism of the ideological bias is the emotions that the “left” and “right” labels 
activate in soldiers’ minds. The literature suggests that group-based emotions are 
emotions that are connected with an individual’s membership in a particular social group 
(Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2016). Therefore, the negative group-based emotional reaction 
toward the left ideological label suggested that the “left” is perceived as relevant for the 
group because it represents a sign of alertness or threat toward the in-group. Indeed, the 
findings also indicated that there is a normalization of the association between the left-
wing and the political identity of the internal enemy. In other words, in the soldier’s 
narratives, as was exposed in chapter 8, it is possible to see an implicit and sometimes 
explicit intrinsic association between the left-wing ideological label and the identity of 
the enemies and potential threats.  
Furthermore, the narratives of the soldiers reveal that any ideas or behaviors that 
were in opposition to the government were associated with the “left” and considered as 
threats by the soldiers. The internal war in Colombia thus has a unique characteristic in 
the way that soldiers understand opposition in the democratic system. Those who legally 
oppose the government are easily equated with the rebels. Criminalization of the political 
opponent then becomes part of the soldiers’ narratives and understanding of left-wing 
ideologies. This logic reflects the consequences of the historical and paradoxical 
coexistence of democracy and political violence that was introduced in Chapter 5. 
Colombian soldiers, and the culture of the military institution, developed a distorted idea 
of democracy because of that coexistence. Therefore, the political opposition (usually 
linked with the left) of political elites (associated with the right-wing) are seen as threats 
to the status quo and therefore legitimate targets of violence. 
The second most prominent category was the role of the state in the economy. The 
results confirmed previous studies in Latin America that suggest that individuals that 
want an active role for the state in the economy and the provision of services do not 
always identify themselves with the left (Zechmeister & Corral, 2013). Those apparent 





indicate that it is important to contemplate the history and context of countries to 
understand the role of those labels in order to study the political behavior and people 
political ideas and beliefs. For Colombian soldiers, behind the “left” ideology label, it is 
possible to see the persistence of the Cold War mentality, the history of the left-wing 
rebel groups in the region, and the impact of leftist governments in recent decades in 
Latin America. For instance, the current Venezuelan political situation reinforces 
soldiers’ ideological bias against the left-wing, as well the persistence of dissidents 
groups from the FARC and the still active leftist rebel group in the country, the National 
Liberation Army (ELN). This environment impacts the meaning of the “left” ideology 
label in the soldiers.  
Despite the lack of studies on this topic in Colombian soldiers, Rivera-Páez´s 
(2019) book which focuses on officers in the Colombian army, navy and air force, found, 
from a survey, that there is a low acceptance of subsidies as a redistribution mechanism 
within the officers. The author explains that there is a historical relationship of mutual 
benefit between the military and economic elites of the country, as I explained in chapter 
5. Moreover, he indicated that in the minds of the officers, there is a direct link between 
subsidies and progressive or left-wing political agendas (p. 149). Nevertheless, in my 
interviews with officers, sub-officers and front line soldiers of the army, I found some 
contradictory narratives among soldiers’ notions of the state’s role in the economy. Some, 
especially sub-officers and front line soldiers recognize that inequality and neglect by the 
state is part of the reason for the internal conflict in the country. In fact, because some of 
them come from rural and poor areas of the country, they were able to relate their personal 
experiences with the notion of abandonment by the state. As a consequence, some of 
them advocate for a stronger role of the state in the economy and provision of services 
like public education, health and economic support for the poorest. 
 However, those ideas look very similar to the traditional narratives of the “left-wing” or 
can be considered part of the repertories or perspective of the out-group. Because these 
ideas differ from the communal narrative of their wider identity group, soldiers tend to 
develop contradictory narratives to mitigate the inconsistencies. Those inconsistences in 
the narratives nuances the ideological views among the soldiers, suggesting that not all 
soldiers held strong ideological bias, and that there are degrees of internalization.  
The following are some examples of those narratives. 
We [the soldiers] are defending an economic model of Colombia with flaws, the soldiers 





knows Colombia like no one else. There is not a single politician who knows Colombia 
like us, we do see it, we see the social problems, we see the economic problems that the 
Colombian people suffer, so I see it and I am aware that there are problems in the 
economic model. Capitalism is a savage capitalism, it has suddenly had top management 
failures at the macroeconomic level that has led to poverty for the Colombian people, but 
poverty cannot be a social claim, it cannot be a social claim, poverty cannot be an excuse, 
it cannot be an excuse to justify taking up arms in response. 
(Participant 10) 
Many leftist people, who have the ideas of Chávez and the ideas of Venezuela because 
they want everything as a gift, my concept is that the Venezuelan likes everything easy, 
everything given away, most of them, right? They want everything as a gift, that the 
government gives them everything and that cannot be the case, one has to work to have 
his things. 
(Participant 25) 
Later in the interview the same participant expressed:  
 
The truth is that not everything on the left is bad, there are good things that, at least I was 
reading yesterday that the left-wing wants to support communities, they want to support 
schools, doing educational things for poor children, so they can study. A country without 
education will always live in ignorance, it is time to study for the country to get ahead 
and become more advanced, but there are certain left-wing ideas that can make us go 
down the path of Venezuela. 
(Participant 25) 
 
Lastly, the values and beliefs category also captures a dimension that can 
influence the preference of soldiers toward right-wing ideology. For some of the soldiers, 
left-wing ideas can jeopardize important values and beliefs that soldiers appreciate, such 
as family and religion. The findings suggested that Colombian soldiers had a strong 
attachment to the Catholic church and the traditional family model, that has led them to 
develop a conservative view of society, which is recognized in other studies (Rivera-
Páez, 2019a). Furthermore, some soldiers indicate, as part of their tradition, the 
preference for the right-wing and aversion toward the left-wing, because their enemies 
were associated with that political-ideological identity.  
This finding make us hypothesize that the ideological bias against the left-wing 





preference toward the right-wing is expressed in terms of “tradition” or with arguments 
such as, “we have always thought that way, the right-wing is good the left-wing is bad”, 
which reconfirms the ideological bias and illustrates the way that soldiers expressed it in 
their narratives. 
9.5 Summing up: how do soldiers understand “left” or “right” ideological 
labels? 
In this first section of the chapter, I have explored the narratives of the soldiers 
using four components of ideology to answer the question, how do soldiers understand 
“left” or “right” ideological labels? The findings suggest that the symbolic component of 
ideology and the role of the state in the economy were the most prominent components 
used by the soldiers to make sense of the ideology labels “left” and “right”. However, 
emotional valence and the values and beliefs were also used, sometimes connected with 
one or more of the other components. In general, the results resonate with the previous 
findings chapters. First, there is a stigmatization toward the label “left” as a consequence 
of the historical conflict against the left-wing rebel groups in the country, but also 
because of the history of the “left” in the region. Consequently, the ideological bias 
against the left-wing in some of the soldiers cannot be understood in a vacuum, but is 
rather embedded in and emerges from a historical conflict between the right-wing and 
the left-wing ideologies in the country and in the region. Furthermore, the narratives 
around the label “left” confirm how some soldiers associate that label with the political 
identity of the enemy or the out-group. Therefore, it is common that when some soldiers 
talked about the meaning of the “left” label, they automatically mentioned the guerrillas 
and criminalized political figures or civilians that they associated with the left-wing. 
These narratives corroborate the experimental findings that reveal the ideological bias 
against the left as a common perception among soldiers, and how soldiers, through a 
social categorization process, use ideological identity as a reference to define the in-
group and the out-group, thus affecting their behavior toward civilians. However, this 
ideological bias against the left-wing civilians may not reflect a deep ideological belief; 
conformity to authority, peer pressure and institutionalized social pressure also play a 
role. Nevertheless, even if there are degrees of ideological internationalization among 
soldiers, the quantitative and qualitative findings suggest a consistent pattern: Those that 
are associated with left-wing ideological identity are more likely to be vulnerable to 





Second, the narratives around the symbolic component of the ideology label 
reveal that there is a common in-group belief and a group expectation that soldiers should 
have a leaning toward the right-wing. As a result, there is a normalized idea that left-
wing ideas are inherently risky or dangerous for the in-group values and beliefs. These 
findings indicate that there is a collective narrative within the army that delineate a group 
identity against the “left”. Consequently, soldiers, as individual members of an identity 
group, often endorse those narratives reflecting the ideological bias against the left, even 
when they perceive themselves and the institution as apolitical or ideologically neutral.  
Finally, the coexistence of consistent narratives around the role of the state in the 
economy indicates that this component of the ideology is influenced by historical events 
of the history of the left in the region. As with civilians in the region, the narratives of 
the soldiers in Colombia develop dissonant discourses about the role of the state, and 
their own understanding of “left” and “right” ideological labels. Some soldiers express 
narratives that claim that left-wing people are lazy or that left-wing political ideas can be 
a threat to the national economy, and their personal experiences and views of the conflict 
lead them to advocate for more intervention of the state in the reduction of poverty and 
inequality, to prevent violence in the country. 
9.6 Ideology cognitive mechanism  
In this section, I explore ideology’s cognitive mechanisms, introduced by Leader 
Maynard (2019). As I mentioned in Chapter 3, this author suggested a theoretical causal 
path to explain how exactly ideologies are able to influence behavior, particularly violent 
behavior. The literature suggests that ideologies influence actors’ threat perceptions, 
shape strategic propensities and affect actors’ conflict capacities (p. 4). However, it is not 
possible to know what are the cognitive mechanisms that translate ideologies into 
behaviors. Leader Maynard (2019) proposed a causal pathway summarized in Table 18. 
In this section of the chapter, I study the soldier’s narratives, taking into account the 
cognitive mechanism for each causal path (internalized and structural) to identify the 
most visible cognitive mechanisms used in the Colombian soldiers. 






9.6.1 Categories  
9.6.1.1 Internalization 
 The first causal path suggested by Leader Maynard (2019) is internalization. He 
defines an internalized ideology as a situation when individuals have a sincere belief, 
values, schemas, and preferences which influence reflective and unreflective cognitive 
processes of both perception and decision-making. An individual with an internalized 
ideology evaluates their actions as desirable, efficacious and legitimate based on the 
ideology, influencing their likely behavior. Furthermore, an internalized ideology will 
shape the way that individuals make sense of intellectual and emotional content of 
political circumstances. This causal path can arise from two cognitive mechanisms: 
commitment and adoption.  
9.6.1.2 Commitment cognitive mechanism: 
Individuals who are commited to a group or system of ideas and beliefs feel some 
direct and relatively stable relation or connection with those ideas. But, this does not 
imply a deep understanding of those ideas. Moreover, commitment can be relatively 
inchoate and still have powerful effects on individual behaviors (Leader Maynard, 2019, 
p. 5). Finally, a sincere ideological commitment implies an intrinsic resonance for 
individuals. Ideology shapes the perception and directs decision-making because 
individuals feel genuinely convinced that they possess a “legitimate” frame within which 
to act.  
9.6.1.3 Adoption cognitive mechanism 
Individuals can accept an ideological position even when they don’t feel intrinsic 
commitment to the ideas involved (Leader Maynard, 2019, p. 6). In this way, individuals 
can adopt those ideas because they are associated with identities or organizational roles 
that they feel genuinely committed to. Additionally, some individuals can fill gaps in 
their political worldviews which adopt those ideas. However, this cognitive mechanism 
implies that individuals can be more tolerant about ideological deviation than individuals 






9.6.1.4 Structural Mechanism  
A second path represents the structural mechanisms. Leader Maynard (2019) 
argues that individuals are influenced in their choices not just by their own sincere 
ideological beliefs, but also by their perceptions of the ideological character of their 
social environment (p. 7). Consequently, individuals incorporate the dominant ideologies 
from groups, organization, and societies. In those cases, the group’s expectation about 
ideologies creates a structure where people expect that other people will follow a certain 
ideology. Usually, the non-genuine believers remained ideologically entrapped within 
the institution or group ideological expectations. Ideological structures operate through 
two principal cognitive mechanisms: conformity and instrumentalization.   
9.6.1.5 Conformity cognitive mechanism 
Group, organizational or societal ideologies can shape people’s behavior because 
of peer pressure, orders from authorities, organizational routines or similar social 
dynamics. These cognitive processes are often unreflective; people decide to just follow 
or conform to social expectations, which reduces the power of sincere personal 
preferences, but it renders the ideologies that influence social expectations of behavior 
crucial (Leader Maynard, 2019, p. 7). Studies from psychology argue that conformity is 
imitation of behavior; hence, individuals are susceptible to copying the behavior of their 
peers. However, while obedience is explicit over the actions, but with conformity, the 
requirement to collaborate with the group is often implicit. For this reason, the behavior 
that the individual adopts does not necessarily reflect explicit orders. Individuals may 
thus feel that they are behaving spontaneously (Milgram, 2016 pp. 157-166). 
Leader Maynard (2019) argues that usually combatants may simply conform to 
an armed group’s operational principles rather than internalize them. As a consequence, 
the behavior of soldiers is a reflection of ideological blueprints. In other words, the 
content of the ideology will still determine the resulting behavior (p. 7).  
9.6.1.6 Instrumentalization cognitive mechanism 
This cognitive mechanism is labeled by Leader Maynard (2019) as powerful 
because people can combine strategically sincere sympathies and structural pressures. 





and benefits of ideological expressions. Therefore, ambiguous contexts or contextual 
changes can influence the way that individuals manage their genuinely internalized 
ideological preferences. For instance, the discourses around professionalization of the 
military may be used by soldiers to cover their ideological preferences in front of 
civilians. But when the audience is a particular group of political leaders related to their 
personal ideological preferences, they can feel more comfortable disclosing their genuine 
ideology. In other words, actors can be strategic in the way that they decide to express 
their ideologies, based on the audience, circumstances or their necessities.  
9.7 Procedure 
 Leader Maynard (2019) recognized in his study that there are interactions between 
internalization and structure, and individuals can act under multiple cognitive 
mechanisms through varying mixtures of commitment, adoption, conformity, and 
instrumentalization. In this study, I keep each cognitive mechanism separate from the 
others to classify the soldiers’ narratives when they talk about ideology. For this purpose, 
I created a code in Nvivo for each cognitive mechanism. Then, when soldiers were 
talking about ideology or ideological labels, the paragraph, that is my unit of analysis, 
will be assigned to one mechanism after analyzing if the message or the ideas expressed 
represent the definition of one of the cognitive mechanism introduced above. Using this 
procedure, I am able to recognize what are the most prominent cognitive mechanisms in 
the Colombian soldiers to translate ideologies into behaviors. Moreover, I will be able to 
identify interaction between the cognitive mechanisms. This is my means of testing the 
theoretical framework of the ideology cognitive mechanism introduced by Leader 
Maynard (2019). However, the methodology applied in this study can be improved, and 
invites future research on ideology and armed conflict using this particular theoretical 
framework. 
9.8 Results  
During the analysis of the narratives of the soldiers and the codification process, I 





mechanisms. Rank,93 socioeconomic background, motivation of join the army, and the 
role within the army were elements that contributed to determining, for example, why 
some soldiers had a tendency toward adoption and not commitment, or vice versa. For 
instance, some soldiers who expressed commitment narratives toward the right-wing 
ideology were of the higher ranks and grew up with strong ties around the army, because 
they have family members who were soldiers. For example, participant 10’s father was 
an officer in the army, he studied in a military school and joined the army when he was 
fourteen years old. As a consequence, he was genuinely convinced that the army is right-
wing because it is the “correct” way to think. He stated:  
 
The army is on the right-wing, that is, in defense of capitalism as an economic model. In 
addition to that because we were taught to believe in this, and I think we were not wrong. 
 
I noticed a similar effect in soldiers that come from disputed territories between 
the guerrillas, the paramilitaries and the army. Participant 24 was a front-line soldier who 
grew up in disputed territories with family members who joined the army and the 
paramilitary groups. This context shapes his system of values and believes, and his 
loyalty toward the right-wing: 
 
We in the family are 11. 6 women and 5 men, the 5 men all did the military service, one 
is still active, he is in Chocó, the other retired 7 years ago. He lost a part of, a limb, his 
foot in a minefield, then he retired. So right now we are two still active in the army. One 
that is retired, he was a soldier, then he retired, then he joined The United Self-Defense 
Forces of Colombia, AUC [a right-wing paramilitary group]. The other was also a soldier 
and he also joined the AUC, so that’s why I liked the army, and as soon as I could I 
enrolled in the army. Then the threats began, especially from the FARC side, to threaten 
my mother, my father, this is why we had to leave the town. So back in my town there 
was a conflict between the ELN, the FARC and the paramilitary groups, of which my 
brothers were members. 
 
 
93 As I mentioned in chapter V, some studies suggested that the internalization of ideologies and 
doctrines varies across ranks in the military institutions (Hoover Green, 2016; Oppenheim & 





In a similar vein, I observed that the economic background and the role of soldiers 
within the army played a role in soldiers’ ideological cognitive mechanisms. Participant 
28, a front line soldier, who was a male-nurse from a poor socioeconomic background, 
with twenty years of experience as a soldier, showed a conformity ideological cognitive 
mechanism. However, he had a critical perspective on the behavior of the army, and he 
recognized that the reason why he followed orders even when he disagreed was because 
being a soldier was for him the only way to gain socioeconomic stability. If he does not 
follow orders, he has too much to lose. Nevertheless, in private he questions the 
communal narratives within the army against the left-wing. Furthermore, because of his 
personal background, he develops empathy toward the rebels and reflects critically on 
the in-group misdeeds. This allowed him to established an independent point of view of 
the conflict.  
 
What happens is that unfortunately the Colombian soldier has to abide by what the 
commanders say (...). The army cannot do politics, and it is true, the army cannot do 
politics. But the highest ranks yes, the generals, those who have the power to take 
decision to do things. They allow themselves to be monopolized by politicians. 
(Participant 28) 
Interviewer: How do you feel about it?  
 
One as a soldier, in my case, even if one did not agree with the orders they give us, what 
else I can do? Well, it’s your job, and you need to follow the orders (...) But, for me this 
war is absurd, absurd in what sense, in that we, the soldiers and the rebels are there [on 
the battlefield] because we had needs, needs that the state has not been able to supply in 
certain parts of the country, in certain regions.  I speak for myself, as a soldier, I am in 
the army because suddenly I did not find another job option, in my case with little study, 
few job options, let’s go to the army. (...) We have to make a reconciliation within the 
country, reconcile ourselves, what does it mean? If the insurgent thinks one thing, why 
are we going to kill him just because he thinks differently than we do? (...) Let’s look for 
reconciliation, let’s not look for the rebel just because he is a rebel or a paramilitary just 
because is a paramilitary, but rather, that is, the government supports the most vulnerable 
people and helps people to reconcile and they will see that by confronting ideas the 







Future studies should consider those factors to contextualize why some soldiers 
will develop more predisposition to have certain kind of ideology cognitive mechanisms 
for explaining the transformation of ideologies into behaviors. 
Table 21 Ideology Cognitive Mechanisms Interview Findings  
Ideology cognitive mechanisms Total Frequency (N) 
 Adoption Commitment  
14 10  
Internalization (Adoption + Commitment) 24 
Conformity  Instrumentalization   
20 6  
Structural (Conformity + Instrumentalization) 26 
  Total N: 28 Interviews  
 
After multiple rounds of codification, conformity was the most prominent 
cognitive mechanism for Colombian soldiers, followed by adoption, commitment and 
instrumentalization (see appendix 22 for some illustrative extracts of each type of 
cognitive mechanisms). The results presented in Table 19 suggest that Colombian 
soldiers have a tendency towards structural mechanisms. Some of the soldiers that I 
interviewed, especially front-line soldiers and middle ranks with extensive experience in 
the battlefield and working in remote areas, were trapped within institutional ideological 
expectations. Some of them showed signs of critical thinking, demonstrating that not all 
soldiers develop strong convictions about who are the enemies and threats. Therefore, 
the behavior among soldiers could be an interception of institutional expectations, group 
pressure and practical encounter experiences of soldiers with civilians. 
The social categorization between left and right was sometimes questioned when 
they connected their personal experiences with the perspective or narratives of the out-
group (leftists). Nevertheless, this happens in private, like a secret for themselves. Some 
of them were afraid to be related with the enemies or labeled as traitors. Others 
contradicted themselves as soon as they realized that their thoughts can be considered 
“subversive” for the collective narrative of the army. As a result, soldiers develop 
strategies of self-regulation and self-sanction toward their own ideas and beliefs to keep 





strategies were related to the feeling that if they refuse to follow orders or if they express 
their genuine opinion, they will lose their jobs. Therefore, in some of the conversations, 
I felt their arguments were surrounded by frustration and vulnerability.  
Certain soldiers refer to the army as a “father” because it provides for them. After 
my experience working with the army, I realized that those terms are deliberately created 
to keep group cohesion and esprit de corps94 that guarantee the training of subordinate 
attitudes within army members. As mentioned in chapter 5, the army is a way for many 
young males and families in the countryside to achieve social mobility.  For that reason, 
economic dependency was an important part of the soldiers’ motivations behind the 
ideological conformity. The soldiers felt they should be grateful for the army.  
In the conservative view of a Christian relation between fathers and siblings, a 
good sibling is one who obeys and respects the father. There is an image of authority-
figures as faultless: questioning the authorities is not allowed, and can be considered a 
disrespectful action. Also, the idea of the army as a father accorded with soldiers’ values 
related to the Catholic principles of having a thankful heart and a submissive spirit. The 
influence of Catholicism is not just part of the history of the army, but also part of the 
legacies of colonization in Colombian society, which created a cult of submission toward 
the authorities, and these attitudes are amplified when there is a relation of financial 
dependency. In Colombia there is a slang expression, no patear la lonchera (“don’t kick 
the lunchbox”)95 that refers to the idea that people must not criticise the institutions that 
they are members of because they provide the money for living. So, the best you can do 
is remain in silence, do your job and follow the rules without question.  In sum, the 
intersectionality of structural mechanisms between religion, and the hierarchical 
structure of the army, create a social environment that amplifies, especially for front-line 
soldiers and low middle ranks that usually come from rural areas and poor socioeconomic 
backgrounds, the ideology cognitive mechanism of conformity.  
While the classification of ideology cognitive mechanisms was useful in 
providing a broad perspective of the patterns within the soldiers’ narratives, there was an 
inevitable dynamic interaction between them. For instance, adoption and commitment 
were sometimes interconnected. Some soldiers’ narratives revealed a genuine belief that 
indicated that as part of being soldiers there is an incorporation of a collective narrative 
 
94 See more in Manning (1991) and Murphy and Farley (2000). 





that delineated that the in-group identity should be right-wing and the “enemy” as the 
out-group is inevitably “left-wing”. Therefore, when I asked the soldiers why people 
believe that the army is right-wing, they usually answered something like: “It’s more like 
tradition, but it’s also because ... it’s the truth” (participant #3).  There was a dynamic 
relation between the adoption of the ideological identity of the army as an organization 
that soldiers feel genuinely attached to, and individual commitment through the 
expression of a stable relation with collective ideas, as if it is a personal decision and the 
only legitimate frame within which to act. 
Another common interrelation between cognitive mechanisms was between 
adoption and conformity. The relation of these mechanisms indicated that peer pressure, 
the authorities’ opinion, and the social environment can reinforce the process of adopting 
the ideological identity of the army. Consequently, the soldiers follow and conform to 
the collective ideological expectation because they feel powerless. They believe that as 
members of the army they cannot behave or express opinions that contradict those 
collective ideas. However, as I discussed above, in private the dynamic can be different, 
which makes us think that they develop a weaker ideological loyalty. I illustrate this 
dynamic with my conversation with Participant 1.  
 
Interviewer: Let’s say that in a hypothetical world the army has the right to vote, do you 
think that soldiers would vote for a left-wing or a right-wing candidate? 
 





Well, it’s always been that mentality we've had, right? The right-wing has been the 
savior, and the left-wing has caused more problems or more failures, yes? 
(Participant 1) 
 
Later, when I asked him how he imagined the peace in Colombia. He answered:  
 
I would say that the left-wing and the right-wing would bring us to peace, if they were 
one, have only one thought. They should not think about destroying each other because 





right-wing have their ideologies and, as long as they do not speak the same language, 
inconveniences and problems will persist. Because you see today what one sees between 
the left and the right is that some save one and the others save others, but one sees that 
few people are saved, and that’s how they are forgetting the people, yes? So the logical 
thing would be for them to speak a single language for the good of the Colombian people. 
(Participant 1) 
 
Finally, the soldiers who show instrumentalization as an ideological cognitive 
mechanism were those who I considered to be following a script when talking with me. 
In other words, I had the impression that they told me what they thought I wanted to hear. 
This mechanism was particularly difficult to identify because it demands a deep 
reflection of the interview as a whole, analyzing the arguments, the consistency and logic 
between them, as well as the way that the person frames and presents their ideas. The 
narratives that I usually associated with instrumentalization were those that dismantle the 
paradoxes of the professionalism understood as the political neutrality of the soldiers. 
Most of them frame themselves and the institution as apolitical, and they reinforced this 
idea with the argument that they cannot vote. Others mentioned that soldiers were very 
obedient of civilians’ orders. Therefore, in the mind of the soldiers, the Colombian Army 
is very professional. However, there is a coexistence of narratives between the self-image 
of the army as neutral and the narratives that relate the identity of threats with the left-
wing, or the in-group identity with the right-wing, which raises questions about the notion 
of the military apolitical ethos: 
 
Interviewer: Why do you think that people believe that the army is close to the right-
wing? 
In general, the military doctrines of right-wing or left-wing are the same. They are made 
to repress outbreaks that are against the status quo and what the State determines (...) The 
army (in Colombia) is neither of center, or right-wing nor from the left-wing, in real 
terms, but in conceptual terms, yes. It is part of a repressive apparatus that the state has. 
(Participant 6) 
9.9 Summary 
In this section of the chapter, I explained  the question of how soldiers transform 
ideology into behaviors. To answer this question, I used the theoretical framework 





cognitive mechanisms that help us to explain how soldiers transform ideas into behaviors. 
The results suggested that most Colombian soldiers conform to the armed group 
ideology. Therefore, their behavior is a reflection of the collective ideology. However, 
some of them develop a private critical view of the collective narrative in the army, which 
suggests a weak loyalty and less sincere personal preferences. Moreover, emerging 
factors suggest that behind the soldiers’ conformity there are socioeconomic factors and 
religious beliefs that contribute to explaining why soldiers tend to go along with the 
collective expectations. 
The narratives also suggest a dynamic relation between the cognitive 
mechanisms. It was not possible, at least empirically, to completely isolate them. As I 
presented in the results, some soldiers’ narratives showed a dynamic between adoption 
and commitment, both of which are part of the causal path of internalization. This finding 
indicated that soldiers shape their emotions, ideas belief and values around the 
collectives’ frames, which then influences their decision-making and behaviors. The 
other dynamic was between adoption and conformity. This relation proposes that some 
cognitive mechanisms from internalized and structural causal paths might interact with 
and reinforce each other. In the case of adoption and conformity, the soldiers adopt the 
ideology of the group because they feel committed to the group, or their roles within the 
group. But, at the same time, they can also feel pressure from the social environment of 
their peers or authorities. Then, even if social expectations reduce the genuine or personal 
power of their personal preferences, group ideology will influence their individual 
behavior. In practice, it is difficult to draw a line dividing both causal paths, but the 
evidence indicates that soldiers can use a little of both the internalized cognitive 
mechanism and, the ideological cognitive mechanism structures. In the next section of 
the chapter, I introduce some of the conclusions from both qualitative chapters and their 
contribution to the understanding of the quantitative results. 
9.10 Conclusions 
 There are some key qualitative findings from chapters 8 and 9 that enrich, and to 
some extent also challenged, the explanation of the quantitative findings presented in this 
study. First, some narratives confirm that negative emotions and threat perception play 
an important role in soldiers’ understanding of the left ideology label. This finding 
confirms what was suggested by Nussio (2017) about the role of group-based emotions 





literature on intergroup conflict proposed and as the quantitative results of this study 
suggest, at the individual level, emotions work as a psychological mechanism that 
exposes how even after successful conflict resolution mechanisms, such as a peace 
agreement, intergroup relations remain damaged (Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2016; Halperin, 
2011; Halperin et al., 2011). As a consequence, through emotions it is possible to 
comprehend the persistence of the identity division between formers adversaries 
(Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011).  Soldiers’ narratives reveal the persistence of a monolithic 
view of the adversary that contributes to the delegitimization of the out-group (leftists) 
and the justification of violence toward them. Moreover, because of the persistence of 
those psychological barriers, soldiers are less willing to protect those whom they 
associate with the identity of the out-group (leftists).  
Second, the persistence of the categorization of “us” and “them” creates a fragile 
environment for sustainable peace. The negative social categorization of the left-wing 
revealed ideological bias among soldiers and the ideological identity of those who are 
more vulnerable after the peace agreement. These findings are crucial, because part of 
the guarantee of the successful peace agreement is the effectiveness of the political 
reintegration of former combatants. Additionally, the security of all social groups is vital 
to prevent cycles of violence. However, if those with the responsibility to protect and 
create a safe environment have negative emotions and remain a threat perception for 
certain groups of civilians because of their ideological identity, the cycles of violence 
will persist with the complicity of the state security providers. 
 Importantly, the findings suggest that under certain conditions soldiers were able 
to develop in-group critical evaluation, acknowledge harm that their in-group had 
inflicted on others, and in some cases, show empathy toward civilians who can be 
considered a threat according to the collective in-group narratives. Those who were able 
to challenge the collective narratives and question the status quo were soldiers who adopt 
the in-group ideology and demonstrated a weak loyalty toward the in-group system of 
values and beliefs. However, some of them were afraid to be linked with the enemies or 
be labeled as traitors. Therefore, the critical mindset toward the in-group is to remain in 
silence because their thoughts can be considered “subversive” for the collective narrative 
of the army. Soldiers thus develop strategies of self-regulation and self-sanction 
regarding their own ideas and beliefs to maintain their loyalty toward the collective 
ideology expectation within the army. Some of the motives behind those strategies derive 





opinion, they will lose their jobs. Those findings present an opportunity for future studies 
that attempt to develop interventions intended to modify the image of the enemy held by 
combatants during transitions.   
Note of the of the author: 
After I finished this section of my thesis, I saw an interesting debate 
between two peace scholars. Svensson (2020) wrote a letter to the 
editors of a journal regarding the article “Emancipation and Critique 
in Peace and Conflict Research” by K. Krause (2019). The debate 
disclosed the tension that exists among peace scholars that identified 
themselves as empirical researchers and those that label themselves as 
critical researchers. I have certainly come to the end of my thesis and 
this discussion can be a thesis in itself. For that reason, I want to 
address some impressions regarding the debate between these 
scholars located in the global north. On the one hand, Svensson (2020) 
argues that peace research is not the continuation of peace activism by 
other means (p. 3). In his argument he suggested that activism within 
academia means “claim[ing] the moral high ground”, which implies 
rejecting the empirical scrutiny of ideas. Then, to establish a 
“convenient distance” necessary to avoid the “risk of research to be 
too consumed by the present-day crisis” (p. 3), it is vital to develop a 
reliable approach, which is not possible under activist lenses. This 
argument confirms that no matter how rigorous I consider my work is, 
it will always be viewed with suspicion. First, as a local researcher 
from a conflict context, the present-day crisis and development are 
constant in our environment. Second, the topics that researchers such 
as myself study are personal, and the drive behind our study is 
embedded in our own history and personal motivation to understand 
and eventually change the status quo in our societies with our 
research. For that reason, when we read, collect data or analyze our 
findings, we sometimes need to put them aside to be able to breathe. 
The difference between a local researcher and a researcher from 
outside is that outsiders don´t necessarily feel the impact of the conflict 
in their own souls. According to Svensson (2020), this will be an 
obstacle in engaging with long-term scholarly discussion. Also, this 
attachment can affect the quality of my academic performance or the 
validity of my research. On the other hand, I agree with Svensson 
(2020) that we should avoid mere performative and programmatic 
discussion and advocate for more data, empirical evidence and 
theories. I personally have an ambivalent view of arguments that 
condemn civilian violence advocating for non-violent resistance using 
moral superiority arguments. Furthermore, I often see how critical 
scholars are incapable to contextualize themselves which derive from 
being located in a “privileged vantage-point” (Holden, 2002, p. 255). 
I consider that trying to understand violence, explain it and identify 





identify useful strategies based on evidence on how to eradicate its 
causes. Then, I believe that it is necessary to conduct more empirical 
studies that help us to see patterns between different cases and 
suggested causal inferences (for example see Shuman, Saguy, van 
Zomeren, & Halperin, 2020). However, I also consider equally 
important and valid those studies that are based on more 
ethnographic, idiographic, feminist, genealogical, postcolonial, 
constructivist approaches (K. Krause, 2020, p. 1). My personal 
preferences for statistics doesn’t necessarily imply that I am opposed 
to those approaches. In fact, the best critics of my research usually 
come from scholars in these areas, and I always enjoy my encounters 
with them because they enrich my own ideas and methodological 
preferences. For instance, I recognize that thanks to those approaches, 
I am aware of the limitations of my research and I can acknowledge 
my own biases, which I consider makes my methodological approach 
more transparent. I have the impression that there are many prejudices 
behind the arguments of both sides of this debate, and we risk missing 
a huge opportunity to learn from each other without invalidating 






10 Discussion and Conclusion  
This thesis set out to explore the effect of ideology on soldiers’ willingness to 
protect civilians and their disposition to be aggressive toward them, after a peace 
agreement was signed. The overall aim of the study has been to provide empirical and 
theoretical knowledge of how ideology shapes the attitudes and behaviors of soldiers 
toward civilians during and after internal conflicts. The theoretical and empirical insights 
of this study are mainly derived from research conducted on the social-psychological 
infrastructure of intractable conflicts, and the role of ideology and identities in armed 
conflict. 
This chapter begins by presenting the main conclusions of this research. I then 
discuss the implications of this study, and propose some guidelines and new approaches 
for future research. I reflect on the value of studying war mentalities embedded in deeply 
divided societies, and the image of the enemy held by combatants of state forces, who 
have experience in an irregular war in a society that is attempting to proceed from war to 
peace. Lastly, I introduce some practical implications for the situation in Colombia and 
other cases. 
10.1 Main Conclusions 
This study began by identifying the gap in the literature about the role of state  
armed actors, particularly that of soldiers, to ongoing insecurity and political violence in 
post-conflict contexts. It was suggested that the common view favored by the state on 
post-conflict scenarios ignores the fact that in civil wars, state forces were actively 
involved in the conflict. State security forces have been deliberately trained for the 
protection of a group of civilians, commonly through the repression of other groups. In 
other words, in civil wars, state forces have perceived some groups of civilians within 
the state as suspected communists, and some civilians are targeted as collaborators of the 
internal enemies. The state-centric approach thus ignores that “those who provide 
security also have the capacity to threaten those they allegedly should be protecting” 
(Andersen, 2011, p. 11). 
Despite case studies on civil wars – mainly qualitative and focusing on the 
institutional level, state violence, and security sector reform (SSR), that reveal state bias 
toward civilians because of their group membership – the literature on post-conflict 





overestimates the capacity of the state to change, but also reinforces the notion that 
internal violence is explained by deficits in state capacity. The assumption is that 
modifying laws, norms and institutional designs will be sufficient to guarantee the 
transformation of the behaviors of individuals who are members of the state forces. 
However, the literature review of this study showed that even after institutional reforms, 
state forces continued to be instruments of state repression toward civilians. The 
approach of state capacity ignores the fact that if institutional changes are to be effective, 
changes in the perceptions of the individuals who are also part of those institutions are 
also necessary. This requires addressing identities, and the incorporation of a new system 
of values and beliefs. However, guaranteeing that institutions change, and transforming 
identities, ideologies, attitudes and the intentional behaviors within the police or the army 
after the conflicts ends, is a subject that remains mostly under-explored. 
The present research has investigated the role of ideology on the identity of the 
enemy held by combatants of the state, while taking into account psychological barriers 
to explain how combatants may continue to uphold the legacies of the conflict and 
contribute to ongoing violence after formal agreements, because the identity-based 
cleavages –in the case of Colombia, the left-right cleavage– during the conflict continue 
to shape the definition of who the enemies and threats are. 
In this study, I unpack ideological identity bias among soldiers, detecting: (1) 
against whom is violence justified; (2) and who deserves or does not deserve to be 
protected in the minds of state soldiers after a peace agreement is signed. This research 
partly fills this omission in the literature. 
The investigation was conducted with an experimental survey and semi-
structured interviews among Colombian soldiers in the post-peace agreement period. 
This study incorporates a unique sample rarely available in social science. The sample 
included 803 experimental surveys, and 28 semi-structured interviews of middle and 
lower rank soldiers with an average of 10-15 years of experience. This research has 
attempted to go beyond institutional, top-down approaches, considering a micro-level of 
analysis to study social-psychological variables of individuals who are members of state 
security sector institutions involved in internal conflicts.  
This thesis makes a contribution to the study of post-conflict violence by 
demonstrating, theoretically and empirically, that state forces may contribute to a 
permissive environment for violence toward civilians – particularly those that share the 





social identity theory of H Tajfel and Turner (1986) as a framework by which to examine 
soldiers’ bias toward civilians. 
 The main experiment (Experiment 1) incorporates the interaction of two 
independent variables to form a nuanced comprehension of soldiers’ bias toward 
civilians. This allowed me to distinguish the drivers of each soldier’s bias towards the 
civilians’ group identity and the civilians’ opinion of a crucial point of the peace agenda: 
the political reintegration of the rebels. The findings reveal that soldiers are more willing 
to be aggressive toward civilians that oppose the political reintegration of the rebels, only 
if they share the ideological identity group of the rebels. Further, the findings indicated 
that soldiers are more willing to protect civilians if they oppose the political reintegration, 
but only if they share the soldier’s in-group identity. These results suggest that the main 
way soldiers contribute to ongoing violence is by failing to protect, rather than being 
themselves actively supportive of violence.  
Additionally, the findings suggest that soldiers can stop justifying violence 
against those that can be associated with the identity of their former enemies, but that 
doesn’t mean that they will be willing to protect them. The incorporation of the role of 
intergroup emotions and out-group threat perception following studies from the social-
psychological infrastructure of intractable conflicts contributes another layer in the study, 
nuancing the effect of ideological bias on soldiers toward civilians. 
 The results indicate that soldiers have strong negative emotions toward civilians 
that share the group identity of the rebels and support the political reintegration. 
Similarly, soldiers considered as threats those civilians that shared the group identity of 
the rebels and support the political reintegration. Further, the understanding of the 
ideological bias of soldiers became more refined when emotions and out-group threat 
perception act as mediators, indicating some causal mechanisms. The results from the 
path models seem to indicate that when emotions and out-threat perception take place as 
mediators, the ideological bias of soldiers becomes more transparent and noticeably 
affects soldiers’ behavioral intentions. For instance, soldiers increase their aggressive 
disposition only if the civilian has the same ideological-identity group of the ex-rebels, 
and support the political reintegration when negative emotions mediate the relationship 
between the variables.  
 This particular result reveals that only when negative emotions take place, are 
soldiers more likely to justify violence toward those civilians that share the identity of 





emotions do not apply, soldiers decrease their aggressive disposition toward civilians 
who share the identity of the out-group and oppose the political reintegration of the 
rebels. Regarding soldiers’ willingness to protect, in the mediation models, when 
negative emotions are in place, soldiers decreases their levels of willingness to protect 
civilians only if they share the identity group of the rebels.  Additionally, when out-group 
threat perception was involved, soldiers’ aggressive disposition increases only toward 
civilians with the same ideological-identity as the ex-rebels. These findings confirm what 
other studies have suggested regarding the effects of war on the rejection of the political 
identity represented by armed groups, and the role of emotions, threat perception and 
exclusionist political attitudes (Balcells, 2012, 2017; Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2016; Daphna 
et al., 2008). 
 Furthermore, the findings of this thesis support studies that have been 
challenging the literature which argues that there are fundamental differences between 
ethnic and no-ethnic wars; instead it suggests that ideological identities indicate similar 
dynamics of targeting to those in ethnic civil wars (Balcells, 2010, 2012, 2017; Balcells 
& Steele, 2016). For that reason, I analyzed the role of identities in the configuration of 
the enemy image held by combatants in a civil war with ideology cleavages (Castano, 
2008; Castano et al., 2008; Castano et al., 2019) 
 Some of the quantitative findings were confirmed and unpacked in the qualitative 
analysis. However, in the interviews, it was evident that despite the concept of a 
homogenous army whose members all share the same opinion and attitudes, there are 
some soldiers who develop a critical mindset toward their own institution, and 
colleagues96. However, most of them do not have real institutional power and prefer to 
remain silent. Further, the dynamics between soldiers discloses mechanisms of regulation 
and suppression, such as social stigmatization of those who express criticism. 
 A Colombian colleague who is doing his PhD about the Colombian Army  from 
an anthropological perspective suggested that the Cold War mentality seems more 
powerfully entrenched than ever in the upper echelons of the military (Gonzáles, 2020). 
However, my quantitative findings suggested that the political identity of the enemy 
formed during the Cold War also persisted within the middle and lower ranks. More 
studies are needed to explore the differences among soldiers from different ranks, and to 
what extent ideology influences their attitudes and behaviors toward civilians.   
 





Another important conclusion from this research concerns the way the conflict in 
Colombia related to the war on drugs policies and its impact on civilian-military relations. 
The results from the trolley dilemma experiment (Experiment 2) and the qualitative 
interviews indicated that Colombian soldiers may be less willing to make costly sacrifices 
to protect civilians who are against the hardline measures to eradicate illegal crops. 
Likewise, the print effect of Experiment 1 on Experiment 2 suggested that the war on 
drugs can reinforce the enemy image that the combatants already have against civilians 
with left-wing political identity who supported the political reintegration of the rebels. 
However, the qualitative analysis showed that some soldiers are caught in personal and 
professional dilemmas when they need to confront civilians who have coca crops. In the 
qualitative findings, it was possible to observe a critical mindset toward the government’s 
decisions regarding the war on drugs. Some soldiers revealed concerns about the forced 
eradication strategies, expressing that their actions could exacerbate tensions between 
civilians and the state security forces in rural and marginalized areas, where there is 
already a lack of trust toward the security forces (Matanock & García-Sánchez, 2018). 
More research is needed to study the effects of the war on drugs on building the image 
of the enemy in the minds of state armed actors, and how it may influence soldiers’ 
disposition to use violence or refuse protection to civilians because of their group 
membership and policy preferences.  
Lastly, this study introduced a unique data set that contributes to the psychology 
of the transformation of the security sector in post-conflict scenarios. The results of this 
investigation offered a new perspective on the reform of state forces in post-conflict 
scenarios, highlighting the importance of interventions meant at transforming and 
deconstructing the identity-image of the enemy held by combatants in transitional times, 
which entails a consideration of studying how social identities and group memberships 
shape and guide combatants’ behaviors during and after the conflict.  
10.1.1 Contribution to the Study of Ideology and Armed Groups  
This study contributes to the literature on the effects of ideology on different 
forms of armed conflicts. As Leader Maynard (2019), J. E. Ugarriza and Craig (2013) 
and Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood (2014), among others, argue, ideology has a mutually 
constitutive relationship with the phenomenon of identities, which means that conflicts 





cases, conflicts are embedded within specific ideological narratives, and at the same time, 
ideologies may establish or constitute conflicting identities (Leader Maynard, 2019, p. 4) 
or wartime cleavages.  
 This research supports what has been suggested mainly for non-state armed 
actors in the Colombian conflict (see Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2014; Gutiérrez-Sanín & 
Wood, 2017; Steele, 2011; Steele, 2017a; J. E. Ugarriza & Craig, 2013; J. E. Ugarriza & 
Weintraub, 2015), but this time for the army. Ideology allows soldiers to distinguish 
groups and civilians because of their group membership.  Indeed, this study demonstrated 
that in Colombia the cleavage is political, showing variation in how the military is willing 
to treat civilians according to their identity group. Hence, the results suggested that 
soldiers continue to carry the legacies of the political cleavage of the conflict, even after 
the peace agreement is signed. This corroborates what has already been suggested, 
namely, that even after successful conflict resolution strategies, such as a peace 
agreement and rebel transformation to a political party, intergroup relations usually 
remain damage and violence can persist (e.g. Bar-Tal, 2011; J. P. Lederach, 1997; 
MacGinty, 2010; Richards & Helander, 2005). This finding contributes to revealing the 
identity of those groups who are more vulnerable after peace agreements are signed. In 
post-conflict scenarios or transitional periods, the deconstruction of the enemy identity 
held by individuals trained in the use of violence within the state may need to be explored 
through the literature on the social psychology of intractable conflicts, in order to 
understand the psychological changes that are necessary to reestablish sustainable and 
peaceful relationships between the state, former rebels and civilians.  
Furthermore, in the literature review of this study (chapter 2), it was shown that 
ideology helps armed groups to shape repertories of violence and identify targets. Further 
studies are needed at the individual level to explore how ideology is translated into 
attitudes and behavior, and how to address ideological changes for behavior 
modification. These studies would be important for state forces training during conflicts, 
and which remain active with the right to inflict violence and provide protection after the 
conflict ends. 
This research advocates a multidisciplinary approach to studying the process of 
group identification in combatants,  and the configuration of enemy identities. This study 
reveals that soldiers continue to carry those identity-based grievances of the conflict to 
define who their enemies and threats are, which confirm previous studies showing that 





2018). Studies suggest that part of the implication of having a strong identity 
identification is that it exacerbates negative intergroup emotions toward the adversary, 
and makes much more rigid monolithic views about the out-group as bad, inferior, and 
less moral, making stronger the perceptions of the out-group as a threat (Castano & 
Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2016) Moreover, it increases in-group 
favoritism, and a tendency to minimize in-group responsibilities, and moral 
disengagement (Castano et al., 2008). However, the thesis also suggests that those 
ideological bias against the left-wing civilians are not necessarily deeply internalized in 
all soldiers. Thus, there is a potential variation of degrees in the ideological convictions 
among them which suggest that not all soldiers behave from a sincere conviction but as 
a consequence of social norms or institutional expectations. These results show the 
importance of continuing research in military contexts at the individual level. The 
evidence indicates that psychological effects among the military may be slightly different 
from effects on civilian. The focus on discipline, group cohesion and members perceiving 
their own behavior as a moral duty protected by the law may also exacerbate the in-group 
glorification. These research efforts are crucial for countries attempting to move from 
war to peace, and using their state forces to protect their former enemies and civilians of 
all backgrounds. 
10.1.2 Contribution to the social psychology of security sector reform  
This study contributes new empirical and theoretical knowledge to the social 
psychology of security sector reform by advancing our understanding of how ideology 
affects the attitudes and intentional behaviors of soldiers, embedded in deeply divided 
societies, toward civilians after peace agreements. The individual level of analysis and 
the socio-psychological study among state combatants who are attempting to transition 
from internal conflict to peace has been little studied. One of the main contributions of 
this study is thus its presentation of the first broad examination (to my knowledge) of 
how combatants from the state forces who remain active after the internal conflict may 
contribute to the persistence of violence, because of their rejection of the identity 
represented by the armed groups. We observed that the soldier’s willingness to protect 
and their disposition of aggression toward civilians reflects the rejection of the identity 
of former enemies which operates across the wartimes cleavage of the Colombian 





reintegration of the rebels. Such knowledge is critical, since state forces are the ones with 
the responsibility to guarantee the safety of the former rebels, their followers, and 
civilians of all backgrounds after the conflict ends. The empirical evidence of this study 
indicates that without addressing the past history of identity division and identity-based 
grievances among the state forces, violence can persist with the complicity of the state.  
O'Rawe (2010) argues that security sector reforms can add value only to the extent 
that they provide an entry point to address deeply felt, often identity-based grievances (p. 
87). Further, it will only be possible to contribute within an environment where all people 
of differing beliefs, and views feel respected, safe, and secure; when the security system 
reforms transcend institutional makeup, to effectively change mentalities and behaviors 
within it.  
Following this idea, this study draws attention to the effects that the concept of 
“legality” has on the state forces’ self-perception and their role during the conflict. The 
findings of this study suggested that this amplified the “we-versus-them” logic, the sense 
of rightness, moral superiority, and in-group favoritism among individual soldiers, which 
implies that individuals are less likely to have critical views about their wrongs and 
engage in moral disengagement strategies. The status of being the only ones with the 
right to exercise legitimate use of physical force during and after the conflict then creates 
in soldiers the perception of being simultaneously within and beyond the law, which is 
very common among the military (e.g. Schirmer, 1998a, pp. 138,139).  
Indeed, interview findings reveal that the moral license that legality provides to 
state soldiers reinforced a closed-minded, biased, selective and distorted processing of 
information about the conflict which preserves and reinforces the identity-enemy image 
they hold. Furthermore, the status of legality exacerbates the in-group favoritism that it 
is already prominent among combatants. The literature suggested that when individuals 
with strong group identification receive negative information about the in-group, they are 
more likely to deny or justify their in-group wrong actions and express less empathy for 
the suffering of others – which my qualitative data confirms (Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, 
2008; Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000). These findings are important 
because they help explain why members of the state security forces are more likely to 
generate major psychological barriers to establishing intergroup reconciliation, thereby 
strengthening the justification of the use of violence and developing  a lack of willingness 
to protect former enemies and civilians who may have associated with the ideology of 





accountability for the human rights violations committed by the state security forces, and 
at the same time, requires addressing the past history of identity division to disclose the 
identity of the state targets of abuses of force during the conflict.  
 
10.2 Implications of the research design  
The design of this study has some implications for the reliability of the causal 
inferences and the generalizability of the findings. Some of the limitations have been 
mentioned in Chapter 5. Some implications, however, deserve supplementary attention 
for a complete evaluation of the applicability and robustness of the study results and 
contribution. First, two contextual conditions that relate to possible generalization 
deserve further mention. The first is the generalizability of the study results to soldiers 
of other countries. Considering the characteristics of the sample of this study, the results 
are likely transferable to other soldiers involved in internal conflicts. However, 
considering the process of selection, self-selection, training of Colombian soldiers and 
history of the conflict, some of the results are limited to the context of the study. The 
experiences of other soldiers involved in internal conflicts may differ, since the war on 
drugs is not an important factor, or the DDR process is also part of SSR, such as in 
Burundi or Liberia, and other cases where DDR processes implicated the incorporation 
of non-state armies within the state army. Military integration is seen as a technical 
endeavor for ethnic integration within state institutions via quotas or affirmative action, 
processes that seek to remove ethnic divisions from public consciousness. However, the 
empirical evidence suggested that this strategy is not always successful. For instance, the 
results of lab-in-the-field experiments implemented by Liberian National Police officers 
indicated that teams with minority police officers show more rather than less 
discriminatory attitudes towards minority civilians (Blair et al., 2016).  
In that manner, the Colombian case is an unusual post-conflict case. First, the 
peace process was very much driven by the Colombian government and there was little 
institutional reforms of the central state. As a consequence, as mentioned in chapter 4, 
the Colombian government refuses to include reforms of the security sector, despite the 
FARC request during the negotiations. Moreover, the head of the military forces during the 
peace negotiations, General Mejia, declared that any reform will be addressed by the military, 





For that reason, more research will be necessary to reach any firm conclusions 
about the impact of the ideological identity division on soldiers’ attitudes toward civilians 
after formal agreements, considering different models of DDR and SSR processes. Such 
future research would be highly relevant, since peacebuilding remains largely state-
centric, and the contribution of the state to ongoing violence has received little attention 
in research on the legacies of conflict. Another scenario worth further study on state bias 
against civilians is the issue of peacekeepers’ presence. As mentioned in chapter 2, the 
study conducted by Fjelde et al. (2018) indicated that peacekeepers can increase the 
political and military cost of targeting civilians only if the violence arises from the rebel 
groups. But if the violence comes from the state, peacekeepers are limited in protecting 
the civilians that the state targets. An unintended consequence of peacekeepers’ presence 
is that they may end up reinforcing and enhancing the state capacity of violence against 
civilians and their lack of willingness to protect civilians because of their identity-group. 
A second condition concerns the nature of the cleavage in a society. In Colombia, 
the cleavage is ideological-political, with a strong influence from the previous Cold War 
mentality, that encouraged the internal enemy logic and defined the political order as the 
elimination of domestic threats (Davenport, 2007a, 2007b). However, in other contexts, 
the cleavage or identity-based grievance can be ethnic, religious or racial. Future research 
should consider these contextual factors in order to replicate a similar research design. 
Another potential limitation of this study is the timing of data collection. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, the survey was conducted two years after the signing of the 
peace agreement with the FARC. Despite the successful transition from an armed group 
to a political party, dissidents of this organization persist, as does the conflict against the 
still active left-wing guerrilla group, The National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN). 
These conditions make it harder to change the enemy image held by soldiers and its 
association with the left-wing. For that reason, future research should consider more 
settled post-peace agreement contexts to ascertain whether the identity-ideological 
division of the conflict continues to shape state forces’ attitudes and behaviors toward 
civilians.  
A fourth point of concern is the sample’s characteristics. This study focused on 
army soldiers. However, it would be interesting to study other armed forces such as the 
navy or air force to see if similar patterns exist. Further studies could also consider if 
members of the police develop similar ideological bias toward civilians. In a civil war, 





approach to police training may also impact the attitudes and behavior of the police. 
Future studies can explore the approaches adopted in this study to the police. 
Another limitation is that this study did not provide completely satisfactory 
theoretical and empirical fine‐grained, mechanism‐based explanations, in spite of path 
analysis that indicated the mediating role of emotions and out-group threat perception on 
soldiers’ behavior intentions toward civilians (willingness to protect and aggressive 
disposition). Future studies can further explore differences among soldiers regarding 
their exposure to violence or out-group victimization (for example see Halperin et al., 
2009). For instance, it is reasonable to expect that negative emotions will be enhanced 
among those soldiers with a history of exposure to leftist violence. Further, future studies 
could investigate which type of threat is the more important mechanism, following the 
dimensions of threat on the Multidimensional Existential Threat Model (MET)  (e.g., 
personal death threat vs physical collective threat or symbolic collective threat). Similar 
possibilities can be explored regarding emotions, identifying which ones are the most 
important mediators for soldiers’ willingness to protect or be aggressive toward civilians. 
Such analysis may provide a more nuanced and comprehensive model (for instance, see 
Daphna et al., 2008) 
A final limitation of this study is that I did not consider the government elites’ 
influence on the behavior of the security forces. Studies like that of Kleinfeld and Barham 
(2018) suggest that economic and political elites politicized the security forces to 
maintain their power and privilege. Future studies could investigate to what extent the 
perpetuation of violence in post-conflict scenarios and the contribution of the state forces 
is a reflection of elites’ strategies to continue marginalizing political opponents (see also,  
Kleinfeld & Barham, 2018; Steele & Schubiger, 2018).  
10.2.1 Implications of the research to the field of peace and conflict studies  
This thesis provides the theoretical and empirical foundation for a new framework 
for studying individuals trained in the use of force: war mentality, especially, but not 
exclusively in the context of internal conflict and deeply divided societies. This concept 
contributes to the field of peace and conflict studies in three main ways. First, it advocates 
for studying the security sector beyond the organizational level of analysis to think about 
its transformation in post-conflict or post-peace agreements scenarios looking into the 





after peace agreement are signed implies the possibility to think about interventions that 
aim to deconstruct the enemy image held by combatants during the conflict with the goal 
of reconciliation which entails healing relationships between the state and citizens. 
Finally, war mentalities acknowledge the limitations of democratic approaches to 
transforming the security sector. Therefore, it opens a possibility to consider the security 
sector reform using positive peace lenses (Ortiz-Ayala, 2021).  
In general, the study of war mentalities will allow us to understand and answer 
questions about how internal enemies and threats are defined among state security forces, 
and what is the role of ideologies in the formation of the enemy images held by 
individuals training in the use of violence. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the role of identity 
in individuals training for the use of violence in internal conflicts is predominantly 
different from that of civilians. There are certain contextual and psychological factors 
that influence the way that soldiers internalize ideological identities. On the one hand, 
military socialization provides an environment that amplifies in-group identification. The 
literature from military studies reveals that peer and organizational bonding is crucial to 
guarantee the in-group cohesion that is necessary to develop satisfactory performance in 
terms of military capacity. On the other hand, besides collective coordination and 
discipline, combatants require individual emotional and cognitive adjustments to be 
capable of killing the enemy and be effective in battle without any remorse or doubts.  
Baggaley et al. (2019), Castano et al. (2008), and Castano (2008), among others, 
argue that in-group identification facilitates dehumanization of the victims, and the moral 
disengagement strategies that are necessary to kill. Commonly, the moral code behind 
the justification for killing in war responds to the in-group’s self-interest, helping the 
combatants to legitimize their actions (Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Roccas et al., 2006). 
Combatants tend to believe that they are on the right side which exacerbates the in-group 
identification in a military context, and facilitates moral distance from the enemy. I 
labeled this process the development of war, or warrior, mentality. The in-group 
identification helps the individual training in the use of force to build an enemy image 
under the logic of “us versus them”, allowing the mental disposition that is necessary to 
justify violence against the “other” (out-group), and it explains the lack of willingness to 





As mentioned above, war mentality may not be exclusive to internal conflict or 
deeply divided societies. The phenomenon of ethnic profiling in Europe or the US97 could 
possibly reflect the bias toward civilians in the state forces of those countries. According 
to the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), racial or ethnic 
profiling in policing has been defined as “the use by the police, with no objective and 
reasonable justification, of grounds such as race, colour, languages, religion, nationality 
or national or ethnic origin in control, surveillance or investigation activities”98. Police 
forces may develop bias to label civilians as suspects because of their identity-group 
which could incentivize intergroup conflicts, encourage state repression, and erode the 
relationship between the state and its citizens.  
Recent reports about the Canadian Armed Forced (CAF) reveal increases in white 
supremacist and right-wing (RWE) beliefs in members of the regular and reserve forces. 
These findings create concerns about the potential implication of hateful conduct and 
extremism in individuals trained in the use of violence (see OntarioTech, 2020). 
Similarly, political-ideological bias was disclosed among state forces after the scandal of 
British troops who were firing at an image of a politician from the government opposition 
in 2019 (TheGuardian, 2019). These other contexts can provide different settings for the 
further study of war mentality. Additionally, the concept of war mentalities in a context 
beyond internal conflict could contribute to future exploratory studies of the assumptions 
behind the “apolitical” condition of state security forces, boundaries around the narratives 
of professionalization within the army and the police, and the neutrality of state forces 
toward civilians regarding their willingness to provide protection or justify the use of 
force (see Brooks, 2020).  
10.3 Practical implications of the Colombian case study  
The results of this study are significant for the Colombian post-conflict period if 
the state wants to consolidate its presence and reestablish relations with civilians in those 
territories which were traditionally occupied by the rebel groups, and if it wants to heal 
the relationship with those civilians and groups from the civil society traditionally 
 
97 See more in Guerber (2020). 
98 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), General Policy Recommendation 






stigmatized by the state and who suffered from state repression. Moreover, the new duty 
of the state forces to protect the former rebels and create a safe environment for their 
effective political reintegration, which is crucial for the sustainability of the peace 
agreement, reveals the importance of studying the contribution of the state forces to peace 
or the perpetuation of violence after formal agreements are signed.  
Unfortunately, during and after the peace accord social leaders have been targeted 
and killed, as well as former combatants, indicating that there are groups willing to use 
violence to resist the peace agreement. Despite the fact that Colombia has been 
considered an international exemplary case in terms of counter-insurgency strategy, and 
that the government forces have a significant military advantage over their opponents 
(Beehner & Collins, 2019; Nussio, 2020), violence continues and has increased 
significantly under the new government, particularly in the most militarized areas such 
as Nariño and Cauca. At the time of writing this chapter (August, 2020), a wave of 
massacres is hitting the country. In less than one week this month, more than 35 people 
were murdered (Reuters, 2020; Wola.org, 2020). Illegal groups such as drug traffickers, 
criminal groups, the ELN, ex-paramilitaries and dissidents of the FARC have targeted 
social leaders and intimidated local communities, mainly in those regions located in coca 
producing areas where those groups fight over the power vacuum and territorial control 
of the formerly FARC-dominated areas (Nussio, 2020). The government has responded 
to recurring counterinsurgency strategies by sending troops and police to enhance the 
forced eradication strategies (CrisisGroup, 2019; Triana & Uribe, 2020), which then 
increases the confrontation between civilians and state forces (see more in Observatorio 
de Observatorio de Tierras, 2020).  
The results of this thesis indicate that the way that the current government is using 
the army and the police may affect relations between the security forces and the civilians. 
It can particularly reinforce the wartime cleavages of soldiers, and decrease their lack of 
willingness to protect certain individuals based on their identity group. Also, it may 
undermine the former rebels’ trust in the overall peace process. Further, this can also 
incentivize civilians’ requests for illegal protection as a response to the state’s failure to 
protect them. If the state continues treating communities as internal threats using 
repressive strategies, and uses only security-focused interventions to build legitimacy 
with civilians, it is likely that Colombia will return to new cycles of violence. 
Additionally, this study enlightens some variables that explain why the security sector 





former rebels, social leaders, activists and government critics have not been successful 
in those territories left by the FARC.  
In this study, I focused on the legacies of the war, studying the role of the political 
and ideologically-based grievance of the conflict among soldiers, and its effect on 
soldiers’ behaviors toward civilians. Future research should continue to explore the 
potential contribution of the state, and the political elites with the ongoing violence in the 
country, with special attention to the identity of the current targets of violence, to 
comprehend the causes behind the state’s failure to provide protection.  
Another important implication of this study is how Colombia should address 
security sector reform. As mentioned above, and as I also argue in Ortiz-Ayala (2019), 
the reform of the security sector was one of the largest concessions that the FARC made 
at the negotiation table. The results of this study warn that institutional reforms are 
ineffective if they do not aim to alter the ideologies and belief systems within the security 
forces that help them to define the identity of internal threats. The qualitative and 
quantitative findings indicate the persistence of the enemy image held by combatants in 
association with political-ideological identities. The Colombian state and its security 
forces should consider a resocialization process that attempts to remedy the negative 
stereotype of the political identity of their former enemies during the conflict. Moreover, 
the members of the state forces in Colombia should prevent considering political ideas 
as a sufficient reason to define internal threats, justify violence or fail to provide state 
protection. 
 Additionally, soldiers’ narratives in the qualitative chapters disclosed the 
instrumental use that soldiers made of the law to minimize the state forces’ wrongs during 
the conflict. Lessons from other cases indicate that the lack of accountability of the 
members of the state forces explains the endurance of violence and abuses by the 
members of the state forces, even after reforms have taken place or formal agreements 
signed (Kurtenbach, 2019; O'Rawe, 2010; Steenkamp, 2005; Tiscornia, 2017).  
Extensive literature on post-conflict justice, reconstruction and memory has 
suggested that groups can remain divided because their narratives remain trapped in the 
binary logic of “us” versus “them”, usually by competing for victim status (Andrighetto, 
Mari, Volpato, & Behluli, 2012; Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012). Following the 
notion of complex political victims by Bouris (2007), there is a moral calculation behind 
the ascription of victimhood, which discloses the intention of the actors to portray 





discloses the intersectionality of the identity of victims and perpetrators, and questions 
the ideal image of victims (see more in Druliolle & Brett, 2018; Williams, 2019).  
In Colombia, the peace talks included participation of the victims, and has been 
documented by some scholars (e.g. Brett, 2018; Mendes, 2019). One of the effects of the 
presence of this delegation in la Habana was the shift in position by the state and the 
FARC. Initially, both the state and the FARC denied the impact of their military actions. 
After the presence of the victims’ delegation, both the state and FARC changed their 
views and acknowledged the suffering that their actions caused in the civilian population 
(Brett, 2018, p. 289). However, this acknowledgement from the state and its security 
forces was not part of the soldiers’ narratives during this study. The soldiers portrayed 
themselves as victims and rescuer or heroes, but never as perpetrators. The argument of 
acting within the law helps them to minimize their responsibility. Furthermore, the 
sentiment that there is a “lawfare” (guerra jurídica) against them as part of the strategy 
of the enemy reveals that the understanding of soldiers of the transitional justice 
mechanisms is another battlefield. As Wills (2020) argues, the principal goal of state 
security forces is not to contribute to the clarification of the past and reparation of the 
victims, it is to win the battle for memory. Future studies to analyze the narratives of state 
solders, the intersection of their victimhood and heroic narratives and its potential 
consequences for social reconciliation are recommended (for example, Breen-Smyth, 
2018a).  
Many societies after peace accords suffer from the perpetuation of violence, and 
this must take into account the role of the state security forces. This thesis has 
demonstrated that when studying the legacies of war, at the micro-level among members 
of the security forces, the identity-based grievances that shaped the enemy image held by 
combatants during the conflict persist, and impact the willingness to protect civilians 













Notes of the author:  
By the time that I finished to write this thesis by February 2021, a new 
cycle of violence hit the country. Massacres and targeted violence 
against social leaders, particularly those that have been advocating  
the implementation of the peace agreement’s illicit crops chapter, have 
increased dramatically. The Colombian government reinforced coca 
eradication operations during the COVID-19 lockdown, increasing the 
violent encounters between the state armed actors (the police and 
military) and civilians. The communities denounced human rights 
abuses by those institutions in those territories. Furthermore, the 
intensification of violence disclosed the disputed control over territory 
among armed actors that include ex-paramilitaries, demobilized 
FARC dissidents, members of the ELN and other illegal armed groups. 
Juan Carlos Osorio, leader of the Network of Craftsmen of Peace, 
Mercy and Compassion, who works with communities in Southwestern 
Antioquia asked in an interview: “How is it possible that, with so much 
institutional control from the police and the military [during 
lockdown], that they can move around so noisily?” He added, “It’s 
also about asking the police authorities why their presence has been 
lacking”99. The results of this thesis may partially answer these 
questions, suggesting that it is possible that a deliberate omission by 
the state security forces to protect certain groups and individuals 
within the society exists. In fact, some of the results of this study reflects 
the thesis that the leaders of the FARC political party have about the 
murders of the ex-combatants. For them, even if the army or the police 
are not the ones who execute the murders of their members, they are 
still accomplices. As they declared in an interview: “We believe that 
there has been permissiveness of the Army and the Police, so that the 
other groups, whoever they may be, attempt against us, for the places 
where they move, for the characteristics of the murders” (Vélez et al., 
2020). This declaration is similar to one made by a member of the 
diplomatic group in charge of monitoring the implementation of the 
peace agenda in the territories: “I could not tell you about a central 
plan to kill them (the social leaders), what already exists is an 
accomplice omission and some local sectors of the state armed actors 
that are letting them kill them” (Vélez et al., 2020). 
 
 









Appendix 1: Codebook  









 Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Aggressive Disposition (ad)   arrested: Was arrested arbitrary (1) 
questioned: Was aggressively questioned (2) 
threatened: Was threatened (3) 
deserving: Was deserving of a violent attack (4) 
 
Willingness to protect (wp)  protected_state: Was protected by members of the State Armed 
Forces (5) 
defended_state: Was defended by member of the State Armed 
Forces (6) 
supported_state: Was supported by members of the State 










 Left Right 
Support Political Reintegration of the ex-
FARC members 
EMSPRLEFT José is a peasant leader 
linked to left-wing social 
organizations. Despite all the 
challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to 
support the Political Reintegration of 
the ex-FARC members. Recently you 
received an anonymous tip suggesting 
that José may pose a threat to the 
maintenance of public order To which 
extent do you experience the 
following feelings when thinking 
about people like José? 
EMSPRRIGHT José is a peasant 
leader linked to right-wing social 
organizations. Despite all the 
challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to 
support the Political Reintegration of 
the ex-FARC members. Recently you 
received an anonymous tip suggesting 
that José may pose a threat to the 
maintenance of public order. To which 
extent do you experience the 
following feelings when thinking 
about people like José?: 
Oppose Political Reintegration of the ex-
FARC members 
EMOPRLEFT José is a peasant leader 
linked to left-wing social 
organizations. Despite all the 
challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to 
oppose the Political Reintegration of 
the ex-FARC members. Recently you 
received an anonymous tip suggesting 
that José may pose a threat to the 
maintenance of public order. To which 
extent do you experience the 
following feelings when thinking 
about people like José?: 
EMOPRRIGHT José is a peasant 
leader linked to right-wing social 
organizations. Despite all the 
challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to 
oppose the Political Reintegration of 
the ex-FARC members. Recently you 
received an anonymous tip suggesting 
that José may pose a threat to the 
maintenance of public order. To which 
extent do you experience the 
following feelings when thinking 



















Randomize the order of all choices 
 Not at all Extremely 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Hate ()  
Hostility ()  
Anger ()  
Irritation ()  
Rage ()  
Anxiety ()  
Afraid ()  
Worried ()  
Empathy ()  
Compassion ()  












Positive emotions (pe)   • Empathy  
• Compassion  





















Out-group Threat  
 Left Right 
Support Political Reintegration of the ex-
FARC members 
METSPRLEFT José is a peasant 
leader linked to left-wing social 
organizations. Despite all the 
challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to 
support the Political Reintegration of 
the ex-FARC members. Recently you 
received an anonymous tip suggesting 
METSPRRIGHT José is a peasant 
leader linked to right-wing social 
organizations. Despite all the 
challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to 
support the Political Reintegration of 
the ex-FARC members. Recently you 







that José may pose a threat to the 
maintenance of public order To which 
extent do you believe that this type of 
person poses a threat because: 
that José may pose a threat to the 
maintenance of public order.  To which 
extent do you believe that this type of 
person poses a threat because: 
Oppose Political Reintegration of the ex-
FARC members 
METOPRLEFT José is a peasant 
leader linked to left-wing social 
organizations. Despite all the 
challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to 
oppose the Political Reintegration of 
the ex-FARC members. Recently you 
received an anonymous tip suggesting 
that José may pose a threat to the 
maintenance of public order. To which 
extent do you believe that this type of 
person poses a threat because: 
METOPRRIGHT José is a peasant 
leader linked to right-wing social 
organizations. Despite all the 
challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to 
oppose the Political Reintegration of 
the ex-FARC members. Recently you 
received an anonymous tip suggesting 
that José may pose a threat to the 
maintenance of public order. To which 
extent do you believe that this type of 
person poses a threat because: 
 
 
A. Individual future-oriented 
physical threat (personal 
death-PD) 
B. A collective future-oriented 
physical threat (physical 
collective annihilation-PA) 
D. Collective past oriented 
threat (past victimization- 
PV) 
C. A collective future oriented 

























Randomize the order of all choices 
 Not at all Extremely 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
          
personaldeath: Jeopardize your physical existence  
physicalcollectivean: Jeopardize the physical 
existence of the Colombian people  
symboliccollectivean: Put in risk the identity of the 
Colombia as a democratic state  
pastvictimization It is a victimizer of the 
Colombian people  
 
  
Personaldeath: Personal Death 
Physicalcollectivean: Physical Collective 
Annihilation 
Symboliccollectivean: Symbolic collective 
Annihilation 



































Options label variables_Data Base 






A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks 
toward five people on strike in favor of the 
eradication of illegal drug crops who will be 
killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. 
You are on a footbridge over the tracks, in between 
the approaching trolley and the five protestors. The 
only way to save the lives of the five protestors is 
to jump off the bridge and onto the tracks below 
where your body will stop the trolley. You will die 
if you do this, but the five protestors will be 
saved. what would you do?   
Jump onto the tracks (1)  
Allow the trolley to proceed along the main track 
(0)  
 






A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks 
toward five people on strike against the 
eradication of illegal drug crops who will be 
killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. 
You are on a footbridge over the tracks, in between 
the approaching trolley and the five protestors. The 
only way to save the lives of the five protestors is 
to jump off the bridge and onto the tracks below 
where your body will stop the trolley. You will die 
if you do this, but the five protestors will be 
saved. what would you do? 
Jump onto the tracks (1)  
Allow the trolley to proceed along the main track 
(0)  
 























Choices codification  
 age  What is your age? 
 
18-24 years old (1)  
25-34 years old (2)  
35-44 years old (3)  
45-54 years old (4)  
55-64 years old (5)  
65-74 years old (6)  
75 years or older (7)  
 
 female What is your biological sex? Male (0)  








 edu What was the last educational level you completed 
or passed? 
Primary School (1)  
Secondary School (in British; Middle and 
High School in America) (2)  
Technical School (3)  
Degree/Bachelors (4)  
Specialisation (5)  
Masters (6)  
Doctorate (Phd) (7)  
 
 socialclass What class would you describe yourself belonging 
to? 
Upper (5)  
Upper-middle (4)  
Middle (3)  
Low-middle (2)  








 rank  What is your current position (rank) in the Army? Soldado Bachiller (1)  
Soldado Regular (2)  
Soldado Profesional (3)  
Dragoneante (4)  
Cabo Tercero (5)  
Cabo Segundo (6)  
Cabo Primero (7)  
Sargento Segundo (8)  
Sargento Viceprimero (9)  
Sargento Primero (10)  
Sargento Mayor (11)  
Sargento Mayor de Comando (12)  
Sargento Mayor de Comando Conjunto  (13)  
Subteniente (14)  
Teniente (15)  
Capitán (16)  
Mayor (17)  
Teniente Coronel (18)  
Coronel (19)  







Mayor General (21)  
Teniente General (22)  
General (23)  
 startyear In what year did you join the institution? 1970-2019 
 totalyears How many years have you worked in the 
Institution? 
1-5 years (1)  
5-10 years (2)  
10-15 years (3)  
15-20 years (4)  
20-25 years (5)  
25-30 years (6)  








 specialization You belong to: 
 
Caballería (1)  
Infantería (2)  
Artillería  (3)  
Comunicaciones (4)  
Inteligencia (5)  
Ingeniería (6)  
Aviación (7)  
Cuerpo Logístico y Administrativo (8)  
Talento Humano  (9)  
Arma de Sanidad (Enfermeros) (10)  
Independent Variables    
Physical and spiritual 
formidability  




The PHYSICAL FORCE of a person or group 
represents the capacity and material resources (for 
example, social power, access to weapons, size) of 
a person or group to fight and REACH THEIR 
OBJECTIVES. Physical strength endows the 
person or group with material potential to 
A  (1)  
B  (2)  
C  (3)  
D  (4)  
E  (5)  







DEFEND OR TO inflict physical damage to the 
opponent. Select the letter of the image that best 




formidability (fe)   
 
The SPIRITUAL FORCE of a person or group 
symbolizes THE ABILITY AND IMMATERIAL 
RESOURCES (INTERNAL ENERGY, FORCE, 
PERSEVERANCE) OF A PERSON OR GROUP 
TO FIGHT AND REACH THEIR OBJECTIVES. 
The spiritual force gives the person or group of 
willpower to achieve their goals, persevere, deal 
with adversities and obstacles. It refers to the force 
with which one believes in what is fought and 
 
 
A  (1)  
B  (2)  
C  (3)  
D  (4)  
E  (5)  








defended. Select the letter of the image that best 
represents your level of spiritual strength. 
 
Ideology     
One dimension scale of 
Ideology (Left-Right)  
ideo_1 Nowadays, when talking about political tendencies, 
many express sympathizing more with left-wing or 
with right-wing. According to the meaning you 
attribute to the terms “left-wing” and “right-wing” 
. When considering your political view-
point, Where would you position yourself in a scale 
of 1 to 10 from left to right respectively, where 1 














Read the following statements and state how in 
favor or against you are 
 
 























sdo_1 In an ideal society, some groups should be 
superior and others inferior. 
sdo_2 Certain groups of people are simply inferior 
to other groups. 
sdo_3 The groups that are inferior in society 
deserve to have the same things as those who are 
superior.  
sdo_4 No group should dominate the society. 
sdo_5 The groups that are inferior shouldn’t be 
forced to maintain that position. 
sdo_6 It is not very ethical that some groups 
dominate over others. 
sdo_7 We shouldn’t defend equality amongst 
different groups 
sdo_8 We shoudn’t try and guarantee that all 
groups have the same quality of life 
sdo_9 It is unfair to try and have equality between 
all groups 
sdo_10 Equality between groups should not be our 
main goal. 
Nor against nor in favor (3) 
In favor (4) 







sdo_11: We should work towards all groups having 
the same chances to be successful in society 
sdo_12: We should do as much as possible to 
equalize the conditions for the different groups. 
sdo_13: Without caring how difficult it can be, we 
should try to strive to ensure that all groups have 
the same opportunities in life. 
sdo_14: Equality between groups should be our 
ideal. 
sdo_15: Certain groups of people should be forced 
to remain in their place. 
sdo_16: It is okay that certain groups are above and 
others below.  
Sacred Values  sv How much money would be necessary for you to 
decide to abandon your current position about 
fighting to protect democracy? (you can keep that 







Never. The quantity does not matter. (6) 

































Victimization     
  
 vicexpo Have you experience or your family any of the 




Guerrila (1)  












Death threat (VICEXPO_5) 
Torture (VICEXPO_6) 
Forced Disappearance (VICEXPO_7) 
Physical injury (VICEXPO_8) 
None of the above (VICEXPO_9) 
Recode:  
 
1Victim by Guerrillas 
2 Victim by Paramilitary 
3 Victim by Guerrillas and Paramilitaries 
 
Combat Exposure  indxcomexp Please select the answer above that best describes 
your experience (4 questions)  
COMEXP1 Did you ever go on combat patrols or 
have other dangerous duty? COMEXP1_1 
 
How often did you fire rounds at the enemy? 
COMEXP1_2 
 
How often did you see someone get hit by 
incoming or outgoing rounds? COMEXP1_3 
 
How often were you in danger of being injured or 















1-3 times (2) 
4-12 times (3) 
13-50 times (4) 
            51 times or more (5) 
  COMEXP3 Were you ever surrounded by the 
enemy? 
 
Never (1)    
1 month (2)   
1-3 months (3)   
4-6 months (4)   
            7 months or more (5) 
  COMEXP4 What percentage of the men in your 
unit were killed, wounded or missing in action?  
 
 
No (1)    
1-2 times (2)       
3-12 times (3)      
13-25 times (4)     
26 times or more (5)  
 
  AOP ¿How many times during your military career 
he has been in the area of operations 
None (1)   
1-25% (2)   
26-50% (3)    
51-75% (4)    








Moral Justification  indxmj 
 
mj_1. It is our nation’s duty to use military force 
when our way of life is threatened.  
mj_2 Responding to terror attacks with military 
counter attacks is the moral thing to do.  
mj_3 It is necessary to use military force to defend 
our nation from attack. 
mj_4. It is wrong to criticize the use of military 
force if such force contribute to our safety.  
mj_5 When a conflict develops, it is wrong to just 
sit and watch. It is better to attack before being 
attacked. 
mj_6 Military solutions to conflicts are inmoral and 
cannot be justified. 
mj_7 It is our duty to stop terrorists by any means 
necessary 
mj_8 While military strikes can have negative 














produced by such strikes is so much less than the 
suffering and destruction produced by act of terror. 
mj_9 It is ok to use military force when it prevents 




indxrr rr_1 A given member of a group should not be held 
accountable for military decisions made 
collectively. 
rr_2. When following orders while on duty, 
soldiers should not be held responsible for their 
actions.  
 rr_3. It’s a soldier’s duty to obey the commander’s 
order, even the soldier disagrees with the order.  
 rr_4. Even when following orders, a person is still 
liable for any action he or she carries out. 
 rr_5. When many people are involved in violent 
crimes, the individual carries less responsibility. 
 rr_6 When an authority demands something that 














accountability is fully on the authority giving 
orders.  
rr_7. When it is my duty to follow orders, I don´t 
carry personal responsibility for my actions, 
because I just execute, but don´t make the actual 
decision. 
rr_8. If a person behaves inhumanely, they are 
responsible, even if they followed direct orders. 
Dummy Independent Variables  
 Label Variable-Data 
Base 





iffamily Select the picture that best represents your relationship to 
your family.  
 
A  (1)  
B  (2)  
C  (3)  
D  (4)  


















Select the picture that best represents your relationship to 




A  (1)  
B  (2)  
C  (3)  
D  (4)  
E  (5)  
 
 
(1 2 3 4 =0) (5=1) 
 
 ifcol  
Select the picture that best represents your relationship to 
Colombia  
as a whole  
 
A  (1)  
B  (2)  
C  (3)  
D  (4)  
E  (5)  
 
 







 ifmunit  
Select the picture that best represents your relationship to 




A  (1)  
B  (2)  
C  (3)  
D  (4)  
E  (5)  
 
 










Appendix 3. Field work evidence  




With this other video, I won among 10 winners the International Humanitarian 
Leader Competition by Red-Cross New Zealand. As a competition´s winner I was 






Appendix 4. Experiment protocol  
General description of the activity 
This experiment is being carried out with the purpose of analyzing the impact of 
the war on Colombian soldiers at a psychological, political and social level. Social 
dilemmas and decision-making scenarios will be presented in which profiles of 
threats associated with the ideology of civilians and civilian support for policies 
which are linked to the peace process are defined. The aim is to determine whether 
there is a differential treatment among soldiers towards certain profiles of civilians 
as a result of their ideological identity or their support for certain policies defended 
by the peace process. The dimensions of right or left political ideologies are also 
included. This experiment proposes to determine whether the impact of the war in 
Colombia on soldiers affects the way in which they determine who deserves 
protection or who doesn’t. 
 
To that purpose, we measure how much they agree with the justification of 
aggressive actions against certain civilians because of those civilians’ identity 
group or support for certain policies, or how willing the soldiers are to protect 
certain civilians compared to others because of their group identity or their support 
for certain policies. 
 
Likewise, the experiment seeks to explain which factors would elucidate this 
differential treatment so that they may be identified. Within these factors, variables 
associated with the theory of the “Devoted Actor” will be evaluated, as well as 
psychological effects such as victimization or exposure to combat. Also, theories 
like dehumanization, and psychological measures of de-legitimization of the 
antagonist will be assessed. 
 
Description of the data collection location 
The experiment is carried out in two locations, one in the North Canton, in the 
School of War located in Bogotá, the capital of Colombia, and the other in the 
Military Base located in Tolemaida. The School of War is one of the most important 
military training facilities in the country, apart from Tolemaida. Here, officers and 
non-commissioned officers attend for promotion and retraining courses. Military 
personnel operating in different areas of the country are together in one place. 
 
Estimation of the time required by each participant 
The completion of the experimental survey will take between 30 and 40 minutes. 
The whole activity lasts a maximum of one hour, including the introduction, 
conclusion, and distribution of refreshments. 
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Criteria for the selection of participants 
This work seeks the greatest diversity of low and middle ranks within the military 
institution. For this reason, the application of the survey to Professional Soldiers 
(the lowest in the chain of career soldiers) and Seniors (the rank obtained before 
becoming a Colonel) was preferred. 
 
The reason for these criteria is to be able to have access to those in the field who 
make decisions, and their subordinates within the chain of command. Likewise, the 
diversity in expertise within the forces was considered, including types of weapons 
and years of experience. 
 
Before gaining access to the population, the researcher had to meet with many high-
level actors within the military hierarchy. She had to obtain their permits and write 
official documents justifying the project, the benefits, and the personnel profile that 
was needed. For this, we counted on the advice of members of the army who 
recommended the Schools to which access was needed in order to address the 
documents and obtain the signatures of key actors within the institution, to 
formalize support and to be able to gather the participants. The times and places of 
the interviews and surveys were determined by the directors of the Schools. 
 
Organization of a typical day of application of the experimental survey 
1. Organization of military personnel in a classroom of the Superior School of 
War or in an auditorium inside the North Canton School. 
2. Distribution of refreshments. 
3. PowerPoint presentation explaining the project. The slides maintain the 
format of the Superior School of War and aim to inspire a sense of 
confidence in the participants. 
3.1 Introduction of the researcher, Alejandra Ortiz. 
3.2 Explanation of the project, main objective, and potential benefits of the 
project for the National Army at the level of professionalization of its members 
and at the operational level. 
3.3 Brief explanation of the survey questions. 
3.4 Explanation of the activity (rules of the activity). 
3.5 Distribution of the link containing the survey. 
3.6 To maintain intervention at a maximum of three times during the activity, 
the following rules were presented: 
• Remember that the survey is completely anonymous. 
• Please be honest with your answers. 
• Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
• Please do not talk to your classmates. Remember that the survey is 
anonymous and individual. 
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       3.7. Closing of the activity: 
Additional questions or doubts of the participants are addressed. It is 
reiterated that the project is carried out for academic purposes and does not 
have any kind of financial support from the army or the national 
government. 
 
The impact of the war on the Colombian National Army 
 
 My name is Alejandra Ortiz, I have been a university professor and researcher 
in different universities of the country, such as Externado U., Rosario U., and the 
Gran-Colombian Polytechnic. Also, I worked in the Superior School of War in 
the first Research Center for Military Historical Memory-2014. During my 
experience as a researcher I realized that there are few studies about the Public 
Force in Colombia. Currently, research interests are concentrated on victims and 
ex-combatants. 
 
For this reason, this project is part of my doctoral thesis, studies that I advance 
in New Zealand, and which aim to quantitatively measure the impact of the war 
on Colombian soldiers at a psychological, political and social level. Many of 
these scales have been applied in other armies and my intention is to initiate 
studies on the Colombian Public Force, applying rigorous methods to generate 
new approaches that allow us to make complex and sophisticated diagnoses about 
the effects of the war on Colombian soldiers. 
 
Some of the questions will confront you with scenarios and dilemmas that may 
arise in your professional life. Furthermore, many of the questions are usually 
applied in other armies and were adapted and translated into Spanish. 
 
Why is this important? 
Operational level 
➢ To be prepared to make decisions and act in VICA contexts. 
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO): "an increasingly 
complex, uncertain, competitive, rapidly changing and transparent 
operating environment" in Colombia: VICA-Volatile, uncertain, 
complex, ambiguous contexts.  
Vision 2030 - research lens: 
➢ Professionalization of the Public Force: knowledge of the impact of the 
war on our soldiers. 
➢  Knowing our soldiers, their thoughts, perceptions, and sufferings will 





This is an example of what the survey will look like on your mobiles. This is one 






Please note that this survey is completely anonymous, it will not affect your 
professional career in any way; it will not have negative effects of any kind. 
Remember, this survey is done solely for academic purposes. 
 
I ask you to please be as honest as possible as the quality of the data will depend 
on the honesty of your response. Also, I ask you please not to speak with your 
colleagues; if you have any questions I ask you to raise your hand and I will 





Appendix 5. Manipulation Checks  





Coef. St.Err. t-value p-value [95% Conf. Interval] Sig Odd 
Ratio101 
Gender          
Female  1.613 0.691 2.34 0.019 0.260 2.966 ** 5.018** 
(3.465) 
Level of Education: 
Referent Group-
Primary School 
        
High School 1.934 1.128 1.72 0.086 -0.276 4.144 * 6.918* 
(7.800) 
Technical School 2.416 1.139 2.12 0.034 0.183 4.648 ** 11.197** 
(12.755) 
Bachelors 3.359 1.226 2.74 0.006 0.956 5.762 *** 28.754**
* 
(35.257) 
Specialization 2.739 1.236 2.22 0.027 0.316 5.161 ** 15.467** 
(19.116) 





        
25-34 years -0.121 0.683 -0.18 0.859 -1.460 1.217  0.886 
(0.605) 
35-44 years 0.000 0.737 -0.00 1.000 -1.446 1.445  1.000 
 
100 For the proposes of this model some variables were modified: 1) For the rank variable the 
observations that not fit the sample requirements were eliminated. The total of observations that 
were eliminated was 4. 2) The observations of Upper class were added within the Upper middle 
class category, because within the total sample, just four soldiers identified themselves with the 
Upper Class. 3) The observations of 25-30 and more than 30 years were added within the 20 and 
more years category, because within the total sample only five soldiers were in those categories. 




45-54 years  -1.522 0.947 -1.61 0.108 -3.377 0.334  0.218 
(0.207) 
Social Class:  
Referent Group Lower 
        
Low-Middle -0.008 0.404 -0.02 0.984 -0.800 0.784  0.992 
(0.401) 









        
Private First Class   1.924 0.663 2.90 0.004 0.625 3.223 *** 6.848*** 
(4.540) 
         




       continue  
Subaltern Officers 0.165 0.547 0.30 0.763 -0.908 1.237  1.179 
(0.645) 
Superior Officers 0.394 0.630 0.63 0.531 -0.840 1.628  1.483 
(0.934) 




        
5-10 years 0.643 0.676 0.95 0.342 -0.682 1.968  1.902 
(1.286) 
10-15 years 0.886 0.705 1.26 0.209 -0.496 2.268  2.425 
(1.711) 
15-20 0.900 0.727 1.24 0.216 -0.525 2.325  2.460 
(1.789) 
20-25 0.973 0.758 1.28 0.199 -0.512 2.458  2.645 
(2.004) 




Victim by Guerrillas 
Groups  





        
Yes  0.262 0.363 0.72 0.470 -0.449 0.974  1.300 
(0.472) 
Victim by Guerrillas 
and Paramilitaries  
        
Yes 0.072 0.365 0.20 0.843 -0.644 0.788  1.075 
(0.393) 
Hypervigilance 0.158 0.098 1.61 0.107 -0.034 0.350  1.171 
(0.115) 
Combat Exposure 0.077 0.118 0.65 0.516 -0.154 0.307  1.080 
(0.127) 
Treatment Group:  
Referent Group-Left-
Support 
        
Left-Oppose -1.316 0.245 -5.37 0.000 -1.795 -0.836 *** 0.268*** 
(0.066) 
Right-Support -0.888 0.241 -3.68 0.000 -1.361 -0.415 *** 0.411*** 
(0.099) 
Right-Oppose -0.661 0.245 -2.69 0.007 -1.142 -0.180 *** 0.516*** 
(0.127) 
 Constant -3.039 1.301 -2.34 0.019 -5.588 -0.490 ** 0.048** 
(0.062) 
Mean dependent var 0.624 SD dependent var  0.485  
Pseudo r-squared  0.109 Number of obs   740  
Chi-square   107.248 Prob > chi2  0.000  
Akaike crit. (AIC) 930.375 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 1063.968  




Significance of all variables within 
the Logistic Regression for 
Manipulation Checks. 
Gender: 
chi2 (1) = 5.46 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0195 
Level of Education: 
chi2(5) = 15.39 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0088 
Age: 
chi2(3) = 1.10 
Prob > chi2 = 0.7772 
Rank:  
chi2(4) =10.88 
Prob > chi2 =0.0279 
Total Years as a Soldier: 
chi2(4) = 2.17 
Prob > chi2 = 0.7044 
Victim by Guerrillas Groups:  
chi2(1) = 2.80 
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0943 
 
Victim by Paramilitaries Groups: 
chi2(1) = 0.52 
 Prob > chi2 = 0.4696 
 
Treatment Groups:  
chi2(3) = 29.95 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Hypervigilance:  
chi2(1) = 2.59 
 Prob > chi2 = 0.1075 
Combatant Exposure Scale: 
chi2(1) = 0.42 




Post-estimations: Predictive Margins of multi-categorical variables  
Level of Education  
Predictive margins                              Number of obs. = 740 
Model VCE: OIM 
Expression: Pr (Manipulation Checks), predict () 
   Delta-method 
   Margin  Std. Err.  z  P>z  [95%Conf. Interval] 
Level of Education 
Primary School       0.160     0.141     1.130     0.258    -0.117     0.437 
High School       0.524     0.041    12.640     0.000     0.443     0.605 
Technical School       0.630     0.035    17.980     0.000     0.561     0.698 
Bachelors       0.801     0.058    13.870     0.000     0.688     0.915 
Specialization       0.695     0.080     8.690     0.000     0.538     0.852 
Masters       0.848     0.137     6.170     0.000     0.578     1.117 
 Variables that uniquely identify margins: Level of Education  
Interpretation:  
The predicted probability of PASS the experiment is 0.16 for the lowest level of 




Note: 0 means participants PASS the experiment, 1 means participants FAIL 
the experiment, and 0.5 means it happens half of the time. 
Age 
Predictive margins                              Number of obs     =        740 
Model VCE: OIM 
Expression: Pr (Manipulation Checks), predict () 
   Delta-method 
   Margin  Std.Err.  z  P>z  [95%Conf. Interval] 
Age 
18-24 years      0.643     0.127     5.050     0.000     0.394     0.893 
25-34 years old     0.619     0.035    17.880     0.000     0.551     0.687 
35-44 years old     0.643     0.039    16.410     0.000     0.566     0.720 
45-54 years old     0.325     0.118     2.750     0.006     0.094     0.557 
Variables that uniquely identify margins: Age 
 
Interpretation:  
The predicted probability of PASS the experiment is 0.64 for the youngest soldiers 





Predictive margins                              Number of obs     =        740 
Model VCE: OIM 
Expression: Pr (Manipulation Checks), predict () 
   Delta-method 




    0.521     0.057     9.210     0.000     0.410     0.632 
Private First Class       0.852     0.065    13.050     0.000     0.724     0.980 
Sub-officers       0.636     0.028    22.990     0.000     0.581     0.690 
Subaltern Officers       0.556     0.083     6.690     0.000     0.393     0.719 
Superior Officers       0.603     0.106     5.700     0.000     0.396     0.811 
Variables that uniquely identify margins: Rank 
Interpretation:  
The predicted probability to PASS the experiment is 0.52 for the lowest rank AND 





Predictive margins                              Number of obs = 740 
Model VCE: OIM 
Expression: Pr (Manipulation Checks), predict () 
   Delta-method 
   Margin  Std.Err.  z  P>z  [95%Conf.Interval] 
Social Class 
Lower     0.619     0.078     7.950     0.000     0.467     0.772 
Low-Middle      0.618     0.029    21.090     0.000     0.560     0.675 
Middle      0.635     0.023    27.810     0.000     0.591     0.680 
Upper and 
Upper Middle  
    0.561     0.073     7.720     0.000     0.418     0.703 
Variables that uniquely identify margins: Social Class 
Interpretation:  
The predicted probability to PASS the experiment is 0.6 for the lowest social classs 








Total year as a soldier   
Predictive margins                              Number of obs = 740 
Model VCE: OIM 
Expression: Pr (Manipulation Checks), predict () 
   Delta-method 
   Margin  Std.Err.  z  P>z  [95%Conf. Interval] 
Total Year as a Soldier  
1-5 years      0.461     0.135     3.420     0.001     0.197     0.725 
5-10 years      0.597     0.047    12.730     0.000     0.505     0.689 
10-15 years      0.646     0.045    14.300     0.000     0.558     0.735 
15-20 years      0.649     0.037    17.780     0.000     0.578     0.721 
20 and more      0.663     0.054    12.260     0.000     0.557     0.769 
Variables that uniquely identify margins: Total Years as a Soldier 
Interpretation:  
The predicted probability to PASS the experiment is 0.4 for the soldiers with less 







Treatment group  
Predictive margins                              Number of obs     =        740 
Model VCE: OIM 
Expression: Pr (Manipulation Checks), predict () 
   Delta-method 
   Margin  Std.Err.  z  P>z  [95%Conf.Interval] 
Treatments  
Left-Support       0.763     0.030    25.400     0.000     0.704     0.822 
Left-Oppose       0.495     0.037    13.540     0.000     0.423     0.567 
Right-Support       0.590     0.034    17.330     0.000     0.524     0.657 




The predicted probability of PASS the experiment is 0.76 for treatment 1, 0.49 for 
the treatment 2. The treatment 2 may produce cognitive dissonance in the soldiers’ 
probability to understand or not the experiment. Because after signed a peace 
agreement with the biggest guerrilla group in the country, don´t make sense that 
there is people from the left against the political reintegration. (This is the core of 
the peace negotiation, the rebel group turned political party). The predicted 
probability of PASS the experiment is 0.64 for treatment 4, and for treatment 3 is 
0.59. The different could be explained because it is unusual that people from right-
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wing support the political reintegration of the rebels. This may represent the impact 




Appendix 6. Qualitative guide questions  
Spanish version:  
Open Questions (Ice-breaker questions)  
1. ¿Cuántos años llevas trabajando en la institución?  
2. ¿Qué lo motivo a ser soldado? 
3. ¿Cuál fue la reacción de su familia cuando les contó que quería ser soldado? 
4. ¿Cuál es su parte favorita de ser soldado?  
5. Pensando en su propia experiencia. ¿Cuáles son los desafíos más importantes 
que enfrenta un soldado en Colombia?  
6. Usted cree que sus experiencias personales, o la experiencia de su familia en 
relación a la violencia en Colombia ha affectado su opinion sobre ciertos grupos 
o ideas políticas en Colombia. (Si contestan sí)  ¿En que sentido?  
7. Ahora, pensando en la situación actual del país, debe ser muy difícil para usted 
como soldado, luego de tantos años de lucha, poniendo en riesgo su vida y 
sacrificando tiempo con su familia y amigos. Tener que cambiar en tan poco 
tiempo y ahora tener la misión de proteger y aceptar miembros de las FARC 
como ciudadanos y quizás futuros políticos. ¿Cómo se siente al respecto? 
Peace agreement, political reintegration of the ex-rebels and political participation 
of the Army in the Colombian Democracy.  
8. ¿Cómo se siente luego del proceso de paz con las FARC? 
9. ¿Cómo se siente con la reintegración política de las FARC? 
10. Algunas personas tienen la expectativa de que las Fuerzas Armadas en todo el 
mundo deberían ser políticamente neutrales. ¿Usted cree que es esto posible? 
¿Qué significa ser políticamente neutral para usted?  
11. ¿Cómo soldado que siente al saber que no puede votar, pero los excombatientes 
de las FARC pueden participar en política?  
Targeting civilians-Identity Group  
12. Luego del acuerdo de paz, la comunidad internacional ha puesto presión en el 
Ejercito Colombia con respecto a la situación de protección de líderes sociales. 
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Probablemente, estos agentes desconocen las complejidades, los sacrificios y 
las realidades en los territorios a los que se enfrentan los soldados. Por esta 
razón, quisiera que me compartiera su opinión sobre la situación de líderes 
sociales en Colombia.  
13. ¿Algunas organizaciones internacionales manifestaron que el plan de 
protección a líderes sociales no está funcionado? ¿Cuál cree usted es la razón 
de estas críticas por parte de la comunidad internacional? ¿Usted cree que existe 
sistematicidad detrás de los asesinatos?  
Who are the enemies and threats? 
14. En su opinión, ¿cuáles son las amenazas más importantes que enfrenta 
Colombia luego del acuerdo de paz?  
15. Algunas personas consideran que si apoyamos ciertas ideas políticas podríamos 
terminar como Venezuela. ¿Qué piensa al respecto? 
16. Algunas personas creen que las Fuerzas Militares prefieren apoyar políticos de 
derecha que políticos de izquierda. ¿Por qué creé que estas personas piensan 
esto?  
17. Existen algunos líderes sociales, defensores de derechos humanos que dicen que 
las Fuerzas Armadas consideran a ciertos civiles como amenazas por su 
ideología política. ¿Qué piensa usted sobre lo que dicen estas personas? 
War on Drugs  
18. Teniendo su cuenta su experiencia, experticia y conocimiento del territorio 
nacional, podría darme su opinión sobre las estrategias de lucha contra el 
narcotráfico.  
19. ¿Cómo se siente frente a las estrategias de erradicación de cultivos ilícitos?  
Close interview: Vision of peace and democracy  
20. ¿Cómo se ve para usted la paz? ¿Cuál cree que es el rol del Ejercito para 
alcanzar esa paz? 
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English version:  
Open Questions (Ice-breaker questions)  
1.  How many years have you been working at the institution? 
2. What motivated you to be a soldier? 
3. What was your family's reaction when you told them you wanted to be a soldier? 
4. What is your favorite part of being a soldier? 
5. Thinking about your own experience. What are the most important challenges 
facing a soldier in Colombia? 
6. You believe that your personal experiences, or the experience of your family in 
relation to violence in Colombia has affected your opinion about groups of 
political ideas in Colombia. (If they answer yes) In what sense? 
7. Now, thinking about the current situation in the country, it must be very difficult 
for you as a soldier, after so many years of fighting, putting your life at risk and 
sacrificing time with your family and friends. Having to change in such a short 
time and now having the mission of protecting and accepting FARC members 
as citizens and perhaps future politicians. How do you feel about it? 
Peace agreement, political reintegration of the ex-rebels and political participation 
of the Army in the Colombian Democracy. 
8. How do you feel after the peace process with the FARC? 
9.  How do you feel about the FARC's political reintegration? 
10. Some people have the expectation that the Armed Forces worldwide should be 
politically neutral. Do you think this is possible? What does being politically 
neutral mean to you? 
11. As a soldier you feel knowing that you cannot vote, but ex-FARC combatants 
can participate in politics, how do you feel about it? 
Targeting civilians-Identity Group 
12. After the peace agreement, the international community has put pressure on the 
Colombian Army regarding the situation of protection of social leaders. These 
agents are probably unaware of the complexities, sacrifices, and realities in the 
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territories facing soldiers. For this reason, I would like you to share your opinion 
on the situation of social leaders in Colombia.  
13. Did some international organizations state that the plan for the protection of 
social leaders is not working? What do you think is the reason for these 
criticisms by the international community? Do you think there is systematicity 
behind the murders? 
Who are the enemies and threats? 
14. In your opinion, what are the most important threats facing Colombia after the 
peace agreement?  
15. Some people consider that if we support certain political ideas we could end up 
like Venezuela. What do you think about it? 
16. Some people believe that the Military Forces prefer supporting right-wing 
politicians than left-wing politicians. Why did I think these people think this? 
17. There are some social leaders, human rights defenders who say that the Armed 
Forces consider certain civilians as threats due to their political ideology. What 
do you think about what these people say? 
War on Drugs  
18. Taking into account your experience, expertise and knowledge of the national 
territory, could you give me your opinion on strategies to fight drug trafficking. 
19. What do you feel about the eradication programs?  
Close interview: Vision of peace and democracy  
20. What does peace look like to you? What do you think is the role of the Army to 




Appendix 7. Field Work challenges supplementary material  
This was the front page of a local political Magazine called Semana, that reports 
the dead threats to soldiers after the scandals reported by the New York Times.  
 
Silence Operation (Operación Silencio in Spanish)  
Source: (Semana, 2019d) 
This was the article that unleashed the scandal: 
 




Appendix 8. Sociodemographic Characteristic Original 












  (N=803) (N=199) (N=191) (N=204) (N=194) 
Gender (%) 
   Male 
778 195 186 
(97.3%) 
197 185 
-97.20% -97.90% -96.60% -95.30% 
   Female 
22 4 3 7 8 








-0.40% -1.00% -0.50% 
Age (%) 
   18-24 
76 17 17 19 20 
-9.50% -8.50% -8.90% -9.30% -10.30% 
   25-34 
364 92 92 94 79 
-45.50% -46.20% -48.10% -46% -40.70% 
   35-44 
343 87 78 87 86 
-42.80% -43.7 -40.80% -42.60% -44.30% 
   45-54 
17 2 4 3 8 






-0.40% -0.50% -0.50% -0.5 
Level of Education (%) 
   Primary 
School 
11 2 2 4 3 
-1.40% -1% -1% -1.96 -1.55% 
   High 
School 
253 56 66 64 57 
-31.60% -28.10% -34.50% -31.4 -29.40% 
   Technical 
School 
339 93 76 83 85 
-42.40% -46.70% -39.80% -40.70% -43.80% 
   Bachelors 
85 14 21 29 20 
-10.60% -7% -11% -14.20% -10.31% 
   
Specialization 
100 29 25 21 25 
-12.50% -14.60% -13% -10.30% -12.90% 
   Masters 
12 4 1 2 3 
-1.50% -2% -0.50% -1% -1.50% 





3 1 none 1 1 
-0.40% -0.50% -0.50% -0.50% 
Social Class (%) 
Low 
41 7 13 10 10 
-5.10% -3.50% -6.80% -5% -5.10% 
Low-Middle 
266 61 75 65 57 
-33.2 -30.60% -39.20% -32% -29.30% 
Middle 
444 123 94 111 111 
-55.50% -61.80% -49.20% -54.40% -57.20% 
       
Upper-
Middle 
45 8 8 16 12 
 







1 1 2 
-0.50% -0.50% -0.50% -1%  






-0.40% -0.50% -1% 















130 27 35 36 25 
-16.30% -13.50% -18.30% -17.60% -12.90% 
   Private First 
Class 
49 13 11 12 13 
-6.10% -6.50% -5.70% -6% -6.70% 
   Sub-Officer 
438 113 100 110 113 
-54.80% -56.80% -52.3 -54% -58.20% 
   Subaltern-
Officer 
122 32 31 30 27 
-15.30% -16.10% -16.20% -15% -14% 
   Superior 
Officer 
56 14 12 16 14 
-7% -7% -6.30% -8% -7.20% 
   General 
1 












Total years as a Soldier (%) 
   1-5 years 
75 16 17 19 19 
-9.50% -8% -9% -9.30% -98% 
   5-10 years 
171 40 44 48 40 
-21.70% -20.10% -23% -23.50% -20.60% 
   10-15 years 
145 38 34 34 37 
-18.30% -19.10% -18% -16.60% -19% 
   15-20 years 
274 75 60 73 60 
-34.60% -37.70% -31.40% -35.80% -31% 
   20-25 years 
120 28 30 26 36 
-15.20% -14% -16% -12.70% -18.50% 
   25-30 years 
4 1 1 2 
none 
-0.50% -0.50% -0.50% -1% 
   More than 
30 years 
1 None 1 
none none 
-0.10% -0.50% -0.50% 
Miss Values 
(%) 
12 1 4 2 2 
-1.50% -0.50% -2% -1% -1.03 
Ideology (%) 
   Left 
24 7 8 3 6 
-3% -3.50% -4.10% -1.40% -3% 
        
 Center 410 102 91 113 97 
  -52.50% -51.20% -47.60% -55.40% -50% 
       
 Right 
347 84 88 84 86 
-44.40% -42.20% -46% -41.10% -44.30% 
  22 6 4 4 5 
Miss Values 
(%) 
-2.70% -3.00% -2% -2% -2.60% 
Victim by Guerrillas Groups  
No 
514 116 121 141 127 
-64% -58.20% -63.30% -70.10% -65.40% 
Yes 
289 83 70 63 67 
-36% -41.70% -36.60% -30.80% -34.50% 
Miss Values 
(%) 
none none none none none 
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Victim by Paramilitary Groups  
No 
745 189 170 192 182 
-92.80% -95% -89% -94.10% -93.80% 
Yes 
58 10 21 12 12 
-7.20% -5% -11% -5.80% -6.10% 
Miss Values 
(%) 
none none none none none 
Victim by Paramilitary and Guerrillas Groups  
No 
739 184 171 194 178 
-92% -92.40% -89.50% -95.10% -91.70% 
Yes 
64 15 20 10 16 
-8% -7.50% -10.40% -4.90% -8.25% 
Miss Values 
(%) 





Appendix 9. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and 
Independent variables of Experiments: Supplementary 
Tables and Figures  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics Treatment 
 Treatment Group  Freq.  Percent  Cum. 
 Left-Support 199 24.91 24.91 
 Left-Oppose 190 23.78 48.69 
 Right-Support 204 25.53 74.22 
 Right-Oppose 192 24.03 98.25 
 Miss Values 102 14 1.75 100.00 
Total  799 100.00  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of treatment variables for Experiment #1 
Dummy Variables 
Political Reintegration of 
FARC 
Freq. Percent Cum. 
Support re-integration 403 50.44 50.44 
Oppose re-integration 382 47.81 98.25 
Miss values 14 1.75 100.00 
Total  799   
Political Ideology    
Right 396 49.56 49.56 
Left 389 48.69 98.25 
Miss values 14 1.75 100.00 






102 The number of observations differences across the indicators. This indicates that some respondents 
skipped some items, thus leaving them as “.” in the dataset. For that reason, I have miss values in the 











Right 204 192 0 396 
Left 199 190 0 389 
. 0 0 14 14 
Total 403 382 14 799 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics Main Dependent Variables Experiment #1 
 Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max Miss 
Values  
Aggressive Disposition  763 3.046 2.01 1 9 36 (4.5%) 
Willingness to Protect  749 5.558 2.438 1 9 50 (6.2%) 
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics Main Dependent Variables Experiment #1 
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max Miss 
Values 
Social Dominance Orientation 799 2.52 .586 1 4.562 None  
Ideology-Scale (Left-Right) 777 7.127 2.255 1 10 22 
Negative Emotions 768 3.883 1.993 1 9 31 
Personal Death Threat 700 4.361 2.844 1 9 99 
Physical Collective Threat 716 4.517 2.931 1 9 83 
Symbolic Collective Threat 719 4.604 2.893 1 9 80 
Past Victimization Threat 711 4.136 2.868 1 9 88 
Moral Justification  764 6.729 1.365 1 9 35 
Dehumanization Left-Wing  686 4.274 3.169 0 10 113 
Dehumanization Right-Wing 670 6.23 3.042 0 10 129 
Combat Exposure  764 2.715 .979 1 5 35 





Table 5. Descriptive Statistics Main Dependent Variables Experiment #2 
 Self-Sacrifice   Freq.  Percent  Cum. 
 Allow the trolley to proceed along the main track 519 64.96 64.96 
 Jump onto the tracks 253 31.66 96.62 
 Miss values  27 3.38 100.00 
Total  799 100.00  
 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics Main Independent Variables Multi-Variable logistic 
regression for Experiment #2 
 
 Categorical Variables 
Rank  Freq. Percent Cum. 
Private Professional Soldiers 130 16.35 16.35 
Private First Class   49 6.16 22.52 
Sub-officers 438 55.09 77.61 
Subaltern-Officers 122 15.35 92.96 
Superior Officers 56 7.04 100.00 
Miss values     
Treatment Variable Political 
Ideology  
   
Left-Wing 396 49.56 49.56 
Right-Wing  389 48.69 98.25 
Miss values  14 1.75 100.00 
Treatment Variable Political 
Reintegration  
   
Oppose Political 
Reintegration  
382 47.81 98.25 
Support Political 
Reintegration  
403 50.44 50.44 
Miss values  14 1.75 100.00 
 
Dummy Variables 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
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Identity Fusion Army    
Yes 378 47.31 47.31 
No  413 51.69 99.00 
Miss values  8 1.00 100.00 
Identity Fusion Military Unit    
Yes  442 55.32 55.32 
No  349 43.68 99.00 
Miss values  8 1.00 100.00 
Identity Fusion Colombia    
Yes 345 43.18 43.18 
No  437 54.69 97.87 
Miss Values  17 2.13 100.00 
Victim by Guerrilla    
Yes 289 36.17 100.00 
No  510 63.83 63.83 
Miss values  none   
Democracy as a Sacred 
Value 
   
Yes  590 73.84 98.87 
No 200 25.03 25.03 
Miss Values  9 1.13 100.00 
 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max Miss Values  
Negative 
Emotions  
768 3.883 1.993 1 9 31 
Spiritual 
Formidability 
794 5.241 1.081 1 6 5 
Physical 
Formidability 




Appendix 10. ANOVA of Experiment #1: Supplementary 
Tables and Figures 
Aggressive Disposition  
The table 1, indicates the dummy coding of the independent variables for the two-way 
factorial analysis.  
 
Table 1: Dummy Coding of Two-way ANOVA predictors (independent variables) 
 
Figure 1: The differences in the Aggressive Disposition mean by treatment adding 




 Treatments  Dummy Variable 1  
(Political Ideological Identity 
of José)  
1=Left 
0=Right  
Dummy Variable 2  
(Reintegration of the Rebels) 
0= "Support re-integration" 1= 
"Oppose re-integration"   
1 Left-support 1 0 
2 Left-oppose 1 1 
3 Right-support 0 0 
4 Right-oppose 0 1 
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Table 2: Two-way ANOVA for Aggressive Disposition 
 Number of obs. = 763   R-squared = 0.0111 
 Root MSE= 2.00315   Adj. R-squared = 0.0072 
 





Model 34.222 3 11.407 2.84 0.0370 
José Left-wing 0.261 1 0 .261 0.07 0.7986 
Oppose political 
reintegration 
 17.957 1 17.957 4.48 0.0347 
José Left-wing# Oppose 
political reintegration 
16.226 1 16.226 4.04 0.0447 
Residual 3045.5627 759 4.0125991  
 







Table 3: Effect sizes measured by η2 Of the Two-way ANOVA for Aggressive 
Disposition  
Effect sizes measured by η2 
Source Eta-Squared df [95% Conf. Interval] 
Model 0.0111 3  0.027 
     
Jose is Left-wing  0.000 1  0.005 
Oppose political 
reintegration  
0.005 1  0.021 
Jose is Left-wing #Oppose 
political reintegration 
0. 005 1  0.020 
 
Note: The overall 2 indicates that our model accounts for approximately 1% of 
variability in aggressive disposition scores though the 95% confidence interval include 
the null value (0.00%, 2%). 2 is equivalent to the R-squared.  
 
 
Table 4: Margins of the Two-way ANOVA for Aggressive Disposition  
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Ideology of Jose #Political 
reintegration  
Margin Std.Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Jose Right-wing #Support 
political re-integration 
3.023 0.142 21.24 0.000 2.744 3.303 
Jose Right-wing #Oppose 
political re-integration 
3.038 0.147  20.63 0.000 2.749 3.327 
Jose Left-wing #Support political 
re-integration 
2.768 0.143 19.30 0.000 2.487 3.050 
Jose Left-wing #Oppose political 
re-integration 
3.367 0.147 22.87 0.000 3.078 3.656 
 




Table 5: Linear Regression between treatment groups and aggressive disposition  
Adjusted predictions    
Expression: Linear prediction, predict () 
Number of obs. = 763 










Aggressive Disposition Coef. St.Err. t-value p-
value 
[95% Conf Interval] Sig 
Jose Left-wing and Support 
political re-integration 
(Referent Group) 
       
Jose Left-wing and Oppose 
political re-integration 
0.599 0.206 2.91 0.004 0.195 1.002 *** 
Jose Right-wing and Support 
political re-integration 
0.255 0.202 1.26 0.208 -0.142 0.652  
Jose Right-wing and Oppose 
political re-integration 
0.27 0.206 1.31 0.19 -0.134 0.674  
Constant 2.769 0.143 19.30 0 2.487 3.05 *** 
Mean dependent var 3.046 SD dependent var.  2.010 
R-squared  0.011 Number of obs.   763 
F-test   2.843 Prob > F  0.037 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 3229.432 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 3247.981 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Willingness to Protect  
Figure 3: The differences in the Willingness to protect mean by treatment adding 
confidence intervals to the bars.  
 
 
Table 6: Two-way ANOVA for Willingness to protect 
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 Number of obs. = 749   R-squared = 0.0235 
 Root MSE= 2.413   Adj. R-squared = 0.019 
 





Model 104.337 3 34.78 5.97 0.0005 
José Left-wing 56.359 1 56.36 9.67 0.0019 
Oppose political 
reintegration 
0.003 1 0.003 0.00 0.9797 
José Left-wing# Oppose 
political reintegration 
50.335 1 50.335 8.64 0.0034 
Residual 4340.719 745 5.826   
Total  4445.057 748 5.942   
      
 
Table 7: Effect sizes measured by η2 Of the Two-way ANOVA for Willingness to 
protect. 
Effect sizes measured by η2 
Source Eta-Squared df [95% Conf.Interval] 
Model 0.0234 3 0.004 0.0459 
     
Jose is Left-wing  0.012 1 0.001 0.033 
Oppose political 
reintegration  
8.73 1 . . 
Jose is Left-wing #Oppose 
political reintegration 
0.011 1 0.001 0.031 
 
Note: The overall 2 indicates that our model accounts for approximately 2% of 
variability in aggressive disposition scores though the 95% confidence interval include 
the null value (0.001%, 3%). 2 is equivalent to the R-squared.  
 
 
Table 9: Margins of the Two-way ANOVA for Willingness to Protect 
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                                                       Delta-method 
Ideology of the Jose #Political 
reintegration  
Margin Std.Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Jose is Right-wing #Support 
political reintegration 
    5.571     0.173  
32.230 
    
0.000 
    5.232     5.910 
Jose is Right-wing #Oppose 
political reintegration 
    6.085     0.177    
34.380 
    
0.000 
    5.738     6.433 
Jose is Left-wing #Support 
political reintegration 
    5.541     0.176    
31.470 
    
0.000 
    5.195     5.886 
Jose is Left-wing #Oppose 
political reintegration 
    5.018     0.180    
27.890 
    
0.000 
    4.664     5.371 
 





Table 10: Linear Regression between treatment groups and willingness to protect  
Adjusted predictions    
Expression: Linear prediction, predict () 
Number of obs = 749 












 Interval]  Sig 
Jose is Left-wing -0.523 0.252 -2.08 0.038 -1.017 -0.029 ** 
Oppose political 
reintegration  
0.030 0.247 0.12 0.903 -0.454 0.515  
Jose is Left-wing 
#Oppose political 
reintegration 
0.544 0.250 2.18 0.030 0.054 1.034 ** 
 Constant 5.541 0.176 31.47 0.000 5.195 5.886 *** 
Mean dependent var 5.558 SD dependent var  2.438 
R-squared  0.023 Number of obs   749 
F-test   5.969 Prob > F  0.001 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 3449.605 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 3468.080 





Appendix 11. GLM: Supplementary Tables and Figures  
Table 1: Generalized linear model with Gamma family and identity link (Additive 
arithmetic mean model) 




[95% Conf. Interval]  Sig 
Jose is Left-wing -0.255 0.202 -1.26 0.207 -0.651 0.141  
Oppose political 
reintegration 
0.015 0.205 0.07 0.941 -0.386 0.417  
Jose is Left-wing 
#Oppose political 
reintegration 
0.584 0.290 2.01 0.044 0.015 1.152 ** 
 Constant 3.024 0.142 21.24 0.000 2.745 3.303 *** 
Mean dependent var 3.046 SD dependent var   2.010 
Number of obs   763.000 Chi-square   8.529 
Prob > chi2  0.036 Akaike crit. (AIC) 3229.432 




















Table 2: Margins of the Generalized linear model for Aggressive Disposition 
 
Adjusted predictions                            Number of obs. = 763 
Model VCE: OIM 
Expression: Predicted mean ad, predict () 
 
   Delta-method 
   Margin  Std.Err.  z  P>z  [95%Conf.  Interval] 








    3.039     0.146    20.770     0.000     2.752     3.326 
Jose Left-wing #Support 
political re-integration 
    2.769     0.130    21.320     0.000     2.514     3.023 
Jose Left-wing #Oppose 
political re-integration 










































Post Estimation figures of GLM model  














Figure 4. Deviance Residual  
 
 













Table 3: Generalized linear model between treatment groups and aggressive disposition  
 
Aggressive Disposition Coef. St.Err. t-
value 
p-value [95% Conf. Interval] Sig 




       
Jose Left-wing and 
Oppose political re-
integration 
0.599 0.208 2.88 0.004 0.192 1.006 *** 
Jose Right-wing and 
Support political re-
integration 
0.255 0.191 1.33 0.183 -0.121 0.630  
Jose Right-wing and 
Oppose political re-
integration 
0.270 0.196 1.38 0.168 -0.114 0.653  
 Constant 2.769 0.130 21.32 0.000 2.514 3.023 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 3.046 SD dependent var   2.010 
Number of obs   763.000 Chi-square   8.351 
Prob > chi2  0.039 Akaike crit. (AIC) 3229.816 




















Appendix 12. Operationalization and findings of 
Psychological Mechanism: Supplementary Tables and 
Figures  
Table 1: Emotions Question and Experiment Treatments 
 Left Right 
Support Political 
Reintegration of the 
ex-FARC members 
EMSPRLEFT José is a peasant leader 
linked to left-wing social organizations. 
Despite all the challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to support the 
Political Reintegration of the ex-FARC 
members. Recently you received an 
anonymous tip suggesting that José may pose a 
threat to the maintenance of public order To 
which extent do you experience the following 
feelings when thinking about people like 
José? 
EMSPRRIGHT José is a peasant leader 
linked to right-wing social organizations. 
Despite all the challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to support the 
Political Reintegration of the ex-FARC 
members. Recently you received an anonymous 
tip suggesting that José may pose a threat to the 
maintenance of public order. To which extent do 
you experience the following feelings when 
thinking about people like José? 
Oppose Political 
Reintegration of the 
ex-FARC members 
EMOPRLEFT José is a peasant leader 
linked to left-wing social organizations. 
Despite all the challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to oppose the 
Political Reintegration of the ex-FARC 
members. Recently you received an 
anonymous tip suggesting that José may pose a 
threat to the maintenance of public order. To 
which extent do you experience the following 
feelings when thinking about people like 
José? 
EMOPRRIGHT José is a peasant leader linked 
to right-wing social organizations. Despite all 
the challenges, after much consideration José has 
decided to oppose the Political Reintegration of 
the ex-FARC members. Recently you received 
an anonymous tip suggesting that José may pose 
a threat to the maintenance of public order. To 
which extent do you experience the following 














Table 2: Out-group Threat Perception and Experiment Treatments 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Emotions Scale and Out-group Threat Perception.  
 
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
 Emotions  779 1.675 2.124 -9 9 
Out-group Threat 
Perception  














of the ex-FARC 
members 
METSPRLEFT José is a peasant leader linked to 
left-wing social organizations. Despite all the 
challenges, after much consideration José has decided 
to support the Political Reintegration of the ex-
FARC members. Recently you received an 
anonymous tip suggesting that José may pose a threat 
to the maintenance of public order To which extent 
do you believe that this type of person poses a 
threat because: 
 
METSPRRIGHT José is a peasant leader 
linked to right-wing social organizations. 
Despite all the challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to support the 
Political Reintegration of the ex-FARC 
members. Recently you received an anonymous 
tip suggesting that José may pose a threat to the 
maintenance of public order.  To which extent do 





of the ex-FARC 
members 
METOPRLEFT José is a peasant leader linked to 
left-wing social organizations. Despite all the 
challenges, after much consideration José has decided 
to oppose the Political Reintegration of the ex-
FARC members. Recently you received an 
anonymous tip suggesting that José may pose a threat 
to the maintenance of public order. To which extent 
do you believe that this type of person poses a 
threat because: 
METOPRRIGHT José is a peasant leader linked 
to right-wing social organizations. Despite all 
the challenges, after much consideration José has 
decided to oppose the Political Reintegration of 
the ex-FARC members. Recently you received 
an anonymous tip suggesting that José may pose a 
threat to the maintenance of public order. To 
which extent do you believe that this type of 
person poses a threat because: 
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Figure 1: The differences in the Emotions mean by treatment adding confidence 
intervals to the bars.  
Emotions findings  
 




Number of obs.=774 
 
 R-squared = 0.0142  
 
Root MSE = 2.111 
 
 Adj. R-squared = 0.0104  
 
Source Partial SS df MS  F Prob>F 
 
Model 49.504 3 16.501 3.70 0.0115 
Jose is Left-wing  17.313 1 17.313 3.88 0.0491 
Oppose political 
reintegration  
8.805 1 8.805 1.98 0.1602 
Jose is Left-wing #Oppose 
political reintegration 
24.022 1 24.022 5.39 0.0205 
 
Residual 
3431.81 770 4.456   
 
     




Table 5: Effect sizes measured by η2 Of the Two-way ANOVA for Emotions 
Effect sizes measured by η2 
Source Eta-Squared df [95% Conf. Interval] 
Model 0.014 3 0.000 0.0319 
     
Jose is Left-wing  0.005 1 . 0.0196 
Oppose political 
reintegration  
0.002 1 . 0.0144 
Jose is Left-wing #Oppose 
political reintegration 
0.006 1 0.000 0.0232 
 
Table 6: Margins of the Two-way ANOVA for Emotions 
Ideology of Jose #Political 
reintegration  
Margin Std.Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Jose Right-wing #Support 
political re-integration 
1.804 0.148 12.12 0.000 1.512  2.097 
Jose Right-wing #Oppose political 
re-integration 
1.239 0.152 8.11 0.000 0.939 1.538 
Jose Left-wing #Support political 
re-integration 
1.751 0.150 11.62 0.000 1.455 2.047 
Jose Left-wing #Oppose political 
re-integration 




Adjusted predictions    
Expression: Linear prediction, predict () 
Number of obs. =774 















Table 7: Linear Regression between Treatment Groups and Emotions  




[95% Conf. Interval]  Sig 




       
Jose Left-wing and 
Oppose political re-
integration 
0.139 0.216 0.64 0.520 -0.285 0.563  
Jose Right-wing and 
Support political re-
integration 
0.053 0.212 0.25 0.802 -0.363 0.469  
Jose Right-wing and 
Oppose political re-
integration 
-0.513 0.215 -2.39 0.017 -0.934 -0.091 ** 




Mean dependent var 1.672 SD dependent var  2.122 
R-squared  0.014 Number of obs   774 
F-test   3.702 Prob > F  0.012 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 3357.215 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 3375.821 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Figure 3: The differences in Out-group Threat mean by treatment adding confidence 
intervals to the bars.  
Out-group Threat Perception findings 
 
Table 8: Two-way ANOVA for Out-group Threat Perception 
Number of obs = 764 
 
 R-squared = 0.0433  
 
Root MSE = 2.387 
 
 Adj. R-squared = 0.039  
 
Source Partial SS df MS  F Prob>F 
 
Model 196.046 3 65.348 11.46 0.0000 
Jose is Left-wing  185.216 1 185.216 32.49 0.0000 
Oppose political 
reintegration  




Table 9: Effect sizes measured by η2 Of the Two-way ANOVA for Out-group Threat 
Perception 
 
Effect sizes measured by η2 
Source Eta-Squared df [95% Conf.Interval] 
Model 0.0432 3 0.0172 0.07194 
     
Jose is Left-wing  0.041 1 0.0178 0.0718 
Oppose political 
reintegration  
0.0003 1 . 0.007 
Jose is Left-wing #Oppose 
political reintegration 
0.0029 1 . 0.015 
 
Figure 4: Residuals Out-group Threat Perception  
 
Jose is Left-wing #Oppose 
political reintegration 
12.810 1 12.810 2.25 0.1343 
 
Residual 
4332.255 760 5.700   
 
     
Total 4528.302 763 5.934   
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Table 10: Margins of the Two-way ANOVA for Out-group Threat Perception 
Ideology of Jose #Political 
reintegration  
Margin Std.Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Jose Right-wing #Support 
political re-integration 
4.203 0.169 24.83 0.000 3.870 4.535 
Jose Right-wing #Oppose 
political re-integration 
3.858 0.176 21.92 0.000 3.513 4.204 
Jose Left-wing #Support political 
re-integration 
4.929 0.170 28.98 0.000 4.595 5.263 
Jose Left-wing #Oppose political 
re-integration 


















   
Expression: Linear prediction, predict () 
Number of obs. = 764 


















 [95% Conf. Interval]  Sig 




       
Jose Left-wing and 
Oppose political re-
integration 
0.174 0.245 0.71 0.478 -0.307 0.654  
Jose Right-wing and 
Support political re-
integration 
-0.726 0.240 -3.03 0.003 -1.197 -0.255 *** 
Jose Right-wing and 
Oppose political re-
integration 
-1.071 0.245 -4.37 0.000 -1.551 -0.590 *** 
 Constant 4.929 0.170 28.98 0.000 4.595 5.263 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 4.524 SD dependent var  2.436 
R-squared  0.043 Number of obs   764 
F-test   11.464 Prob > F  0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 3501.889 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 3520.443 
 





Appendix 13. Path Models: Supplementary Tables  
Table 1: Path model of Political Ideology, Emotions and Aggressive Disposition 
Direct effects  
 




   
Emotions   
 
 
   
Left-Wing  0.296 0.145 2.03 0.042 0.073 
Aggressive Disposition  
 
 
   
Emotions  0.297 0.034 8.54 0.000 0.297 
Left-Wing  -0.060 0.139 -0.43 0.664 -0.015 
 
Indirect effects  
 




   
Emotions   
 
 
   
Left-Wing  - (no path) 
 
- - 
Aggressive Disposition  
 
 
   
Emotions  - (no path) 
 
- - 
Left-Wing  0.088 0.044 1.98 0.048 0.0220 
 
Total effects  
 




   
Emotions   
 
 
   
Left-Wing  0.296 0.145 2.03 0.042 0.073 
Aggressive Disposition  
 
 
   
Emotions  0.297 0.034 8.54 0.000 0.297 







Table 2: Path model of Political Reintegration, Emotions and Aggressive Disposition 
Direct effects  
 








   
Oppose Political 
Reintegration  
-0.300 0.145 -2.06 0.039 -0.074 
Aggressive Disposition  
 
 
   
Emotions  0.303 0.034 8.75 0.000 0.304 
Oppose Political 
Reintegration  
0.388 0.139 2.80 0.005 0.097 
      
Indirect effects      
 








   
Oppose Political 
Reintegration  




Aggressive Disposition  
 
 
   






-0.091 0.045 -2.01 0.045 -0.022 
      
Total effects      
 








   
Oppose Political 
Reintegration  
-0.300 0.145 -2.06 0.039 -0.074 
Aggressive Disposition  
 
 
   





0.297 0.145 2.04 0.041 0.074 
 
Table 3: Path model of Political Ideology, Emotions and Willingness to Protect  
Direct effects  
 








   
Left-Wing  0.282 0.150 1.87 0.061 0.068 
Willingness to protect  
 
 
   
Emotions  -0.177 0.042 -4.14 0.000 -0.149 
Left-Wing  -0.482 0.176 -2.73 0.006 -0.098 
      
Indirect effects      
 








   




Willingness to protect  
 
 
   




Left-Wing  -0.050 0.029 -1.70 0.088 -0.010 




   
 








   
Left-Wing  0.282 0.150 1.87 0.061 0.068 
Willingness to protect  
 
 
   
Emotions  -0.177 0.042 -4.14 0.000 -0.149 






Table 4: Path model of Political Reintegration, Emotions and Willingness to Protect  
Direct effects  
 








   
Oppose Political Reintegration  -0.200 0.151 -1.33 0.184 -0.048 
Willingness to Protect  
 
 
   
Emotions  -0.185 0.0429 -4.33 0.000 -0.156 
Oppose Political Reintegration -0.042 0.177 -0.24 0.810 -0.008 




   
 








   




Willingness to Protect  
 
 
   




Oppose Political Reintegration 0.037 0.029 1.27 0.204 0.007 




   
 








   
Oppose Political Reintegration  -0.200 0.151 -1.33 0.184 -0.048 
Willingness to Protect  
 
 
   
Emotions  -0.185 0.042 -4.33 0.000 -0.157 









Table 5: Path model of Political Ideology, Out-group Threat Perception and Aggressive 
Disposition.  
Direct effects  
 




   
Out-group Threat Perception   
 
 
   
Left-Wing  1.0306 0.172 5.96 0.000 0.213 
Aggressive Disposition  
 
 
   
Out-group Threat Perception   0.321 0.028 11.31 0.000 0.392 
Left-Wing -0.294 0.137 -2.15 0.032 -0.07 




   
 




   
Out-group Threat Perception   
 
 
   




Aggressive Disposition  
 
 
   




Left-Wing 0.331 0.062 5.28 0.000 0.083 




   
 




   
Out-group Threat Perception   
 
 
   
Left-Wing  1.0306 0.172 5.96 0.000 0.213 
Aggressive Disposition  
 
 
   
Out-group Threat Perception   0.321 0.028 11.31 0.000 0.392 








Table 6: Path model of Political Reintegration, Out-group Threat Perception and 
Willingness to Protect  
Direct effects  
 




   
Out-group Threat Perception  
 
 
   
Oppose Political Reintegration  -0.086 0.177 -0.49 0.624 -0.017 
Aggressive Disposition  
 
 
   
Out-group Threat Perception  0.309 0.027 11.15 0.000 0.377 
Oppose Political Reintegration  0.311 0.134 2.32 0.020 0.078 
  
 




   
 




   
Out-group Threat Perception  
 
 
   




Aggressive Disposition  
 
 
   




Oppose Political Reintegration  -0.026 0.054 -0.49 0.625 -0.006 




   
 




   
Out-group Threat Perception  
 
 
   
Oppose Political Reintegration  -0.086 0.177 -0.49 0.624 -0.017 
Aggressive Disposition  
 
 
   
Out-group Threat Perception  0.309 0.027 11.15 0.000 0.377 








Table 7: Path model of Political Ideology, Out-group Threat Perception and 
Willingness to Protect  
Direct effects  
 




   
Out-group Threat Perception  
 
 
   
Left-Wing  0.968 0.176 5.49 0.000 0.198 
Willingness to Protect 
 
 
   
Out-group Threat Perception 0.004 0.037 0.12 0.901 0.004 
Left-Wing -0.558 0.183 -3.05 0.002 -0.113 
  
 




   
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Std. Coef. 
Out-group Threat Perception  
 
 




   




Out-group Threat Perception 
 
 
   




Out-group Threat Perception  0.004 0.036 0.12 0.901 0.000 
  
 




   
 




   
Out-group Threat Perception  
 
 
   
Left-Wing  0.968 0.176 5.49 0.000 0.198 
Willingness to Protect 
 
 
   
Out-group Threat Perception 0.004 0.037 0.12 0.901 0.004 








Table 8: Path model of Political Reintegration, Out-group Threat Perception and 
Willingness to Protect  
Direct effects  
 




   
Out-group Threat Perception  
 
 
   
Oppose Political Reintegration  -0.083 0.180 -0.46 0.642 -0.017 
Willingness to Protect 
 
 
   
Out-group Threat Perception -0.018 0.037 -0.49 0.626 -0.017 
Oppose Political Reintegration -0.015 0.180 -0.09 0.932 -0.003 
  
 




   
 




   
Out-group Threat Perception  
 
 
   




Willingness to Protect 
 
 
   




Oppose Political Reintegration 0.001 0.004 0.34 0.736 0.000 
  
 




   
 




   
Out-group Threat Perception  
 
 
   
Oppose Political Reintegration  -0.083 0.180 -0.46 0.642 -0.017 
Willingness to Protect 
 
 
   
Out-group Threat Perception -0.018 0.037 -0.49 0.626 -0.017 








Appendix 14. Pair Correlation Experiment #1   
Table 1: Pair Correlation Experiment #1 Multilinear Regression Variables 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Social Dominance Orientation  1.000                
Ideology (Left-Right) 0.084** 1.000               
Negative Emotions  0.180*** 0.089** 1.000              
Personal Death Threat 0.128*** 0.077** 0.474*** 1.000             
Physical Collective Threat 0.122*** 0.163*** 0.490*** 0.708*** 1.000            
Symbolic Collective Threat 0.150*** 0.173*** 0.481*** 0.636*** 0.780*** 1.000           
Past Victimization Threat 0.146*** 0.026 0.335*** 0.453*** 0.467*** 0.485*** 1.000          
Moral Justification Threat  -0.141*** 0.128*** 0.002 -0.048 -0.004 0.058 0.006 1.000         
Dehumanization Leftist  -0.067* -0.128*** -0.203*** -0.138*** -0.197*** -0.185*** -0.041 0.078** 1.000        
Dehumanization Rightist  0.035 0.283*** -0.033 0.013 0.007 0.012 0.017 0.237*** 0.420*** 1.000       
Combatant Exposure  0.061* -0.057 -0.023 0.023 -0.020 0.009 -0.009 0.245*** 0.051 0.138*** 1.000      
Hypervigilance  0.053 0.079** 0.184*** 0.151*** 0.124*** 0.174*** 0.102*** 0.159*** -0.023 0.032 0.270*** 1.000     
Left-Wing Treatment  0.044 -0.007 0.058 0.230*** 0.201*** 0.170*** 0.110*** 0.003 -0.025 0.005 -0.020 0.012 1.000    
Oppose Pol Reintegration Treatment Variable  -0.009 0.038 -0.043 0.034 -0.026 -0.048 0.019 -0.007 0.019 -0.015 -0.002 0.023 0.004 1.000   
Willingness to Protect  -0.099*** -0.028 -0.003 -0.039 -0.099*** -0.109*** 0.015 0.075** 0.002 0.041 0.065* -0.049 -0.110*** 0.001 1.000  
Aggressive Disposition  0.165*** 0.080** 0.526*** 0.324*** 0.321*** 0.305*** 0.251*** -0.131*** -0.080** 0.015 -0.073** 0.030 0.007 0.076** 0.034 1.000 





Appendix 15. Independent Variables for Multilinear 
Regression Model: Supplementary Tables and Figures  
Operationalization Independent Variables: Multi-Linear Regression 
Model, Individual Characteristics of Colombian Soldiers  
Social Dominant Orientation103 - SDO7 original scale by Arnold K Ho et al. (2015) 
Instructions:  





nor in favor 
(3) 




1) Some groups of people must be kept in their place. 
2) It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top… 
3) …And that other groups are at the bottom. 
4) An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and 
others to be on the bottom. 
5) Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
6) Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top. 
7) No one group should dominate in society. 
8) Groups at the bottom should not have to stay in their place. 
9) Group dominance is a poor principle. 
10) We should not push for group equality. 
11) We shouldn’t try to guarantee that every group has the same 
quality of life. 
12) It is unjust to try to make groups equal. 
13) Group equality should not be our primary goal. 
14) We should work to give all groups an equal chance to 
succeed. 
15) We should do what we can to equalize conditions for 
different groups. 
16) No matter how much effort it takes, we ought to strive to 
ensure that all groups have the same chance in life. 
 
103 I applied the Spanish version of the SDO7 scale validated in this article (Carvacho et al.) 
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17) Group equality should be our ideal. 
 
The scale reliability coefficient or alpha the Cronbach of this scale for the sample of 
Colombian soldiers was: 0.8103 
Left-wing and Right-wing Scale104 Obsdemocracia (2016b) 
Nowadays, when talking about political tendencies, many express more symptathy with 
either the Left-wing, or with Right-wing. According to the meaning you attribute to the 
terms “Left-wing” and “Right-wing,” and when considering your political view-
point, where would you position yourself on a scale of 1 to 10 from left to right, 
respectively, where 1 means “Left-wing” and 10 means “Right-wing”? 
 
 Left-wing Right-wing 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Emotions105  
The scale of negative emotions was based on the work of Halperin (2011). I sent an 
email to this professor and he shared some items concerning group-based hatred, anger 
and fear to measure negative emotions, and empathy, compassion and respect to 
measure positive emotions. Following this, I did my own scale, which I translated it 
into Spanish. After some pilots, I selected the accurate items to measure negative and 
positive emotions. Subsequently, I decided to connect the question about emotions with 






104 I used the scale from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in the Spanish version. 
This scale has been applied in Colombia since 2004 to a sample of national representation. This will 
allow me to compare the ideology of the soldiers who participated in my survey with the ideology of the 
Colombian population. 
105 The items for this scale were counterbalanced across all participants. 
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 Left Right 
Support Political Reintegration of the ex-
FARC members 
EMSPRLEFT José is a peasant leader 
linked to left-wing social 
organizations. Despite all the 
challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to 
support the Political Reintegration of 
the ex-FARC members. Recently you 
received an anonymous tip suggesting 
that José may pose a threat to the 
maintenance of public order To which 
extent do you experience the 
following feelings when thinking 
about people like José? 
EMSPRRIGHT José is a peasant 
leader linked to right-wing social 
organizations. Despite all the 
challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to 
support the Political Reintegration of 
the ex-FARC members. Recently you 
received an anonymous tip suggesting 
that José may pose a threat to the 
maintenance of public order. To which 
extent do you experience the 
following feelings when thinking 
about people like José?: 
Oppose Political Reintegration of the ex-
FARC members 
EMOPRLEFT José is a peasant leader 
linked to left-wing social 
organizations. Despite all the 
challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to 
oppose the Political Reintegration of 
the ex-FARC members. Recently you 
received an anonymous tip suggesting 
that José may pose a threat to the 
maintenance of public order. To which 
extent do you experience the 
following feelings when thinking 
about people like José?: 
EMOPRRIGHT José is a peasant 
leader linked to right-wing social 
organizations. Despite all the 
challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to 
oppose the Political Reintegration of 
the ex-FARC members. Recently you 
received an anonymous tip suggesting 
that José may pose a threat to the 
maintenance of public order. To which 
extent do you experience the 
following feelings when thinking 
about people like José? 
 
 Not at all Extremely 
 
12) Hate  
13) Hostility  
14) Anger  
15) Irritation  
16) Rage  
17) Anxiety 
18) Afraid  
19) Worried  
20) Empathy  
21) Compassion  
22) Respect  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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The alpha the Cronbach of negative emotion was 0.9 this shows that there is an internal 
consistency within the set of items as a group. Instruments that have alpha the Cronbach 
between-0.9 and min 0.7 indicate that it is good and acceptable.  Nevertheless, if alpha 
the Cronbach is between 0.7 or less than 0.5 is weak and sometimes unacceptable. The 
result for positive emotions was 0.6.  For that reason, in the model I used only the 
negative emotions scale.  
Out-Group Threat: The Multidimensional Existential Threat Model (MET) 
(Hirschberger et al., 2016)106 
To incorporate the MET model, I include the question within the treatments and I 
randomize within bloc the four dimension of the existential threat model.  
 
106 The items for each type of the MET model where were counterbalanced across all 
participants. 
 Left Right 
Support Political Reintegration of the ex-
FARC members 
METSPRLEFT José is a peasant 
leader linked to left-wing social 
organizations. Despite all the 
challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to 
support the Political Reintegration of 
the ex-FARC members. Recently you 
received an anonymous tip suggesting 
that José may pose a threat to the 
maintenance of public order To which 
extent do you believe that this type of 
person poses a threat because: 
 
METSPRRIGHT José is a peasant 
leader linked to right-wing social 
organizations. Despite all the 
challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to 
support the Political Reintegration of 
the ex-FARC members. Recently you 
received an anonymous tip suggesting 
that José may pose a threat to the 
maintenance of public order.  To which 
extent do you believe that this type of 
person poses a threat because: 
Oppose Political Reintegration of the ex-
FARC members 
METOPRLEFT José is a peasant 
leader linked to left-wing social 
organizations. Despite all the 
challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to 
oppose the Political Reintegration of 
the ex-FARC members. Recently you 
received an anonymous tip suggesting 
that José may pose a threat to the 
maintenance of public order. To which 
extent do you believe that this type of 
person poses a threat because: 
METOPRRIGHT José is a peasant 
leader linked to right-wing social 
organizations. Despite all the 
challenges, after much 
consideration José has decided to 
oppose the Political Reintegration of 
the ex-FARC members. Recently you 
received an anonymous tip suggesting 
that José may pose a threat to the 
maintenance of public order. To which 
extent do you believe that this type of 




 Not at all Extremely 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
5. Jeopardize your physical existence  
6. Jeopardize the physical existence of the Colombian people  
7. Put at risk the identity of Colombia as a democratic state  
8. Represent the perpetrators of the Colombian people  
Moral Justification (L. E. Jackson & Gaertner, 2010) 
To respond to the following questions, use the following scale, where “1” means 
STRONGLY DISAGREE and “9” means STRONGLY AGREE. Please write the 
number that represents your response beside each statement. (The following options 
were randomize within bloc). This scale was translated into Spanish.  
1. It is our nation’s duty to use military force when our way of life is threatened. 
2. Responding to terror attacks with military counter attacks is the moral thing to 
do. 
3. It is necessary to use military force to defend our nation from attack.  
4. It is wrong to criticize the use of military force if such force contributes to our 
safety. 
5. When a conflict develops, it is wrong to just sit and watch. It is better to attack 
before being attacked. 
6. Military solutions to conflicts are immoral and cannot be justified. (Reverse 
scored.)  
7. It is our duty to stop terrorists by any means necessary. 
8. While military strikes can have negative consequences, the suffering and 
destruction produced by such strikes is so much less than the suffering and 
destruction produced by acts of terror. 
9. It is okay to use military force when it prevents more suffering than it causes. 
 
The alpha the Cronbach of Moral Justification scale was 0.75.  
 
In the survey, I also included a scale that measures Responsibility Reduction following 
the theory of delegitimization and the moral disengagement that implies the 
diminishing of personal responsibility, which removes culpability of the self for the act 
and its consequences. In theory, it is possible to say that soldiers are more likely to 
attribute their individual responsibility to a legitimate authority. That’s why soldiers 
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usually argue that, because they are following orders or acting in groups, it is not 
possible for them assume individual responsibility.  
I applied the scale presented in the L. E. Jackson and Gaertner (2010) study in the 
Spanish version. Nevertheless, the alpha the Cronbach of this scale was 0.4085. For 
that reason, it was not possible to include the scale in this study.  
To respond to the following questions, use the following scale, where “1” means 
STRONGLY DISAGREE and “9” means STRONGLY AGREE. Please write the 
number that represents your response beside each statement. 
 
1. A given member of a group should not be held accountable for military 
decisions made collectively.  
2. Soldiers should not be held responsible for their actions when following orders 
while on duty.  
3. It’s a soldier’s duty to obey the commander’s orders, even when the soldier 
disagrees. 
4. Even when following orders, a person is still liable for any action he or she 
carries out.  
5. When many people are involved in violent crimes, the individual carries less 
responsibility.  
6. When an authority demands something that the individual does not agree with, 
the accountability is fully on the authority giving orders.  
7. When it is my duty to follow orders, I don’t carry personal responsibility for my 
actions, because I just execute. I don’t make the actual decision. 
8. If a person behaves inhumanely, they are responsible, even if they followed 
direct orders.  
Dehumanization of Out-Ideology Group  (Kteily et al., 2015) 
Some believe that people may vary in their level of humanity. According to this, some 
people appear highly evolved, while others don’t seem to be much different from 
animals. Using the following image of the evolution of man, where 0 represents the 
lowest level of humanity and 100 the maximum level, select the number that represents 
 
 397 
the level of evolution of the members of each group. The items for this scale were 




    




3. Petristas  
4. Communists 
5. Capitalists  
6. Rightists  
7. Socialists 
Control Variables  
Combatant Exposure (CES) (Sundberg, 2015) 
To measure Combatant Exposure, I used the scale created by the U.S 
Department of Veterans Affairs. The Combat Exposure Scale (CES) is a self-report 
measure that assesses wartime stressors experienced by combatants. Items are rated on 
a 5-point frequency (1 = "no" or "never" to 5 = "26+ times" or "51+ times"), 5-point 
duration (1 = "never" to 5 = "7+ months"), or 45-point degree of loss (1 = "none" to 45 
= "76% or more") scale. This scale is usually applied to soldiers who were involved in 
peacekeeping operations or interstate conflicts (Sundberg, 2015). However, during the 
pilots of this study, I incorporated the suggestions of the Colombian soldiers to improve 
the scale, and to make it more accurate for a Colombian context.  
 
Please select the answer above that best describes your experience: 
 
 No (1) 1-3 times (2) 4-12 times (3) 13-50 times (4) 51 times or more (5) 
 
Did you ever go on combat patrols, or have other dangerous duty?  
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How often did you fire rounds at the enemy?  
How often did you see someone get hit by incoming or outgoing rounds?   
How often were you in danger of being injured or killed in the line of duty?  
 
Were you ever under enemy fire? (Think of your whole career experience as a soldier.)  
1. Never  
2. 1 month  
3. 1-3 months 
4. 4-6 months  
5. 7 months or more 
 
Were you ever surrounded by the enemy? (Think of your whole career experience as a 
soldier.) 
1. No  
2. 1-2 times 
3. 3-12 times  
4. 13-25 times  
5. 26 times or more  
  
What percentage of the men in your unit were killed, wounded, or missing in action?  
1. None  
2. 1-25%   
3. 26-50%   
4. 51-75%   











How many times during your military career have you been in a combat area? (Spanish: 
área de operaciones.) 
1. None 
2. 1-5   
3. 5-10  
4. 10-20  
5. 20 or more  
 
The alpha the Cronbach of this scale for the sample of Colombian soldiers was 0.9  
Hypervigilance (Rosemary E. Bernstein, Brianna C. Delker, Jeffrey A. Knight, & 
Jennifer J. Freyd, 2015) 
Instructions: Please respond to each of the statements by placing an “X” in the answer 
column that best applies to you. There is no right or wrong response for each statement. 
To help you decide your answer for each item, think back over the past month and then 
mark a column with your answer based either on “about how much the statement is true 
as it relates to you,” or on “about how often the statement is true as it relates to you.” 
Options: 
 
Not at all like me 
(Never true)  
Somewhat like me 
(Sometimes true)  
Much like me 
(Often true)  
Mostly like me 
(Very often true)  
Very much like me 
(Always true) 
1. As soon as I wake up and for the rest of the day, I am watching for signs of 
trouble. 
2. When I am outside, I think ahead about what I would do (or where I would go) 
if someone were to try and surprise or harm me.     
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3. I notice that when I am in public or new places, I need to scan the crowd or 
surroundings. 
4. When I am in public, I feel overwhelmed because I cannot keep track of 
everything going on around me.      
5. I feel that if I don’t stay alert and watchful, something bad will happen. 
     
The alpha the Cronbach of this scale for the sample of Colombian soldiers was 0.84.  
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Appendix 16. Multivariable Regression for Experiment #1 
Outcomes: Supplementary Tables and Figures  
Main Effects Independent Variables: Individual Level Background for  
Aggressive Disposition  
A main effect (also called a simple effect) is the effect of one independent variable on 
the dependent variable. It ignores the effects of any other independent variables.  
 
Table 1: Main Effects Aggressive Disposition and Social Dominance Orientation and 
Ideology (one-dimension scale left-right) 
 Aggressive 
Disposition 






 Interval]  Sig 
 Social Dominance 
Orientation 
0.561 0.121 4.62 0.000 0.323 0.799 *** 
 Constant 1.635 0.314 5.21 0.000 1.019 2.251 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 3.046 SD dependent var  2.010 
R-squared  0.027 Number of obs   763 
Adjusted R2 0.02   
F-test   21.345 Prob > F  0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 3212.851 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 3222.126 
 










 Interval]  Sig 
Ideology  
(Left-Right) 
0.072 0.033 2.18 0.029 0.007 0.137 ** 
 Constant 2.534 0.245 10.33 0.000 2.052 3.016 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 3.045 SD dependent var  2.018 
R-squared  0.006 Number of obs   745 
Adjusted R2 0.005   
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F-test   4.770 Prob > F  0.029 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 3158.413 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 3167.639 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 2: Main Effects Aggressive Disposition and Negative Emotions  
 Aggressive 
Disposition 






 Interval]  Sig 
Negative Emotions 0.529 0.031 16.84 0.000 0.467 0.591 *** 
 Constant 0.975 0.136 7.20 0.000 0.709 1.241 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 3.004 SD dependent var  1.984 
R-squared  0.277 Number of obs   743 
Adjusted R2 0.27   
F-test   283.511 Prob > F  0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 2888.685 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 2897.907 
 




























 Interval]  Sig 
Personal Death 
Threat 
0.108 0.037 2.90 0.004 0.035 0.181 *** 
Physical Collective 
Threat 
0.063 0.045 1.40 0.162 -0.025 0.151  
Symbolic 
Collective Threat 
0.052 0.041 1.26 0.208 -0.029 0.134  
Past Victimization 
Threat 
0.063 0.029 2.16 0.031 0.006 0.120 ** 
 Constant 1.661 0.148 11.23 0.000 1.371 1.951 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 2.896 SD dependent var  1.947 
R-squared  0.127 Number of obs   650 
Adjusted R2 0.121   
F-test   23.372 Prob > F  0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 2632.077 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 2654.461 
 















Table 4: Main Effects Aggressive Disposition and Moral Justification  
 Aggressive 
Disposition 






 Interval]  Sig 
 Moral Justification -0.195 0.054 -3.57 0.000 -0.302 -0.088 *** 
 Constant 4.361 0.375 11.63 0.000 3.625 5.097 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 3.048 SD dependent var  2.007 
R-squared  0.017 Number of obs   730 
Adjusted R2 0.015   
F-test   12.756 Prob > F  0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 3078.840 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 3088.026 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 5: Main Effects Aggressive Disposition and Dehumanization 
 Aggressive 
Disposition 






 Interval]  Sig 
Dehumanization 
Left-Wing  
-0.078 0.028 -2.75 0.006 -0.134 -0.022 *** 
Dehumanization 
Right-Wing 
0.044 0.029 1.50 0.133 -0.013 0.102  
 Constant 3.045 0.193 15.82 0.000 2.667 3.423 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 2.982 SD dependent var  2.019 
R-squared  0.012 Number of obs   616 
Adjusted R2 0.009   
F-test   3.871 Prob > F  0.021 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 2610.775 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 2624.045 
 






Table 6: Main Effects Aggressive Disposition and Combatant Exposure  
 Aggressive 
Disposition 






 Interval]  Sig 
 Combatant 
Exposure 
-0.148 0.075 -1.97 0.049 -0.296 0.000 ** 
 Constant 3.429 0.216 15.86 0.000 3.004 3.853 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 3.028 SD dependent var  1.981 
R-squared  0.005 Number of obs   733 
Adjusted R2 0.003   
F-test   3.872 Prob > F  0.049 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 3081.502 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 3090.696 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 7: Main Effects Aggressive Disposition and Hypervigilance  
 Aggressive 
Disposition 






 Interval]  Sig 
 Hypervigilance 0.066 0.080 0.83 0.408 -0.091 0.223  
 Constant 2.905 0.184 15.78 0.000 2.544 3.267 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 3.046 SD dependent var  2.010 
R-squared  0.001 Number of obs   763 
Adjusted R2 0.0004   
F-test   0.687 Prob > F  0.408 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 3233.270 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 3242.544 
 


















 Interval]  Sig 
 Left-wing  0.029 0.146 0.20 0.840 -0.257 0.315  
 Constant 3.031 0.103 29.49 0.000 2.829 3.233 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 3.046 SD dependent var  2.010 
R-squared  0.000 Number of obs   763.000 
F-test   0.041 Prob > F  0.840 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 3233.917 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 3243.191 
 






















Table 9: Multilinear Regression Aggressive Disposition 
Multilinear Regression Model for Aggressive Disposition  
Aggressive Disposition  Coef. St.Err. t-value p-value [95% Conf. Interval]  Sig 
Social Dominance 
Orientation  
0.073 0.128 0.57 0.569 -0.178 0.324  
Ideology (Left-Right)  0.026 0.037 0.70 0.486 -0.047 0.1  
Negative Emotions 0.438 0.05 8.79 0 0.34 0.536 *** 
Personal Death Threat 0.066 0.041 1.61 0.107 -0.014 0.146  
Physical Collective Threat -0.025 0.045 -0.55 0.586 -0.114 0.064  
Symbolic Collective Threat 0.033 0.044 0.75 0.452 -0.053 0.119  
Past Victimization Threat 0.034 0.03 1.14 0.255 -0.025 0.094  
Moral Justification  -0.199 0.062 -3.20 0.001 -0.321 -0.077 *** 
Dehumanization Left-
Wing107  
















Combat Exposure  -0.023 0.084 -0.27 0.786 -0.189 0.143  
Hypervigilance  -0.14 0.088 -1.59 0.114 -0.313 0.033  
Referent Group: Right-Wing        
Left-Wing  -0.329 0.207 -1.59 0.112 -0.735 0.077  
Referent Group: Support the 
Political Reintegration of 
FARC 
       
José Oppose the Political 
Reintegration of FARC 
0.363 0.201 1.80 0.072 -0.032 0.758 * 
Left-Wing##Oppose -0.016 0.295 -0.06 0.956 -0.595 0.562  
 
107 The original scales for both dehumanization variables were recoded. The original scale is 0-100 and 
to keep consistency with the other variables in the model the variables were transformed into a scale 0-
10. Moreover, the total amount of missed valued for both dehumanization scales where particularly high. 
This was expected because they are sensible question. To see more about the descriptive statistics of this 





Constant 2.176 0.595 3.66 0 1.007 3.345 *** 
Mean dependent var 2.867 SD dependent var  1.938 
R-squared  0.297 Number of obs   515 
F-test   14.067 Prob > F  0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 1992.460 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 2060.367 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 













Main Effects Independent Variables: Individual Level Background for  
Willingness to Protect  
Table 10: Main Effects Willingness and Social Dominance Orientation and Ideology 










 Interval]  Sig 
 Social Dominance 
Orientation 
-0.408 0.150 -2.72 0.007 -0.702 -0.113 *** 
 Constant 6.579 0.386 17.04 0.000 5.821 7.337 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 5.558 SD dependent var  2.438 
R-squared  0.010 Number of obs   749 
Adjusted R2 0.008   
F-test   7.377 Prob > F  0.007 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 3456.035 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 3465.273 
 










 Interval]  Sig 
 Ideology 
 (Left-Right) 
-0.031 0.040 -0.77 0.444 -0.110 0.048  
 Constant 5.747 0.300 19.16 0.000 5.158 6.336 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 5.528 SD dependent var  2.436 
R-squared  0.001 Number of obs   731 
Adjusted R2 -0.0005   
F-test   0.587 Prob > F  0.444 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 3378.444 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 3387.633 
 




Table 11: Main Effects Willingness to Protect and Negative Emotions  
 Willingness to 
Protect 






 Interval]  Sig 
Negative Emotions -0.003 0.046 -0.07 0.942 -0.093 0.086  
 Constant 5.555 0.198 28.05 0.000 5.167 5.944 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 5.543 SD dependent var  2.441 
R-squared  0.000 Number of obs   733 
Adjusted R2 -0.001   
F-test   0.005 Prob > F  0.942 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 3391.313 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 3400.507 
 























Table 12: Main Effects Willingness to Protect and Out-group Threat Dimensions  
Willingness to 
Protect 






 Interval]  Sig 
Personal Death 
Threat 
0.046 0.050 0.91 0.364 -0.053 0.144  
Physical Collective 
Threat 
-0.047 0.060 -0.77 0.442 -0.165 0.072  
Symbolic 
Collective Threat 
-0.146 0.057 -2.59 0.010 -0.257 -0.035 ** 
Past Victimization 
Threat 
0.075 0.039 1.93 0.054 -0.001 0.152 * 
 Constant 5.820 0.198 29.39 0.000 5.432 6.209 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 5.452 SD dependent var  2.459 
R-squared  0.028 Number of obs   642 
Adjusted R2 0.021   
F-test   4.535 Prob > F  0.001 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 2968.256 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 2990.579 
 



















Table 13: Main Effects Willingness to Protect and Moral Justification  
Willingness to 
Protect 






 Interval]  Sig 
 Moral Justification 0.133 0.066 2.00 0.045 0.003 0.262 ** 
 Constant 4.637 0.456 10.18 0.000 3.743 5.532 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 5.532 SD dependent var  2.430 
R-squared  0.006 Number of obs   719 
Adjusted R2 0.004   
F-test   4.018 Prob > F  0.045 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 3316.364 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 3325.520 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 14: Main Effects Willingness to Protect and Dehumanization 
Willingness to 
Protect 






 Interval]  Sig 
Dehumanization 
Left-Wing  
-0.035 0.035 -1.01 0.312 -0.104 0.033  
Dehumanization 
Right-Wing 
0.041 0.036 1.16 0.248 -0.029 0.112  
 Constant 5.479 0.233 23.47 0.000 5.020 5.937 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 5.584 SD dependent var  2.439 
R-squared  0.003 Number of obs   613 
Adjusted R2 -0.0005   
F-test   0.837 Prob > F  0.434 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 2835.833 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 2849.089 
 







Table 15: Main Effects Willingness to Protect and Combatant Exposure 
 Willingness to 
Protect 






 Interval]  Sig 
 Combat Exposure  0.162 0.092 1.76 0.079 -0.019 0.343 * 
 Constant 5.118 0.266 19.22 0.000 4.595 5.641 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 5.558 SD dependent var  2.430 
R-squared  0.004 Number of obs   718 
Adjusted R2 0.002   
F-test   3.085 Prob > F  0.079 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 3312.723 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 3321.876 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 16: Main Effects Willingness to Protect and Hypervigilance 
 Willingness to 
Protect 






 Interval]  Sig 
 Hypervigilance -0.130 0.097 -1.34 0.182 -0.320 0.061  
 Constant 5.834 0.225 25.93 0.000 5.392 6.276 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 5.558 SD dependent var  2.438 
R-squared  0.002 Number of obs   749 
Adjusted R2 0.001   
F-test   1.785 Prob > F  0.182 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 3461.608 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 3470.846 
 










Multilinear Regression Model for Willingness to Protect  
Table 17: Multilinear Regression Willingness to Protect 
Willingness to Protect Coef. St.Err. t-value p-value [95% Conf. Interval]  Sig 
Social Dominance 
Orientation  
-0.427 0.183 -2.33 0.02 -0.787 -0.067 ** 
Ideology (Left-Right)  -0.044 0.054 -0.82 0.415 -0.149 0.062  
Negative Emotions 0.048 0.072 0.67 0.5 -0.092 0.189  
Personal Death Threat 0.074 0.058 1.27 0.205 -0.041 0.189  
Physical Collective 
Threat 
-0.057 0.065 -0.88 0.38 -0.185 0.071  
Symbolic Collective 
Threat 
-0.16 0.063 -2.55 0.011 -0.284 -0.037 ** 
Past Victimization 
Threat 
0.087 0.043 1.99 0.047 0.001 0.172 ** 
Moral Justification  0.083 0.089 0.94 0.35 -0.091 0.258  
Dehumanization Left-
Wing  
-0.095 0.04 -2.38 0.018 -0.173 -0.017 ** 
Dehumanization Right-
Wing 
0.06 0.042 1.44 0.15 -0.022 0.143  
        
Combat Exposure  0.094 0.121 0.78 0.434 -0.143 0.332  
Hypervigilance  -0.14 0.126 -1.11 0.267 -0.387 0.107  
Referent Group: Right-
Wing 
       
José Left-Wing  -0.261 0.298 -0.88 0.382 -0.847 0.325  
Referent Group: 
Support the Political 
Reintegration of FARC 
       
Oppose the Political 
Reintegration of FARC 
0.208 0.29 0.72 0.472 -0.361 0.778  
Left-Wing##Oppose 
Political Reintegration 
-0.947 0.424 -2.23 0.026 -1.78 -0.114 ** 
Constant 6.686 0.858 7.79 0 5 8.371 *** 
 
 415 
Mean dependent var 5.445 SD dependent var  2.446 
R-squared  0.093 Number of obs   512 
F-test   3.383 Prob > F  0.000 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 2349.998 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 2417.811 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 





Appendix 17. Findings of Experiment #2: Supplementary 
Tables and Figures  
Table 1: Logistic Regression Self-Sacrifice by Policy Preference 
  




[95% Conf Interval]  Sig 
 Left-Wing Policy 
(Reference 
Category)   
       
 Right-Wing Policy  0.842 0.13 -1.11 0.267 0.622 1.14  
Constant 0.526 0.056 -6.00 0 0.426 0.648 *** 
 
Mean dependent var 0.326 SD dependent var  0.469 
Pseudo r-squared  0.001 Number of obs   764 
Chi-square   1.235 Prob > chi2  0.266 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 967.313 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 976.590 


















Table 2: GLM model with a logit link of Self-Sacrifice by treatments  
 Self-Sacrifice Odds 
Ratio 
St.Err. t-value p-value [95% Conf. Interval] Sig 
Treatment 1. Left-Oppose 
(Referent Category) 
       
Treatment 2. Left-Support  0.041 0.048 0.84 0.403 -0.054 0.136  
Treatment 3. Right-
Oppose  
0.023 0.047 0.48 0.633 -0.070 0.116  
Treatment 4. Right-
Support  
0.093 0.048 1.94 0.053 -0.001 0.187 * 
Age -0.003 0.025 -0.13 0.900 -0.052 0.046  
Female -0.016 0.102 -0.16 0.875 -0.215 0.183  
 Constant 0.295 0.068 4.34 0.000 0.162 0.428 *** 
Mean dependent var 0.325 SD dependent var   0.469 
Number of obs   759 Chi-square   4.065 
Prob > chi2  0.540 Akaike crit. (AIC) 1010.998 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Individual Level background for Self-Sacrifice  
Main Effects  
Table 3: Main Effect Self-Sacrifice and Spiritual Formidability  




Model 3  
Odds Ratio 



















   (0.065) (0.104) (0.083) 
 _cons 0.744 0.509 1.030 
   (0.279) (0.289) (0.520) 
 Pseudo R2  0.001 0.000 0.004 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 4: Main Effect Self-Sacrifice and Physical Formidability  
 
    Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  






 Obs. 769 380 389 
Physical 
Formidability 
1.045 1.090 1.013 
   (0.067) (0.106) (0.086) 
 _cons 0.398*** 0.299*** 0.502* 
   (0.117) (0.134) (0.196) 
 Pseudo R2  0.000 0.002 0.000 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  













Table 5: Main Effect Self-Sacrifice and Democracy as a Sacred Value 
 
    Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  






 Obs. 766 380 386 
Democracy as a 
Sacred Value 
0.987 0.816 1.184 
   (0.174) (0.207) (0.293) 
 _cons 0.492*** 0.525*** 0.464*** 
   (0.075) (0.115) (0.099) 
 Pseudo R2  0.000 0.001 0.001 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 6: Main Effect Self-Sacrifice and Identity Fusion Army  
 









Obs. 769 379 390 
No Fused 
(Referent Category) 
   
Identity Fusion Army 1.546*** 1.236 1.912*** 
 (0.241) (0.277) (0.416) 
_cons 0.385*** 0.398*** 0.372*** 
 (0.045) (0.066) (0.061) 
Pseudo R2 0.008 0.002 0.018 
Standard errors are in parenthesis   




Table 7: Main Effect Self-Sacrifice and Identity Fusion Military Unit  
      Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 






 Obs. 767 378 389 
No Fused  
(Referent Category) 
   
Identity Fusion Military 
Unit 
1.411** 1.623** 1.266 
   (0.218) (0.364) (0.272) 
 _cons 0.415*** 0.349*** 0.480*** 
   (0.044) (0.056) (0.068) 
 Pseudo R2  0.005 0.010 0.002 
Standard errors are in parenthesis    



















Table 8: Main Effect Self-Sacrifice and Identity Fusion Colombia  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 





Obs. 760 376 384 
No Fused 
(Referent Category) 
   
Identity Fusion 
Colombia 
1.321* 0.991 1.749** 
 (0.208) (0.225) (0.384) 
_cons 0.413*** 0.449*** 0.383*** 
 (0.050) (0.078) (0.064) 
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.000 0.013 
Standard errors are in parenthesis   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Control Variables  
Table 9: Main Effect Self-Sacrifice and Victim by Guerrilla 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 





 Obs. 772 382 390 
Victim by Guerrilla  0.738* 0.583** 0.951 
   (0.120) (0.136) (0.217) 
 _cons 0.542*** 0.547*** 0.538*** 
   (0.051) (0.076) (0.070) 
 Obs. 772 382 390 
 Pseudo R2  0.004 0.012 0.000 
Standard errors are in parenthesis    




Table 10: Main Effect Self-Sacrifice and Negative Emotions  
 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 






 Obs. 748 368 380 
Negative Emotions 0.920** 0.807*** 1.032 
   (0.037) (0.050) (0.056) 
 _cons 0.665** 0.990 0.473*** 
   (0.113) (0.250) (0.110) 
 Obs. 748 368 380 
 Pseudo R2  0.005 0.029 0.001 
Standard errors are in parenthesis    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
Table 11: Main Effect Self-Sacrifice and Ranks  
 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 






 Obs. 772 382 390 
Private Professional Soldiers 
(Referent Category) 
   
      
Private First Class   1.389 1.462 1.321 
   (0.478) (0.715) (0.640) 
Sub-officers 0.873 0.797 0.949 
   (0.188) (0.244) (0.288) 
Subaltern-Officers 0.519** 0.449* 0.601 
   (0.149) (0.184) (0.242) 
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Superior Officers 0.568 0.518 0.612 
   (0.206) (0.278) (0.301) 
 _cons 0.587*** 0.579** 0.595* 
   (0.111) (0.155) (0.160) 
 Pseudo R2  0.011 0.016 0.008 
   
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
Table 12: Main Effect Self-Sacrifice and Political Ideology Treatment  
    Model 1  
    Self-Sacrifice  
Treatment Right-Wing (Referent 
Category) 
 
    
Treatment Left-Wing (Referent Category) 0.842 
   (0.130) 
 _cons 0.526*** 
   (0.056) 
 Obs. 764 
 Pseudo R2  0.001 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  












Table 13: Main Effect Self-Sacrifice and Opinion Political Reintegration Treatment  
      (1) (2) (3) 






 Obs. 764 378 386 
Treatment José Support the 
Political Reintegration of FARC 
 (Referent Category) 
   
Treatment José Oppose the 
Political Reintegration of FARC 
1.252 1.170 1.331 
   (0.194) (0.261) (0.286) 
 _cons 0.433*** 0.410*** 0.456*** 
   (0.047) (0.064) (0.070) 
 Pseudo R2  0.002 0.001 0.004 
Standard errors are in parenthesis    



















Table 14: Multi-Variable Logistic Regression for Self-Sacrifice 








Obs. 722 355 367 
Rank  
Private Professional Soldiers 
(Referent Category) 
   
Private First Class   1.361 1.264 1.465 
   (0.508) (0.706) (0.778) 
 Sub-officers 0.765 0.565 1.143 
   (0.188) (0.202) (0.412) 
 Subaltern-Officers 0.474** 0.311** 0.801 









   (0.186) (0.179) (0.424) 
Spiritual Formidability 0.846* 0.92 0.77** 
   (0.073) (0.124) (0.09) 
Physical Formidability 1.075 1.125 1.041 
   (0.081) (0.134) (0.103) 
Democracy as a Sacred Value  0.976 0.725 1.235 
   (0.189) (0.213) (0.332) 
 Identity Fusion Army  1.407 0.892 1.991** 
   (0.298) (0.288) (0.58) 
Identity Fusion Military Unit  1.202 1.735* 0.917 
   (0.252) (0.557) (0.266) 
Identity Fusion Colombia  1.101 0.9 1.428 
   (0.212) (0.265) (0.378) 
Victim by Guerrilla  0.8 0.778 0.898 
   (0.142) (0.206) (0.224) 
Negative Emotions  0.893** 0.785*** 1.011 
   (0.04) (0.054) (0.061) 
 
 426 
José Left-Wing 0.931   
   (0.218)   



















Pseudo R2  0.042 0.074 0.052 
LR Chi2 38.18 32.14 24.41 
Standard errors are in parenthesis     






Appendix 18. Experiment #2: Supplementary Tables and 
Figures  
Operationalization Independent Variables Experiment #2:  
Multi-Variable Logistic Regression Model, Individual Characteristics of 
Colombian Soldiers109.  
Spiritual Formidability and Physical Formidability (Gómez et al., 2017) 
Physical Formidability  
Instructions:  
The PHYSICAL FORCE of a person or group represents the capacity and material 
resources (for example, social power, access to weapons, size) of a person or group to 
fight and REACH THEIR OBJECTIVES. Physical strength endows the person or 
group with material potential to DEFEND OR TO inflict physical damage to the 
opponent. Select the letter of the image that best represents your level of physical 
strength. 
 
A. (1)  
B. (2)  
C. (3)  
D. (4)  
 
109 For the Spanish version of some of these questions (Physical and Spiritual Formidability, Sacred 
Values and identity Fusion) I contacted one of the inventor of the scales, professor Dr. Angel 
Gómez, who shared with me the validate translation for these questions in Spanish. For Physical 




E. (5)  
 F. (6) 
Spiritual Formidability 
Instructions:  
The SPIRITUAL FORCE of a person or group symbolizes THE ABILITY AND 
IMMATERIAL RESOURCES (INTERNAL ENERGY, FORCE, PERSEVERANCE) 
OF A PERSON OR GROUP TO FIGHT AND REACH THEIR OBJECTIVES. The 
spiritual force gives the person or group of willpower to achieve their goals, persevere, 
deal with adversities and obstacles. It refers to the force with which one believes in 
what is fought and defended. Select the letter of the image that best represents your 
level of spiritual strength. 
 
A. (1)  
B. (2)  
C. (3)  
D. (4)  
E. (5)  
 F. (6) 
Democracy as a Sacred Value (Gómez et al., 2016) 
How much money would be necessary for you to decide to abandon your current 








Never. The quantity does not matter. (6) 
Identity Fusion 
Identity Fusion refers to a visceral feeling of connectedness between self and 
group. In this study is assessed by a pictorial instrument developed by William B. 
Swann et al. (2009). In this pictorial way the participants viewed a pictorial array with 
pairs of circles with different degrees of overlap. One circle represented the participant 
(me) and a larger circle represented ‘the group’ that was tagged with a flag or other 
identifying icon (see also Gómez et al., 2017).  
 
I adapted the Identity Fusion Scale for the Colombian Context:  
 
 
Source: (William B. Swann et al., 2009) 
Instructions  












2. Select the picture that best represents your relationship to the Army.  
 
   
3. Select the picture that best represents your relationship to your Military Unit. 
 
Victim by Guerrilla (A. Rettberg et al., 2008)  





Death threat  
Torture  
Forced Disappearance  
Physical injury  
None of the above  
Emotions  
The scale of negative emotions was based on the work of Halperin (2011). It is the same 






This study is focused on the low, middle and high-middle ranks of the Army. After 
clean the survey and keep the participants that fit with the requirement of the study, I 
regroup the ranges in five categories following the recommendation of one of my 
informants: A Coronel Veteran from the Army in Colombia.  
1. Professional Soldier or Private Professional Soldier (lowest rank in the Army)  
Regular soldiers that stay in the army after completing their 22 months' 
mandatory conscription service, making it a permanent career. 
2. Private First Class  
Soldiers who have gained recognition through their achievements and have 
special training. They have a certain degree of authority over regular soldiers. 
3. Sub-Officers or warrant officers (ranking below the commissioned officers and 
above the noncommissioned officers), this category includes: Third Corporal, 
Second Corporal, First Corporal, Second Sergeant, Sergeant First Class, First 
Sergeant, Sergeant Mayor, Command Sergeant Major.  
4. Sub-Alter Officers (is a junior commissioned officers) this category includes: 
Joint Command Sergeant Major, Second Lieutenant, Lieutenant, Captain.  






Appendix 19. Pair Correlation Experiment #2 
Table 1: Pair Correlation Self-Sacrifice Multi-Variable Logistical Regression Model  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Rank  1.000              
Spiritual 
Formidability  
0.162*** 1.000             
Physical 
Formidability  
0.122*** 0.379*** 1.000            
Democracy as 
Sacred Value  
-0.015 0.074** 0.023 1.000           
Identity Fusion 
Army  
0.012 0.119*** 0.163*** 0.119*** 1.000          
Identity Fusion 
Military Unit  
0.020 0.157*** 0.131*** 0.090** 0.578*** 1.000         
Identity Fusion 
Colombia  
-0.034 0.141*** 0.100*** 0.169*** 0.419*** 0.412*** 1.000        
Social Dominance 
Orientation  
0.032 -0.155*** -0.037 -0.016 -0.045 -0.040 -0.038 1.000       
Ideology  
(Left-Right) 
-0.031 0.057 0.090** 0.069* -0.032 -0.040 0.017 0.084** 1.000      



















0.071** 0.034 -0.038 0.007 -0.068* -0.033 0.005 0.022 0.030 0.206*** 1.000    
Negative Emotions  -0.231*** -0.087** -0.020 -0.067* -0.031 -0.025 -0.042 0.180*** 0.089** -0.023 0.046 1.000   
Left-Wing 
Treatment Variable  
-0.004 -0.010 0.020 0.026 0.007 0.046 0.045 0.044 -0.007 -0.020 0.068* 0.058 1.000  
Self-Sacrifice  -0.094*** -0.042 0.025 -0.003 0.101*** 0.081** 0.064* -0.031 -0.044 0.021 -0.068* -0.077** -0.040 1.000 
*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 




Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Rank  1.000              
Spiritual 
Formidability  
0.162*** 1.000             
Physical 
Formidability  
0.122*** 0.379*** 1.000            
Democracy as 
Sacred Value  
-0.015 0.074** 0.023 1.000           
Identity 
Fusion Army  
0.012 0.119*** 0.163*** 0.119*** 1.000          
Identity 
Fusion 
Military Unit  








0.032 -0.155*** -0.037 -0.016 -0.045 -0.040 -0.038 1.000       
Ideology  
(Left-Right) 
-0.031 0.057 0.090** 0.069* -0.032 -0.040 0.017 0.084** 1.000      
Combatant 
Exposure  
0.033 0.016 0.008 0.018 -0.019 0.005 -0.029 0.061* -0.057 1.000     
Victim by 
Guerrillas  























-0.004 -0.010 0.020 0.026 0.007 0.046 0.045 0.044 -0.007 -0.020 0.068* 0.058 1.000  
Self-Sacrifice 
Right-Wing 
Policy   




Table 3: Pair Correlation Self-Sacrifice Left-Wing Policy Multi-Variable Logistical Regression Model 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Rank  1.000              
Spiritual 
Formidability  
0.162*** 1.000             
Physical 
Formidability  
0.122*** 0.379*** 1.000            
Democracy as 
Sacred Value  
-0.015 0.074** 0.023 1.000           
Identity Fusion 
Army  
0.012 0.119*** 0.163*** 0.119*** 1.000          
Identity Fusion 
Military Unit  
0.020 0.157*** 0.131*** 0.090** 0.578*** 1.000         
Identity Fusion 
Colombia  
-0.034 0.141*** 0.100*** 0.169*** 0.419*** 0.412*** 1.000        
Social Dominance 
Orientation  
0.032 -0.155*** -0.037 -0.016 -0.045 -0.040 -0.038 1.000       
Ideology  
(Left-Right) 
-0.031 0.057 0.090** 0.069* -0.032 -0.040 0.017 0.084** 1.000      
Combatant 
Exposure  






0.071** 0.034 -0.038 0.007 -0.068* -0.033 0.005 0.022 0.030 0.206*** 1.000    
Negative 
Emotions  




-0.004 -0.010 0.020 0.026 0.007 0.046 0.045 0.044 -0.007 -0.020 0.068* 0.058 1.000  
Self-Sacrifice 
Left-Wing Policy   





Appendix 20. Qualitative Supplementary material  
Table 1: Ideology component: Emotional valence  
Ideology component  Frequency (N) 
Affective or emotional valence 
toward “left” or “right” labels 
10 
Total N: 28 Interviews 
Illustrative extracts  
Negative Emotions  
Participant #4. For me those political groups seek to camouflage it under different political 
ideals and labels [he is commenting that communist, socialist and leftist all represent the same 
political ideals] they are the same, for me they are all the same, a plague! [raises tone of voice] 
Plague! [laughter] Petro,110 he is the one who represents the left-wing; disgusting guerrillero. 
Participant # 5: I have nothing against left-wing people, but sometimes, the truth is, as I say, I 
am neutral, neither right-wing nor left-wing, but sometimes people on the right-wing they show 
more affection [toward the army] than people on the left. 
Table 2: Ideology component: Values and beliefs 
Ideology component Frequency (N) 
Values and Beliefs  15 
Total N: 28 Interviews  
Illustrative extracts 
Interviewer: Why do you think that people believe that the army is close to the right-wing? 
Participant 3: Well, it's always been that mindset we've had, right? As long as the right -wing 
has always been conceived as the savior, the left-wing has always caused problems and 
failures, yes? And not only because we have seen here in Colombia, in some other countries 
where the left-wing has always existed it has always brought ruin, has brought poverty, yes? 
 
110 Gustavo Petro is a left-wing Colombian politician, former rebel of the M-19 movement, 
senator and presidential candidate during the last presidential elections in 2018.  
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Interviewer: What are the sacred values that a soldier defends or makes it possible that soldiers 
sacrifice themselves? 
Participant #7. The family, the family as an indivisible cell, source of all principles and good 
customs, a more Catholic model of family. The Colombian soldier has a very special 
characteristic and is rooted in his elders, by his customs, by his traditions and above all by that 
great feeling that the word homeland means. 
Participant #4: They [the left] start selling an ideology from the very foundations, destroying 
education, destroying family and destroying religion. And if you see socialism, it's always 
going to attack those three principles that are what form morality, ethics, morality. 
Interviewer: Why do you think that people believe that the army is close to the right-wing?  
Participant #10. Because the institution, is an institution with Christian values, first point; 
second, the simple fact that the internal enemy of Colombia that caused pain to families, killed 
comrades and subaltern soldiers, was of communist origin. 
Table 3: Ideology component: Role of the state 
Ideology component Frequency (N) 
Role of the State  22 
Total N: 28 Interviews  
Examples 
Participant #3: Capitalism may be wild, it may have many problems, but people progress; If you 
do not work, you do not eat bread, the one who works is doing well, in the United States many 
people have worked their way up washing dishes, until one day they have more money than 
someone still washing dishes. 
Participant #2: People must be given opportunities, extended a hand, but not given things. That is 
the danger of the left, and you know that the left is not going anywhere. In which country has the 
left triumphed, in which country is the left functioning very well? In none, or am I wrong? No, it 
is not that we support more the right-wing than the left-wing but that the people who are in the 
FFMM are people who, 80% are very humble, very hard-working people, who have earned things 
by working. Fighting, right? So you do not agree that a degenerate bum arrives and they treat 
them in the same manner as a hard-working person who has earned things by working honestly, 
would you agree with that? 
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Table 4: Ideology component: Political symbolic 
Ideology Component Frequency (N) 
Political symbolic  23 
Total N: 28 Interviews  
Illustratative extracts 
Participant #4:  Álvaro Uribe Vélez represents the extreme right-wing. He is the character that 
balances things here. So the best way to attack his government, the eight years of government 
of the ex-president Álvaro Uribe Vélez was discrediting what was his right hand [the army]. 
Participant #2: In Venezuela there is a leftist military dictatorship. Left-wing, sustained, and 
led by the Cubans. Never in the history of civilization has a more miserable people been seen 
than the Cuban people and that's what happens. There [in Venezuela] Maduro does not rule, 
there is a group of commanders from Havana that led.  The military are part of the Cuban army 
and receive training in Cuba, they [the Venezuelan soldiers] lost their uniforms and they look 
like Cuban soldiers, so it is not bulshit. It is a risk for me that Colombia falls into that sophistry 
of the left dictatorship, it does seem to me a risk. 
Participant #10: From the FARC came out the visible, but the invisible? The underground 
communist party? Bolivarian and popular militancy? Agrarian unions? And everything they 
do. People forget that the FARC are a political-military organization, so the army came out, 
that is not what I am saying, their statute says so, the armed came out and let themselves be 
seen and delivered their weapons. But, where are those that are in the social organizations, the 
front organizations that serve them for social mobilization, for mass mobilization, for 
recruitment, for self-sufficiency, for the complaints that lives in the territories that they 





Appendix 21. Supplementary material for qualitative findings  
 Rivera-Páez (2019a) in his book, incorporated some anecdotes from his life 
experience as a soldier. In this particular anecdote, he suggested that the country's 
military institutions disclose their political-ideological preferences filtrating the 
politicians that they decided can or not participate in academic activities within the army. 
He believes that this is an obstacle to help the soldiers to develop critical thinking and 
political understanding of the country. Furthermore, he explains that the motivation 
behind those academic scenarios is vital for soldiers understanding that social conflict is 
normal in any society. Therefore, societies need to deal with the best ways to manage 
conflict, respect those who think differently, which will create an environment where 
violence is not necessary because dialogue it's possible as a tool to manage conflicts (p. 
191).  
 “The group (military institutions) closes contact with members of groups that 
have antagonistic ideas - political leaders - or different religious beliefs. An 
example of this is demonstrated in an event that took place in 2006 within the 
framework of the Seminars Chair of Naval Thought, at the Almirante Padilla 
Naval Cadet School. The director on duty, when developing the planning of the 
representatives of civil society that would participate in the seminar, 
contemplated the intervention of a leader recognized for his progressive or leftist 
positions. At the time of socializing this with the Army Command, he received a 
veto on this participation, arguing that they could be detrimental to the formation 
of naval cadets, by generating confusion or opposition with the security policy 
that was established by the Government of that time. With an adviser to the United 
States Army who participated in the process of restructuring the academic 
programs of the training schools at that time, and who was knowledgeable about 
the subject, we discussed the unfortunate nature of that event by encouraging an 
ideological bias and reduce the cadet's ability to develop critical thinking, which 




Appendix 22. Supplementary material Ideology´s cognitive 
mechanisms 
Ideology´s cognitive mechanisms Total Frequency (N) 
 Adoption Commitment  
14 10  
Internalization 24 
Conformity  Instrumentalization   
20 6  
Structural  26 
  Total N: 28 Interviews  
Table 1: Ideology´s cognitive mechanisms 
 
Adoption  
Participant #15: Well, these governments of the court of Iván Duque, of Santos, of 
Uribe, those governments prioritize investment, they prioritize investment, they take 
care of businessmen, there are soldiers taking care of pipelines, but not towns, there 
are soldiers taking care of antennas, but no border So they don't prioritize the 
population (...) Their priority is to capitalize the country (...) but these people sold the 
country, they are not interested in the town, they sold it for mining, they sold the 
rancherías river, rivers were sold for mining, coal concessions were expanded, so we 
are talking that for none of the presidents that I have seen the population pass has been 
the priority, it is not, because they come from a capitalist system that produces money 
for their families, the country in recent years has been governed by families, it has been 
8 years governed by Uribe, 8 years by Juan Manuel and they come from the same (...) 
power is centralized and what interests them is that they produce (...) but they are not 
interested in the people (...) so there really is no interest in the people, there is not. That 
this generates disagreements and that perhaps that is a source of what happens and 
maintains the guerrillas may be, but perhaps it is not the way, perhaps there should be 
a very powerful right-wing leader, there really should be someone who with speech 





Participant #7: Latin America was influenced for a few years by what was called the 
socialisms of the 21st century or the third way, this deeply rooted trend with Juan 
Manuel Santos and his best friend Tony Blair imported and affected the São Paulo 
forum because many nations, we saw Argentina, we saw Chile, we saw Paraguay, we 
saw Uruguay, we saw Brazil, we saw Ecuador, we saw Peru, we saw Venezuela, we 
saw Nicaragua, socially and economically exhausted by those regimes that all they did 
was practice a false populism until the resources ran out, when the resources ran out 
their failure was felt; and right now these nations are being rebuilt, Colombia has 
managed to survive because we still have that traditional feeling of our customs that 
has prevented us from reaching the edge of that abyss.  
 
Conformity   
Interviewer: Why people think that the Army is right-wing? 
Participant 23: Yes, of course; What happens is the left-wing is the opposition of the 
government, that's why when the president takes out a project or something of them 
they are the ones who try not to support it so that it is approved. That’s why the whole 
army goes more to the right-wing because it is more in favor of the government 
 
Instrumentalization  
Participant 8 talking about the military view of the political reintegration of the rebels.  
Participant 8: Yes, let's say in the military field you have an objective that is to end the 
rival threat and in many of the operations and in all these years we have focused on 
just war, war, war, but every military person must also have that saber complement 
think things out and although many times we are told that, for example, we cannot 
comment on politics but if we have thought and internally we can have our point of 
view and our positions, and my point of view many times the military of what is He 
has spoken, I for example with many colleagues, that is complicated because, from 
that point of view, they are people who have done a lot of harm to the country, but in 
one way or another and seeing the current environment and how all this is happening, 
that they are no longer part of the conflict and that we have to take care of them at 
many times and places here in Colombia, because it is very complicated if you are only 
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Vergara Garzón, J. C., Gelvez, J. D., & Aparicio Silva, Á. M. (2019). Los costos humanos 
de la erradicación forzada ¿es el glifosato la solución? . Retrieved from 
http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/1734 
Viki, G., Osgood, D., & Phillips, S. (2013). Dehumanization and self-reported proclivity 
to torture prisoners of war. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49(3), 
325. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2012.11.006 
Villamizar, D. (2017). Las guerrillas en Colombia: una historia desde los orígenes hasta 
los confines. Bogotá: Debate.  
Villegas Posada, C., Flórez, J., & Espinel, N. (2018). Moral disengagement mechanisms 
and armed violence. A comparative study of paramilitaries and guerrillas in 
Colombia. Revista Colombiana de Psicología, 27(1), 55-69.  
Vlassenroot, K. (2020). Can collaborative research project reverse external narratives 
of violence and conflict? Retrieved from 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2020/05/08/collaborative-research-methods-
projects-reverse-external-narratives-violence-conflict-drc/ 
Volckhausen, T. (2018). How Colombia became Latin American’s palm oil powerhouse 
Retrieved from  
Volkan, V. (1999). Post-traumatic states: beyond individual post-traumatic stress 
disorder in societies ravaged by ethnic conflict. Canadian Foreign Policy, 7(1), 
27-38.  
Volkan, V. (2009). Large-group identity: Us and them; polarizations in the international 
arena.(Special Issue: US vs Them). Psychoanalysis, Culture &amp; Society, 
14(1), 4.  
Wahl, R. (2013). Policing, Values, and Violence: Human Rights Education with Law 
Enforcers in India. In Human Rights Education and Training: Taking Stock of 
Theory and Practice. 
 
 478 
Wahl, R. (2016). Learning World Culture or Changing It? Human Rights Education and 
the Police in India. Comparative Education Review, 60(2), 293-310. 
doi:10.1086/685581 
Walker, L. J., & Hennig, K. H. (2004). Differing Conceptions of Moral Exemplarity: 
Just, Brave, and Caring. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86(4), 
629-647. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.86.4.629 
Weinstein, J. M. (2007). Inside rebellion : the politics of insurgent violence. Cambridge 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Weiskopf, J., Gaviria, A., & Mejia, D. (2017). Anti-drug Policies in Colombia: 
Successes, Failures, and Wrong Turns: Vanderbilt University Press. 
Wibben, A. T. R. (2019). Everyday Security, Feminism, and the Continuum of Violence. 
Journal of Global Security Studies, 5(1), 115. doi:10.1093/jogss/ogz056 
Wilén, N. (2015). From Foe to Friend? army integration after war in Burundi, Rwanda 
and the Congo. International Peacekeeping, 1-28. 
doi:10.1080/13533312.2015.1103187 
Williams, T. (2019). NGO Interventions in the Post-conflict Memoryscape. The Effect 
of Competing 'Mnemonic Role Attributions' on Reconciliation in Cambodia. 
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 13(2), 158-179. 
doi:10.1080/17502977.2018.1558775 
Wills, M. E. (2014). Los Tres nudos de la guerra colombiana: Un campesinado sin 
representación política, una polarización social en el marco de una 
institutionalidad fragmentada, y unas articulaciones perversas entre regiones y 
centro. 
Wills, M. E. (2020). La Comisión de Esclarecimiento de la Verdad en el ojo del huracán. 
Razón Pública. 
Wills, M. E., Ortiz-Ayala, A., & Machado, J. (2017). Conversaciones inéditas entre la 
Fuerza Pública y el Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica: Aprendizajes de una 





Wohl, M. J. A., & Branscombe, N. R. (2005). Forgiveness and Collective Guilt 
Assignment to Historical Perpetrator Groups Depend on Level of Social Category 
Inclusiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88(2), 288-303. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.88.2.288 
Wohl, M. J. A., Matheson, K., Branscombe, N. R., & Anisman, H. (2013). Victim and 
Perpetrator Groups' Responses to the C anadian Government's Apology for the 
Head Tax on C hinese Immigrants and the Moderating Influence of Collective 
Guilt. Political Psychology, 34(5), 713-729. doi:10.1111/pops.12017 
Wola.org. (2020). Colombian Authorities Must Seek Justice for Brutal Massacre of 5 
Afro-Colombian Teenagers [Press release]. Retrieved from 
https://www.wola.org/2020/08/colombia-must-seek-justice-massacre-5-afro-
colombian-teenagers/ 
Wolf, G. (2007). Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations/The 
School of the Americas. Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas. 
Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe(82), 151-153.  
Wolfendale, J. (2007). Military Obedience: Rhetoric and Reality. In I. Primoratz (Ed.), 
Politics and Morality (pp. 228-246). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
 
 479 
Wood, E. (2010). Sexual Violence during War: Variation and Accountability. In A. 
Smeulers & E. v. Sliedregt (Eds.), Collective Crimes and International Criminal 
Justice: an Interdisciplinary Approach. Antwerp: Intersentia. 
Wood, E. J. (2003). Insurgent collective action and civil war in El Salvador. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Wood, E. J. (2008). The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of 
Social Networks. Annual Review of Political Science, 11(1), 539-561. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104832 
Wood, E. J. (2009). Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare? 
Politics & Society, 37(1), 131-161. doi:10.1177/0032329208329755 
Wood, R. M., & Thomas, J. L. (2017). Women on the frontline: Rebel group ideology 
and women’s participation in violent rebellion. Journal of Peace Research, 54(1), 
31-46. doi:10.1177/0022343316675025 
Wright, K. B. (2019). Web-Based Survey Methodology. In P. Liamputtong (Ed.), 
Handbook of Research Methods in Health Social Sciences (pp. 1339-1352). 
Singapore: Springer Singapore. 
Yzerbyt, V., Castano, E., Leyens, J.-P., & Paladino, M.-P. (2000). The Primacy of the 
Ingroup: The Interplay of Entitativity and Identification. European Review of 
Social Psychology: European Review of Social Psychology, 11(1), 257-295. 
doi:10.1080/14792772043000059 
Zaller, J. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge [England] 
New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. 
Zaum, D., & Cheng, C. (2011). Corruption and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding : Selling the 
Peace? Florence, UNITED STATES: Routledge. 
Zechmeister, E. (2006). What’s left and who’s right? A Q-method study of individual 
and contextual influences on the meaning of ideological labels. Political 
Behavior, 28(2), 151-173.  
Zechmeister, E., & Corral, M. (2010). The Varying Economic Meaning of ‘Left’and 
‘Right’in Latin America. AmericasBarometer Insights Series, 38, 1-10.  
Zechmeister, E., & Corral, M. (2013). Individual and contextual constraints on 
ideological labels in Latin America. Comparative Political Studies, 46(6), 675-
701.  
Zelik, R., & Castro, N. (2015). Paramilitarismo : violencia y transformación social, 
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